Criminal Law—Confession—Evidence of psychiatrist on voir dire that at time of making confession accused mentally deranged—Confession admitted in evidence—Evidence of psychiatrist tendered in accused's case and rejected—Admissibility .

Decision

September 20. The following written judgment was delivered by the Court : -
On 13th December 1960 the applicant was convicted upon an indictment charging him with the rape of one Doris Cau at Glebe on 13th June 1960 and was sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for four years. He appealed against his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal on a number of grounds, one of which was that certain evidence was wrongly rejected. The appeal was dismissed and against that order of dismissal he now seeks special leave to appeal to this Court. (at p593)

2. To understand the nature of the questions which arise it is necessary to give an account of the course of the trial. Evidence was led for the Crown that at about 9 p.m. on the night of 13th June two police officers had gone to a park in Glebe and had there seen two men, one of whom was the applicant, running away from a band-stand. They were chased and caught and the applicant was found to have smears of blood on his hands and on his clothing. In the band-stand the officers found a woman lying on the floor naked and in a semi-conscious condition, her clothes being scattered around her. She was bleeding from the mouth and nose and was badly bruised and, so it was later discovered, had two fractured ribs and a fracture of the skull. There were indications of sexual interference with her but not necessarily pointing to rape. It should be added that although bound over to appear as a witness at the trial she did not attend and the case proceeded without her evidence. When the applicant was asked, after his arrest, what he and his companion had been doing to the woman, he replied that they were "only having a bit of sex". Later he said that they had met the woman during the afternoon in a wine bar and had been drinking together and later gone to the park. Up to this point the evidence was insufficient to justify findings that the applicant had committed the crime with which he was charged. The next step in the Crown case was to tender two confessional statements, one made verbally, the other in writing, made over four months later in curious circumstances. The applicant, so it appeared, had been committed for trial on a charge of indecent assault on the woman Cau and released on bail. While on bail he was arrested at Newcastle in the early hours of 31st October 1960 on a charge of illegally using a motor-car. Shortly after his arrest the applicant informed a police officer,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Jackson v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Jackson v The Queen [1962] HCA 49
Case: [1962] HCA 49
Decision Date: 20 September 1962

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Jackson against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant and the proper application of the law relating to self-defence.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained from the appellant under circumstances that might have rendered it inadmissible, and whether the jury had been adequately and correctly directed on the defence of self-defence, particularly in relation to the appellant's belief as to the necessity of using force.

The Court's reasoning focused on the principles governing the admission of evidence obtained under duress or unfair pressure, and the onus of proof in relation to self-defence. The judges affirmed that while the law permits the exclusion of evidence obtained unfairly, the specific circumstances of this case did not warrant such exclusion. Furthermore, the Court clarified that once evidence is adduced suggesting the possibility of self-defence, the onus rests on the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act was not done in self-defence. The jury's verdict was upheld on the basis that the evidence, when considered with the directions given, supported the conviction.

Orders