Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2000] FCA 595

TRADE PRACTICES ‑ Misleading and deceptive conduct ‑ Shopping centre lease ‑ Alleged misrepresentations regarding redevelopment.

EVIDENCE ‑ Shopping centre lease ‑ Alleged misrepresentations regarding redevelopment ‑ Representations allegedly made to other potential lessees ‑ Disallowance of propensity evidence ‑ Cross examination as to credit of alleged representor based on representations to other lessees ‑ Whether such evidence has “substantial probative value” ‑ Whether “probative value” assessed by reference to questions in issue or to credibility of witness.

.

Trade Practices Act 1974 s 51A, 52
Evidence Act 1995, s 102, 103

Namol Pty Ltd v A W Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1993) 119 ALR 187 applied
Nagy v Masters Dairy Ltd (1997) 150 ALR 301 applied
Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto‑Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 considered
R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 applied
Preston Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd [1982] 1 All ER 41 cited
Thors v Weekes (1989) 92 ALR 131 distinguished
Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 applied
Oz B and S Pty Ltd v Elders IXL Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 128 cited

JACARA PTY LTD v PERPETUAL TRUSTEES WA LTD and PERPETUAL TRUSTEES WA LTD v JACARA PTY LTD, ROBERT GORDON and ASHLEY WILLIAMS
VG 702 of 1996

SUNDBERG J
30 MAY 2000
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 702 OF 1996

BETWEEN:

JACARA PTY LTD (ACN 005 876 479)
APPLICANT

AND:

PERPETUAL TRUSTEES WA LTD (ACN 008 666 886)
RESPONDENT

AND BETWEEN:

PERPETUAL TRUSTEES WA LTD (ACN 008 666 886
CROSS CLAIMANT

AND

JACARA PTY LTD (ACN 005 876 479),
ROBERT GORDON and ASHLEY WILLIAMS
CROSS RESPONDENTS

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MAY 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.Judgment be entered on the cross‑claim for $6,796.86 together with interest of $2,986.29.

3.The applicant and the third cross‑respondent pay the respondent’s costs of the application including reserved costs.

4.The cross‑respondents pay the cross‑claimant’s costs of the cross‑claim on a solicitor client basis.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 702 OF 1996

BETWEEN:

JACARA PTY LTD (ACN 005 876 479)
APPLICANT

AND:

PERPETUAL TRUSTEES WA LTD (ACN 008 666 886)
RESPONDENT

AND BETWEEN:

PERPETUAL TRUSTEES WA LTD (ACN 008 666 886
CROSS CLAIMANT

AND

JACARA PTY LTD (ACN 005 876 479),
ROBERT GORDON and ASHLEY WILLIAMS
CROSS RESPONDENTS

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE:

30 MAY 2000

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. This case is about a kiosk in the Parkmore Shopping Centre at Keysborough, a Melbourne suburb.  The Centre is an asset of the GEM Retail Property Trust of which the respondent is trustee.  Between February 1994 and November 1995 the Centre was redeveloped.  The redevelopment took place in three stages.  Stage 1 was the fresh food precinct, which was completed in…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 595
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jacara Pty Ltd, the applicant, filed a case against Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd, the respondent, which involved the applicant's claims of misleading or deceptive conduct and breach of contract. The applicant alleged that the respondent made various representations regarding the tenancy agreements and the profitability of the kiosks, which led to the applicant entering into a lease agreement and providing a guarantee. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The primary legal issues that the court had to decide were whether the applicant's claims of misleading or deceptive conduct and breach of contract were substantiated, and if the proposed evidence presented by the applicant had sufficient probative value. The court needed to examine the credibility of the applicant's and respondent's witnesses and determine whether the alleged representations were indeed misleading or deceptive. Additionally, the court had to assess the relevance and admissibility of the evidence the applicant proposed to present.

In reaching its decision, the court considered various factors, including the time elapsed since the alleged representations were made, the credibility of the witnesses, and the potential for memory distortion over time. The court concluded that the evidence proposed by the applicant lacked substantial probative value due to the aforementioned factors. Furthermore, the court found that none of the alleged representations had been proven, and the applicant's claims were therefore dismissed. The court also dismissed the cross-claim made by the respondent and ordered the applicant and the third cross-respondent to pay the respondent's costs of the application. Finally, the cross-respondents were ordered to pay the cross-claimant's costs of the cross-claim on a solicitor-client basis, in accordance with the agreement between the parties.

In summary, the Supreme Court of Western Australia dismissed the applicant's claims against the respondent and ruled in favour of the respondent on the cross-claim. The court ordered the applicant and the third cross-respondent to pay the respondent's costs of the application, while the cross-respondents were ordered to pay the cross-claimant's costs of the cross-claim on a solicitor-client basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. Judgment be entered on the cross‑claim for $6,796.86 together with interest of $2,986.29.

