JN v The Queen

[2019] NSWCCA 287

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation:	JN v R [2019] NSWCCA 287
Hearing dates:	1 July 2019
Date of orders:	04 December 2019
Decision date:	04 December 2019
Before:	Payne JA at [1]; Button J at [197]; Lonergan J at [210]
Decision:	(1)   Appeal allowed on ground 1. (2)   Dismiss grounds 2 and 3. (3)   Set aside the appellant’s conviction on counts 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14 and 16 of the amended indictment and in place thereof order that a verdict of acquittal be entered.
Catchwords:	CRIME – appeals – appeal against conviction – unreasonable verdict – jury verdicts of guilty for historical sexual offences committed against two complainants – where there were internal inconsistences in the evidence and directly contradictory evidence – unreasonable verdicts – verdict of acquittal entered
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 61J, 61M, 61N, 66A, 66C Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), ss 5, 6 Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW), r 4 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 20
Cases Cited:	Daaboul v R [2019] NSWCCA 191 M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63 Mahmood v State of Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; [1984] HCA 38 R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35 R v Bauer (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 40; 92 ALJR 846 R v Westerman (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 19 July 1991, unrep) SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	JN (Appellant) Regina (Respondent)
Representation:	Counsel: G Woods QC / T Woods (Appellant) B Baker (Respondent)   Solicitors: Malouf Criminal Lawyers (Appellant) Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
File Number(s):	2016/00262777
Publication restriction:	Non-publication of any information or material that may lead to the identification of the complainants pursuant to s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW)
Decision under appeal	Court or tribunal: District Court of New South Wales Jurisdiction: Crime Date of Decision: 27 August 2018 Before: O’Rourke SC DCJ File Number(s): 2016/00262777

Judgment

Relevant background

Evidence at trial

Amended indictment presented on 22 August 2018

Grounds of appeal

Ground 1 – Unreasonable verdicts of guilty

Appellant’s submissions

Presentation of Simon as a disturbed individual

Evidence that Simon and Yvonne continued voluntarily to attend JN’s home

The appellant’s good character

The weight of the evidence did not support the Crown’s central claims

Crown submissions

Presentation of Simon as a disturbed individual

Evidence that Simon and Yvonne continued voluntarily to attend JN’s home

The appellant’s good character at all relevant times

The weight of the evidence did not support the Crown’s central claims

Consideration of Ground 1 – Unreasonable verdicts of guilty

Legal principles

The evidence at the trial

Relationships

The appellant’s house

The complainants’ house

Playing video games at the appellant’s house

Playing video games at the complainants’ house

Simon’s telephone call to the appellant

The counts relating to Yvonne

The counts relating to Simon

Ground 2 – Failure to interview or call witnesses

Appellant’s submissions

Crown submissions

Consideration of Ground 2 – Failure to interview or call witnesses

Ground 3 – Amendment of the indictment

Appellant’s submissions

Crown submissions

Consideration of Ground 3 – Amendment of the indictment

Conclusion and proposed orders

Judgment

1. PAYNE JA: Between 13 August 2018 and 27 August 2018, the appellant, who shall be referred to in this judgment as JN to protect the identity of the complainants, was tried before O’Rourke SC DCJ and a jury in the District Court at Parramatta.

2. On 27 August 2018, JN was found guilty of sexual offences committed between 8 May 1994 and 31 December 2002 against two complainants, who in this judgment I will call Simon and Yvonne, who were children from another family who lived on the same street and who were friends of JN’s younger brother, who I will refer to in this judgment as Michael.

3. On 13 August 2018, JN was arraigned on an indictment containing nine counts. On 22 August 2018, after the close of the Crown case, the indictment was substantially amended. The amended indictment charged JN with 16 separate counts. On 27 August 2018, JN was convicted by a jury on nine of the 16 counts, namely, counts 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14 and 16. Immediately after the verdicts were given, O’Rourke SC DCJ refused a detention application made by the Crown and granted the appellant bail.

4. On 22 February 2019, O’Rourke SC DCJ sentenced the appellant. In relation to counts 2, 4, 8, 12, 14 and 16, JN was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 4 years imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of 2 years and 5 months commencing on 22 February 2019 and an additional term of 1 year and 7 months to commence on the expiration of the non-parole period. In relation to counts 3, 9 and 10, a community correction order of 12 months commencing on 22 February 2019 was imposed. Immediately following sentence, O’Rourke SC DCJ granted the appellant conditional bail pending the appellant’s conviction appeal to this Court.

Relevant background

Evidence at trial

5. The Crown called Simon and Yvonne (pseudonyms I have given the complainants), Victor (a pseudonym for the complainants’ brother), Mary (a pseudonym for the complainants’ mother), Michael (a pseudonym for the appellant’s brother), Aldous (a pseudonym for the complainants’ and Michael’s friend), Doreen (a pseudonym for Simon’s ex-fiancé), Robert (a pseudonym for Simon’s friend), DSC Thomas, DSC Hayman and SC Williams. The evidence is summarised below. JN did not give evidence but on 26 May 2015, the day of his arrest, participated in an electronically recorded interview (“ERISP”). Relevant parts of JN’s evidence in the ERISP are set out below.

Amended indictment presented on 22 August 2018

6. On 22 August 2018, after the close of all the evidence and immediately prior to the closing addresses, the Crown amended the indictment pursuant to s 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). The amended indictment alleged 16 counts of sexual offences. Some counts were in the alternative. The counts, and the evidence said to support them, were advanced by the Crown at the trial in the following way:

1. COUNT 1: That JN, between 8 May 1994 and 7 May 1997, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Simon, who was at that time under the age of 10 years, namely, between 7 and 9 years, contrary to s 66A.

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“The first count deals with an act of oral sex which [Simon] alleged was committed upon him by the accused, [JN] in circumstances where they were in the bedroom and [Simon] was playing video games and there was a conversation about, “I want you to get up” … that is an act of the accused placing his mouth over [Simon’s] penis.”

2. COUNT 2: Further, in the alternative to count 1, that JN, between 8 May 1997 and 7 May 2000, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Simon, who was at the time above the age of 10 years and under the age of 16 years, namely, between 10 and 12 years, contrary to s 66C(1).

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“Now, here is the first alternative, count 2. And the reason for that is that [Simon] in his evidence said he was between seven and 12. And unfortunately there is a delineation point at ten that requires consideration of both these offences. And there’s a particular methodology that I think I’ll leave to her Honour to tell you how you go about. For instance, if you cannot find he was under ten, if there was insufficient evidence and that may well be. The Crown concedes on what he has said to be the case. You could go to count 2 and if you were satisfied as to the physical act, you could convict on that. And that is why that count has been placed now on the new indictment.”

3. COUNT 3: Further that JN, between 8 May 1994 and 7 May 2000, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did incite Simon, a person then under the age of 16 years, namely, between 7 and 12 years to commit an act of indecency with him, contrary to s 61N.

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“Count 3 was … the preamble to the anal sex, if I can be as direct, where it is alleged that [JN] requested [Simon] to touch his erect penis. All that has changed there is the dates have been expanded, but the offence remains the same. There is no need for an alternative there.”

4. COUNT 4: Further that JN, between 8 May 1994 and 7 May 2000, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Simon without his consent, and knowing that he was not consenting to the sexual intercourse, in circumstances of aggravation, namely, that at the time of the offence Simon was a person under the age of 16 years, namely, between 7 and 12 years of age, contrary to s 61J(1).

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“Now, there’s one other charge that was put on and that is in relation to the allegation of anal sex said to have been committed by [JN] on [Simon]. That allegation is pleaded to be sexual intercourse without the consent of the complainant and in circumstances where the accused knew there was no such consent. And you heard very dramatically, you may think, from [Simon] when I asked the question, did he consent to that act. … You heard him, he went off, to use the vernacular, that he did not consent. All right, why have I raised this? Because there are three aspects. There is the act, there is his lack of consent and there is the knowledge of the accused. Say, for instance, in the course of your deliberation, say, for instance, you come to that third element and you have a doubt whether the accused had the requisite knowledge, whether he was either he knew that [Simon] wasn’t consenting or he didn’t care one way or the other. Say, it causes you a problem. There are alternate counts and they have been placed on the indictment. And those alternate counts are quite simply the sexual act with a child under ten, there is no issue of consent. And the sexual act with a child over ten. Again, because of the time period, both had to be laid as an alternate. And an alternative - your Honour will address you, I’ll just touch briefly - is something to turn to if the substantive count - say, for instance, as I’ve just recounted, the sexual intercourse without consent with the knowledge of lack of consent. If, for instance hypothetically, you’re stuck on that third and you have a reasonable doubt, you then turn to those alternatives where in that specific case, consent is not an issue.

…

Now we come to 4. This is the one that I was speaking on before. This is the act of anal intercourse following the discussion of girls and caves and beaches et cetera. It has been expanded from seven to 12 but the allegation remains the same. If, for instance, you were not satisfied that the act happened, well you wouldn’t have to consider 5 and 6 really. If you were satisfied the act happened and you didn’t accept [Simon] that he did not consent, you would have to consider 5 and 6 because consent is irrelevant to those. If you accepted his evidence that he did not consent but at the end you had a doubt whether the accused realised that, you would still go to 5 and 6. I hope that gives you some guidance as to why they’re there and why is there two of them. Again, the delineating time factor of under ten, over ten.”

5. COUNT 5: Further, in the alternative to count 4, that JN, between 8 May 1994 and 7 May 1997, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Simon, who was at that time under the age of 10 years, namely, between 7 and 9 years, contrary to s 66A. See the Crown prosecutor’s address to the jury on Count 4.

6. COUNT 6: Further, in the alternative to count 5, that JN, between 8 May 1997 and 7 May 2000, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Simon, who was at that time above the age of 10 years and under the age of 16 years, namely, between 10 and 12 years, contrary to s 66C(1). See the Crown prosecutor’s address to the jury on Count 4.

7. COUNT 7: Further that JN, between 8 May 1994 and 7 May 1997, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Simon, a person who was at that time under the age of 10 years, namely, between 7 and 9 years, contrary to s 66A.

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“Number 7 deals with the - if I can use it - the talcum powder and Brut, oral sex and there is some context evidence before that, but that doesn’t concern us now. What we are concerned about is [Simon] placing his mouth over the penis of the accused. And you’ll see count 7 is framed as if the complainant was under ten and count 8 is the alternative if the complainant was over ten.”

8. COUNT 8: Further, in the alternative to count 7, that JN, between 8 May 1997 and 7 May 2000, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Simon, who was at that time above the age of 10 years and under the age of 16 years, namely, between 10 and 12 years, contrary to s 66C(1). See the Crown prosecutor’s address to the jury on Count 7.

9. COUNT 9: Further that JN, between 8 May 1994 and 7 May 2000, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did commit an act of indecency toward Simon, a person then under the age of 16 years, namely, between 7 and 12 years, contrary to s 61N.

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“9 and 10, the only changes are the expansion of the dates. And that is the pornographic video incident, 9 and 10, when [Simon] says that the accused commenced to masturbate in front of him and then directed or asked [Simon] to masturbate himself. So all that has happened is that the years have been expanded on those.”

10. COUNT 10: Further that JN, between 8 May 1994 and 7 May 2000, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did incite Simon, a person then under the age of 16 years, namely, between 7 and 12 years of age, to commit an act of indecency with him, contrary to s 61N. See the Crown prosecutor’s address to the jury on Count 9.

11. COUNT 11: Further that JN, between 1 January 1999 and 2 June 2001, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did assault Yvonne, a person then under the age of 10 years, namely, between 7 and 9 years of age and immediately before such assault did commit an act of indecency on the said Yvonne, contrary to s 61M(2).

