Isley v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor

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[2021] HCATrans 121

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M17 of 2021

B e t w e e n -

JOHN ISLEY

Plaintiff

and

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Defendant

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Defendant

GAGELER J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON WEDNESDAY, 4 AUGUST 2021, AT 11.00 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

HIS HONOUR:   In this matter the orders that I make are as follows:

1.The interlocutory application filed on 3 August 2021 is directed to be determined on the papers and is dismissed.

2.The originating application for a constitutional or other writ is dismissed.

3.The plaintiff is to pay the defendants’ costs of and incidental to the originating application.

I publish my reasons and I direct that those reasons be incorporated into the transcript.

The plaintiff in this application for a constitutional or other writ filed in the original jurisdiction of the High Court is a citizen of the United Kingdom.  He was born in1962.  He relocated to Australia with his family in 1971.

In 2011, following a trial in the County Court at Melbourne, the plaintiff was convicted of indecent assault of a child under the age of 16 and of incest.  On appeal to the Court of Appeal of Victoria, his total sentence was reduced to imprisonment for eight years and six months with a non‑parole period of five years and eight months.

In 2015, a delegate of the Minister cancelled the plaintiff’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). In 2017, the Minister decided not to revoke the cancellation under s 501CA of the Migration Act.  In 2018, Kerr J in the Federal Court of Australia dismissed an application for judicial review of the non‑revocation decision:  Isley v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 632.

The plaintiff served the whole of his term of imprisonment. Upon his release on 23 September 2019, he was taken into immigration detention under s 189(1) of the Migration Act where he remains.

The originating application for a constitutional or other writ names the Minister for Home Affairs and the Commonwealth of Australia as defendants.  The originating application was signed by counsel for the plaintiff on 10 March 2021 and was filed by the solicitor for the plaintiff on 12 March 2021.

By the originating application, the plaintiff seeks writs of prohibition and habeas corpus, a declaration to the effect that his detention and continuing detention purportedly under s 189(1) of the Migration Act was and is invalid, and damages for false imprisonment on an aggravated and exemplary basis.

In the originating application, the plaintiff relies on four grounds for the relief he seeks.  The grounds are confusing in their expression and are confused in their content.

The first ground is to the effect that the treatment of the plaintiff under s 501(3A), s 501CA and s 189(1) of the Migration Act amounted to a “violation of the principle of legality” on the…

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Details
Case
[2021] HCATrans 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Isley v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor*, Gageler J of the High Court of Australia considered an application for judicial review concerning the lawfulness of the applicant's detention. The applicant, Mr Isley, sought to challenge the validity of his ongoing detention by the Minister for Home Affairs and the Commonwealth of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant's detention was authorised by law, specifically in light of the High Court's previous decision in *Al-Kateb v Godwin*. The Court was required to determine if the principles established in *Al-Kateb* continued to permit the indefinite detention of a non-citizen who could not be removed from Australia.

Gageler J applied the principles from *Al-Kateb*, which held that a non-citizen who is unable to be removed from Australia may be lawfully detained under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for the purpose of effecting their removal. His Honour reasoned that the legislative framework, as interpreted by the High Court, authorises such detention even where removal is not presently practicable. The Court affirmed that the power to detain is not contingent on the existence of a realistic prospect of removal, but rather on the legal status of the individual as a non-citizen who has not been lawfully permitted to remain in Australia.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

John Isley, a UK citizen who moved to Australia in 1971, was convicted in 2011 of indecent assault of a child under 16 and of incest by the County Court at Melbourne. He was sentenced to imprisonment, which was reduced to eight years and six months with a non-parole period of five years and eight months on appeal to the Court of Appeal of Victoria. Upon his release from prison on 23 September 2019, Isley was taken into immigration detention under section 189(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and remains detained. In 2015, a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs cancelled Isley's visa under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act, and in 2017, the Minister decided not to revoke the cancellation under section 501CA of the same Act. Isley's application for judicial review of the non-revocation decision was dismissed by the Federal Court of Australia in 2018.

Isley filed an originating application in the High Court seeking writs of prohibition and habeas corpus, a declaration that his detention is invalid, and damages for false imprisonment. He relies on four grounds for the relief he seeks, primarily arguing that his treatment under the Migration Act violated the principle of legality, the separation of powers doctrine, and the principle of state immunity. Isley also claims that his detention is invalid due to the Minister's inability or unwillingness to remove him from Australia to the UK in the foreseeable future. The defendants responded to the originating application, and after judgment in The Commonwealth v AJL20 (2021) 95 ALJR 567, the parties filed supplementary submissions addressing the effect of that decision on the originating application. Isley later filed an interlocutory application seeking leave to amend the originating application, but this application was dismissed as there was no arguable basis in fact and law for the amendment sought.

This case, Isley v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor, originated as an application filed in the original jurisdiction of the High Court by the plaintiff, John Isley, a British citizen who had been residing in Australia since 1971. The plaintiff, who was convicted in 2011 of indecent assault and incest, was the subject of visa cancellation under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and has been detained under s 189(1) of the Act since his release from prison in 2019. After a failed judicial review in the Federal Court in 2018, Isley brought this originating application seeking writs of prohibition and habeas corpus, a declaration of invalidity in relation to his detention, and damages for false imprisonment. The matter was filed on 12 March 2021, and the defendants responded and filed a reply in accordance with Pt 25 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth). After the decision in The Commonwealth v AJL20 in July 2021, the parties filed supplementary submissions on the impact of that decision on the originating application. The matter was listed for determination on 4 August 2021.

