Iverson and Iverson
[2007] FMCAfam 257
•4 May 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| IVERSON & IVERSON | [2007] FMCAfam 257 |
| FAMILY LAW – Contravention application – property orders. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.112AB, 112AC, 112AD, 112AF Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001, r. 25.04 |
Lindsey & Lindsey [1995] FLC 92-638
Fauna Holdings Pty Ltd & McGillivray & Ors v Mitchell (No 2) [2000] FLC 93-053
TVT & TLM [2006] FMCAfam 20
| Applicant: | MS IVERSON |
| Respondent: | MR IVERSON |
| File Number: | MLM 6095 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | O'Sullivan FM |
| Hearing date: | 11 April 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 11 April 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 4 May 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr King |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Pearsons Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms Piccinini |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | GPZ Legal |
ORDERS
That the husband, without reasonable excuse, contravened order 3(a) of the Orders of 1 November 2006.
That the husband be fined $3,300.00.
That the husband immediately return all other items in his possession that he removed from the former matrimonial home.
That order 2 be stayed for 30 days pending full compliance by the husband with order 3(a) of the orders of 1 November 2006.
The Court will hear the parties on the necessary orders to garnishee the respondent’s wages.
The Court will hear the parties on any order as to costs.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Iverson & Iverson is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLM 6095 of 2006
| MS IVERSON |
Applicant
And
| MR IVERSON |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This matter concerns two applications initiated by Ms Iverson (“the wife”) relating to orders of this Court made on 1 November 2006.
First, there is a Form 18 contravention application filed on
20 December 2006. That application falls to be determined in accordance with Part XIIIA of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”). Part XIIIA of the Act deals with sanctions for failure to comply with orders and other obligations that do not affect children.
I shall return to the second application filed 3 November 2006.
Before doing so however it is appropriate to canvass the background to the proceedings.
Short background
The applicant wife was born in 1975 and the respondent husband in 1969.
The parties commenced cohabitation in 1996 and were married in 1999. The parties separated on a final basis on 17 May 2006. There are no children of the marriage.
During 2006 the husband sought medical advice, was hospitalised and had open heart surgery. The husband was employed as a cleaner at the E Hospital however has not returned to work there following his surgery in late 2006.
Following an application for property settlement by the wife final property orders were made by consent on 7 August 2006 (which provided for the husband to remain in the former matrimonial home). They were:
“1.Within sixty (60) days of the making of this Order by the Court the Husband shall discharge the following liabilities owing by the parties:
(a) The ANZ Credit Card in the Wife’s name;
(b) American Express Debt;
(c) Esanda loan;
And upon such payments the Husband provide documentary proof of discharge to the Wife’s Solicitors.
2.That the Husband within sixty (60) days pay the sum of twenty eight thousand dollars ($28,000.00) by cheque made payable to the Bendigo Bank for payment of the loan account number 9xxx, such loan having been taken out by the wife’s parents and such cheque being provided to the Wife’s Solicitors.
3.Upon payment of the sum of twenty eight thousand dollars ($28,000.00) referred to in paragraph 2 herein, the Wife do all things necessary, including making such payments as required to discharge the loan.
4.That the Husband be solely responsible for the payment of any and or monies owed by the parties to Mr N and indemnify the Wife in respect to this amount.
5.That the Husband within seven (7) days of this Order sign all such documents as are necessary to transfer to the Wife the VL Calais motor vehicle Registration No. Txxx, such documents to be provided by the Wife to the Husband.
6.That the Husband is hereby restrained from disposing of, encumbering or dealing with the Holden commodore Registration Vxxx, pending discharge of the Husband’s obligation pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 herein except for the purposes of discharging such obligations.
7.That the Wife is hereby permitted to register with Vic Roads a financial interest upon vehicle Registration No. Vxxx and that such interest be released and/or discharged by the Wife, at her expense, upon the Husband discharging his obligations pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 herein and that the production to Vic Roads of a sealed copy of these Orders be sufficient evidence of the Wife’s financial interest upon the said motor vehicle.
8.That within sixty (60) days of this Order the Husband discharge the RAMS home loan and any other encumbrance affecting the matrimonial property and contemporaneously with such discharge the Wife transfer to the Husband all of her right title and interest in the property known as
Property R.