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“In relation to [Yvonne], what simply has occurred is that the original first matter for her has an alternative and the reason for that is if she was over ten years of age that original count doesn’t cover the act. If she is over ten then the alternative is the one that you would look at.”

“The first act is counts 11 and 12. I’ve explained to you why they exist in the fashion that they do. Because of that sign post, ten years, we need to put both. The act of indecency is an act of her masturbation but with the assistance of the accused placing his hand over hers. In other words, manipulating her hand so that she masturbated his penis.”

12. COUNT 12: Further, in the alternative to count 11, that JN, between 3 June 2001 and 31 December 2002, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did assault and commit an act of indecency on Yvonne in circumstances of aggravation in that Yvonne was under the age of 16 years, namely, between 10 to 11 years, contrary to s 61M(1). See the Crown prosecutor’s address to the jury on Count 11.

13. COUNT 13: Further that JN, between 1 January 1999 and 2 June 2001, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Yvonne, who was at that time under the age of 10 years, namely, between 7 and 9 years of age, contrary to s 66A.

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“Likewise, in relation to 13, it has an ancillary alternative and it boils down to was she under ten or over ten … 13 and 14 deal with an act of the insertion of some object into her anus by the accused whilst she was in such a position, turned away, and was not able to see what it was.”

14. COUNT 14: Further, in the alternative to count 13, that JN, between 3 June 2001 and 31 December 2002, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Yvonne who was at that time above the age of 10 years and under the age of 16 years, namely, between 10 and 11 years, contrary to s 66C(1). See the Crown prosecutor’s address to the jury on Count 13.

15. COUNT 15: Further that JN, between 1 January 1999 and 2 June 2001, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Yvonne, who was at that time under the age of 10 years, namely, between 7 and 9 years of age, contrary to s 66A.

The Crown prosecutor told the jury:

“And likewise for counts 15 and 16 … 15 and 16 deal with his - that is the accused’s request and her compliance with placing her mouth over his penis. The act of inserting an object into somebody’s anus I would envisage that her Honour will tell you, as a matter of law, is sexual intercourse. The same with inserting your penis into a person’s mouth - into their mouth; I stress that - is also, at law, defined as an act of sexual intercourse.”

16. COUNT 16: Further, in the alternative to count 15, that JN, between 3 June 2001 and 31 December 2002, at Granville in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Yvonne who was at that time above the age of 10 years and under the age of 16 years, namely, between 10 and 11 years, contrary to s 66C(1). See the Crown prosecutor’s address to the jury on Count 15.

7. On 27 August 2018, the jury returned verdicts of guilty in respect of nine counts on the amended indictment, namely, counts 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14 and 16.

Allegation	Count	Verdict
Fellatio in relation to Simon	Count 1 Sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years: s 66A In the alternative, Count 2 Sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16 years: s 66C(1)	Not guilty of Count 1 Guilty of Count 2
Incite Simon to touch the appellant’s penis	Count 3 Incite act of indecency from a child under 16 years: s 61N	Guilty of Count 3
Anal penetration of Simon	Count 4 Aggravated sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years: s 61J(1) In the alternative, Count 5 Sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years: s 66A In the alternative, Count 6 Sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16 years: s 66C(1)	Guilty of Count 4
Fellatio in relation to Simon	Count 7 Sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years: s 66A In the alternative, Count 8 Sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16 years: s 66C(1)	Not guilty of Count 7 Guilty of Count 8
Masturbating in presence of Simon	Count 9 Act of indecency towards a child under 16 years: s 61N	Guilty of Count 9
Incite Simon to masturbate	Count 10 Incite act of indecency from a child under 16 years: s 61N	Guilty of Count 10
Yvonne masturbates the appellant’s penis	Count 11 Aggravated indecent assault of a child under 10 years: s 61M(2) In the alternative, Count 12 Aggravated indecent assault of a child under 16 years: s 61M(1)	Not guilty of Count 11 Guilty of Count 12
Anal penetration of Yvonne	Count 13 Sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years: s 66A In the alternative, Count 14 Sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16 years: s 66C(1)	Not guilty of Count 13 Guilty of Count 14
Fellatio in relation to Yvonne	Count 15 Sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years: s 66A In the alternative, Count 16 Sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16 years: s 66C(1)	Not guilty of Count 15 Guilty of Count 16

Grounds of appeal

8. By a notice of appeal dated 20 February 2019, the appellant appeals against his conviction on three grounds:

1. The verdicts of guilty are unreasonable, or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence.

1. There was a substantial miscarriage of justice in that important eyewitnesses were neither interviewed by police nor called as witnesses in the prosecution case and consequently the jury was deprived of information highly pertinent to the central issue in the trial.

2. The indictment was substantially rewritten at the close of the Crown case, producing such a divergence between the case as particularised, presented on arraignment and opened, that the trial was irregular and not a fair trial, and there was a miscarriage of justice.

Ground 1 – Unreasonable verdicts of guilty

9. As it will be necessary to consider all of the evidence in the trial in order to address this ground it is appropriate that it be addressed first.

Appellant’s submissions

10. The appellant submitted that the verdicts of guilty are unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. The appellant relied in particular upon the following matters.

Presentation of Simon as a disturbed individual

11. The appellant submitted that Simon presented in court as a disturbed individual. During his cross-examination on 15 August 2018, Simon engaged in a violent and emotional outburst which provoked the security officers to enter the court and resulted in an adjournment. Simon struck and injured his hand against the woodwork of the witness box. The following exchange occurred between counsel and the trial judge as to what to do:

“CROWN PROSECUTOR: Short update. The witness went and composed himself by having a cigarette and buying a cold pack because he’s bruised his hand. He is rational. He realises that that was unwarranted and he believes that he is able to continue. He has now consented to having the WOS lady in, and I think that would be beneficial because

…

HER HONOUR: He’s not in a good way tonight.

CROWN PROSECUTOR: This is what we had. We had - there was at a time, and your Honour would have seen it, I saw it. I didn’t know what to do - when he turned away from everybody.

HER HONOUR: Yes, of course I saw him.

CROWN PROSECUTOR: That’s when he had to compose himself the first time. What he says he’ll do is

HER HONOUR: It’s not the first time he’s done it throughout his evidence, though. He’s done it quite frequently.”

12. The appellant submitted that it was relevant that the Crown prosecutor was reluctant to have conversations with Simon about arrangements for giving his evidence. The appellant submitted that Simon repeatedly used expletives which showed recklessness and disrespect to the court. The appellant submitted that it is significant that Simon raised that he suffered post-traumatic stress disorder for the first time in his evidence at trial. It can be reasonably inferred from his work in a clerical role in relation to workers compensation claims that Simon would have had some knowledge of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Evidence that Simon and Yvonne continued voluntarily to attend JN’s home

13. The appellant submitted in relation to Simon that it is difficult to accept that a child would have continued to visit the appellant’s house after being assaulted in the way described. Simon had said of the anal intercourse, “I remember that first instant that it went in. I’ll never forget that pain”. The appellant submitted that in the present case the alleged offences did not occur in a place where the child permanently resided, but a place where the child voluntarily visited. The appellant’s and Simon’s family homes were separated by another house. It would be unlikely that a child would continually visit the appellant’s home if the appellant had in fact sexually assaulted Simon and caused unforgettable pain. Common sense suggests that Simon would have stayed away and avoided the situation even if he may not have reported the incident.

14. The appellant submitted in relation to Yvonne that it is not credible that a child subjected to repeated anal intercourse and fellatio would have continued voluntarily to visit the appellant’s home and in particular his bedroom. The appellant noted that Yvonne gave evidence that the assaults occurred 2-3 times a week over a period of 4-5 years. The repetition and regularity of her visits to a place that she was not bound to attend raises real doubts about her claims.

The appellant’s good character

15. The appellant submitted that he had no criminal convictions and had been in more or less continuous employment since he completed high school. This is relevant for the purposes of the good character direction given by the trial judge.

16. The appellant submitted that the absence of criminal convictions tells against the appellant possessing the sexual tendencies alleged by the Crown and against the likelihood of the commission of the alleged offences.

The weight of the evidence did not support the Crown’s central claims

17. The appellant submitted that a central claim of the Crown case in relation to both complainants was that there was a friendly relationship between the children of both families such that the complainants would frequent the appellant’s home to play video games which allowed many opportunities when there were no adults present for the alleged offences to have occurred. The appellant submitted that the evidence is significantly to the contrary. The evidence suggests that there would have been few, if any, opportunities for the complainants to be alone with the appellant.

18. The appellant submitted that another central claim of the Crown case in relation to both complainants was that there were restrictions on the complainants playing video games in their own home and as a result they were inclined to go to the appellant’s home to do so. The appellant submitted that the evidence is significantly to the contrary.

19. The appellant submitted that the evidence of both complainants contained so many errors and contradictions that a reasonable jury would not have convicted the appellant. The appellant submitted that much of Simon’s evidence was withdrawn in cross-examination and that the various retractions, changes and conflicts in his evidence are so serious that they are not mere conflicts about minor matters.

20. The appellant submitted that there is nothing said by the appellant in the pretext conversations other than mere suggestion and the general thrust of the conversations is that the appellant denies impropriety. The pretext conversations show that the appellant was upset about the accusations made against him. That is why he went to the police to report that he was being harassed by the complainants.

21. The appellant accepted that, in the ERISP, he minimised the degree of his contact with the complainants’ family. The appellant explained that this was because by this time he was concerned that Simon was accusing him of sexual misbehaviour.

22. The appellant submitted that in undertaking an independent assessment of the evidence as a whole and having regard to all the inadequacies and contradictions in the Crown case individually and in sum, this Court would have real doubt as to the guilt of the appellant.

23. Finally, the appellant noted that, shortly after the verdicts were given and in disposing of a detention application made by the Crown, the trial judge made the following remarks:

“This Court is, of course, bound by and respects the verdicts of the jury. To my mind, however, there are real concerns in this particular case. As I sat and listened and watched the evidence that fell and the manner in which it did that there would be legitimate concerns as to whether or not the evidence in this trial justifies the verdicts of the jury.”

24. The appellant submitted that it is a relevant consideration that her Honour, having seen and heard all of the evidence, came to the view that she did. It was submitted that the Court, in paying due regard to the advantage which the jury had in seeing and hearing the evidence, should also take into account the advantage which the trial judge, who had lengthy and substantial experience of criminal trials, had in seeing and hearing the evidence.

Crown submissions

25. The Crown submitted that it is necessary for this Court to review the whole of the evidence to determine whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty. In performing this task, deference should be given to the jury’s determination as the jury heard the evidence of the witnesses, particularly the evidence of the complainants. The Crown submitted that the trial judge’s post-verdict remarks relied upon by the appellant are irrelevant and should not carry any weight.

Presentation of Simon as a disturbed individual

26. The Crown submitted that there is no dispute that Simon was emotionally distressed when he gave evidence. Early in Simon’s evidence in chief, the trial judge observed that “it’s clearly apparent from this witness the raw emotion that is there” and enquired whether Simon had been advised that he could have a support person. When cross-examined on his police statements, Simon stated that he deliberately did not read his statements the previous night, stating “I couldn’t pick them up and physically read them” and “forgive me for getting upset”. The trial judge said to Simon that “we cannot have a repeat of the performance yesterday” and Simon replied “[i]t won’t happen again”.

27. Addressing the appellant’s submissions on this issue, the Crown submitted:

1. The incident during which Simon injured his hand and required the court security officers to attend occurred in the context of Simon becoming very distressed during his cross-examination about his failure to mention to police his concerns about the appellant having sexually assaulted his sister.

