FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| JARAVAZA & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2013] FCCA 68 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of Migration Review Tribunal – whether PAM3 inconsistent with Regulations – whether Tribunal erred in applying the policy – jurisdictional error – relief granted on that basis –whether Tribunal discriminated against the applicant – declaration not made. |
| Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.15AB Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), ss.31, 43 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 476 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.1 |
| Cases cited: Applicant S 214 of 2012vAttorney-Generalof Australia [2004] FCA 1635 Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 Chumbairux v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1986) 74 ALR 480 Elias v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 845; (2002) 123 FCR 499 An v Minster for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 160 FCR 480 Xiu Zhen v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 1142 Howard v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 547 Re Drake and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 |
| First Applicant: | VENGESAI STEIN JARAVAZA |
| Second Applicant: | GLADYS ELIZABETH JARAVAZA |
| Third Applicant: | FADZAI GWENDOLINE JARAVAZA |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 859 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 26 February 2013 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 26 February 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 19 April 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr S Lloyd of senior counsel with Mr J King of counsel. |
| Solicitors for the Applicants: | Fragomen Solicitors |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr G Kennett of senior counsel with Ms A Mitchelmore of counsel. |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
ORDERS
A writ in the nature of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent, dated 27 March 2012, to affirm the decision of the delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant the applicants each an Employer Nomination (Residence) (Class BW) visa.
A writ in the nature of mandamus issue remitting the matter to the Tribunal and requiring it to determine according to law the application made to it by the applicants for review of the delegate’s decision.
The application made on 18 April 2012, and amended on 4 July 2012, is otherwise dismissed
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 859 of 2012
| VENGESAI STEIN JARAVAZA |
First Applicant
| GLADYS ELIZABETH JARAVAZA |
Second Applicant
| FADZAI GWENDOLINE JARAVAZA |
Thirds Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made on 18 April 2012, pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), amended on 4 July 2012, seeking review of the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 27 March 2012, to affirm the decision of the respondent Minister’s delegate (“the delegate”) to refuse the grant of Employer Nominated (Residence) (Class BW) visas to the applicants.
Background
The applicants are…
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- Case
- [2013] FCCA 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court were whether the policy document PAM3 was inconsistent with the relevant Migration Regulations, and if so, whether the Migration Review Tribunal had erred in law by applying that policy. A further issue was whether the Tribunal's actions constituted unlawful discrimination against the applicant on the ground of his age, contrary to the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth).
Judge Nicholls examined sections 31 and 43 of the Age Discrimination Act 2004. Section 31 makes it unlawful to discriminate on the ground of age in the administration of Commonwealth laws and programs. However, section 43(1) provides an exception, stating that Part 2 of the Act does not make unlawful anything done in relation to the administration of the Migration Act 1958 or regulations made under it. The applicants argued that PAM3 imposed a stricter "exceptional circumstances" test for those aged 60 and over, compared to those aged 45 to under 60, thereby creating a discriminatory policy.
The Court found that the exception in section 43(1) of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 meant that the provisions of Part 2 of that Act, which prohibit age discrimination, did not apply to the administration of the Migration Act. Therefore, the applicants' claim of unlawful age discrimination under the Age Discrimination Act could not succeed. However, the Court did grant relief on the basis of jurisdictional error, finding that the Tribunal had erred in its application of the policy.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Further, s.31 of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) (“the ADA”) is in the following terms:“Administration of Commonwealth laws and programs(1) It is unlawful for a person who:(a) performs any function or exercises any power under a Commonwealth law or for the purposes of a Commonwealth program; or(b) has any other responsibility for the administration of a Commonwealth law or the conduct of a Commonwealth program;to discriminate against another person on the ground of the other person's age in the performance of that function, the exercise of that power or the fulfilment of that responsibility.Definition(2) In this section:"Commonwealth program" means a program conducted by or on behalf of the Commonwealth Government.”[Emphasis in the original.] Section 43(1) of the ADA is in the following terms:“(1) This Part does not make unlawful anything done by a person in relation to the administration of:(a) the Migration Act 1958 ; or(b) the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946; or (c) a regulation or any other instrument made under either of those Acts.” At the final hearing, Mr. S. Lloyd of senior counsel, with Mr. J. King of counsel, appeared for the applicants. Mr. G. Kennett of senior counsel, with Ms. A. Mitchelmore of counsel, appeared for the first respondent. The Court had before it the Court Book and written submissions filed on behalf of both parties. [I note that subsequent to the filing of written submissions, the applicants’ legal representatives provided an amended copy of the written submissions to the Court. Regard has been had to those submissions.] In addition, the applicants sought leave to read and rely on:1)The affidavit of Sarah Suh-Hee Choe, a solicitor in the employment of the applicants’ solicitors, affirmed on 4 July 2012, which annexed a copy of the PAM3 as at the date of the Tribunal’s decision (annexure “A”) and at the date that the applicants’ lodged the visa application (annexure “B”) (the “first affidavit of Ms Choe”).2)The affidavit of Sarah Suh-Hee Choe, affirmed on 13 February 2013, which annexed a “Notice of Termination” issued by the Australian Human Rights Commission in response to a complaint filed by the applicant against the first and second respondents (the “second affidavit of Ms Choe”).These were admitted with no objection by the Minister. Before the Court the applicants submitted that grounds one and two of the amended application were “closely related”. As a result, in oral submissions, the applicants addressed the grounds together. The applicants submitted that the policy (as expressed in PAM3) imposed an additional “test” for individuals who are 60 years of age or over. That is, that while cl.857.213(b) simply required that “exceptional circumstances” needed to apply for individuals who had “turned 45” to be granted the visa, the policy imposed an additional, and stricter, requirement on those who were 60 years of age or older. That is, the policy propounded a different “definition” of “exceptional circumstances” for those aged 60 years or over to those aged 45 years to under 60 years.