9.That within seven (7) days the Wife deliver to the Husband the dogs known by the parties as N & D.
10.That upon the Husband discharging his obligations pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 the Wife make available for collection by the Husband the following items:
(a)The Samsung Plasma television;
(b)The digital receiver;
(c) The T.V. Stand;
(d)The Sony surround system;
(e)The Samsung DVD Player;
(f)The Antique dining table and eight dinning chairs;
(g)The dishwasher;
(h)Such car models and car prints within her possession or control;
(i)Such of the Husband’s jewellery, watches and clothing within her possession or control.
11.That in the event the Husband fails to discharge his obligations pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 8 herein, the motor vehicle Registration No Vxxx and the matrimonial home and all matrimonial furniture and household items be forthwith sold and the proceeds be applied as follows:
(a)To pay all selling expenses and outstanding rates and encumbrances in respect to the property;
(b)To discharge the RAMS home loan;
(c)To discharge the Bendigo Bank loan and loan to Mr N equally;
(d)Esanda Loan;
(e)ANZ Credit Card;
(f)American Express Credit Card;
(g)The balance thereof or liabilities thereof to be divided equally between the parties.
12.Liberty apply in respect to the terms and conditions of sale.
13.That pending compliance with these Orders the Husband be permitted to occupy the home and be responsible for the payment of mortgage repayments and outgoings.
14.That with respect to the Husband’s obligations pursuant to paragraph 8 herein, the Wife agrees not to enforce her right pursuant to paragraph 11 provided that the Husband has complied with his obligations pursuant to paragraph 1 and 2 and provides to the Wife’s Solicitors written conformation from an approved Finance Institution of sufficient funds available to the Husband to meet his obligation within a further thirty (30) days.
15.That unless otherwise specified in these order and except for the purposes of enforcing the payment of any money due under these or any subsequent orders:
(a)Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the order to all property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at this date.
(b)Each party hereby forgoes any claim they may have to any superannuation benefits belonging to or earned by the other.
(c) All insurance policies to become the sole property of the beneficiary named therein.
(d)Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders;
(e)Any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.
16.That save as otherwise provided herein all joint tenancies be expressly severed and each party retain for his or her sole use such things in his or her own possession as at the date of this Order.”
It is common cause that the respondent did not comply with his obligations set out in the above orders. As a result the applicant brought a further application filed 11 October 2007 for which time was abridged and was returnable on 1 November 2006.
On 1 November 2006 orders were made by the Court providing that the husband transfer the former matrimonial home to the wife to be sold for the payment of the debts (referred to in the above orders) as well as an order requiring that the husband transfer and deliver the VL Holden Commodore Registration No: “Vxxx” to the wife for sale.
The wife believed the car was not delivered in accordance with the orders of 1 November 2006. The wife also believed the husband had removed chattels from the former matrimonial home prior to transfer. The wife made several attempts to pursue the return of those items through her solicitors. However no resolution was forthcoming and eventually the matter proceeded to the Court again.
The VL Holden Commodore referred to above, was a limited edition Commodore. The car was delivered to the wife on 4 November 2006 following a meeting at the wife’s solicitors where the paperwork to complete the transfer was signed on 3 November 2006.
The contravention application filed 20 December 2006 was first listed on 21 February 2007. On that day orders were made adjourning the matter to the duty list of this Court on 7 March 2007 and provided that in the event the husband failed to attend on the next occasion a warrant be issued for his arrest. The wife’s costs of the day were fixed at $880.00 and reserved to the adjourned date.
On 7 March 2007 both parties appeared in person and the husband requested a short adjournment to allow him to prepare material responding to the allegations that he contravened the orders of
1 November 2006. As a result the matter was adjourned until
11 April 2007and orders were made for the respondent to file and serve any response and affidavit by 21 March 2007.
On 11 March 2007 both parties were represented at the hearing.
Mr James of Counsel appeared on behalf of the wife and Ms Piccinini of Counsel appeared on behalf of the husband.