2. The fact that Simon used expletives did not show a measure of disrespect to the court.

3. Simon’s evidence in cross-examination that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder does not suggest that he was not a credible witness. It was submitted that Simon’s memory gaps during evidence should stand or fall on their own and should not be given more weight because of his post-traumatic stress disorder.

28. The Crown submitted that any inferences to be drawn from Simon’s distress when giving evidence were matters for the jury.

Evidence that Simon and Yvonne continued voluntarily to attend JN’s home

29. The Crown submitted that the appellant’s submissions on this issue rely on outdated assumptions about the behaviour of victims (particularly child victims) following sexual assault. There are many reasons why children act counter-intuitively and return to the place of an assault, such as normalisation, denial, the need for friendship, the desire to play games to which they do not have access at home, and a belief that the assault will not reoccur.

The appellant’s good character at all relevant times

30. It was common ground that the appellant’s good character must be taken into account by this Court when considering whether the appellant has demonstrated that the jury’s verdicts are unreasonable. However, evidence of previous good character cannot prevail against evidence of guilt. This matter alone does not of itself undermine the jury’s verdicts.

The weight of the evidence did not support the Crown’s central claims

31. The Crown submitted that the trial judge had directed the jury that the Crown did not have to prove beyond reasonable doubt “every single fact or every single issue that has arisen from the evidence and that may be in dispute in this trial”. In relation to the appellant’s contention that the evidence at trial was inconsistent with Yvonne’s evidence in cross-examination that she was assaulted 2-3 times per week over the course of several years, the jury was not required to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Yvonne was sexually assaulted on occasions other than those alleged in the indictment. In relation to the appellant’s contention that Simon’s evidence that he went to the appellant’s home because he was not allowed to play video games at home during the week, the Crown submitted that Mary had stated that she “assumed” that her children played games but that they did not have a console when they were younger and that Victor had stated that there was no restriction on playing games during the week but that it was discouraged by their father.

32. The Crown submitted that it was open to the jury to consider each of the alleged inconsistences in the evidence of the complainants to be peripheral matters, which could be explained by the effluxion of time and did not undermine the credibility or reliability of the complainants. The Crown submitted that the jury may well have concluded that Simon was mistaken about the chronology of events.

33. The Crown submitted that the fact the appellant reported to police that he was being harassed is a neutral factor which does not point necessarily to guilt or away from guilt. It was submitted that it was open to the jury to take into account that it was the appellant who first raised matters of a sexual nature in the recorded conversations. However, the Crown accepted that by the time the appellant raised those matters, he may have at least suspected he was being accused by Simon of sexual assault almost 20 years before. The Crown submitted that in these circumstances the appellant has not demonstrated that the jury’s verdicts are unreasonable.

Consideration of Ground 1 – Unreasonable verdicts of guilty

Legal principles

34. The right to appeal against conviction to this Court is found in s 5 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). Section 6 of that Act is enlivened by ground 1 of the appeal:

6      Determination of appeals in ordinary cases

(1) The court on any appeal under section 5 (1) against conviction shall allow the appeal if it is of opinion that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the ground of the wrong decision of any question of law, or that on any other ground whatsoever there was a miscarriage of justice, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal; provided that the court may, notwithstanding that it is of opinion that the point or points raised by the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.

(2) Subject to the special provisions of this Act, the court shall, if it allows an appeal under section 5 (1) against conviction, quash the conviction and direct a judgment and verdict of acquittal to be entered.

35. The principles that are applicable to an appeal on the ground that a verdict is unreasonable, or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence, were identified by the High Court in M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 492-493; [1994] HCA 63. Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ, in their joint judgment, stated:

“Where a court of criminal appeal sets aside a verdict on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, it frequently does so expressing its conclusion in terms of a verdict which is unsafe or unsatisfactory. Other terms may be used such as “unjust or unsafe”, or “dangerous or unsafe”. In reaching such a conclusion, the court does not consider as a question of law whether there is evidence to support the verdict. Questions of law are separately dealt with by s 6(1). The question is one of fact which the court must decide by making its own independent assessment of the evidence and determining whether, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which a jury might convict, “none the less it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty to stand”.

…

Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. But in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations.” (Footnotes omitted.)

36. The principles were reiterated by the High Court in SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13. French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ, in their joint judgment, stated:

“[13] The starting point in the application of s 6(1) is that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, and the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. [1] However, the joint judgment in M went on to say: [2]

“In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred.”

[14] In determining an appeal pursuant to s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act, by applying the test set down in M and restated in MFA, the Court is to make “an independent assessment of the evidence, both as to its sufficiency and its quality”. [3] In M, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ stated: [4]

“In reaching such a conclusion, the court does not consider as a question of law whether there is evidence to support the verdict. Questions of law are separately dealt with by s 6(1). The question is one of fact which the court must decide by making its own independent assessment of the evidence and determining whether, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which a jury might convict, ‘none the less it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty to stand’.”

1. M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493; [1994] HCA 63 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

2. M v The Queen at 494.

3. Morris v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 454 at 473; [1987] HCA 50 (Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).

4. M v The Queen at 492-493.

37. At [22] French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ said:

“On appeal, the task of the Court of Criminal Appeal was to make an independent assessment of the whole of the evidence, to determine whether the verdicts of guilty could be supported. There is no doubt that the Court of Criminal Appeal was not bound by the ruling of the trial judge concerning the date of the 2006 offences. However, the Court of Criminal Appeal was required to form an opinion as to the date of the 2006 offences in order to weigh the whole of the evidence. The reasons for judgment by Simpson J do not disclose that the Court of Criminal Appeal made an independent assessment of the evidence concerning the 2006 offences, and therefore the Court could not weigh the competing evidence to determine whether the verdicts of guilty could be supported.”

38. More recently in R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35 at [65] the High Court has emphasised the central place of the jury trial in the administration of criminal justice and, thus, the stringency of the unreasonable verdict test. The Court stated:

“It is fundamental to our system of criminal justice in relation to allegations of serious crimes tried by jury that the jury is “the constitutional tribunal for deciding issues of fact”. Given the central place of the jury trial in the administration of criminal justice over the centuries, and the abiding importance of the role of the jury as representative of the community in that respect, the setting aside of a jury’s verdict on the ground that it is “unreasonable” within the meaning of s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code is a serious step, not to be taken without particular regard to the advantage enjoyed by the jury over a court of appeal which has not seen or heard the witnesses called at trial.”

39. In determining a complaint about an allegedly unreasonable verdict it is necessary to bear firmly in mind the constitutional importance of the jury as the arbiter of fact. It is axiomatic that this jury, having heard full argument in relation to the credibility and reliability of the complainants, nevertheless concluded that it was satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, as to the truthfulness and reliability of the complainants’ evidence in respect of the charges on which the appellant was convicted.

40. However, as the High Court has emphasised, that does not absolve this Court from undertaking its own assessment of the credibility and reliability of the complainants’ evidence, and of all the evidence in the case, in order to determine whether it was open to the jury to convict the appellant on the charges on which it returned a guilty verdict. Indeed, the passages just cited from SKA v The Queen make it clear that properly to address this ground this Court has an obligation to review findings of fact made by a jury in a criminal trial and make an independent assessment of the evidence. The Court is required to determine whether, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which a jury might convict, “none the less it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty to stand”.

41. In undertaking this task the Court was urged by the appellant to take into account the views of the respected and experienced District Court judge who presided over the trial and in particular her Honour’s remarks when granting bail pending the outcome of this appeal. Without any disrespect to her Honour, I have decided not to take those views into account.

42. This submission raises an issue, about which there is conflicting authority in this Court, about the extent to which comments by the trial judge, who like the jury had the advantage of seeing the complainants, could be taken into account in determining whether the verdict is unreasonable. In Daaboul v R [2019] NSWCCA 191 the Chief Justice recently said:

“[294] The applicant submitted that the comments by the trial judge who, like the jury had the advantage of seeing the complainant, could be taken into account in determining whether the verdict is unreasonable.

[295] I do not agree. It was a matter for the jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the applicant, not the trial judge. It is the function of this Court to determine whether the verdict is unreasonable in accordance with the authorities to which I have referred. With the greatest respect to those who take a contrary view (see McCann v R [2014] NSWCCA 79; Drysdale v R [2015] NSWCCA 135), I do not think that it is appropriate to take the view of the trial judge expressed following the conclusion of the trial into account.

[296] The view which I have expressed seems to be consistent with what was said by Crennan J in SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 at [112]-[115]. Although her Honour was in dissent as to the result, nothing said by her was inconsistent with the reasoning of the majority who did not deal with the issue.”

43. In addressing this ground I have not found it necessary to take into account the comments of the trial judge or the Crown prosecutor which were urged upon the Court by the appellant. I have put those remarks wholly aside in considering this ground.

44. Whilst I find the judgment of the Chief Justice in Daaboul persuasive as properly reflecting the jury’s critical role in the trial, whether there are circumstances in which the views of the trial judge or the Crown prosecutor may be relevant to determining whether a verdict is unreasonable should be determined in a case where determination of that issue is critical and the Court is appropriately constituted to resolve the conflict in the authorities.

The evidence at the trial

45. I have made an independent assessment of all the evidence in the trial. I will first set out my assessment of the relevant background evidence before addressing each of the counts in the amended indictment and the critical evidence necessary to be weighed in determining whether the verdicts of guilty could be supported.

Relationships

46. The complainants, Simon and Yvonne, are siblings. Simon is 4 years older than Yvonne. At all relevant times they lived in Granville with their father, mother (Mary), and their elder brother (Victor). Victor is 9 years older than Simon and 13 years older than Yvonne. The complainants’ family lived two houses away from the appellant’s family. Victor was a friend of the appellant. Victor is one year older than the appellant. The appellant is 8 years older than Simon and 12 years older than Yvonne.

47. The appellant lived with his mother, father, younger brother (Michael), and three sisters. Michael is 12 years younger than the appellant.

48. Both complainants were friendly with Michael. Michael was 4 years younger than Simon and a month younger than Yvonne. Yvonne was also friends with twin brothers who lived in the same street, who I will refer to in this judgment as Aldous and Dylan. Michael gave evidence that he was friendly with Simon, Yvonne and Victor, but mainly Yvonne as she was closest to him in age.

49. Aldous gave evidence that his family moved to Granville when he was about 6 or 7 years old on the street that intersected with the street where the appellant’s family and the complainants’ family lived. As he was growing up, Aldous hung out with Yvonne and Michael at their homes, as well as at the park. Aldous stated that he had a friendship with Simon “just in the neighbourhood”.

50. Simon gave evidence that he had a friend called Patricia who lived across the road from him in Granville. Simon had known her when he was 5 to 12 years old. She was 1 or 2 years older than Simon.

The appellant’s house

51. Michael lived in the family home at Granville all his life and at the time of the trial still lived there. He shared the front room with JN until he was 16 years old while his three sisters shared a room and his parents lived in the remaining room. He took a video of the house which was in evidence. The differences between his bedroom at the time of the alleged offences and the time he took the video were that a chest of drawers with movies on it used to be where the computer was now located. The wardrobes now had mirrored doors whereas previously there were wooden doors. There was no lock on the bedroom door when he was in primary school and he and Yvonne were friends. Only when he became an adult after he had left school that a lock was placed on the door.

