[2012] HCATrans 168
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S420 of 2011
B e t w e e n -
JOHN FAIRFAX PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD
First Applicant
MATTHEW EVANS
Second Applicant
and
ALEKSANDRA GACIC
First Respondent
LJILJANA GACIC
Second Respondent
BRANISLAV CIRIC
Third Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 22 JUNE 2012, AT 1.11 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR T.D. BLACKBURN, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.R. SIBTAIN, for the applicants. (instructed by Banki Haddock Fiora Lawyers)
MR C.A. EVATT: May it please your Honours, I appear with MR C.J. DIBB for the respondents. (instructed by McKenzie Leamey Solicitors & Barristers)
CRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Blackburn.
MR BLACKBURN: Your Honours, the first special leave point in this case is a point of public importance by reason of the fact that it is an issue of general application notwithstanding that the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) has been repealed. The question of law raised is this. In a case involving the defence of fair comment, either at common law or one of the statutory defences as here the now repealed Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) or, indeed, the current uniform Acts, in such a case where the imputation formulated by the plaintiff is one which was never intended to be conveyed by the commenter, by the defendant, is not obviously contiguous with the actual comment that the commenter made and arises purely and only inferentially, by inference, from the matter complained of, the issue is, in those circumstances, should the defence of comment be – or should the success or failure of the defence of comment be judged by reference to the actual comment alone, that is, what the commenter actually wrote or said, rather than to this artificial construct, the imputation?
KIEFEL J: Does this not amount then to a challenge as to the imputation that was allowed? This is really a pleading question, is it not?
MR BLACKBURN: We would say not really, your Honour. Obviously at the pre‑trial stage an argument could have been had and, your Honour, so many of these arguments happen in the defamation list and they just lengthen proceedings and add to costs, but an argument could, one supposes, have been had to the effect that the imputation was absolutely incapable of being conveyed in that form because ‑ ‑ ‑
KIEFEL J: Is that really what you are saying ‑ ‑ ‑
MR BLACKBURN: No, I am not, your Honour. I am not at all.
KIEFEL J: You are saying that the imputation by itself does not convey what the words actually conveyed?
MR BLACKBURN: No. I think, your Honour, what we are saying is this. We frankly have to accept that the matter complained of was capable of conveying an – well, perhaps I can go back a step and…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd & Anor v Gacic and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2012] HCATrans 168
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Full Court were whether the single judge had erred in finding that the published articles bore defamatory meanings, and consequently, whether the appellants had established a defence of qualified privilege. The court was required to consider the ordinary reasonable reader's understanding of the publications and the circumstances in which they were published to determine if the defence of qualified privilege was available.
The Full Court analysed the meaning of the articles in question, applying the established principles for determining defamatory imputations. It considered the context of the publications and the likely understanding of the readership. Regarding the defence of qualified privilege, the court examined whether there was a legal or moral duty to publish the information and a corresponding interest in receiving it. The court found that the single judge had correctly determined the defamatory meanings and that the defence of qualified privilege was not established in the circumstances of the publication.
The appeal was dismissed, with the Full Court affirming the decision of the single judge.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.