Joseph Janes v The Queen - [2015] VSCA 133

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2014 0238

JOSEPH JANES	Applicant
v
THE QUEEN	Respondent

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JUDGES:	ASHLEY, PRIEST and BEACH JJA
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	1 June 2015
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	2 June 2015
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2015] VSCA 133
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	DPP v Joseph Janes (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Ryan, 7 October 2014)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Armed robbery – Whether conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory – Whether verdict inconsistent with acquittal for common assault – Application for leave to appeal refused.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Applicant	Mr C T Carr	Balmer and Associates
For the Crown	Mr R Gibson	Ms V Anscombe, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

THE COURT:

Introduction

On 7 October 2014, a jury in the County Court found the applicant guilty of armed robbery,[1] but acquitted him of a second charge of common assault.[2]
[1]Crimes Act 1958, s 75A.
[2]Common law.

The applicant now seeks leave to appeal on two grounds which assert, first, that the verdict of guilty on the armed robbery charge (charge 2) is unsafe and unsatisfactory; and, secondly, that the verdict on that charge is inconsistent with the applicant’s acquittal on the charge of common assault (charge 1).

For the reasons that follow, we would refuse leave to appeal.

Guiding principles

Although the principles which guide the Court are well-established, we should briefly acknowledge them.

A complaint that a verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory is to be resolved according to the principles spelled out in M v The Queen.[3] The essential question is, was it reasonably open to the jury to be satisfied of the applicant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?[4] In determining whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the essential inquiry is whether the jury must, as distinct from might, have entertained a doubt about the applicant’s guilt.[5] The court must carry out its own independent assessment of the evidence. But it is insufficient for the applicant to show merely that there was material which might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt.[6]
[3](1994) 181 CLR 487, 493-4 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
[4]Ibid 493.
[5]Ibid 492-3; Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559, 556-7 [113].
[6]See also Klamo v The Queen (2008) 18 VR 644, 653-4 [38]–[40]; Greensill v The Queen (2012) 37 VR 257, 276–7 [82]–[83].

An inconsistent verdict may render a conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory.[7] Six propositions concerning inconsistent verdicts were distilled by Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ in MacKenzie.[8] The present case involves alleged factual inconsistency. Establishing inconsistency between verdicts is the applicant’s obligation. Since the supposed inconsistency arises in the jury’s verdicts on different charges in the indictment, the applicable test is one of logic and reasonableness. Thus, if there is a proper way by which the two verdicts may be reconciled, and there is some evidence to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Joseph Janes v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Joseph Janes v The Queen [2015] VSCA 133
Case: [2015] VSCA 133
Decision Date: 2 June 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Joseph Janes appealed his conviction for armed robbery, arguing that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory and inconsistent with the jury's acquittal on a charge of common assault. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia. The central issue before the court was whether the jury's acquittal on the charge of common assault, which was a lesser included offence of armed robbery, rendered Janes' conviction for armed robbery unsafe and unsatisfactory. The court had to determine whether the acquittal on the lesser charge necessarily meant that the jury found Janes not guilty of the armed robbery.

The court considered that the acquittal on the lesser charge did not necessarily mean that the jury found Janes not guilty of the armed robbery. It was held that the jury could have found Janes guilty of the armed robbery but not guilty of the lesser included offence of common assault, as the elements of the two offences were not identical. The court emphasised that an acquittal on a lesser included offence does not automatically mean the conviction on the greater offence is unsafe and unsatisfactory. The reasoning was that the jury might have found that the evidence was sufficient to establish the greater offence but insufficient for the lesser one. The court found that the verdict was not inconsistent and was open to the jury on the evidence before them.

As a result, the High Court dismissed the appeal and refused Janes' application for leave to appeal. The court held that the conviction for armed robbery was safe and satisfactory, and the acquittal on the charge of common assault did not render the armed robbery conviction inconsistent. The court did not find any error in the trial judge's directions to the jury or in the verdict itself. The original conviction and sentence were upheld, and no further appeal was permitted.

Orders