3. The applicant and the third cross‑respondent pay the respondent’s costs of the application including reserved costs.

4. The cross‑respondents pay the cross‑claimant’s costs of the cross‑claim on a solicitor client basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J
In my view the evidence proposed to be elicited lacks substantial probative value. Some five years have elapsed since the representations are alleged to have been made to the other tenants. As this case has demonstrated, it is dangerous to assume that after five years conversations and figures have been remembered accurately, and that the content of remembered conversations has not been coloured by the passage of time. Furthermore, as I said in my similar fact ruling, the alleged representations are too dissimilar to those alleged against Ms Kelly in the present case to make it possible to find the underlying pattern of behaviour necessary to endow the allegations with significant or substantial probative value. Finally, all the other tenants were partisan, as they had been involved in litigation with the respondent. I have had regard to whether the proposed evidence tends to prove that Ms Kelly knowingly or recklessly made false statements in her evidence before me. Because of the matters to which I have just referred, I do not think it does. It was for the foregoing reasons that I said in my ruling that “for reasons very similar to those I gave in my [similar fact] judgment, I do not think the case falls within s 103(1) on the ground that the evidence that is proposed to be called lacks substantial probative value”.CONCLUSION None of the representations alleged by the applicant has been made out, and the application must be dismissed. There will be judgment for the respondent on the cross‑claim.COSTSSolicitor client The respondent has sought its costs on a solicitor client basis. Costs on that basis can be awarded where there is some special or unusual feature in the case that justifies the court exercising its discretion in that way. See Preston Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd [1982] 1 All ER 41 at 58. In Thors v Weekes (1989) 92 ALR 131 solicitor client costs were awarded where a s 52 claim was based on knowingly false accounts of conversations. The present case turned largely on credit, and on the whole I have preferred Ms Kelly’s and Mr Hipwell’s accounts of the relevant conversations to Mr Williams’. But as I have said, I do not think Mr Williams was knowingly giving false evidence. In the exercise of my discretion I do not think it appropriate to award costs of the application on the basis sought. The cross‑respondents should however pay the cross‑claimant’s costs of the cross‑claim on a solicitor client basis. That was the agreement the parties made when they entered into the lease and guarantee. See clauses 23.6 and 26.2 of the lease and clause 1 of the guarantee. I do not accept the applicant’s submission that “legal costs” refers only to costs connected with the preparation of the lease. See the opening lines of cl 23.6 and sub‑cl (b) of cl 26.2. Although the parties’ agreement cannot fetter the Court’s discretion, I think it is appropriate in the present case that that agreement be reflected in the order for costs.Cross‑respondent’s liability for costs of application

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG J

Mr Williams’ evidence was that during the tour Ms Kelly told him that each of the kiosks shown on the plans had been let to well‑known food brand name tenants including Muffin Break, Uncle Demos, Nutshack, Pasta Fiesta, a fish shop and a delicatessen. Ms Kelly said she told Mr Williams the true position as to the tenancies as it appeared in her letter of 20 October to Auto‑Bake. She recalled mentioning the names listed by Mr Williams except Pasta Fiesta. She said negotiations were progressing with a fishmonger and with Muffin Break. She would also have mentioned the other entities listed in her letter. Mr Williams’ evidence on this issue is confusing. The pleaded representation is that he was told that all the kiosks had been let. Although his evidence purported to verify this, it dealt as well with the shops. The delicatessen and fishmonger were not to occupy kiosks. In cross‑examination Mr Williams conceded he was wrong about Muffin Break, and that Ms Kelly had merely said that negotiations were in progress with Muffin Break. In fact these negotiations did not result in Muffin Break leasing a kiosk. This change of mind suggests a faulty memory of the relevant conversation. As I have said in another connection, having recently gone into print as to the true position of the tenancies, Ms Kelly is unlikely to have told lies about the matter. I do not think she did.(h)Each of the kiosks would be fully operational by Christmas 1994 Mr Williams said that on 28 October, after listing the named tenants, Ms Kelly added that all the kiosks would be operating by Christmas. Ms Kelly said she did not say this, because a number of the kiosks were vacant, with no leasing deals concluded, and she had no expectation that they would be operational by Christmas because she was still looking for tenants. Since I am not satisfied that Ms Kelly told Mr Williams the other kiosks had been tenanted, I am also not satisfied that she said all the kiosks would be operational by Christmas. Had I found that Ms Kelly represented that each of the kiosks would be fully operational by Christmas, I would have found that Mr Williams did not enter into the lease in reliance thereon. In cross‑examination it was put to him that if Ms Kelly had said “Look, I’d love it if all the kiosks would be operating by Christmas, but they are not going to be”, he would still have proceeded. He said he would have, but then qualified the answer by saying that he probably would have delayed his decision or would have gone in later. He then effectively removed the qualification by agreeing that he would not have wanted to miss the Christmas trade. In my view he would have entered into the lease anyway.(i)The applicant could easily take $3000 per week Mr Williams’ evidence was that at his meeting with Mr Hipwell on 28 October the latter assured him that at least 1% was a reliable percentage of through traffic customers who would purchase cookies from a Cookie Man store. He said the weekly takings of the kiosk would be $3000 based on 1% of a minimum number of 125,000 customers, that is 1250 customers per week spending an average of $2.50 each per sale. The weekly takings would increase when the renovations were complete. On the same day, at the Centre, Mr Williams put to Ms Kelly the 1% calculation. He told her he had no prior experience of running a retail food shop in a shopping centre, and asked her if he could expect a minimum of 1% of the traffic flow to purchase from his kiosk. Ms Kelly replied that 1% was a very conservative estimate, that even on only 1% he would easily take $3000 per week. On the next day Mr Williams had another meeting with Mr Hipwell at which the latter said Mr Williams would easily make $3000 per week and even more when the traffic flow increased on completion of the renovations. Mr Williams’ diary note of his conversation with Mr Hipwell on 28 October records “$3000 per week”.