Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      JOHNSTON v AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LTD & ORS [2006]  NSWCA 218

FILE NUMBER(S):
40046/05

HEARING DATE(S):               2 June 2006

DECISION DATE:     07/08/2006

PARTIES:
Daryl Lindsay Johnston - Appellant
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd - First Respondent
John Edward Star - Second Respondent
Stuart Karim Ariff - Third Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Giles JA Santow JA Basten JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          SC 20553/00

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Hoeben J

COUNSEL:
Mr W. Washington/Ms M. Coroneos - Appellant
Mr J W J Stevenson SC/Mr C D Wood - First Respondent
Mr A Leopold/Mr R K McPherson - Second and Third Respondents

SOLICITORS:
J. P. Leong & Co - Appellant
Minter Ellison - First Respondent
Ebsworth & Ebsworth - Second and Third Respondents

CATCHWORDS:
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION – pleadings – elements of the tort – who is the prosecutor – what is the required belief of the prosecutor – whether defects in pleading incapable of correction – “rolled up” pleadings

LEGISLATION CITED:
Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW), s4
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), s57

DECISION:
(1)  Appeal allowed
(2)  Order of primary judge dismissing the proceedings be set aside
(3)  Orders of the primary judge with respect to the costs of the application before him be set aside
(4)  In lieu thereof
(a)  grant leave to the Appellant to file a further amended statement of claim in the form in which it was provided to this Court with amendment of clauses 40 and 41 to comply with these reasons
(b)  there be no order of the costs of the proceedings before the primary judge
(c)  the Respondents pay the Appellant’s costs of the proceedings in this Court
(5)  The Respondents have a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if otherwise so entitled

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40046/2005
SC 20553/2000

GILES JA
SANTOW JA
BASTEN JA

7 August 2006

JOHNSTON v AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LTD & ORS

The Appellant, Mr Johnston seeks to bring proceedings against the Respondents for malicious prosecution concerning two charges under the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW). The charges were dismissed in 1998.
The Respondents have been successful in having several statements of claim previously struck out.  On the most recent occasion, the judge struck out a second further amended statement of claim and dismissed the action as the pleadings showed no reasonable cause of action and the defect is of such a kind as to be incapable of correction by further pleading.  Mr Johnston appealed.
The issues for determination in the Court of Appeal were:

  1. what are the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution;

  2. whether his Honour erred in concluding that the defect in the pleading then before him was of such a kind as to be incapable of correction by further pleading;

  3. whether this Court, in the exercise of its discretion, should grant the Appellant…

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Details
Case
[2006] NSWCA 218
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in *Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd* concerned a claim for malicious prosecution brought by the appellant against the respondent bank. The primary judge had dismissed the proceedings, finding that there were two essential defects in the appellant's pleading that were incapable of correction. The appellant sought to have this dismissal set aside.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge erred in holding that the appellant's pleading failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the bank was the "prosecutor" for the purposes of the tort of malicious prosecution, and whether the pleading sufficiently alleged the absence of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the acts of a receiver and manager, or his employer, could be attributed to the bank, and whether the bank's solicitor's letter could be seen as instigating the prosecution, thereby overcoming the finding of an independent exercise of discretion by the police.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the primary judge's conclusion that the appellant could not, as a matter of law, assert a tenable cause of action was wrong. The court reasoned that the proposed amended pleading alleged facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that the decision to lay the charge was based on the solicitor's letter, thus potentially establishing the bank as the instigator of the prosecution. The court also considered the issue of reasonable and probable cause, noting that while the primary judge inclined to the view that the magistrate's decision to dismiss the charge might have been in error, the critical question was whether there was a properly arguable question of law to be decided, which the court found there was.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the appeal be allowed, the primary judge's order dismissing the proceedings and his costs orders be set aside. Leave was granted to the appellant to file a further amended statement of claim, with specific amendments to clauses 40 and 41. There was to be no order as to the costs of the proceedings before the primary judge, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, with a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW) available to the respondent if otherwise entitled.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Appeal allowed; (2) Order of primary judge dismissing the proceedings be set aside; (3) Orders of the primary judge with respect to the costs of the application before him be set aside; (4) In lieu thereof; (a) grant leave to the Appellant to file a further amended statement of claim in the form in which it was provided to this Court with amendment of clauses 40 and 41 to comply with these reasons; (b) there be no order of the costs of the proceedings before the primary judge; (c) the Respondents pay the Appellant's costs of the proceedings in this Court; (5) The Respondents have a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if otherwise so entitled

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On one approach, Mr Ariff’s acts may be treated as those of Mr Star, being undertaken in the course of his employment by Mr Star. However, it does not follow that he may nor bear personal liability for his own actions. Accordingly, I would not be satisfied that the pleading demonstrates no arguable basis of claim against Mr Ariff.Judgment of primary judge As noted above, the Appellant concedes for the purposes of this appeal that there were defects in the pleading before the primary judge. No purpose is served by revisiting his Honour’s criticisms of the pleading before him, except to the extent that he held that particular defects could not be remedied. As noted above, the primary judge dismissed the proceedings because there were two essential defects which were incapable of correction: at [78]. These were identified by the Bank as:(a) the Bank was not the “prosecutor”, and(b) there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. In relation to the first matter, the primary judge appears to have accepted, at [45], a submission made on behalf of the Bank that the assertions in the pleading before his Honour “do not and could not as a matter of law establish that the first defendant [the Bank] had instigated the prosecution”. At least in part that was because matters relied upon involved things done by the receiver and manager, or his employer or caretakers. In the absence of a pleading of material facts which could establish agency, those acts, his Honour held, could not be the acts of the Bank. On a somewhat different basis, at [49] his Honour concluded that relevant entries in the police records indicated how the decision to prosecute had been made. His Honour concluded:“It is difficulty to imagine a clearer or more explicit instance of an independent exercise of discretion by a police officer.” Perhaps because steps had been taken to allege facts from which agency could be inferred, in the proposed pleading, the approach adopted by the Bank on the appeal was to treat the critical fact as the letter sent on 5 November 1996 by the Bank’s solicitor. No issue of agency was raised in that respect. Rather, the Bank relied upon the proposition that his Honour had been correct in concluding that, on the basis of the facts alleged, the Bank could not in law be treated as a party responsible for putting the criminal process in train, because there had been an independent exercise of discretion by Constable Hawes in laying the relevant charge. However, for reasons set out above, the proposed pleading alleges facts from which it might reasonably be inferred that the decision to lay the charge was, in the manner described, based on the solicitor’s letter. If that analysis is correct, his Honour’s conclusion that the Appellant could not, as a matter of law, reasonably assert a tenable cause of action is shown to be wrong. The second matter relied upon by the Bank in support of the conclusion that the proceedings should be dismissed concerned the absence of reasonable and probable cause. The primary judge dealt with this issue by reference to the submissions made for the receiver and Mr Ariff. In putting his contentions that the pleading then before the Court did not establish any basis for reaching such a conclusion, counsel challenged the actual finding of the magistrate in dismissing the charge, arguing that the Appellant in fact had no lawful excuse to be on the property. His Honour stated at [71]:“Although I incline to the view that the learned magistrate was in error in his decision (it should be noted that he was not referred to any of the relevant cases) it is not necessary for the purposes of the argument to determine whether or not the learned magistrate was correct, but rather whether there was a properly arguable question of law to be decided. There clearly was.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established