On that date it was agreed the Court would also deal with the wife’s application filed 3 November 2006 but only in so far as it dealt with an application for orders for the husband to return furniture removed from the former matrimonial home.
Finally it was also agreed that for the purposes of the hearing the Court would deal first with the contravention application filed
20 December 2006and then with the application (filed 3 November 2006) for orders for the return of the property.
The contravention application
The contravention application filed 20 December 2006 made two separate allegations of contraventions of the orders made on
1 November 2006. However, at the commencement of hearing on
11 April 2007Counsel for the wife indicated she abandoned the first alleged contravention and pursued only the second which was as follows:
“On 2 November 2006 the husband failed to deliver the VL Commodore motor vehicle in good order in breach of paragraph 3 of the orders made by Federal Magistrate Connolly on
1 November 2006.”
At the hearing on 11 April 2007 the applicant relied on:
·her application filed 3 November 2006;
·her affidavit filed 3 November 2006;
·application filed 20 December 2006; and
·her affidavit filed 20 December 2006.
The respondent relied on:
·his response filed on 10 April 2007; and
·two affidavits both filed on 10 April 2007.
The orders
In so far as is relevant for the purposes of the wife’s contravention application the relevant orders made 1 November 2006 are set out below:
“1.That the Husband forthwith transfer to the Wife and give possession to the Wife to be held by her on trust for sale the following:
a.the matrimonial property at Property R in the state of Victoria (the property);
b.the Holden VL Commodore Registration number Vxxx (the car).
c.All matrimonial furniture and household items in the property (including the items noted in paragraph 10 of the orders made on 17 August 2006) (the furniture).
2.That upon transfer and giving up of possessions of the property, the car and the furniture the wife forthwith sell the same and apply the proceeds as follows:
a.First in satisfaction of the costs order against the Husband referred to in paragraph 6 herein;
b.Secondly in accordance with paragraph 11 of the Orders made 7 August 2006 save as provided in paragraph 5 hereof.
3.That for the purposes of paragraph 1 hereof:
(a) the husband deliver the car in good order together with all registration documents to the wife’s premises at Property S by 4.00 pm on the 2nd November 2006;
(b) the husband do all such acts and things and sign all necessary documents to transfer the property to the wife as soon as practicable;
(c) the husband vacate the property by 4.00 pm on Friday 3 November 2006, and thereafter the wife have sole occupation and the husband leave the property in good order and deliver the keys to the wife’s solicitors by that time and date;
(d) the husband not remove any of the furniture from the property…”
Approach to Contravention application
Part XIIIA of the Act governs applications concerning contravention of property orders. Section 112AB of the Act provides that:
“1.A person shall be taken for the purposes of this Part to have contravened an order under this Act if, and only if:
(a)where the person is bound by the order-he or she has;
i. intentionally failed to comply with the order; or
ii. made no reasonable attempt to comply with the orders; or
(b) in any other case- he or she has:
i. intentionally prevented compliance with the order by a person who is bound by it; or
ii. aided or abetted a contravention of the order by a person who was bound by it.”
I note it was agreed section 112AB(i)(b) of the Act is not relevant for present purposes.
The Act sets out in section 112AC the meaning of reasonable excuse for contravening an order in the following terms:
“1.The circumstances in which a person may be taken to have had, for the purposes of this Part, a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act include, but are not limited to, the circumstances set out in subsection (2).
2.A person (in this subsection called the respondent) shall be taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act if:
(a) The respondent contravened the order because, or substantially because, he or she did not, at the time of the contravention, understand the obligations imposed by the order on the person who was bound by it; and
(b) The court is satisfied that the respondent ought to be excused in respect of the contravention.”
Section 112AD of the Act provides that:
“If a Court having jurisdiction under this Act is satisfied that a person has, without reasonable excuse, contravened an order under this Act, a court may make an order for the imposing, in respect of that person, one or more of the sanctions under subsection (2), being a sanction or sanctions that the court considers to be most appropriate in the circumstances.”