52. The appellant’s home was a small and modest house. It was uncontroversial on the appeal that the house was always very busy and loud and there “was always someone in the house”. The street was also busy with cars driving up and down and children playing sport in the front yard and grassed area behind the house. Michael’s mother did not work outside the home and throughout the potentially relevant period Michael’s father was not employed and was always at home “just doing housework”. Michael’s mother would pick him up from primary school and his father was always home when he arrived home. The family car was a Ford Falcon. When he came home from primary school each day, Michael would do homework, have dinner, watch television and play games. If Dylan and Aldous were available, he would play games in the afternoon before dinner. He did not have after-school activities during primary school.

The complainants’ house

53. In about 1993 or 1994, the complainants’ family home in Granville was demolished. While a new house was being built on the land, the family rented a house across the street. Sometime after June 1998, 4 years later, the complainants’ family moved into the new house.

Playing video games at the appellant’s house

54. Simon and Yvonne gave evidence that the bedroom that the appellant and Michael shared had a little child-sized, fold-out couch at the end of one of the two single beds in the bedroom, specifically, the bed closest to the television. In front of the couch were a gaming system and a television.

55. Yvonne gave evidence that she and Michael played video games together on his Nintendo 64 console in his bedroom nearly every day during the week between 1999 and 2002. Yvonne stated that she knew that Michael and the appellant shared the bedroom because someone told her and she sometimes saw the appellant sleeping in there. Yvonne stated that she and Michael would also play games on a PlayStation console located in the lounge room.

56. Yvonne gave evidence that she would usually scream out from the street at the front of the house to see if Michael was home and then Michael would come out and tell Yvonne to come in.

57. Simon gave evidence that he played video games in the rumpus room and the bedroom Michael shared with the appellant two to four times a week. Simon stated that the consoles could be moved between the rooms, but that “most of the time” the consoles were in the appellant’s bedroom. Simon stated that:

“A. On occasions it was - be my sister, myself and [Michael]. On other occasions there would be myself, my sister, [Michael] and the twins, [Dylan] and [Aldous]. Other times there would be myself by myself. Other times there would be just me and [Michael]. Other times there would just be me, [Michael] and his brother. Other times there would be me and his brother.”

58. Simon stated that there were “more than 10 occasions” when it was just him and the appellant in the appellant’s bedroom. This occurred when Simon was between 8 and 12 years old.

59. Michael gave evidence that sometimes Yvonne would come to his house and they would play games on his Nintendo 64 console. When he was 8 to 10 years old, Yvonne would come over to his house, and after that, he would go to her house. He could not remember Simon coming to his house other than one occasion for his tenth birthday party when he had a jumping castle and many friends from primary school attended.

60. Michael gave evidence that when Yvonne would come over to his house he would hear his name called from outside the front of the house and then he would go see that it was Yvonne calling his name. If his parents allowed her to come in, she would do so and they would play games. If his parents did not allow her to come in because it was time for dinner or homework, she would go home. The appellant was present on occasions when Yvonne was over but the appellant never played games with them when she was over.

61. Michael stated that there were rare occasions when he and Yvonne played games in his bedroom, usually during birthday parties. This occurred when Michael was in high school and seeing Dylan and Aldous more frequently. It was when the appellant was finishing school, just before the appellant moved out or just after he had moved out. At the time, the appellant was working as a security officer at a factory, so he would sometimes sleep during the day and Michael could not play games in the bedroom then.

62. Michael gave evidence that his friends, Dylan and Aldous, would also play games at his house. Sometimes they were there when Yvonne was there. He did not start hanging out with Dylan and Aldous until after he was 10 years old. From then on, he spent more time with them than Yvonne but Yvonne would pop in every now and again. As they got older, Yvonne’s visits became less frequent and they drifted apart as they went into high school. They did not go to the same high school and Yvonne started high school before he did.

63. Michael gave evidence that the appellant played video games. The appellant had bought the games that they had at home and the console they played on.

64. Aldous gave evidence that he went to Michael’s house “a lot”. The appellant was still living there when Aldous went to his house. Aldous could not recall how old he was, only that he was still in primary school when the appellant moved out. When he, Dylan and Michael, went to Yvonne’s house, the house was a two-storey house at the time. Aldous stated they hung out “in her room or pretty much in her living room”. Yvonne had a Nintendo 64 console and they would “just play games, hang out, talk”. Aldous stated that when he, Dylan, Yvonne and Michael played games at Michael’s house, Simon was there “[s]ometimes” but “more like 60 or 70% that he wasn’t there”. He stated that Simon would usually only come to play with them when they played outside in the park.

65. Victor, the complainants’ elder brother, stated that his parents directed him to pick Simon up from the appellant’s house “a few times”. When he went to pick Simon up, Simon was “sometimes playing with [Michael]” and “sometimes in [JN’s] room playing the Nintendo”. Victor said that he knew this because he would see Simon playing it when he went to pick him up.

Playing video games at the complainants’ house

66. Simon gave evidence that he started playing video games when he started primary school at the age of five. At home, they had the Omega system and the Nintendo system. When he was 13 years old, they had a Nintendo 64 console.

67. Victor gave evidence that, when they were in the old house, they had a Sega Megadrive, a Sega Master system and a Nintendo. There was a television in Simon and Victor’s bedroom, and a television in Yvonne’s bedroom. Simon, who was in primary school at the time, played games on the console in the bedroom they shared. Yvonne sometimes played games but mostly watched television in her bedroom. Once they moved into their new house, each of the children had their own bedroom. When Simon was in high school, he frequently played games on his computer in his bedroom, often until 4.00am. His parents were aware of this. In cross-examination, Victor stated that Simon started playing video games at home around the age of 10 and not before.

68. Simon gave evidence that he and Yvonne would go to JN’s house to play video games because their mother, Mary, did not allow them to play games during the school week, only during school holidays. In cross-examination, Simon rejected the proposition that there was no restriction on them playing video games. He stated that they were only allowed to play games in the school holidays.

69. Victor agreed that their parents would let Simon and Yvonne play video games “without restriction”, although his father would say stuff like “Knock it off and focus on your studies.” Victor stated that, by “without restriction”, he meant that Simon would play from midnight, their father would tell Simon to stop, Simon would not stop and their father would let it go. This applied to all the children and they spent a lot of time playing video games at all times of the day and night. Victor stated that his parents, in particular his father, were not too happy about this because they played games a lot. When he had seen them playing a lot, he would turn off the machine and tell them to go to their rooms or do homework. Their parents were content with their friends coming over to play at their house, but they wanted them to study more.

70. Michael gave evidence that, when he was 10 to 15 years old, he would go to Yvonne’s house “plenty of times” and play games on the Nintendo 64 console. When he went over to Yvonne’s house, when he was 9 to 13 years old, he would see Simon. Michael said he either played video games with Simon or watched Simon play. On those occasions, Yvonne would also be present.

Simon’s telephone call to the appellant

71. Simon gave evidence that, sometimes after the new house was built, Simon called the appellant from the upstairs telephone of the new house. Simon told the appellant that he “came for the first time, and I was so fucking proud of myself”. Simon could not remember how old he was.

72. Simon stated that he made the call in 1999 and that he was certain it was 1999 “because the new house was built and that’s when we moved into it”. The appellant was at home when he picked up. Simon could not remember the exact words he said, but it was words to the effect of “Hey, the - finally, I - I looked at some porn on the internet”. Simon said that the appellant said “[s]omething along the lines of ‘Yeah, good, great.’ Kind of brushed it off as if it was nothing”.

The counts relating to Yvonne

73. I propose now to address each of the counts in the amended indictment and the critical evidence necessary to be weighed in determining whether the verdicts of guilty are unreasonable within the meaning of s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act. Despite being dealt with later in the amended indictment, as the events and issues regarding Yvonne are in a relatively narrow compass I will address this ground as it relates to counts 11-16 first. The Crown case on these counts relied, very substantially, upon the credibility and reliability of Yvonne’s evidence.

74. The first thing to observe is that Yvonne’s evidence is that she apparently had no memory of any of these events for many years until she experienced “flashbacks” of what she described as “snippets” of memory of the relevant events whilst working as a childcare worker after she had left school.

75. The second thing to observe is that Yvonne’s evidence in relation to each of the assaults contained four common and essential features:

1. all of the events about which she gave evidence took place when she was in primary school between years 3 and 6;

2. all of the events about which she gave evidence took place after school between 3.30 and 4.30pm;

3. all of the events about which she gave evidence took place at the appellant’s house when the appellant was home alone; and

4. all of the events about which she gave evidence took place in the appellant’s bedroom. Yvonne’s evidence was that the door to the bedroom was always open unless someone was in the room and that she was assaulted by JN with the door open on occasions.

76. Yvonne gave evidence of essentially three separate incidents. The first, which was the basis of counts 13 and 14 in the amended indictment, she described as follows:

“Q. Were you ever in that bedroom when [Michael] was not there?

A. Yes

Q. What’s your first recollection of being in that bedroom with [Michael] not there?

A. It would be when I was - probably a day after school, primary school, and he wasn’t home yet. So I went over and I asked to see if [Michael] was there. I usually scream out from the street to see if [he’s] there, cause he’s usually in his bedroom, playing, and then he’ll come out and tell me to come in. But then, like, one of the times [JN] was home by himself and then he told me to come in and wait for [Michael] inside.

Q. Do you recall what year in school you were in on the first occasion that [JN] invited you inside?

A. Not really. I don’t really have much of a recollection of my childhood.

…

Q. What did you do in the bedroom?

A. I was playing games and then that’s when the assault started.

Q. I just want to stop you there before we go into detail.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Who assaulted whom?

A. [JN] would have assaulted me.

Q. How old were you when this commenced?

A. It would have been in 1999.

Q. Can you remember the first occasion that something happened?

A. It’s all - I can remember a few instances but, like, mostly my brain has blocked most of them out, and I can remember snippets of the assaults.

Q. For what period of time, over how long do you say, that these assaults took place?

A. It would have lasted my - from - for my whole primary school. From—

Q. From your whole—

A. Yeah, from about year 3 to year 6 is when I - when I started going to [Michael’s] house.

Q. You say that you remember snippets?

A. Yeah.

…

Q. What’s your first memory regarding these assaults?

A. Him bending me over the - over the bed.

Q. Where did this happen?

A. In his bedroom.

Q. Do you remember any conversation prior to being bent over the bed in the bedroom?

A. No.

Q. How were you dressed at the stage that you were bent over the bed?

A. I would have had my shirt on but my pants around the ankles.

Q. How did your pants come to be around your ankles?

A. Either I dropped them or he dropped them.

Q. How was [JN] dressed?

A. I couldn’t see, cause I - he didn’t let me turn my head around.

Q. Where was he in relation to you?

A. Behind me.

Q. You’ve drawn a diagram, a depiction, of the bedroom that shows at least two beds.

A. Yep.

Q. Which bed were you on?

A. [Michael’s].

Q. When he was behind you, did something happen?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened?

A. He inserted something into my bum.

Q. Why do you say, “Something”?

A. Because I don’t know what it was, and when I asked him, he said it was his fingers.

Q. So, doing the best you can, what did you say to him?

A. I asked him what it was that he was doing.

Q. Yes, and what did he say?

A. He just said that, “I’m inserting my fingers,” and I “don’t need to see it”.”

77. The second incident which was the basis of counts 11 and 12 was described by Yvonne as follows:

“Q. Do you have any other recollections of assaults upon you by the accused?

A. Yes.

Q. What else do you remember?

A. I remember using my hands on his penis.

Q. Where was that?

A. In his bedroom again, on his bed, though.

Q. Where was he when this occurred?

A. He was sitting on the bed.

Q. Where were you when this occurred?

A. Opposite him.”

78. The third incident which was the basis of counts 15 and 16 was described by Yvonne as follows:

“Q. Now you were going to move onto another act. You were going to tell me

about another act.

