Jargon Pty Ltd v Good Earth Garden Products Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   JARGON PTY LTD -v- GOOD EARTH GARDEN PRODUCTS PTY LTD [2006] WASC 282

CORAM:   MASTER NEWNES

HEARD:   30 OCTOBER 2006

DELIVERED          :   15 DECEMBER 2006

FILE NO/S:   COR 141 of 2006

BETWEEN:   JARGON PTY LTD (ACN 008 956 214)

Plaintiff

AND

GOOD EARTH GARDEN PRODUCTS PTY LTD (ACN 008 999 120)
Defendant

Catchwords:

Corporations - Application to set aside statutory demand - Error in creditor's address for service - No substantial injustice - Judgment debt - Demand for less than actual amount of judgment debt - Whether demand must be accompanied by verifying affidavit - Whether genuine dispute as to debt - Default judgment - No extant application to set aside judgment

Legislation:

Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA), s 8
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 457J, s 459E, s 459G, s 459J
Corporations Law, s 460(2)(a)
Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA), s 4, s 10, s 12

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr S V Smith

Defendant:     Mr A J Prentice

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Lawton Gillon

Defendant:     Mossensons

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Aldridge Electrical Industries Pty Ltd v Mobitec AB [2001] NSWSC 823

Anderson Formrite Pty Ltd v CASC Hire Pty Ltd (2006) 24 ACLC 154

Daewoo Australia Pty Ltd v Suncorp Metway Ltd [2000] NSWCA 35

Energy Equity Corporation Ltd v Sinedie Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 419

Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508

MEC Import Sales Pty Ltd v Iozzelli SRL (1998) 29 ACSR 229

Palmbay Nominees Pty Ltd v Fowler [2003] WASCA 217

Quitstar Pty Ltd v Cooline Pacific Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 329

Quitstar Pty Ltd v Cooline Pacific Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 402

Re Ad-A-Cab Holdings Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of Qld (Mackenzie J); 25 October 1996

Re International Business Solutions Pty Ltd (1992) 10 ACLC 1247

Topfelt Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1993) 120 ALR 155

Case(s) also cited:

Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council v Four Seasons Construction Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 299

Mibor Investments Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] 2 VR 290

PDR Pty Ltd v Cottesloe Constructions Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 62

Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 681

Victor Tunevitsch Pty Ltd v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1994) 12 ACLC 963

  1. MASTER NEWNES:  This is an application by the plaintiff ("Jargon") to set aside a statutory demand served by the defendant ("Good Earth") claiming the sum of $50,000 pursuant to a judgment obtained in the Magistrates Court.  The statutory demand was served on or about 15 August 2006.

  2. It is necessary first to turn to the circumstances in which the statutory demand came to be served.

  3. On or about 9 May 2006, Good Earth commenced proceedings against Jargon in the Magistrates Court.  Good Earth's claim was for the sum of $44,403.73 said to be owing by Jargon for goods sold to…

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Details
Case
[2006] WASC 282
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jargon Pty Ltd sought to enforce a judgment debt against Good Earth Garden Products Pty Ltd by issuing a statutory demand. Good Earth sought to set aside the demand, arguing that the creditor's address was incorrect and that the amount claimed was less than the judgment debt. The case was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues were whether the error in the address for service warranted setting aside the statutory demand and whether the demand must be accompanied by a verifying affidavit when the amount claimed is less than the actual judgment debt. The court also considered whether there was a genuine dispute as to the debt.

The court found that the error in the creditor's address did not warrant setting aside the statutory demand because Good Earth was aware of the correct address and the demand was served at that address. The court relied on the principle that theoretical possibilities of depriving the debtor of a right or opportunity are not sufficient to render the demand ineffective if there is a contrary fact. The court also held that the difference between the amount of the judgment debt and the amount claimed did not mean that a verifying affidavit had to be served with the statutory demand. The court emphasised that the amount claimed was less than the judgment debt and that no substantial injustice would result from not setting aside the demand. The court also noted that there was no genuine dispute as to the amount claimed, as it was the subject of an existing judgment.

The court dismissed Good Earth's application to set aside the statutory demand and ordered Good Earth to pay Jargon's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Good Earth argued that the contention as to the incorrect address was not open to Jargon because it was not a matter raised in the original affidavit in support of the application to set aside the statutory demand. Counsel referred to Energy Equity Corporation Ltd v Sinedie Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 419 and submitted that if there is no mention of a ground in the supporting affidavit, it is not open to the debtor to rely upon that ground. It was argued that, in any event, the error in the address did not give rise to substantial injustice within the meaning of s 459J of the Act. Jargon was well aware of the address of Good Earth's solicitors and indeed served the application and supporting affidavit at that address within the 21‑day time limit. It was submitted on behalf of Good Earth that the difference between the amount of the judgment debt and the amount claimed did not mean that a supporting affidavit had to be served with the statutory demand. Anderson Formrite Pty Ltd v CASC Hire Pty Ltd (supra) was not authority for such a proposition, but depended upon its particular facts. In that case, extraneous events or circumstances had intervened causing the amount to change, whereas in the present case the basis of the claim remained the judgment debt but the amount had been reduced in the belief that that was necessary so that the amount remained within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court. In any event, no substantial injustice would be caused if the statutory demand was not set aside as the amount claimed is less, rather than more, than Jargon is obliged to pay and Jargon cannot be confused as to the basis of the obligation to pay. Moreover, as Jargon has already failed to pay a sum of $44,000 into the Magistrates Court in order to have the default judgment set aside, there was never any prospect that the demand would have been complied with. It was submitted that there could be no genuine dispute as to the amount claimed. It was the subject of an existing judgment of the Magistrates Court, in respect of which there was now no application to set it aside, two previous applications having been dismissed. I do not consider that the error in Good Earth's address for service would warrant the statutory demand being set aside. In Re International Business Solutions Pty Ltd (1992) 10 ACLC 1247, the demand served under s 460(2)(a) of the Corporations Law failed to specify the creditor's address. However, the debtor was aware of that address. The question was whether the omission of the address rendered the demand ineffective. It was held that it did not. The fact the debtor was aware of the creditor's address could not be ignored. Whilst the omission from the demand of the address of the creditor was capable of having the effect of depriving the debtor of a right or opportunity to exercise a right, mere theoretical possibilities were not to be given effect in the face of a contrary fact, whether obvious to the Court from the demand itself or established by the evidence.