FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
IXW24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 1328
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read IXW24 v Commonwealth of Australia and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2024] FCA 1328
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that Section 196(4) of the Migration Act precluded it from making an order for the applicant’s release from immigration detention unless and until it had finally determined that the detention was unlawful or that the applicant was not an unlawful non-citizen. Therefore, the Court did not have the power to make the interlocutory order sought by the applicant. Furthermore, on the material before the Court, the balance of convenience did not favour the applicant’s release from detention on the nominated conditions pending the hearing and determination of the claim for habeas corpus. The Court also considered the Commonwealth’s argument that Section 196(4) and (5) do not draw a distinction between proceedings alleging unlawfulness in excess of the statutory power conferred by the Migration Act and proceedings challenging the constitutional legality of detention. The Court concluded that a court is precluded from making an order for the release of a person detained under the Migration Act unless it has made a final determination to that effect.
In conclusion, the Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for interlocutory relief, reserving costs, and noted that entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s claim for interlocutory relief in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the originating application dated 25 October 2024 is dismissed.
2. Costs be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Commonwealth also refuted the applicant’s postulated distinction between proceedings alleging unlawfulness in excess of the statutory power conferred by the Migration Act and proceedings challenging the constitutional legality of detention. The Commonwealth submitted that s 196(4) and (5) do not draw any such distinction. Those provisions address the power of a court to grant interlocutory relief in circumstances where a person might be unlawfully detained, but (like s 196(3)) they do not purport to authorise unlawful detention. Nothing in s 196 is intended to prevent a court from ordering the release of a person whose detention is unlawful, but a court is precluded from making such an order unless it has made a final determination to that effect. In so far as a substantive proceeding involves a challenge to the constitutional legality of detention, the Commonwealth submits that it is well established in the context of constitutional challenges to legislation that a court generally approaches any question of interlocutory relief on the basis that the impugned law is valid unless and until it is shown to be invalid: Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 155-156 (Mason CJ); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 104 ALR 389 at 393 (Mason CJ).CONSIDERATIONPower to order release from detention on an interlocutory basis It is common ground between the parties that, apart from any limitation validly imposed by s 196 of the Migration Act, this Court has power to make interlocutory orders requiring that a person in immigration detention be released pending the hearing and determination of a proceeding in which the person challenges the legality of his or her detention. The source of the power to make such orders is generally attributed to s 23 of the FCA Act, which confers power in matters within the Court’s jurisdiction “to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the Court thinks appropriate”. In Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 at [26], Gleeson CJ noted that it was “not uncommon” for a bail order to be made as an interlocutory step in habeas corpus proceedings: see also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Turkoglu [1988] QB 398 at 399 (Sir John Donaldson MR, with whom Croom-Johnson and Bingham LJJ agreed). In fact, before the appeal in Al-Kateb was removed from this Court into the High Court, Mansfield J had made interlocutory orders (by consent) for the applicant’s release from detention pending the hearing of the appeal, subject to conditions designed to ensure his availability for detention and removal if and when it became reasonably practicable: see Al-Kateb at [23], [26] (Gleeson CJ), [107], [141] (Gummow J), [280] (Callinan J). This was consistent with previous authority in this Court confirming the power to make an interlocutory order for the release from custody of a person who had brought judicial review proceedings to challenge the exercise of statutory powers to detain the person pending his or her deportation: Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Msilanga (1992) 34 FCR 169 at 179-181 (Beaumont J, with whom Black CJ agreed), 186-189 (Burchett J); see also Lim at 13 (Mason CJ).