A. Yes.

Q. What was that other act?

A. I used my mouth on his penis.

Q. Do you remember the circumstances when that occurred?

A. It would have been around the same - like, if I was done with my hands, he’d tell me to use my mouth.

Q. I’m going to ask you a question: that act with the hand on the penis, what

would you call that now as you sit here as a—

A. A hand job.

Q. A little bit more formal?

A. Oral.

Q. No. Don’t worry about it. “Hand job”, okay. Are you speaking of a progression of acts after the hand job?

A. Yes.

Q. The next act, what was that?

A. Using my mouth.

Q. Can you recall any conversation that occurred before you used your mouth?

A. Yeah, he’d tell me to use my mouth.

Q. Did he tell you what to do?

A. He kind of just said to wrap my mouth around his penis and then go up and down like I did my hands.

Q. And what did you do?

A. I did as I was told.

Q. So you had his penis in your mouth?

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were talking about going up and down.

A. Yeah.

Q. Was that with your mouth?

A. Yes.

Q. What was he doing whilst you were doing that to him?

A. He’d sometimes place his hand on my head.

Q. Whereabouts?

A. On, like, the back of my head.

Q. What would he do, if anything, with his hand.

A. He would push down harder.

Q. Push?

A. Push harder and, like, I’d be gagging.

Q. What would happen when he pushed harder? Now, you said, “Gagging.” Why were you gagging?

A. Because his penis would have been hitting the back of my throat.

….

Q. In relation to that act, how did it end?

A. With him either making me stop before or ejaculating in my mouth.

Q. Those two events, of the hand job and the penis in the mouth, occurred on the same occasion?

A. I believe so.”

79. I harbour considerable doubts about Yvonne’s evidence. My doubts about Yvonne’s credibility and reliability as a witness commence from a consideration of the quality of Yvonne’s recollection, which was fragmentary and consisted of “flashbacks” of “snippets” of memory. She commenced her evidence with a statement that “I don’t really have much of a recollection of my childhood”. Whilst I do not doubt that childhood trauma may lead a victim to repress memories of abuse, a remarkable feature of the evidence in this case is that Simon’s recollection of abuse was similarly fragmentary and also consisted of “flashbacks” which, on Yvonne’s account, were experienced by the siblings after many years at much the same time and without there being any prior discussion between them.

80. Yvonne gave evidence that she told Simon about these flashbacks a day or two days before she gave her initial statement to the police on 23 January 2013. She and Simon were in their living room and he told her for the first time that he was experiencing “flashbacks” of memory. Yvonne’s evidence was that “[Simon] was - like - I need to talk to you about - like - flashbacks that I was having. And then I asked him what and then he was - like - I was having flashbacks of [JN] assaulting him as well.” In cross-examination, Yvonne stated that Simon had not given specific details about what he meant by “flashbacks”, but that she “could make the connection”. In cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

“Q. He tells you he’s had an involvement with [JN]?

A. Yes.

Q. You say he uses the words, “Sexual assault”?

A. Yes.

Q. And then he says to you, “I don’t know, but did it happen to you as well?”

A. I believe that’s what he asked, yes.

Q. And there had never between a word between the two of you up to this point in time?

A. Not about specifics, no.

Q. Not about anything?

A. No.

Q. Of a general, specific, or other nature concerning [JN] and sexual assault?

A. No.

Q. And you responded and said to him what? “Guess what? I’ve had flashbacks too?” Something like that?

A. I believe so.”

81. This evidence about the apparently near simultaneous recovery of memory “flashbacks” by Yvonne and Simon of sexual assaults by JN, without any prior discussion whatsoever of the topic, causes me to have a doubt about the credibility and reliability of that evidence. I would go further; Yvonne’s evidence in general was shown not to be credible or reliable. In cross-examination, Yvonne stated that she started remembering more things “[a]fter discussion with [her] psychologist” and that conversations with her psychologist had resulted in her “increased memory”.

82. The next matter of significance is that the scale of the offending Yvonne gave evidence about was staggering. Yvonne gave the following context evidence in chief:

“Q. Did they only occur once?

A. No

Q. The penetration of your anus. Did it only occur once?

A. No.

Q. In relation to yourself and [JN], do you recall anything else occurring?

A. In terms of?

Q. Of sexual contact.

A. I can’t really remember.”

83. Yvonne agreed in cross-examination that she had made statements to the police that she went to the appellant’s house five days a week in the time she was in years 3 to 6 at primary school and was sexually assaulted 2-3 times a week during that period by the appellant. This, she agreed, amounted to many hundreds of sexual assaults, including the repeated penetration of her anus by JN. The credibility and reliability of that evidence of repeated violent sexual assaults over three years must be considered in the context of Yvonne’s evidence that “I don’t remember being in any pain after this first time … I don’t ever remember being in physical pain after any of the assaults, and I never went to a doctor about it. I played a lot of sport, and I usually had some injuries, so I was invariably in pain often”. This evidence explaining Yvonne’s physical state after the repeated sexual assaults and her suggestion that, although in pain from sporting injuries, she never suffered pain from the repeated sexual assaults she described causes me to have a doubt about the credibility and reliability of that evidence.

84. An important matter which causes me further to doubt Yvonne’s evidence is that, to the extent she gave any details of the time at which the assaults occurred, that evidence was flatly contradicted by the evidence given by Mary, the complainants’ mother. Mary’s evidence was that she stayed home with each child for 12 months after they were born and then returned to work after that. Once the children were of school age, Mary drove them to school and collected them from school. When Simon commenced high school, he caught the bus but sometimes she drove him. The following exchange occurred:

“Q. You were primarily responsible for the children’s care and picking them and dropping them off?

A. That’s right.

Q. Occasionally your husband could help but—

A. When he was home.

Q. Your recollection of their school years was when they would come home there would be dinner and a time to do homework?

A. Of course.

Q. They wouldn’t usually go out and play in the afternoon during school term?

A. No.

Q. But they would some of the time?

A. Rarely, yes. Yeah.”

85. Mary stated that, when Simon and Yvonne were in primary school, they would each go to after-school care five days a week until she picked them up after work between 5.00 and 5.30pm:

“Q. Did you tell the police that when [Yvonne] started, they both – that is both [Yvonne] and [Simon] – went to before and after school care?

A. That’s right.

Q. You would drop them off before and pick them up at the after school care which was.

A. That’s correct. About 5.

Q. –run by the school.

A. That’s right.

Q. Do you recall what time you dropped them off at school?

A. About 8 o’clock because I start work at 8.30. And--

Q. And collection time, whilst they were at after care?

A. About 5.30. Anywhere between 5 and 5.30.

Q. Five days a week?

A. That’s correct.

Q. That continued, do you recall, for how long?

A. Well, until [Simon] started high school that his before and after school care finished.

…

Q. You were responsible, most of the time, for picking them up each and every afternoon—

A. That’s correct.

Q.—around 5.30.

A. Yes.”

86. This evidence raises a significant doubt about Yvonne’s evidence that the assaults she described took place between 3.30 and 4.30pm after school during her primary school years. It also leads to further doubts. Yvonne’s evidence was that when she was assaulted she was alone in the house with JN, having gone there to play video games and to wait for Michael to come home from school. That evidence is contradicted by Michael’s evidence that he was not involved in after-school activities and Mary’s evidence that Yvonne was picked up from after-school care every day during the relevant period between 5.00 and 5.30pm.

87. Yvonne’s evidence that JN was alone in the house after school on any of the occasions she gave evidence about is difficult to accept. Yvonne herself agreed that the appellant’s home was a “modest small family home”, that the “[r]ooms were close to each other” and that “[n]oise carried very easily” in the house. Yvonne agreed that the home was a “noisy busy home” and sometimes could be called “a madhouse”. She agreed that JN’s “parents were rarely, if ever, not home” and that JN had three sisters of school age and a brother, who were “often” but “not always” at home. She asserted that there were “a few instances” between 3.30 and 4.30pm when there was no one at home except for the appellant.

88. Michael’s evidence, which was not relevantly challenged by the Crown, was that he did not engage in after-school activities, that his mother did not work out of the home and that his father was always present at home after school. In addition Michael had three sisters who were always at home after school. It was a small house where noise travelled easily. I do not doubt that serious sexual assaults occur in circumstances where other family members are close by but Yvonne’s account that the events she gave evidence about took place in JN’s bedroom when there was nobody else at home and, at least on “occasions” the door to the bedroom was open, leaves me with a real sense of disquiet.

89. How Yvonne says that she ever came to be alone in the house with JN is also troubling. She stated:

“Q. What’s your first recollection of being in that bedroom with [Michael] not there?

A. It would be when I was - probably a day after school, primary school, and he wasn’t home yet. So I went over and I asked to see if [Michael] was there. I usually scream out from the street to see if he’s there, cause he’s usually in his bedroom, playing, and then he’ll come out and tell me to come in. But then, like, one of the times [JN] was home by himself and then he told me to come in and wait for [Michael] inside.”

90. Yvonne’s explanation that she walked in through the back door of JN’s house and went through the house and saw that she was alone with JN was not an account Yvonne had given before her cross-examination. Yvonne stated that the incidents occurred between 3.30 and 4.00pm. Yvonne also stated that the blinds in the appellant’s bedroom, which looked onto the street, were always closed during the assaults. She agreed that she had not mentioned this in her statements to the police or in her evidence in chief. Yvonne was asked how she knew that JN was home alone. The following exchange occurred:

“Q. How do you know he was at home alone?

A. Because I was there and he was the only one there.

Q. In the bedroom?

A. In the house and the bedroom.

Q. Well, did you go to every other room in the house before this incident occurred?

A. Well, I’d usually walk in through the back and then while walking through the house to go to the bedroom, you’d have to walk through the whole house. So I’d see that there’s no one there.

Q. You’d stand out the front and scream, was your evidence, wasn’t it?

A. Yeah.

Q. Where do you say thereafter that you made your entry from the back not the front?

A. I believe‑‑

Q. It’s not your sworn evidence, is it, up to this point?

A. Sorry?

Q. You haven’t said it in any question to answer to the Crown, you came through the back door. Correct?

A. No.

Q. Is it in either of your statements.

A. I believe so.

Q. Which one?

A. I - I said - I believe I would have said that I usually go in through the back.

Q. Madam, your statements are in front of you.

A. Yeah.

…

WITNESS: It doesn’t look like it’s in the statement saying that I entered through the back of the house.”

91. This was evidence about a critical matter, namely how it was Yvonne came to be in the home alone with her abuser. The fact that the evidence was only offered for the first time at the trial leads me to doubt Yvonne’s credibility and reliability.

92. I also have doubts about Yvonne’s evidence based on the fact that, on her account, she returned to the scene of the abuse hundreds of times over a three year period. In saying this, I do not doubt the attraction of video games for young people or the normalisation that can occur in relation to a young person who is the victim of repeated sexual assaults returning to the scene of that abuse. In this case, however, the evidence that Yvonne was visiting Michael’s house to play video games as she was not allowed to do so at home, at least during school weeks, was contradicted by Mary and by Victor, Yvonne’s elder brother. It is true that Mary’s evidence was somewhat tentative, but Victor gave evidence that their parents let them play video games at home without restriction. The fact that the critical explanation proffered by Yvonne about why she repeatedly returned to the scene of the terrible abuse she described is affected by doubt leaves me with a sense of disquiet about Yvonne’s account on a critical issue.

