FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| JATA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 1557 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Partner (Temporary) (class UK) (subclass 820) visa – whether the Tribunal failed to consider a substantial and clearly articulated submission – whether the Tribunal made an irrational or illogical finding – whether the Applicant was denied procedural fairness – jurisdictional error not established – Application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.65 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl. 820.211(2)(d)(ii) of Schedule 2, criteria 3001, 3003 and 3004 of Schedule 3 |
| Applicant: | TERENC JATA |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | MLG 2085 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Blake |
| Hearing date: | 20 May 2019 |
| Date of last submission: | 20 May 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 7 June 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the applicant: | Ms Grinberg |
| Solicitors for the applicant: | Lawson Bayly |
| Counsel for the first respondent: | Mr Murano |
| Counsel for the second respondent: | No appearance |
| Solicitors for the respondents: | DLA Piper |
ORDERS
The application filed on 27 September 2016 and amended on 25 January 2019 be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $7,467.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 2085 of 2016
| TERENC JATA |
First Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
First respondent
And
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) on 23 August 2016. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the Applicant a Partner (Temporary) (class UK) (subclass 820) visa (‘the Visa’).
For the reasons set out below, I have decided to dismiss the application for review.
Background
The Applicant is an Albanian national. He first arrived in Australia on 23 August 2012 on a subclass 420 (entertainment) visa which came to an end on 28 October 2012.
On 21 November 2012, the Applicant attempted to lodge a partner visa. This visa application was invalid. A consequence of this was that the Applicant did not hold a visa for a period of time between November 2012 and June 2013, however despite this, continued to reside in Australia.
On 20 June 2013, the Applicant lodged a valid partner visa. The visa was sponsored by Ms Analisa Albano on the basis that she was the Applicant’s spouse.
The…
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- Case
- [2019] FCCA 1557
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had engaged in an active intellectual process and given proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the applicant's claim concerning his migration history and its relevance to "compelling reasons." This involved determining if the claim was substantial and clearly articulated, and if the Tribunal's reasons demonstrated a failure to exercise its jurisdiction in the manner contemplated by statute.
Judge Blake found that the applicant's claim regarding his migration history was neither substantial nor clearly articulated. This conclusion was based on the applicant's initial submission that his migration history was irrelevant to the determination of compelling reasons, and his refusal to answer questions on the matter due to potential self-incrimination. The Court also noted the speculative nature of the claim, which relied on hypothetical future actions of a delegate. Applying the principles from *Singh v Minister for Home Affairs* [2019] FCAFC 3, the Court held that a decision-maker must engage in an active intellectual process with substantial, clearly articulated arguments. However, the applicant's conduct and the speculative nature of his claim meant it did not meet this threshold.
The Court ordered that the application for judicial review be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The post hearing submission is contained in an email from the Applicant’s representative dated 18 August 2016 (Court Book page 262). The relevant extract is set out below:‘In this regard, the “best case scenario” for the sponsor, in the event of a decision to affirm, appears to be that she will be unable to pay the rent on the matrimonial home and her extended family will then attempt to make room for her to live (probably for a very extended period of time, given the applicant’s immigration history) at the 5\86 Kirkham Road Property.’ …. (emphasis added) In support of the submission that the Tribunal had failed to consider the claim, the Applicant relied on the decision of Justice Bromberg in MZYPZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 478, and the comments at paragraph 19 of that decision in respect of the need for the Tribunal engage in an ‘active intellectual process’ leading to genuine consideration. It was also submitted by the Applicant, in response to a submission made by the First Respondent, that firstly, any requirement for there to be probative material on this issue before the Tribunal was minimal. Secondly, there was probative material before the Tribunal to support this submission. The Applicant says, to this Court, that the claim in the Tribunal in relation an unusually long period of separation was a substantial and clearly articulated claim. I find otherwise. I have already referred to the submissions made by the Applicant at the outset of the Tribunal hearing when he indicated that he would not be answering any questions about his past migration history on the basis that he might incriminate himself. The Applicant, however, then went further than this. He submitted to the Tribunal that his past migration history was not relevant to the determination of ‘compelling reasons’: see the decision of the Tribunal at paragraph [17] on page 281 of the Court Book, and also page 36, line 14 of the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, which is set out below:‘Were consideration or regard to be had to the applicant’s visa history, prior to entering that relationship, and prior to the relevantly compelling circumstances arising, we really would say that that’s just a purely irrelevant consideration.’ The other factor which in my view supports a finding that the claim was not a substantial one is the speculative nature of it. It was a claim based on speculation about what a delegate of the Minister may or may not do at a certain point in time when assessing any application or future application that the Applicant might make in circumstances when the Applicant had said his migration history was not relevant. For these reasons the claim was neither substantial nor clearly articulated. The next issue raised by this Ground is the extent to which a decision-maker must give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to matters before it. This is the subject of a recent decision from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. In Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3, a Full Court summarised the key principles that need to be considered. The key paragraphs are paragraphs [34] to [38] of the decision, extracts of which are as follows:‘34. The principle is directed to the question whether the jurisdiction reposed in the decision-maker is in fact exercised and exercised in a way which is authorised by the statute. If the decision-maker does not actively consider a mandatory consideration, the decision-maker has not exercised the jurisdiction the statute contemplated the decision-maker would exercise. Likewise, a Tribunal charged with “review” may commit jurisdictional error in failing to exercise the jurisdiction it was contemplated it would exercise, if – for example – it does not engage in an active intellectual process or give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to:• a “substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts” – see: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 at [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, with whom Hayne J agreed;• a claim “raised by the evidence and the contentions before it which, if resolved in one way, would or could be dispositive of the review” – see: NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [63] per Black CJ and French and Selway JJ; or• a matter “that is an essential integer to an applicant’s claim or that would be dispositive of the review” – see: ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru (2018) 360 ALR 228 at [14] per Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ.35. However, it is important to recognise that the ultimate concern is with the identification of jurisdictional error: the Tribunal not performing the function entrusted to it or not performing it in an authorised way. The Full Court in Carrascalao at [32] cautioned against allowing this ground for judicial review to slide into merits review:…36. The principle does not require the decision-maker to refer in the reasons to every piece of evidence and every contention made: Carrascalao at [45]; ET067 at [13]. However, if a critical piece of evidence or a particular issue is not referred to, that fact might be one from which an inference can appropriately be drawn that the decision-maker did not consider it. That, in turn, may be relevant to whether the decision-maker engaged actively with the matter.37. In determining whether the decision-maker had an active intellectual engagement, the following matters are relevant:(1) First, the degree of consideration which is necessary for the jurisdiction to have been exercised, and exercised in a manner which is authorised, is affected by the centrality of the matter, which is said was not engaged with, to the issues in the prominence the matter assumed.(2) Secondly, in examining the reasons of the decision-maker to determine whether there was a lack of intellectual engagement:(a) the reasons should not be scrutinised “minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error”: Carrascalao at [45] quoting Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at [30];(b) it is necessary to read the reasons in light of the whole of the case as it was before the Tribunal, which might have involved more issues that are raised, and more evidence than is, before courts on judicial review and subsequent appeal. The failure to mention a particular paragraph of a particular piece of evidence should be analysed by reference to the whole of the material before the Tribunal and its prominence assessed by reference to all of the issues in the way in which the matter was conducted in the Tribunal; and(c) a conclusion that the decision-maker has not engaged in an active intellectual process “will not lightly be made and must be supported by clear evidence, bearing in mind that the judicial review applicants carry the onus of proof”: Carrascalao at [48].’