On 3 August 2021, the plaintiff filed an interlocutory application seeking leave to amend the originating application. This eleventh-hour application was dismissed without being listed for hearing, as the plaintiff had failed to provide an arguable basis in fact and law for the amendment sought. The plaintiff's attempt to reformulate his claims was deemed an abuse of process and not supported by evidence, particularly in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. The originating application was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendants' costs of and incidental to the originating application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the treatment of the plaintiff under s 501(3A), s 501CA and s 189(1) of the Migration Act amount to a "violation of the principle of legality"?
2. Does the treatment of the plaintiff under s 501(3A), s 501CA and s 189(1) abrogate and curtail the independence and authority of the Court of Appeal and the Adult Parole Board of Victoria in the performance of the administration of justice, in violation of Ch III of the Constitution?
3. Does the treatment of the plaintiff under s 501(3A), s 501CA and s 189(1) abrogate and curtail the independence and authority of the County Court, Court of Appeal and Adult Parole Board in the performance of the administration of justice, in violation of the principle of State immunity pursuant to ss 106 and 107 of the Constitution?
4. Is the plaintiff's detention or continuing detention under s 189(1) of the Migration Act invalid by reason of unwillingness or inability on the part of Commonwealth officers to remove the plaintiff from Australia to the UK in the foreseeable future?
5. Does the plaintiff's continuing detention under s 189(1) of the Migration Act violate the prohibition against arbitrary and indefinite detention and in violation of the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, under customary international law, as adopted or incorporated into Australian law?
6. Is the plaintiff's continuing detention under s 189(1) of the Migration Act unconstitutional, involving a re-opening of Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562?

Held
1. The interlocutory application to amend the originating application is dismissed.
2. The originating application for a constitutional or other writ is dismissed.
3. The plaintiff's continuing detention under s 189(1) of the Migration Act does not violate the principle of legality, Ch III of the Constitution, or the principle of State immunity.
4. The plaintiff's detention under s 189(1) is not invalid due to the Commonwealth's inability or unwillingness to remove him to the UK in the foreseeable future.
5. The plaintiff's continuing detention does not violate the prohibition against arbitrary and indefinite detention or the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under customary international law.
6. The plaintiff's continuing detention does not involve a re-opening of Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In considering the plaintiff's application, the Court first addressed the issue of whether the treatment of the plaintiff under sections 501(3A), 501CA, and 189(1) of the Migration Act amounted to a "violation of the principle of legality." The Court found that the plaintiff's contention that these provisions "abrogated and curtailed" his legal rights to apply for or be released on parole was not supported by the facts. The Court held that the Migration Act's visa regime operates separately from the State criminal justice system and that the potential for the two regimes to intersect does not apply in the present case. Therefore, the Court found that the plaintiff's first ground of relief did not provide an arguable basis for challenging the cancellation decision, the non-revocation decision, or the detention of the plaintiff.

The Court then turned to the plaintiff's second and third grounds of relief, which alleged that the treatment of the plaintiff under sections 501(3A), 501CA, and 189(1) of the Migration Act abrogated and curtailed the independence and authority of the Court of Appeal and the Adult Parole Board of Victoria in the performance of the administration of justice, in violation of Chapter III of the Constitution and the principle of State immunity. The Court found that these grounds were also unsupported by the facts and did not provide an arguable basis for challenging the cancellation decision, the non-revocation decision, or the detention of the plaintiff. The Court held that the Migration Act's visa regime operates separately from the State criminal justice system and that the potential for the two regimes to intersect does not apply in the present case.

The Court next considered the plaintiff's fourth ground of relief, which alleged that his detention or continuing detention under section 189(1) of the Migration Act was invalid by reason of the unwillingness or inability on the part of Commonwealth officers to remove the plaintiff from Australia to the United Kingdom in the foreseeable future. The Court found that this ground was also unsupported by the facts and did not provide an arguable basis for challenging the detention of the plaintiff. The Court held that there was no evidentiary basis for the assertion that the Minister or any relevant officer was unable or unwilling to remove the plaintiff from Australia in the foreseeable future.

Finally, the Court considered whether the plaintiff's continuing detention under section 189(1) of the Migration Act violated the prohibition against arbitrary and indefinite detention and the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under customary international law, as adopted or incorporated into Australian law. The Court found that the plaintiff's detention was not arbitrary or indefinite, as he was detained for the purpose of removing him from Australia and there was no evidence that this could not be achieved in the foreseeable future. The Court also found that the plaintiff's detention did not amount to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

In conclusion, the Court found that none of the plaintiff's grounds of relief provided an arguable basis for challenging the cancellation decision, the non-revocation decision, or the detention of the plaintiff. The Court held that the Migration Act's visa regime operates separately from the State criminal justice system and that the potential for the two regimes to intersect does not apply in the present case. The Court also found that the plaintiff's detention was not arbitrary or indefinite and did not amount to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court therefore dismissed the plaintiff's application and ordered that he pay the defendants' costs.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Migration Act's visa regime operates separately from the State criminal justice system, and that the potential for the two regimes to intersect does not apply in cases where a non-citizen has been convicted of a serious criminal offence and their visa has been cancelled under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act. The Court also held that a non-citizen's detention under section 189(1) of the Migration Act is not arbitrary or indefinite if they are detained for the purpose of removing them from Australia and there is no evidence that this cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. Finally, the Court held that a non-citizen's detention does not amount to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if they are treated in a humane and dignified manner and their basic human needs are met.