93. The evidence about the order of the incidents alleged by Yvonne also changed significantly over time. On 16 August 2018, the fourth day of the trial, Yvonne gave evidence that her memory of the assaults was that the anal intercourse incident was first in time (counts 13 and 14). Later that day, in cross-examination, Yvonne was taken to paragraph 18 of her second statement dated 12 February 2014, which stated: “In my first statement I said that the assault on the bed happened first, but after thinking about it, I believe the first instance happened the way I have described above”. According to her second statement, the first incident was when she had her hand on the appellant’s penis (counts 11 and 12), the second was when the appellant’s penis was in her mouth (counts 15 and 16), and the third was the anal intercourse (counts 13 and 14). Yvonne disagreed that changing the order of the incidents meant that she had substituted or replaced a previous memory. Of itself, such a change in recollection would not cause me significant concern but, in context, it is an additional hurdle to my acceptance of Yvonne’s reliability.

94. I have weighed the competing considerations in the evidence. I have had regard to the recorded conversations between Simon and JN which I set out at length below. There is nothing relevant in those conversations involving Yvonne. I have also had regard to the appellant’s ERISP where he denied all of the allegations put to him. That ERISP (which I have summarised below) contains clear and emphatic denials from the appellant about the allegations then made by Yvonne. It is true, as the Crown submitted, that the appellant (and to an extent Michael in his evidence) tended to downplay the extent to which Yvonne and Simon visited their home. Whilst that leads me to approach their evidence somewhat cautiously, there is nothing in that evidence supportive of JN’s guilt on counts 12, 14 and 16 of the amended indictment.

95. Finally, in relation to Yvonne, I have taken into account the fact that there were two complainants here and the jury was entitled to take tendency evidence into account. In R v Bauer (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 40; 92 ALJR 846 the High Court explained:

“[58] In a multiple complainant sexual offences case, where a question arises as to whether evidence that the accused has committed a sexual offence against one complainant is significantly probative of the accused having committed a sexual offence against another complainant, the logic of probability reasoning dictates that, for evidence of the offending against one complainant to be significantly probative of the offending against the other, there must ordinarily be some feature of or about the offending which links the two together. More specifically, absent such a feature of or about the offending, evidence that an accused has committed a sexual offence against the first complainant proves no more about the alleged offence against the second complainant than that the accused has committed a sexual offence against the first complainant. And the mere fact that an accused has committed an offence against one complainant is ordinarily not significantly probative of the accused having committed an offence against another complainant. [5] If, however, there is some common feature of or about the offending, it may demonstrate a tendency to act in a particular way proof of which increases the likelihood that the account of the offence under consideration is true.”

5. See HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [11]-[12] per Gleeson CJ, [105] per Hayne J (Gummow and Kirby JJ agreeing at [41], [59]); GBF v R [2010] VSCA 135 at [26]; BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 at [70]-[71] per Hayne J (Gummow J agreeing at [61]).

96. Having regard to all of the evidence, including my conclusions about Simon’s evidence which I set out below, I continue to harbour significant doubts about JN’s guilt. Considered as a whole I am left in a state of considerable doubt about JN’s guilt of counts 12, 14 and 16.

97. Making due allowance for the constitutional role of the jury as the arbiter of fact, even having regard to the possibility that tendency reasoning was important to the jury’s conclusion, I have concluded that the jury should have shared that doubt about the appellant’s guilt of counts 12, 14 and 16. Simply put, the weight of internal inconsistencies in Yvonne’s evidence, improbabilities on the face of that evidence and directly contradictory evidence is simply too great to accept Yvonne’s evidence as sufficiently credible or reliable to find the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. I have concluded that the jury should also have shared that reasonable doubt. It would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow those verdicts of guilty to stand. It follows that the appellant succeeds on this ground in relation to Yvonne’s evidence and he is entitled to an acquittal on counts 12, 14 and 16.

The counts relating to Simon

98. The Crown case in relation to counts 1-10 of the amended indictment relied in substantial part on the credibility and reliability of Simon’s evidence. A good deal of Simon’s evidence was simply fantastic in the literal sense. Simon’s memory of abuse by JN was fragmentary and consisted only of “flashbacks” which, in total, amounted to about 15 seconds. He explained it thus:

A. Yes.

Q. By this stage, sir, you had had previous conversations with [JN]?

A. Yes.

…

Q. ‑‑were, I want to suggest to you, getting somewhat desperate to get [JN] to confess to something, anything, weren’t you?

A. I don’t agree to that.

Q. Having listened to the calls yesterday, you don’t hear in your tone and in your text a level of desperation?

A. Correct.

Q. There was, wasn’t there?

A. Yes.

…

Q. You were prepared, on the face of that material, to allege against [JN] that he had something to do with [Patricia]’s disappearance.

A. There’s no allegation on this paperwork.

Q. Please, sir. Read the words to yourself as I read them out aloud. “It wouldn’t have happened to [Yvonne] and, god knows, maybe - maybe [Patricia] would still be around. I have no idea.” And over the page, “That’s the guilt I have on mine.”

A. Yes.

Q. What were you telling [JN] if you weren’t making some form of veiled allegation against him being involved in the [Patricia] disappearance? What were you saying it to him for?

A. By that point, I was more understanding of what the circumstances were around myself and my sister and the guilt played on me, the fact of if I did not - if I’d opened my mouth when it happened, as it happened, nothing would have happened to my sister.

Q. And how does [Patricia] get involved in this?

A. Let me finish. I didn’t finish. And because it happened around the same time as [Patricia], my mind couldn’t help but try and connect the two dots together and I tried to fight it tooth and nail for it not to be connected.

Q. And without any evidence available to you, or information, you were prepared to connect [JN] in some tenuous fashion to her disappearance?

A. No, I wasn’t prepared, but I needed to know for myself.

Q. Needed to know what?

A. To see if my lack of telling anyone at the point of my rapings happening, then it wouldn’t have happened to [Patricia] or it wouldn’t have happened to my sister.

Q. The warrant that the police were executing with your assistance was to investigate allegations of sexual assault involving yourself and [JN].

A. Okay.

Q. Did they tell you you could investigate the [Patricia] matter as well?

A. No.

Q. Why did you raise it then?

A. Because I had to know for myself.

Q. Know what? Whether he was involved or not?

A. I just needed to know that if my lack of not doing something in this world could have caused that for two other girls in this world. For one, it did; for second, I’m glad it didn’t.”

145. DSC Hayman gave evidence that the appellant was not involved in the disappearance of Patricia and that an unrelated person had been charged and was awaiting trial in relation to Patricia’s disappearance. The fact that Simon reasoned at the time that “my mind couldn’t help but try and connect the two dots together” gives rise to real doubts in my mind about his credibility. Those doubts are intensified by the fact that Simon originally told the police that Patricia’s disappearance on 27 July 1998 marked the end of the abuse he suffered.

146. SC Williams gave evidence that on 13 May 2015 the appellant attended Granville Police Station and made a complaint about Simon and Yvonne. On that day, she made the following COPS entry:

“About 4.15pm on 13/5/2015 [JN] attended Granville police station. He stated that about three weeks ago [Simon] contacted him by phone and requested to meet up with him. [JN] agreed, however he thought it was strange as he had not been in contact with [Simon] for years. They met in South Street, Granville. [Simon] began accusing [JN] of sexually assaulting him when he was a child. [JN] denied this and left.

Since the meeting, [Simon] has made numerous phone calls to [JN], both to his mobile and home phone. [JN] does not know how [Simon] came to have his phone number. [JN] states that [Simon] is calling him in excess of five times per day and wants to discuss with [JN] sexually assaulting him. [JN] further claimed that [Yvonne] called him three times today.

[JN] has sought legal advice and attended the station to report the matter. [JN] denied being involved in the sexual assault upon [Simon] and/or his sister [Yvonne].”

147. The appellant making that complaint, together with the evidence of JN’s good character, is not a mere neutral matter. If the appellant had indeed committed the alleged offences, it would be brazen indeed to attend the police station to complain that he was being harassed by Simon and Yvonne. The appellant did not know that the police were investigating Simon and Yvonne’s complaints at the time. The appellant’s actions are consistent with the conduct of an innocent man. At the very least the conduct contributes to raising reasonable doubt. It is important evidence which I take into account in determining if I have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant. As I have said, I do have such a doubt.

148. On 26 May 2015, the appellant attended Parramatta Police Station. On that day, he was arrested and cautioned, and he agreed to participate in an electronically recorded interview (“ERISP”) with DSC Hayman and DSC Nix. In cross-examination, DSC Hayman stated that the appellant was polite, not evasive and met each question asked of him during the ERISP. I will attempt to summarise the critical parts of the ERISP. At the time of the interview, JN was 36 years old and lived in the house in Granville with his parents, two sisters, his brother and his two children who were 4 years old and 11 months old at the time. The appellant moved out of his parent’s house in the period between 2006 and 2010 or 2011. JN started high school in 1992 and finished Year 12 in 1997. After he finished school, he did security work for about a year and in 1999 started his current job as a forklift driver/storeman. From 1999 and onwards, his work hours were initially from 6.00am to 2.00pm, then from 5.30am to 12.30pm, and more recently from 3.30am to 12.00pm. During high school, his friend, who I will refer to in this judgment as Nathan and who was in the same year at school, would come over to his house and he would go over to Nathan’s house. This occurred when they were in years 8 or 9 and 14 or 15 years old. JN said that he bought a video game console unit but he “hardly played with them” and that it was more Michael’s thing. He and his sisters bought games for Michael. The game console was set up in the lounge room and it was never set up in the bedroom he shared with Michael. He said that their father used to want the television all the time so he used to kick them out. If he wanted to play video games, he would go to his cousins’ house and play games there.

149. When asked whether he knew the complainants’ family, the appellant said “Not really well. I mean they were just neighbours. See each other here and there but that was about it”. He said he “would hardly see them” and he “never hung out with them”. He denied spending any time with Yvonne and agreed that he did not really know Simon other than that he was a neighbour. When asked about Victor, the appellant stated that they were just mates growing up but they drifted apart when they got to their late teens and did not spend much time together. When asked about Simon, the appellant stated “Very rarely I remember [Simon] coming over. Not at all actually. I, actually I can’t remember him coming over at all to be honest.” The appellant stated that he did not really know Simon apart from being neighbours. He said that he did not have much to do with Simon and was not friends with him, they never socialised or played video games together. Simon was not in his age group so he had no reason to hang out with him and be alone with him.

150. The appellant denied ever playing any sort of games with Simon and playing any games with Simon that involved nudity or sexual exploration, stating “No. Of course not. … That’s sickening. No way.” When asked about an extract of the recorded conversation set out at [134] above, JN said:

“Q. What can you tell me about what you just heard?

A. Like I said to, like I said to him maybe he, maybe I’m not sure like, he walked, maybe I had a shower and I walked out by accident - - -

Q. Mmm.

A. - - - and he seen me. I don’t know. And I didn’t know who was there. But um, I remember always, I was always covered. I had three sisters in the house so - - -

Q. Yeah.

A. But I like, when I said that to him what I meant was maybe he would remember something.

…

Q. That comment about experimenting and playing with each other’s penises, what - - -

A. I never say playing with each other’s penises.

Q. Ah hmm.

A. Maybe he walked in while I was masturbating. I don’t know. Maybe he would have, maybe he would have remembered something like that because I certainly don’t. That’s why I was bringing it to his attention but obviously it turns out it wasn’t the case.”

151. When asked about an extract of the same recorded conversation, which recorded him talking about dunking Michael and Simon on the bed, the appellant stated:

“A. Oh, like, I might, I might, I might have dunked him on my brother but I was never alone with him dunking him, I never dunked him on his own. Like if he came to play with my brother I’ll um, I might just give him like, a little wrestle here and there but I was never alone with the, never alone with the kid.