Section 112AD(2) of the Act sets out the penalties the Court may impose following a finding that a contravention has been proved, that is, having been satisfied that the civil standard of proof has been satisfied on the a balance of probabilities. The Court may:
“(a)Require the person to enter into a bond in accordance with section 112AF; or
(b)Impose a sentence by order on the person or make an order directed to the person in accordance with section 112AG; or
(c)Fine the person not more than 60 penalty units; or
(d)Subject to subsection 2A impose a sentence of imprisonment on the person in accordance with section 112AE.”
Under section 112AD(4) of the Act the Court is empowered to make any other necessary order to ensure compliance with the orders contravened.
Part 25B of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 sets out the procedure for the Court when dealing with applications such as the present. Part 25BO4 sets out the procedure at hearing as follows:
“At the hearing of the application, the Court must:
(a)inform the respondent of the allegations; and
(b)ask the respondent whether the respondent wishes to admit or deny the allegations; and
(c) hear any evidence supporting the allegation; and
(d)ask the respondent to state the response to the allegation; and
(e)hear any evidence for the respondent; and
(f)determine the proceedings.”
At the commencement of the hearing the respondent was informed of the remaining alleged contravention in the application filed
20 December 2006. The respondent was asked whether he wished to admit or deny the allegation. The respondent denied the allegation.
Consideration of evidence
Both the applicant wife and the respondent husband gave evidence and were cross examined. Where the evidence is in conflict I prefer the evidence of the wife. I found the wife’s evidence was far more credible than that of the husband. The husband seemed at times incapable of giving a straight answer. He constructed scenarios he hoped would assist him such as equating a car in good order to a car without a engine or gear box. The husband’s evidence had an air on unreality about it particularly his evidence regarding his compliance with the orders (eg. asking the Court to accept his evidence that the wife agreed to the transfer of the car in such a state, when it was to be sold to meet debt). I also refer to his evidence that he wasn’t working at F Pty Ltd. However, there was clear evidence the business represented him as the factory manager as demonstrated in a business card submitted in evidence by the wife (exhibit “A6”).
The wife gave evidence that the husband had said he would kill himself before he gave her the car. The wife denied she knew, or was told before the orders were made on 1 November 2006 that the car had been damaged or that the engine and gear box removed for repair.
The wife gave evidence regarding the items missing from the car when it was delivered on 4 November 2006. In doing so the wife relied on exhibits “A1” and “A2” which showed the car on the day it was delivered to her on a tow truck. By reference to exhibit “A3” (wherein the car was described by the wife as in ‘mickey mouse’ or showroom condition) the wife maintained that the husband had not delivered the car in ‘good order’ pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of the orders. The wife said as a result the husband had contravened those orders of
1 November 2006.
It was not disputed the car was delivered without:
·an engine;
·a gear box;
·a gear stick;
·the FR19 Mag wheels;
·the stereo;
·the Momo steering wheel;
·the interior door handles;
·the personalised registration plates; and
·the front spoiler.
The husband deposed that he had been in the process of restoring and modifying the car at the time the orders were made. He deposed that he was customising the interior and modifying the vehicle from manual to automatic to make it easier to drive, as he had suffered from a stroke. The husband’s evidence was that at the time the final orders were made the car’s engine had been blown and it needed to be replaced.
The husband’s evidence was that the wife knew about this. The wife vehemently denied this in cross examination.
The husband said he delivered the car to the wife in the condition he had it in at the time the orders were made.
The husband maintained in his evidence that on this basis he had not breached the orders.
It was common cause that the parties attended on the offices of the wife’s solicitors on 3 November 2006. At that meeting the paperwork was completed to transfer the car to the wife, and to deliver the keys for the former matrimonial home.
The husband deposed that he had made it clear to the wife’s solicitor he was retaining the personalised registration plate. He deposed the wife’s solicitor agreed to accept the transfer documents on that basis.
The husband denied the car was delivered without the [Limited Edition] build plates. The husband gave evidence that he had sold the FR19 mag wheels and that the engine had been sold by GTEC, to recover the monies owed for the repairs they carried out on the engine.
In submissions before the Court by Counsel for the husband that he had delivered the car in the best condition he had it at the time the orders were made.
