Islander Enterprises Pty Ltd v Commonwealth

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

ISLANDER ENTERPRISES PTY LTD v COMMONWEALTH

[2021] SASC 84

Judgment of the Honourable Justice S David  

COURTS AND JUDGES - COURTS - JURISDICTION AND POWERS - CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF DIFFERENT COURTS - TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER CROSS-VESTING LEGISLATION - WHERE APPROPRIATE AND IN INTERESTS OF JUSTICE - GENERALLY

On 5 August 2020, the applicant instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia relying on two principle causes of action; breach of contract and representation and promissory estoppel.

On 2 December 2020, the respondent made an application pursuant to s 5(2)(b)(iii) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (SA) seeking an order transferring the proceedings to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory on the basis that it is in the interests of justice to do so.

The applicant in the substantive proceedings is opposed to the application.

Held, dismissing the application:

1. The transfer of proceedings is not in the interests of justice.

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (SA) s 5(2)(b)(iii), referred to.
BHP Billiton v Schultz & Ors (2004) 221 CLR 400; Cini & Ors v Pets Paradise Franchising SA Pty Ltd & Ors (2008) 102 SASR 177; Crompton Specialties Pty Ltd v BASF Australia Ltd [2006] SASC 39; Garra Water Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Ourback Yard Nursery Pty Ltd & Garra [2010] SASC 326, considered.

ISLANDER ENTERPRISES PTY LTD v COMMONWEALTH
[2021] SASC 84

Supreme Court:       Civil

  1. DAVID J: This application is made pursuant to s 5(2)(b)(iii) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (SA) (‘the Act’). The Act provides that where a proceeding is pending in this Court and it appears to the Court that it is otherwise in the interests of justice that the relevant proceedings be determined by the Supreme Court of another State or Territory, this Court shall transfer the relevant proceedings to that other Supreme Court. The respondent in the substantive proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia, seeks an order transferring the proceedings to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’) on the basis that it is in the interests of justice to do so. The applicant in the substantive proceedings, a company ‘Islander Enterprises Pty Ltd’, is opposed to the application.

    Background

  2. The applicant is registered in Queensland.  The sole director of the company, at the relevant time, was a Mr Christopher Langton (‘Langton’), who now resides in Coolangatta, Queensland.  The applicant was engaged by the respondent under a services contract to provide air surveillance services operating out of Samoa.  The contract was executed on or about 7 August 2014 and was for a period of 12 months.  The contract provided for a review for the purposes of determining the future viability of the contract.  On 5 August 2015, the respondent gave notice that the contract would not be renewed.  Accordingly, the contract came to an end on 6 August 2015.

  3. The contract provides that the laws of the ACT apply, and that…

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Details
Case
[2021] SASC 84
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Islander Enterprises Pty Ltd brought a claim against the Commonwealth of Australia in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The Commonwealth applied to the Court to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, citing a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract between the parties. Islander opposed the application on the basis that it was not in the interests of justice to transfer the proceedings. The central legal issue was whether the Court should transfer the proceedings to the ACT, considering the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause and the interests of justice. The Court considered the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, which reserved the option for the parties to choose a different jurisdiction. Islander submitted that the clause was not determinative and that the common law applicable to the dispute did not have special points of law or interpretation unique to the ACT. Islander also argued that the respondent bore an evidential onus to establish a basis for transferring the proceedings to the ACT and that it was in the interests of justice to do so.

The Court noted that neither the locus of the dispute nor the parties to the dispute had any real connection with either South Australia or the ACT. Islander's primary witness resided in Queensland, while the respondent's primary witness and counsel resided in Cairns and Canberra, respectively. Although the residence of the witnesses was relatively neutral, the Court found that Islander would incur increased costs and inconvenience if the proceedings were transferred to the ACT. Islander's current director, who provides instructions, resides in Adelaide, and the Court acknowledged that continuing to obtain instructions from Adelaide would add a level of inconvenience and expense should the matter be transferred to the ACT. The Court concluded that the transfer of proceedings was not in the interests of justice.

The Court dismissed the Commonwealth's application to transfer the proceedings to the ACT, finding that it was not in the interests of justice to do so. The Court considered the increased costs and inconvenience to Islander if the proceedings were transferred, and the relatively neutral connection of the parties and witnesses to the ACT. The Court did not find a compelling reason to transfer the proceedings based on the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause or the interests of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held, dismissing the application:

1. The transfer of proceedings is not in the interests of justice.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Thirdly, and in respect of the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, the respondent submits that the existence of the clause is not determinative on its own. The clause does not purport to make the named place an exclusive jurisdiction, but rather expressly reserves to the parties the option of choosing a different jurisdiction to that named in the contract. Further, the law applicable to the dispute is the common law and there are no special points of law or interpretation unique to the ACT which would affect the justice of the case. Consideration The respondent bears an evidential onus to establish a basis upon which a court may make an assessment that a court of the ACT is the more appropriate forum to litigate the proceedings, and that it is in the interests of justice to transfer the proceedings to that court.[5] [5] Garra Water Investments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Ourback Yard Nursery Pty Ltd & Garra [2010] SASC 326 at [12]; Cini & Ors v Pets Paradise Franchising (SA) Pty Ltd & Ors (2008) 102 SASR 177. Neither the locus of the dispute nor the parties to the dispute have any real connection with either South Australia or the ACT. The applicant is based in Queensland. The primary witness for the applicant, Langton, resides in Queensland. The primary witness for the respondent, Parsons, resides in Cairns. A witness for the respondent, Broadbent, resides in Canberra. However, the residence of the witnesses, and the balance of convenience as to those witnesses, is relatively neutral between the parties. As mentioned, the applicant’s solicitors are based in Adelaide with no office in the ACT. The applicant’s counsel is in Adelaide. The applicant’s other current director, Fuller, resides in Adelaide. The respondent’s solicitors with conduct of the matter are based in Sydney, but the respondent’s solicitors also have an office in Canberra. The respondent’s counsel is based in Adelaide. There was no evidence before me as to the existence of a cost agreement between the applicant and their solicitors which requires no immediate payment, nor that this agreement could not be entered with another Canberra based firm and/or counsel. Consequently, I put this submission to one side for the purposes of this application. However, I am satisfied that the applicant would, at the very least, incur increased costs and inconvenience in their presently instructed solicitors and counsel having to travel to Canberra to litigate the claim, or in having to instruct new solicitors or counsel in Canberra. Whilst some of the work already completed would not need to be duplicated, there is an inevitable incurring of further costs by instructing new solicitors and counsel so they can become fully apprised of the materials. Fuller, who provides instructions for the applicant, also resides in Adelaide. With increased technology and advanced communications, the burden on the applicant continuing to obtain instructions from Fuller, should the matter be transferred to the ACT, is less than it may once have been. However, the residence of Fuller in Adelaide would still add a level of inconvenience and expense should the proceedings be transferred to the ACT, particularly at the commencement of any trial.