…

Q. So are, are you saying that this did happen this dunking, wrestling, sorry is it dunking?

A. Dunk. I don’t know. You just dunk them on the bed stuff like that. I know, I know, I know I used to wrestle with my brother a lot. Um, but I don’t remember doing it to him. But like I said I, the reason I mentioned it to him was maybe it would have rang a bell for him.

Q. Ah hmm.

A. But obviously that wasn’t the case so - - -

…

Q. … “I was probably young and done something stupid. People do that when they’re growing up.”

A. I said probably so maybe he has seen something that I can’t remember but I obviously never done that stuff to him. Maybe would have brought back a memory for him or something like that by me mentioning that.

Q. Ah hmm. O.K.

A. Like, it happened so many years ago maybe by me mentioning that to him maybe something already came to his mind. But obviously um, me dunking him and wrestling and stuff like that wasn’t the case so, but being, me getting accused of um, doing that stuff I deny all that allegations because it’s just not me. It’s not what I do.”

152. The appellant was challenged about inconsistencies between what he had said in the ERISP and in the recorded conversations. The following exchange occurred:

“Q. I, I recall your position to be that you don’t remember them ever being at your house alone or otherwise.

A. I don’t remember, no, like, I don’t remember but they might have come.

…

Q. … But that is contrary, the recording is contrary to that.

A. Yep.

Q. What’s the explanation?

A. They might have come. I don’t remember but they might have come.

Q. But that’s not what you say in the recording.

A. Well - - -

Q. You refer to them being over not may have come over.

A. Well - - -

…

Q. - - - would you agree that it sounds like somebody who’s speaking from a place of knowledge?

A. As in me you mean?

Q. Mmm.

A. No.

Q. By that I mean that you’re saying you did come over and I do remember wrestling with you and I do remember playing with you guys.

A. What I meant was like, maybe he would have remembered me doing something like that like, as in wrestling and stuff like that. I remember I used to wrestle my brother all the time.

Q. Mmm.

A. But maybe he was there too. Maybe I wrestled with him too. So by me saying that maybe it would have um, brought back something for him that’s what I meant.”

153. When first asked about Yvonne, the appellant said that he knew the name but that was it. He never spent any time with her. He said that he knew her as a neighbour but that was it. He later said that he did not remember Yvonne coming over to his house and playing games with Michael, but probably saw her once or twice. He said that she might have come to his house but he did not remember her coming, and that she might have come when he was not there. He then said that she did not come over when he was at home, “not once”.

154. The appellant said he did not know anything about Simon and Yvonne’s allegations and described a household where there would have been no opportunity for the alleged offences to have occurred. He stated that it was a home “always full of people” with “parents always at home”, and that he was “never home alone”. He emphatically denied that there was ever a situation when he was home alone.

155. The appellant denied all the allegations. He said “But I never touched those kids. I was never alone with those kids. And like I said to you before I deny all these allegations and I don’t understand none of this.”

156. Taking all of the evidence in this case into account I have come to the conclusion that Simon’s evidence was neither credible nor reliable. Simon’s evidence altered as his memory allegedly both improved and diminished. He gave inconsistent accounts of what he claimed to be a memory of a real event and attributed those significant inconsistencies as failures of his memory. Simon also had a demonstrated capacity to lie about JN.

157. This is a difficult case. I have also taken into account the fact that there were two complainants and the jury was entitled to use tendency reasoning. I have concluded, however, that the jury, acting reasonably, must have had a doubt about the appellant’s guilt on each of the counts upon which he was convicted. Each of the matters I have identified about Simon’s evidence, by themselves, would not necessarily lead me to conclude that these are unreasonable verdicts. In this case the weight of internal inconsistencies in Simon’s evidence, improbabilities on the face of that evidence and directly contradictory evidence was simply too great for the jury properly to accept Simon’s evidence as sufficiently credible or reliable to find the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The matters I have identified, working together, should have left the jury with a doubt about whether the Crown had established that JN was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

158. In those circumstances, I am persuaded that it was not open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offences on which he was convicted. Accordingly, the verdicts of the jury, in respect of counts 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10, are unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. It follows that ground 1 of the appeal must succeed and the appellant be acquitted.

Ground 2 – Failure to interview or call witnesses

159. Despite the conclusion I have reached on ground 1, for abundant caution and on a contingent basis I will briefly address ground 2.

Appellant’s submissions

160. The appellant submitted that there was a substantial miscarriage of justice in that important eyewitnesses were neither interviewed by police nor called as witnesses in the prosecution case and consequently the jury was deprived of information highly pertinent to the central issue in the trial.

161. The appellant submitted that a central issue in the case related to the geography of the two houses, and the frequency and circumstances of visits between the children of the two families. The credibility of the allegations made more than a decade after the alleged events depended significantly on whether, after school and at other times, the appellant’s family home was a busy, noisy place with people regularly in the house or whether it was empty of adults or other children, so that the complainants might be with the appellant alone and allow the appellant the opportunity to commit the alleged offences.

162. The appellant submitted that no statement was ever taken from the appellant’s parents or three sisters. It was submitted that these potential witnesses could have given evidence relating to the frequency of the complainants’ visits and the circumstances in which the complainants may or may not have visited the appellant’s home over the years. The appellant’s parents were important witnesses since the evidence is undisputed that his father was not working and his mother was a stay-at-home parent during the relevant period.

163. The appellant submitted that, since the frequency and circumstances of the complainants’ visits to the appellant’s home was of critical importance, the absence of testimony of these witnesses in the prosecution case left a major gap. This absence represents such an irregularity that the trial was flawed and the convictions vitiated.

164. The appellant submitted that the significance of the failure to investigate and to call these possible witnesses is more readily seen from the evidence as to the location, size and occupancy of the appellant’s house which showed that it was modest and that the “busyness” of the family home occupied by two parents, two sons and three daughters was inevitable.

165. The appellant submitted that the police have a duty to investigate what evidentiary contribution witnesses can make and present relevant witnesses to the court. The appellant’s parents were present at court throughout the trial. No explanation was presented to the court to suggest that the appellant’s family was unwilling or unavailable to give evidence, or likely to be unhelpful or untruthful. The Crown did not evaluate the appellant’s family to form a view (which the Crown would have been entitled to take) that their contribution might not be helpful. It was not a valid reason that the Crown did not regard the appellant’s family as truthful since the witnesses were never interviewed.

166. The appellant submitted that the failure to investigate the potential evidence of the appellant’s family who lived in the house at all relevant times, taken into account with the other evidence, means that the jury should have had doubt about the guilt of the appellant. This ground alone should be accepted as a basis for disturbing the verdicts but, in the alternative, this ground goes to ground 1.

Crown submissions

167. The Crown submitted that a decision of a prosecutor not to call a particular person as a witness will only constitute a ground for setting aside a conviction if, when viewed against the conduct of the trial as a whole, it is seen to give rise to a miscarriage of justice. The Crown acknowledged that a prosecutor may not ethically decline to call a witness merely on the basis that the witness is in the “camp” of the accused. However, the Crown submitted that in the present case no such determination was made.

168. The Crown submitted that the prosecution called Michael to give evidence and Michael gave evidence generally supportive of the appellant’s case on the issue of opportunity. It was submitted that the Crown prosecutor in his closing address did not invite the jury to reject Michael’s evidence. Rather, the Crown prosecutor’s submission was limited to the following:

“So, opportunity runs seven days of the week and of course the pornographic video … That was on a Sunday. The Crown says that there was opportunity. Maybe it was a limited opportunity, but we’re talking about things over a four to five year period.”

169. The Crown submitted that Yvonne’s evidence on this issue was consistent with Michael’s evidence. Yvonne gave evidence that the appellant’s parents were rarely, if ever, not home, and that the appellant’s siblings were also usually at home.

170. The Crown submitted that it is not known what evidence the appellant’s parents and sisters would have given. At most, it could be said that they might have given evidence corroborative of the evidence of Michael and Yvonne. The impugned witnesses were not alleged to have been eyewitnesses to the assaults, only witnesses who are said to be in a position to give evidence as to the “busyness” of the house and opportunity. Michael’s evidence was also uncontested, and consistent with Yvonne’s evidence. In these circumstances the appellant’s parents and sisters’ evidence was not necessary to unfold the narrative and give a complete account of the events upon which the prosecution was based. The absence of their evidence was not such as to cause a miscarriage of justice.

169. The Crown submitted that the conduct of the trial as a whole must include the conduct of defence counsel. Although r 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW) does not apply, the Crown submitted that the underlying common law principles reflected in r 4 apply, namely that an accused person should not reserve points of appeal, is bound by the tactical and forensic decisions of his or her counsel, and the failure of counsel to raise an issue with the trial judge is indicative of the issue not being seen to cause a miscarriage in the atmosphere of the trial.

170. The Crown submitted that, prior to closing addresses, the only mention that had been made of these witnesses was in questions asked of DSC Hayman in cross-examination. DSC Hayman agreed that the appellant in his ERISP had “indicated certain aspects of his life that allowed potential investigation to take place”, and that the appellant had nominated employers, spoken about his cousins’ family and his friend Nathan, and nominated his parents and sisters as still living in the house. DSC Hayman was not asked whether she had attempted to interview any of these persons or for the reasons why no such interview was sought. In his closing address, defence counsel made reference to the fact that Michael was the only member of the appellant’s family spoken to by the police and to Simon’s evidence that the appellant’s parents had been at church on the morning of one of the alleged offences but had not been spoken to about this event. Following the addresses, defence counsel sought a Mahmood direction in respect of witnesses not called by the Crown (that is, where a witness, who might have been expected to be called and to give evidence on a matter, is not called by the Crown, a jury is entitled to take into account that there was no evidence from that witness in deciding whether or not there is a reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt: Mahmood v State of Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1). Defence counsel did not press the matter further.

171. The Crown submitted that in the present case defence counsel did not request that the Crown prosecutor interview or call the appellant’s parents or sisters, despite being in a position to readily ascertain the evidence that the witnesses could give. Defence counsel did not request the trial judge to invite the Crown prosecutor to reconsider any decision not to call those witnesses. Defence counsel took forensic advantage of the absence of those witnesses. It was submitted orally that the absence of a request to call the witnesses demonstrates that, in the atmosphere of the trial, defence counsel did not consider that those witnesses were required.

Consideration of Ground 2 – Failure to interview or call witnesses

174. A decision of a prosecutor not to call a particular person as a witness will only constitute a ground for setting aside a conviction if, when viewed against the conduct of the trial as a whole, it is seen to give rise to a miscarriage of justice: R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575; [1984] HCA 38.

175. I have concluded that, viewed against the conduct of the trial as a whole, the failure to call other members of the appellant’s family did not give rise to a miscarriage of justice. An important feature of the trial is that experienced defence counsel did not request that the Crown interview or call the appellant’s parents or sisters. There is no evidence that the Crown would have refused such a request. Given the conduct of the trial, which I have studied at length, there is every reason to think that the Crown would, if asked, have called the appellant’s parents and sisters to give evidence. Not only that, there was unchallenged evidence in any event from more than one witness in the trial about the busy and crowded circumstances of the home of the appellant. In those circumstances, the absence of the witnesses was not such as to produce a miscarriage of justice.

176. Ground 2 should be dismissed.

Ground 3 – Amendment of the indictment

177. Despite the conclusion I have reached on ground 1, for abundant caution and on a contingent basis I will briefly address ground 3.

Appellant’s submissions

178. The appellant submitted that the indictment was substantially rewritten at the close of the Crown case, producing such a divergence between the case particularised, presented on arraignment and opened, that the trial was irregular and not a fair trial, and there was a miscarriage of justice.