It was submitted on behalf of the husband the delivery of the car without the items referred to at paragraph 32 above was what the husband understood ‘good order,’ in paragraph 3(a) of the orders of
1 November 2006, to mean.
Turning to whether the husband contravened the orders Counsel for the wife referred to and relied on Fauna Holdings Pty Ltd and McGillivary & Ors v Mitchell (No 2) (2000) FLC 93-053. The wife submitted that the husband knew the orders were made, that he was legally represented and that he understood the orders when signing them by consent. In summary, the wife submitted that the husband intentionally failed to comply with the orders and further without making any reasonable attempt to do so.
The orders of 1 November 2006 required the husband to deliver the car to the wife in ‘good order.’ The wife gave evidence that this and the transfer of the former matrimonial home were necessary so she could attend to the payment of the debts accrued throughout the marriage.
Given the items missing from the [Limited Edition] car referred to in paragraph 32 herein and the wording of the orders I find the husband’s explanation inherently improbable and prefer the evidence of the wife. To suggest, as the husband does, that delivering the car in ‘good order’ meant delivery without the items in paragraph 32 is not credible. This is particularly the case where there is no evidence it was clear to the Court or the wife those items were missing when the orders were made.
Put simply, the husband’s explanation strains the bounds of credulity. Having regard to the definition contained in section 112AB of the Act of what it means to contravene an order I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there has been such a contravention on the part of the husband (see Lindsey v Lindsey (1995) FLC 92-638).
Reasonable excuse
As I have found that the husband contravened the order, the question then arises whether the husband ought to be excused in respect of that contravention.
Section 112AC(I) of the Act makes clear that a reasonable excuse includes, but is not limited to, the circumstances in subsection (2). Therefore putting to one side the issue of whether the husband did not understand the obligations imposed by the order the question is whether he should nonetheless be taken to have had a reasonable excuse.
The wife submitted that the husband led no evidence to satisfy the Court that the [Limited Edition] car had been modified (or was without the items referred to in paragraph 32) at the time of the orders of
1 November 2006.
In this case, the wife submitted the husband had not relied on a misunderstanding regarding the orders. He says simply he provided the car in the best possible order he had it in at the time. He asked the Court to take into account his health difficulties in considering the flagrancy of the breach.
In determining whether the husband has a reasonable excuse I am satisfied an objective test should apply (Fauna Holdings Pty Ltd & McGillivary & Ors v Mitchell).
In order for the husband to satisfy the objective test that his excuse was reasonable his conduct in all the circumstances must be on an objective basis present facts or circumstances sufficient which make it reasonable that he be excused (see TVT & TLM [2006] FMCAfam 20).
The husband’s evidence regarding both his understanding of the phrase ‘good order’ and why the car was delivered without the parts in paragraph 32 was in conflict with that of the wife.
Having had the benefit of seeing the husband and the wife give evidence I am satisfied the husband’s purported excuse for the contravention was not reasonable.
In coming to that conclusion I have considered the husband’s health problems, that he carried out work on the car and that he was represented at the time the orders were made.
In the circumstances of this particular case the evidence supports the wife’s position and that the husband contravened the orders without reasonable excuse.
In this case I am not satisfied the husband has established a reasonable excuse for contravention of the orders.
Penalty
The contravention having been proven and the husband having failed to establish a reasonable excuse, I turn now to consider the appropriate penalty.
Under section 112AD of the Act I am required when considering sanction to invoke the sanction most appropriate in the circumstances.
Under section 112AD(2) of the Act there are four categories of sanctions available.
In submissions made on behalf of the husband it was said any sentence of imprisonment on the husband would be grossly harsh and unjust. It was submitted that having regard to this being the first contravention, a bond was appropriate. Finally, it was submitted that if a fine was thought to be the appropriate penalty it ought be stayed until the husband resumes work.
The submissions made on behalf of the wife on this issue pressed the Court to consider the appropriate penalty for what was said to be a flagrant breach of the orders.
The wife acknowledged that the Court needed to consider all sanctions. Nonetheless the wife sought that there be a substantial penalty.
In accordance with section 112AE(4A) of the Act the wife submitted the Court ought impose a sanction by way of a suspended term of imprisonment conditional on the husband’s delivering to the wife the items referred to in paragraph 32.
