Janet Hayes v Katrina Harrison

Case [2002] ACTSC 22


JANET HAYES v KATRINA HARRISON
[2002] ACTSC 22 (28 March 2002)

CATCHWORDS

DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIP – extension of time – conditions for grant of leave - application for adjustment of property – domestic relationship between persons of the same sex – preponderance of hardship.

Domestic Relationships Act 1994 s 10, s 11, s 12 and s 13
De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) (now Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW))

Beavan v Fallshaw(1992) 15 Fam LR 686
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Mason v Murray’s Charter Coaches and Travel Services Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 308; 159 ALR 45

No. SC of 814 of 2001

Judge:          Higgins J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date:           28 March 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE     )
  )          No. SC  814 of 2001
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )

BETWEEN: JANET HAYES

Plaintiff

AND: KATRINA HARRISON

Defendant

ORDER

Judge:  Higgins J
Date:  28 March 2002
Place:  Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The application be dismissed with costs.

  1. The plaintiff, on 10 December 2001, made application, pursuant to the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) (the “DR Act”), for an extension of time within which to make an application for an adjustment of property interests in her favour.

  1. Whilst there are some factual disputes foreshadowed between the parties, the proper approach is to assume that the plaintiff will make good the assertions of fact which she makes for the purpose of determining whether an extension of time should be granted.

  1. There needs first to be prima facie evidence that the court has jurisdiction.

  1. The plaintiff asserts that a relationship began about September 1994 between herself and the defendant.  However, the plaintiff was then domiciled in, and a citizen of, the United States of America (USA).  They first were together, on Australian soil, in April 1995.  That was for a “visit” though they lived together for five weeks.

  1. The plaintiff moved to Australia in live in a domestic relationship with the defendant in October 1995.  It is clear that the plaintiff (and, presumably, the defendant) intended this to be permanent and the plaintiff applied for permanent residency accordingly.

  1. That was granted on 22 July 1998.

  1. The parties resided together until February 1999 in Canberra at the defendant’s home, which she owned, at Swinden Street, Downer, in the Australian Capital Territory.

  1. The defendant then moved to Sydney.  She had been unwell and was seeking a change of employment.  Initially, she took leave from her then public service position but resigned in June 1999, deciding to take up other employment.

  1. The parties have not cohabited since February 1999, though the plaintiff asserts that, in October 1999, after the defendant told her the relationship was over, they were intimate on one occasion.  That fact, if established, does not alter the need for the plaintiff to have an extension of time.

  1. In essence, though the defendant foreshadows that she will dispute this if the matter proceeds, the plaintiff says that she did not understand…

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AGLC
Janet Hayes v Katrina Harrison [2002] ACTSC 22
Case
[2002] ACTSC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Janet Hayes, sought an extension of time to apply for an adjustment of property settlement following the termination of her domestic relationship with Katrina Harrison. The application was brought in the Family Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the applicant met the conditions necessary to grant an extension of time and whether there was a preponderance of hardship sufficient to justify such an extension. The court needed to consider the legal framework governing extensions of time in property settlement applications and the specific circumstances of the case, including the nature of the relationship and the reasons for the delay in making the application.

The court examined the relevant legal principles and the circumstances of the case. It found that the applicant had not satisfied the conditions for an extension of time as the delay was not due to circumstances beyond her control and she had not demonstrated a preponderance of hardship. The court held that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claim of hardship and that the delay in making the application was due to her own inaction. The court also considered the legal and factual matrix of the case and found that the applicant had not met the threshold for an extension of time.

As a result of its findings, the court dismissed the application. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated the necessary conditions for an extension of time and that the delay in making the application was not due to circumstances beyond her control. The court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated a preponderance of hardship sufficient to justify an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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