John Holland Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   JOHN HOLLAND PTY LTD -v- THE CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION & ORS [2005] WASC 146

CORAM:   LE MIERE J

HEARD:   10 JUNE 2005

DELIVERED          :   1 JULY 2005

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1441 of 2005

BETWEEN:   JOHN HOLLAND PTY LTD (ABN 11 004 282 268)

Plaintiff

AND

THE CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
First Defendant

THE CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION OF WORKERS
Second Defendant

JOSEPH MCDONALD
Third Defendant

MICHAEL BUCHAN
Fourth Defendant

MICHAEL POWELL
Fifth Defendant

Catchwords:

Injunctions - Interlocutory injunctions - Industrial dispute - Whether serious question to be tried - Tort of interference with contracts - Tort of interference with trade or business by unlawful means - Whether industrial action was protected - Whether s 166A of Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) bars plaintiff's claim for relief - Proceedings commenced without obtaining s 166A(6) certificate - Serious question to be tried that an application for an injunction to restrain the future commission of tortious acts is not "an action in tort" within the meaning of s 166A - Balance of convenience favours plaintiff - Whether sufficient case for quia timet injunctions is made out - Justice best served by grant of interlocutory injunctions restraining threatened unlawful interference with plaintiff's rights.  Whether court should refrain from hearing the matter because another tribunal is seized of the dispute - The fact that an industrial tribunal is seized of a dispute between the parties is not a reason to refuse relief to a party that has made out a case that it is otherwise entitled to relief - Interlocutory injunctions granted

Legislation:

Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s 127, s 166A, s 170LJ, s 170MI, s 170MO, s 170MT(2), s 170MW

Result:

Interlocutory injunctions granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr M H Zilko SC & Mr J B Blackburn

First Defendant             :     Mr H Borenstein SC & Mr T J Dixon

Second Defendant         :     Mr H Borenstein SC & Mr T J Dixon

Third Defendant           :     Mr H Borenstein SC & Mr T J Dixon

Fourth Defendant          :     Mr H Borenstein SC & Mr T J Dixon

Fifth Defendant            :     Mr H Borenstein SC & Mr T J Dixon

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Clayton Utz

First Defendant             :     Slater & Gordon

Second Defendant         :     Slater & Gordon

Third Defendant           :     Slater & Gordon

Fourth Defendant          :     Slater & Gordon

Fifth Defendant            :     Slater & Gordon

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

ABB Australia Pty Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2002] FCA 1070

Australian Die Castings Pty Ltd v AMWU [2002] VSC 328

CGM Investments Pty Ltd v Chelliah (No 2) [2003] FCA 305

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mirvac Constructions Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 341; 171 ALR 279

Fletcher v Bealey (1885) 25 Ch D 688

Harry M Miller Attractions v Actors & Announcers Equity Association (1970) 1 NSWR 614

Hazelwood…

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Details
Case
[2005] WASC 146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of John Holland Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, the plaintiff sought interlocutory injunctions to restrain the defendants from engaging in industrial action that the plaintiff alleged would constitute tortious interference with contracts and interference with trade or business by unlawful means. The defendants contended that the plaintiff's claims were barred by section 166A of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) because the plaintiff had not obtained a certificate from the Australian Industrial Relations Commission before commencing proceedings. The court was required to determine whether the plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of section 166A and whether there was a serious question to be tried on that issue. The court was also required to consider whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of interlocutory injunctions and whether the court should refrain from hearing the matter because another tribunal was seized of the dispute.

The court held that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the future commission of tortious acts was an "action in tort" within the meaning of section 166A(1). The court referred to previous decisions that had taken different approaches to this issue and held that it was open to conclude that section 166A(1) would have work to do even if it was restricted to an action in tort strictly so called. The court held that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of interlocutory injunctions because the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the industrial action proceeded without restraint. The court also held that the fact that an industrial tribunal was seized of a dispute between the parties was not a reason to refuse relief to a party that had made out a case that it was otherwise entitled to relief.