The evidence in this case establishes that many of the parts missing from the car at paragraph 32 when it was delivered have been disposed of. The husband’s evidence was that he had sold the FR19 mag wheels and the engine had been sold by GTEC.
There was no evidence capable of establishing, that when the orders were made, it was made clear to the Court or the wife the car was missing the items in paragraph 32. Given under the orders the car was to be sold to meet the debts of the parties this action by the husband should be taken into account in considering penalty.
It is appropriate to consider the flagrancy of the breach by the husband in deciding on the appropriate penalty. I accept the wife’s evidence that she was unable to sell the car given the state in which it was delivered and as a result is in debt.
There was no evidence of a previous breach of Court orders or prior contravention proceedings. It seems to me that in the particular circumstances of this case that neither a bond nor a community sentence order is likely to produce the parts missing from the car to the wife. I am not satisfied that a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate in all the circumstances of this case.
That leaves the issue of a fine. A penalty unit is currently $110.00 and therefore the maximum fine possible would be $6,600.00. In the circumstances I have concluded that a fine of 30 penalty units is an appropriate sanction having regard to the flagrancy of the breach.
In coming to that conclusion I have considered that whilst the husband is not working at the E hospital the evidence is sufficient to establish he is working at F Pty Ltd.
The application in relation to furniture
Turning to the application regarding the furniture. Ultimately the wife pursued only the following order in the application filed 3 November 2006:
“To return any furniture removed from the property.”
It was not disputed that the husband removed items from the former matrimonial home. Those items were a bed, fridge and washing machine.
What was in issue was whether the husband had removed the following items in addition to those set out above:
·microwave;
·futon;
·compressor;
·gurney spray gun;
·bed side tables;
·kitchen table;
·car pictures; and
·car models.
The wife deposed that after the hearing on 1 November 2006 the husband called her to ask if he could take the furniture from the former matrimonial home. The wife’s evidence was that she had refused.
Despite this, the wife said the husband removed the fridge, washing machine, bed, bed side tables, kitchen table, cabinets in the garage, car models, car posters, tall boy, tools and other household items.
The husband deposed that the items referred to in paragraph 69 taken from the former matrimonial home were taken either because the wife had told him she did not want those items he brought into the marriage or, at least in relation to the bed he did not have a bed to sleep on nor any money to buy one.
In relation to the items such as the gurney spray gun the husband’s evidence was that this belonged to the wife’s father and was not in his possession. The husband’s evidence was the compressor belonged to his father and had been returned to him.
The husband maintained he had only taken the items referred to at paragraph 69 he did out of necessity. He denied that in taking those items he demonstrated his attitude to the Court orders. In cross examination he said he “could have taken anything” but he did not.
At the conclusion of the hearing by consent orders were made for the husband to return to the wife a bed, fridge and a washing machine taken from the former matrimonial home.
On the evidence such as it is, I can only find that the remaining items removed from the former matrimonial home are no longer in the husband’s possession. There was no other evidence capable of establishing those remaining items are, or were, in the husband’s control after 4 November 2006.
Consistent with the order made by consent the only order the Court can make is that the husband return all items in his possession taken from the former matrimonial home.
Conclusion
Section 112AD(4) of the Act provides that where the Court makes an order under section 112AD(1) the Court can make such orders as it considers necessary to ensure compliance with the order that was contravened.
In this case given the differing evidence regarding the value of the car I have not been able to establish its exact value with any certainty. However, the husband’s own evidence was the car could have fetched in excess of $15,000.00.
Given this and the finding I have made that the husband contravened the orders I will hear the parties as to the appropriate order necessary to garnishee the husband’s wages either when he returns to employment at the E hospital (or any wages or monies he earns otherwise) to recover the amount the wife has lost and ensure compliance with the orders.
In relation to the issue of the wife’s costs that had been reserved and any costs of the hearing I will hear the parties in relation to the appropriate order as to those costs.
I will stay the enforcement of the fine for 30 days pending the husband returning the items missing from the car to the wife.
Otherwise I will make orders as set out at the beginning of this judgment.
I certify that the preceding eighty-two (82) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of O'Sullivan FM
Deputy Associate: Rachelle Lombardo
Date: 1 May 2007
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