179. The appellant submitted that, by the close of the Crown case, the conflicts between the complainants’ evidence at trial and their statements that had informed the original indictment were such that either the indictment had to be restructured or the trial abandoned. For this reason, additional alternative charges were presented ex officio and the indictment amended.

180. One of the counts in the amended indictment was a more serious charge than that pleaded in the original indictment. The appellant had anticipated and prepared for a trial on charges carrying specific maximum penalties, and this major change to the Crown case towards the end of the trial exposed the appellant to more significant penalties of imprisonment.

181. The appellant submitted that the expansion of the charges in the amended indictment was capable of giving the jury the idea that the case against the appellant had become more serious and more powerful. The amended indictment was significantly longer than the original indictment. There was a cascade of alternative verdicts. It was necessary for the trial judge to give detailed and complex further directions. While it is true that the trial judge gave directions on this issue, this could not remove the problem. The appellant submitted that the amendment of the allegations in terms of time rather than in terms of the physical nature of the alleged conduct also does not cure this problem. The appellant submitted orally that the amendment may not have been that radically different but nonetheless the age of a child during the offending can be critically important for sentencing purposes and relevant in terms of who was where and when.

182. The appellant submitted that leave is not required to argue this ground of appeal under the Criminal Appeal Rules. The trial judge’s decision to permit the Crown to amend the indictment does not fall within the scope of r 4 because it was not a direction, an omission to direct or a decision as to the admissibility of evidence.

183. The appellant submitted that, if the Court were to conclude that leave is required or that the ground should be rejected because defence counsel consented to the amendment, the Court should consider it in the context of the procedural history of the matter. It was submitted that substantial delays and interruptions had affected the matter, such as an earlier trial date being vacated, the first jury being discharged due to inappropriate remarks by the Crown in his opening address, and the second jury being discharged because a juror became ill. If an objection to the amended indictment had been made and upheld, it would have necessitated the discharge of the jury. The appellant was under personal and financial stress and wanted to avoid further delay to the proceedings. He was not a wealthy person and was privately represented. The appellant submitted that his decision not to object must be seen in this context and it would be unfair to hold it against him.

184. The appellant submitted that the late amendment of the indictment and re-arraignment led to an irregular and unfair trial, and that the convictions should be set aside. However, if the Court were to regard this ground as insufficient, the confusion caused by the late amendment was such that this ground should be taken into account in relation to the general ground 1.

Crown submissions

185. The Crown submitted that the amended indictment contained more counts and expanded the timeframe of the alleged offences, but that the alleged acts remained the same. Each amendment and ex officio count related only to the expansion of the dates of the alleged offences. In some instances, this required the laying of an ex officio count. It was submitted that all but one of the ex officio counts concerned an equivalent or less serious charge. The one ex officio count for which the Crown placed a more serious charge was count 7 in the amended indictment. Count 7 alleged an offence contrary to s 66A of the Crimes Act. Count 8 (in the alternative to count 7) alleged an offence contrary to s 66C. Counts 7 and 8 replaced count 4 on the original indictment which alleged an offence contrary to s 66C. The Crown noted that the jury found the appellant not guilty in respect of count 7, the more serious count, and found the appellant guilty of count 8, which relied on the section originally alleged.

186. The Crown submitted that the addition of the alternative counts did not cause a miscarriage of justice. Whilst the alternatives were not placed on the indictment until shortly before closing addresses, the need to amend the indictment was foreshadowed at the time of the complainants’ evidence. On 16 August 2018, the fourth day of the trial, the Crown prosecutor indicated that he proposed to amend the indictment at the close of the Crown case. The amendments were not inconsistent with the way in which the Crown prosecutor had opened the Crown case. Since the appellant’s case was that the alleged events did not occur, there was no prejudice to the appellant occasioned by the way in which the defence case was conducted. It was not unfair or oppressive for the Crown to rely on the alternative counts simply because it might deprive the appellant of a chance of an acquittal on the principal charges.

187. The Crown submitted that it is necessary for the appellant to demonstrate that the amendment of the indictment has caused a miscarriage of justice: Criminal Appeal Act, s 6. The appellant did not allege that the late amendment caused a miscarriage. The appellant simply submitted that the late amendment led to an “irregular and unfair trial” without particularising the respect in which the trial is said to be “unfair”. It cannot be said that the trial judge erred in law in “permitting” the amendment of the indictment. Orally the Crown submitted that the indictment should not have been amended so late and that it was certainly irregular, but submitted that irregularity does not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

188. The Crown submitted that, as defence counsel consented to the amendment, the amendment was authorised by statute and there was no occasion for the trial judge to rule on the amended indictment: Criminal Procedure Act, s 20(1)(b). In those circumstances, it is necessary to demonstrate miscarriage.

189. The Crown accepted that r 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules does not strictly apply. However, it was submitted that the underlying common law principles reflected in r 4 apply, namely that an accused person should not reserve points of appeal and is bound by the tactical and forensic decisions of his or her counsel. In the present case, defence counsel made a deliberate decision to consent to the amendment and acknowledged that there was a forensic advantage in pointing out to the jury the variations of the dates in the Crown case. As there is a reasonable explanation for defence counsel’s consent to the amendment, a miscarriage of justice has not been established.

190. The Crown submitted that the expansion of the dates on the amended indictment is irrelevant to the determination of the unreasonableness of the verdicts in ground 1. That determination is an enquiry about the sufficiency of the evidence, not about trial procedures.

Consideration of Ground 3 – Amendment of the indictment

191. To succeed on this ground, it would be necessary for the appellant to demonstrate that the amendment of the indictment has caused a miscarriage of justice: Criminal Appeal Act, s 6.

192. Experienced trial counsel, after having the opportunity to take instructions, did not oppose the amendment of the indictment. No doubt, as counsel candidly told the trial judge and the jury, this was, in part, due to forensic advantages perceived by counsel about so dramatic a change in the Crown case. JN is bound by the tactical and forensic decisions of his counsel. As there is a reasonable explanation for defence counsel’s consent to the amendment, I am not persuaded that a miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the amendment.

193. No different conclusion arises by reason of the decision of this Court in R v Westerman (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 19 July 1991, unrep) which was brought to the attention of the Court by junior counsel for JN after the decision had been reserved. That was a case where, bearing in mind the way the case had been fought to that point about a specific date, the effect of the amendment to the indictment was found to give rise to irretrievable prejudice. No such issue arises here.

194. Having reflected on the matter, I have also concluded that the Crown is correct that the issue of the amended indictment is irrelevant to the determination of the unreasonableness of the verdicts in ground 1. The unreasonable verdict ground requires the Court to enquire about the sufficiency of the evidence, not about trial procedures.

195. Ground 3 should be dismissed.

Conclusion and proposed orders

196. For the reasons given I propose the following orders:

1. Appeal allowed on ground 1.

2. Dismiss grounds 2 and 3.

3. Set aside the appellant’s conviction on counts 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14 and 16 of the amended indictment and in place thereof order that a verdict of acquittal be entered.

197. BUTTON J: I have had the considerable benefit of reading the judgment of Payne JA in draft.

198. I agree with all that his Honour has written about grounds 2 and 3, and have nothing to add.

199. I also agree with all that his Honour has written about the legal principles to be applied in considering ground 1.

200. I also agree with Payne JA with regard to the counts pertaining to the complainant Yvonne. And I say that not forgetting that this was not a trial that featured one complainant. But the cumulation of factors recounted at [79] to [97] of the judgment of his Honour compels me to experience a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant of those offences, and it is a doubt that I believe the jury must also have experienced, despite its undoubted advantages over a judge reading transcript in Chambers.

201. The position with regard to the complainant Simon is less clear-cut, for the following reasons.

202. When a sexual assault complainant shows signs of psychological or psychiatric disturbance, that can give rise to a “chicken and egg” question; namely, whether on the one hand those problems may corroborate the commission of the offences by being the consequences of them, or whether on the other hand they may call into question the reliability and credibility of the complainant. Here, it could have been the former.

203. The pretext calls contained some material that, in my opinion, had the potential to be regarded as inculpatory, albeit in the overarching context of firm denials.

204. The evidence that Simon gave of the offences themselves was detailed and not inherently incredible.

205. Inconsistencies and mistakes in a case such as this may be able to be explained by the passage of time and the age of a complainant.

206. Each of the factors recounted by Payne JA on its own could not, in my opinion, lead to success of the ground.

207. However, after an extended period of reflection, I have come to the view that the cumulative effect of those factors leads to the verdicts pertaining to Simon being unreasonable and unable to be supported as well.

208. In coming to that view, the irrational and groundless belief of Simon about there being a connection between the appellant and the disappearance of Patricia is of particular significance to me. So is the fact that one can infer that the jury took into account as tendency evidence its satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant of the counts pertaining to Yvonne in support of its verdicts with regard to the counts pertaining to Simon, when it should not have been so satisfied of the former.

209. In short, on my own assessment of the entirety of the evidence, I agree with the orders proposed by Payne JA.

210. LONERGAN J: I have had the considerable benefit of reading the judgment of Payne JA in draft and the additional comments of Button J.

211. I agree that grounds 2 and 3 of this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons stated by Payne JA.

212. Ground 1 was for obvious reasons a more difficult decision to make but having carefully considered all the evidence and reflected at length, I have reached the view that these verdicts are unreasonable and cannot be supported; the jury ought to have been left with a reasonable doubt as to whether guilt had been established to the necessary standard

213. I agree with and adopt the conclusion of Button J at [200] that it is the cumulation of the factors recounted by Payne JA at [79] to [97] with respect to the complainant Yvonne that leads to that view.

214. With respect to the complainant Simon, I agree with the analysis of the evidence of Payne JA at [98] to [130] and the conclusions set out at [156] and [157] that there were internal inconsistencies and improbabilities in Simon’s evidence that lead to reasonable doubt.

215. I also specifically agree with the observations of Button J at [202] to [206].

216. There are two additional matters that need comment. Contrary to the conclusion reached by Payne JA at [139] but in a similar vein to the view expressed by Button J at [203], I regard JN’s responses to the matters raised by Simon in the face to face meeting and the pretext calls in April 2015 as suggestive of guilty knowledge on the part of JN that inappropriate activity took place involving or in the presence of Simon. But this is not sufficient to alter my assessment of the evidence overall and is not sufficient to allay my serious doubt that the Crown has proven beyond reasonable doubt the offences of which JN was convicted. There is nothing said by JN in the exchanges with Simon which can be construed as an admission to any of the specific charges.

217. In relation to JN attending the police station to report the recent contact from Simon in May 2015, whilst I agree with Payne JA that the actions can be consistent with the actions of an innocent man [147], they are also consistent with the actions of a guilty man who is seeking to out-manoeuvre his victims by approaching the police to create an impression that he has nothing to hide. For that reason I consider this event to be neutral, and not one that adds to reasonable doubt. This is particularly so given the obvious attempts by JN in the early parts of his record of interview on 26 May 2015 to distance himself from any previous involvement with Simon, including stating that he “can’t remember him coming over at all to be honest”, despite acknowledging to Simon in his conversation with him just a few weeks earlier that Simon did come to his house, including to JN’s room and that JN “wrestled” with him and that JN “probably walked around naked” and Simon “probably saw” that. It was only when confronted later in the record of interview with the recorded conversations with Simon that JN moved away from that position.

218. However on my own assessment of the whole of the evidence, I agree with the order proposed by Payne JA.

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Endnotes

Decision last updated: 04 December 2019