The court granted interlocutory injunctions restraining the defendants from engaging in the threatened unlawful interference with the plaintiff's rights. The court held that justice was best served by granting the injunctions because the plaintiff had made out a sufficient case for quia timet injunctions and the defendants had not established that they had a bona fide dispute with the plaintiff that was protected by section 166A. The court also held that it was not appropriate to refrain from hearing the matter because the interlocutory injunctions were not an alternative to the industrial tribunal's resolution of the dispute but rather a means of preserving the plaintiff's rights pending the tribunal's determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 82 IR 87, the defendant submitted that the Supreme Court of Western Australia was without jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction because the plaintiff's action was barred by s 166A. The plaintiff contended that s 166A(1) has no application because the writ was not relevantly solely for an action in tort within the meaning of the subsection. The plaintiff submitted that its claim was a suit in equity and therefore was to be distinguished from an action in tort as the latter is solely and exclusively a creature of the common law. Parker J held at 90:"The question may well be alive in these proceedings in due course. As things presently stand, however, there is authority for the plaintiff's proposition and that authority is in line with well‑known understandings in the law. It is the view I should take of the provision for the purposes of this interlocutory application. On this view alone s 166A(1) is no impediment to a grant of interlocutory relief to the plaintiffs." In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mirvac Constructions Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 341; 171 ALR 279, Ryan J held that there was a serious question to be tried whether an action for a quia timet injunction is an action in tort within the meaning of s 166A so that the issue by the Commission of a certificate under that section is a prerequisite to the institution of proceedings. A different approach was taken by Goldberg J in Keppel Prince Engineering Pty Ltd v Automotive Full Engineering Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2001] FCA 1637; 109 IR 436. At [34] Goldberg J said:"Even if there had been conduct warranting the grant of an interlocutory injunction in relation to the continuation or commission of a tort, I do not consider that such an action is available without a certificate from the Commission under s 166A of the Act unless the conduct comes within subsection (2). Although there have been some decisions of other courts in which this issue has been raised, namely that an application for injunctive relief by way of exercise of equitable jurisdiction does not fall within s 166A of the Act, I do not consider that those cases set out a sufficient basis upon which I should conclude at the present time that there is a serious question to be tried on this issue." In ABB Australia Pty Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2002] FCA 1070, Weinberg J held that there was not a serious question to be tried in relation to the applicants' claims brought for injunctive relief arising out of a claim in tort because he agreed with the reasoning of Goldberg J in Keppel. In Australian Die Castings Pty Ltd v AMWU [2002] VSC 328, Nettle J heard an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain picketing by the defendants at the plaintiff's plants. Counsel for the defendants, Mr Friend, submitted that the proceeding was incompetent because the bringing of the proceeding was barred by s 166A until such time as a certificate had been issued. He submitted that the expression "action in tort" which is used in s 166A(1) should be understood as including not only actions for damages and specific relief in tort but also proceedings for equitable remedies which might be granted in equity or in the auxiliary jurisdiction in aid of legal rights. He submitted that if s 166A were not construed in that fashion the result would be effectively to emasculate the provision. He contended that because an action in tort for damages could not on any view be prosecuted to judgment in the 72 hours which may elapse under s 166A(6) it must have been in the contemplation of the legislators when they used the expression "action in tort" that it would cover not only an action for damages but also proceedings for other remedies which conceivably could be obtained within the 72 hours. In his submission, s 166A should be seen as informed by an intent to leave industrial disputes to be dealt with under the Workplace Relations Act during the 72 hour period, unaffected by approaches which either party might otherwise wish to make to a court of law or equity. Alternatively, he submitted that even if the words "action in tort" are properly to be confined to an action in tort strictly so called, the effect of s 166A(1) is still to preclude the grant of an injunction to restrain activity until the 72 hours has expired: because, he submitted, equity will not act in aid of legal rights if the legal rights are either barred or unenforceable, whether by reason of statute or otherwise. Nettle J concluded at [14]and [15]:" … I must say for my own part that I regard Mr Friend's submission as persuasive. A court of equity will not ordinarily lend its aid in support of legal rights if those legal rights cannot, by reason of statutory prohibition, be enforced at law: Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 76 ALJR 1 at [16] and [86].That said, however, because of the decisions to which I have already referred, and because I think it is open to conclude that s 166A(1) would have work to do even if it is restricted to an action in tort strictly so called, I consider that there is at least a serious question to be tried as to whether this action or its commencement was prohibited by s 166A(1)."