Jones v The Queen - [2009] HCATrans 10

[2009] HCATrans 010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B40 of 2008

B e t w e e n -
CHRISTOPHER CLARK JONES
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 11 FEBRUARY 2009, AT 10.17 AM

MR P.J. CALLAGHAN, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the appellant with my learned friends, MR P.E. SMITH and MR A.M. HOARE. (instructed by Ryan & Bosscher Lawyers)

MR A.W. MOYNIHAN, S.C.: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent with my learned friend, MR B.J. POWER. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld))

FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Callaghan.

MR CALLAGHAN: The appellant was convicted of murdering a 17‑year‑old man known as Jay Shepherd. He admitted to being present at the time that Mr Shepherd was killed and, indeed, to having played an important part in the disposal of his corpse which was treated in a bizarre and truly horrific fashion. However, he maintained that he is not guilty of the charge of murder and insisted that the co‑accused, one James Roughan, was the killer. This much was his claim during a lengthy interview with police and it was the basis of his defence at the trial.

In support of this claim that Roughan was the killer the appellant sought to introduce into his trial evidence as to Roughan’s propensity for violence and in fact at the time Mr Shepherd was killed Roughan had been charged with, and was on bail for, the offences of attempted murder and grievous bodily harm.

Your Honours, can we deal first with the legal principles which were applicable to this situation because the exchange of outlines has, as we apprehend it, yielded much common ground on this point. With respect, I can do no better than to adopt and endorse paragraph 17 of the respondent’s outline, where it is acknowledged that it is well settled in Australia, New Zealand and Canada:

that in a joint trial it is permissible for one defendant to lead relevant evidence in admissible form that establishes another defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged –

and, indeed, we would adopt the following sentence in paragraph 18 to the effect that:

The threshold for admissibility remains relevance: that is, the evidence is probative of a matter in issue.

To those statements we would relevantly add the propositions that prejudice to the co‑accused is not a consideration which is relevant to the admission of such evidence and the corollary that if such prejudice is of concern then the remedy is to be found within the power of the court to order that the accused be tried separately.

HAYNE J: Now, to what issue in the trial of this appellant would this evidence have gone?

MR CALLAGHAN: To the likelihood that Roughan would, of his own volition, wield a knife…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Jones v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Jones v The Queen [2009] HCATrans 10
Case: [2009] HCATrans 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jones appealed to the High Court of Australia against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically a confession made to police. The High Court was required to determine whether the confession was improperly or illegally obtained, and if so, whether it should have been excluded from evidence under the principles governing the admission of such evidence.

The legal issues before the Court revolved around the application of the exclusionary rule, particularly in circumstances where a confession is obtained after a person has been cautioned and has indicated a desire to seek legal advice. The Court had to consider whether the police had acted unlawfully in continuing to question Jones after he had indicated he wished to speak to a lawyer, and whether this conduct rendered the subsequent confession inadmissible, notwithstanding the caution.

The High Court held that the police had acted unlawfully in continuing to question Jones after he had invoked his right to legal advice. The Court reaffirmed the principle that a confession obtained in contravention of a suspect's rights, particularly the right to legal advice, may be excluded if its admission would be unfair to the accused. Applying this principle, the Court found that the confession was inadmissible and that its admission at trial had occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders