John Favaro John Housden v Michael Spiby

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS



Re:Opposition by John Favaro & John Housden to registration of trade mark application 1659034(41) - BADLOVES - filed in the name of Michael Spiby.

Delegate: Iain Campbell Thompson
Representation: Opponent: Bird & Bird – written submissions by Edward Muston, SC.
Applicant: Self represented – written submissions
Decision: 2016 ATMO 122
Trade Marks Act 1995
s52 opposition to registration - s58 contention that Applicant is not owner of the Trade Mark - evidence establishes that the Trade Mark is owned by the individuals or partnership that constituted the Group.
Opposition to registration established.

Background

  1. In these proceedings under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’) Michael Spiby (‘the Applicant’) has applied to register the trade mark which appears below:

Application No:         1659034
Priority Date:             19 November 2014
Services:  Class 41: Live band performances
Trade Mark:               BADLOVES

(‘the Trade Mark’)

  1. The Trade Mark was examined as mandated by section 31 of the Act and subsequently advertised as accepted for possible registration in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 16 April 2015.

  2. On 15 May 2015, John Favaro & John Housden (‘the Opponents’) filed Notice of Intention to Oppose the registration of the Trade Mark, followed, on 12 June 2015, by a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘the SGP’). The SGP details grounds under sections 58, 60 and 42 of the Act.

  3. On 5 August 2015, the Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend.

  4. Since then, the parties have filed Evidence in Support, Evidence in Answer, and Evidence in Reply as is further discussed below.

  5. On 3 August 2016, the Applicant filed additional information which he wishes the Registrar to consider under the provisions of regulation 21.19 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995 (‘the Regulations’).  I do not consider that it is appropriate that the Registrar consider this information for the reasons discussed under the heading Information, below.

  6. Both the Applicant and the Opponents have been advised of their right to be heard or to make written submissions.  Neither party has requested to be heard; both parties have filed written submissions.

  7. In order that the Registrar may discharge her obligation under section 55 of the Act to decide this matter, it has been allocated to me, one of her delegates, for my decision on the written record which is comprised of those materials mentioned within paragraphs [1] to [7], above.

Onus

  1. The Opponent bears the onus of establishing one or more grounds of opposition on the balance of probabilities.[1]

  2. The relevant date at which the grounds under section 52 of the Act must be considered is the filing date of the opposed application[2].

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Details
Case
[2016] ATMO 122
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application to register a trade mark, opposed by John Favaro and John Housden (the Opponents) against Michael Spiby (the Applicant). The dispute centred on the ownership and potential abandonment of the trade mark "The Badloves". The decision was made by the Registrar.

The primary legal issue before the Registrar was whether the Applicant was the owner of the trade mark at the relevant date, which was intrinsically linked to the question of whether the Opponents had abandoned the trade mark. The Registrar was required to determine if the grounds for opposition, specifically abandonment, had been established.

The Registrar's reasoning was informed by established principles regarding trade mark abandonment. Drawing on authorities such as *King Par, LLC v Brosnan Golf Pty Ltd* and *Settef SpA v RivOland Marble Co (Vic) Pty Ltd*, the Registrar noted that abandonment requires more than mere non-use; there must be an intention to abandon. The Registrar observed that Mr O’Prey, an original member of the group associated with the trade mark, was prevented from claiming joint ownership due to a Deed of Termination and Release. Conversely, this deed suggested that the remaining signatories, including Mr Spiby, Mr Housden, Mr Tabone, and Mr Featherstone, retained an entitlement. The Registrar inferred that Mr Favaro, as Mr O’Prey’s replacement, also held an entitlement. The departures of Messrs Tabone and Featherstone were noted but their impact on the ownership question was unclear. Ultimately, the Registrar found that the grounds for opposition, including abandonment, had been established.

The Registrar refused to register the trade mark. As the Applicant was the unsuccessful party, the Registrar ordered that costs be awarded against the Applicant at the Official Scale.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Concerning abandonment of a trade mark, in King Par, LLC v Brosnan Golf Pty Ltd[19] Greenwood J said:Abandonment is not to be inferred merely from non-use: Shanahan, 5th Ed, [10.1510] at p 75, and the authorities noted at fn 77. On the other hand, a mere intention not to abandon is not enough: Shanahan, 5th Ed, [10.1510] at p 75, fn 76, and the authorities cited at fn 76. In Settef SpA v RivOland Marble Co (Vic) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 IPR 402, McGarvie J accepted that in reliance upon the principles in Mouson & Co v Boehm (1884) 26 Ch D 398, Chitty J, that mere non-use of the trade mark is not enough to give rise to abandonment; there has to be an intention to abandon; abandonment is a question of fact; and, inferences as to fact (concerning an intention to abandon) might be capable of being drawn from primary facts. In RivOland Marble Co (Vic) Pty Ltd v Settef SpA (1988) 19 FCR 569 at 571-572, Bowen CJ in the Full Court of the Federal Court said this:Once having acquired proprietorship it can only be lost upon some established general law basis such as estoppel, acquiescence or abandonment ... Counsel for the Marble Co did argue that Settef had abandoned its trade mark through disuse ... However, in my opinion, to show abandonment of the mark in circumstances such as the present it would be necessary to demonstrate more than slightness of use. There would have to be some evidence indicating an intention to abandon the trade mark to result in the right to proprietorship being lost. ...[19] [2014] FCA 795 at [188].[Stress added] In the situation before me, when considering the original members of the Group, it may be fairly observed that at least Mr O’Prey would be prevented from claiming joint ownership of the Trade Mark by virtue of the Deed of Termination and Release which he executed on 1 November 1994. In this Deed Mr O’Prey acknowledged that:he has no entitlement to the name “The Badloves” or any goodwill or benefit attached thereto; Conversely, this Deed might be viewed as confirming that the remaining members of the Group who were signatories to the Deed, (Michael Spiby, John Housden, Chris Tabone and Anthony Featherstone) did have an entitlement to the name “The Badloves” as well as any goodwill or benefit attached thereto. Absent any evidence to the contrary, it logically follows that Mr John Favaro who was Mr O’Prey’s replacement (and who had an equal share in the legal entities associated with the Group) also had ‘an entitlement to the name “The Badloves” or any goodwill or benefit attached thereto’. The departures of Messrs Tabone and Featherstone from the Group appear to be taken as a ‘given’ by both of the parties and the ramifications of their departures as far as this matter is concerned are not clear. The absence of Messrs Tabone and Featherstone from the partnership documents mentioned at paras [14.9], [14.11] and [14.12], above, confirms the departure of those gentlemen from the Group by at least 13 February 2001. I note, however, that the function of the Registrar is not to determine the current ownership of the Trade Mark but to assess whether, at the relevant date, the Applicant was the owner of the Trade Mark. This question is tied up with the question of whether, as the Applicant appears to assert, the Opponents have abandoned the Trade Mark.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 55 of the Act relevantly provides:55Decision(1)Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:(a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or(b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.Note:For limitations see section 6. I refuse to register the Trade Mark. The Opponents requested their costs in the event that the opposition to registration be established. As the Applicant was the unsuccessful party it is appropriate that costs be awarded against him at the Official Scale set out in Schedule 8 to the Regulations.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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