Irwin v Irwin
[2016] FCCA 1767
•23 June 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| IRWIN v IRWIN | [2016] FCCA 1767 |
| Catchwords: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – S.78B Notice – no constitutional issue raised. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.43(1), 52(1) & 52B Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.78B |
| Cases cited: Nikolic v MGICA Ltd [1999] FCA 849 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd and Others (1999) 167 ALR 303 |
| Applicant: | ANGUS WILLIAM IRWIN |
| Respondent: | CAMPBELL CREAGHE IRWIN |
| File Number: | ADG 69 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Heffernan |
| Hearing date: | 20 June 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 20 June 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 23 June 2016 |
| (ex tempore) |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr S Ower |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Iles Selley Lawyers |
| The Respondent: | No appearance |
UPON NOTING THAT Mr Robert William Naudi and Mr Stuart George Reid have agreed to act as joint and several trustees in bankruptcy
ORDERS
A sequestration order be made against the estate of CAMPBELL CREAGHE IRWIN.
The applicant creditor’s costs be taxed and paid from the estate of the respondent debtor in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
The Court notes that the date of the act of bankruptcy is 8 January 2016
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADG 69 of 2016
| ANGUS WILLIAM IRWIN |
Applicant
And
| CAMPBELL CREAGHE IRWIN |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Settled from transcript)
This is the Creditor’s Petition of Angus William Irwin against the respondent debtor, Campbell Creaghe Irwin.
I note that a preliminary issue arose on Monday on which I have already ruled. The respondent, Mr Campbell Creaghe Irwin, filed a s.78B Notice of a Constitutional Matter and as a result sought that proceedings be adjourned pending the determination of that issue.
I was referred, and referred to, the authorities Nikolic v MGICA Ltd[1] and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd and Others[2], both decisions of his Honour French J, as he then was. I note that in Berbatis Holdings, his Honour at paragraph 14 made the following observation:
“Section 78B does not impose on the court a duty not to proceed pending the issue of a notice no matter how trivial, unarguable or concluded the constitutional point may. If the asserted constitutional point is frivolous or vexatious or raised as an abuse of process, it will not attach to the matter in which it is raised the character of a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation.”
[1] [1999] FCA 849.
[2] (1999) 167 ALR 303.
His Honour also referred to the decision in Re Finlayson; Ex parte Finlayson[3], a decision of 1997 of his Honour, Toohey J, where his Honour observed in terms of s.78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
“A cause does not involve a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation merely because someone asserts that it does. That is not to say that the strength or weakness of the proposition is critical but it must be established that the challenge does involve a matter arising under the Constitution.”
[3] (1997) 72 ALJR 73.
I was satisfied on the previous occasion that there was no merit in the matters referred to in the s.78B Notice and I declined to adjourn the hearing of this petition on the basis of that Notice.
Before I deal with the matters alleged in the Creditor’s Petition and the substantive issues, I will summarise briefly the procedural chronology of this matter before the Court.
The Creditor’s Petition was filed on 2 March 2016. The matter first came on before the Court on 4 May 2016. On that day, a solicitor, Mr Edwards, attended on behalf of the respondent debtor. He advised the Court that the respondent was in Sri Lanka and it was difficult to obtain instructions from. He advised the Court that there were jurisdictional issues relating to the alleged act of bankruptcy and indicated that preliminary discussions had been held with counsel to represent the respondent. He sought an adjournment which was opposed by the applicant creditor.
At that time, there was a Notice of Appearance but no Notice of Opposition to the order, or any supporting affidavit filed by the respondent debtor. I granted an adjournment until 2 June 2016.
On 1 June 2016, Mr Edwards filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act as a lawyer for the respondent. By this stage, the respondent had conveyed his phone number to the Court with a request that the Court ring him. The Court rang the respondent on 2 June 2016 and the respondent appeared by telephone from Sri Lanka. By this stage, the respondent had still only filed a Notice of Appearance. No other documents had been filed.
The Court had received by that stage what purported to be a medical certificate emailed to my chambers by the respondent from the Durdans Hospital. That indicates that he was admitted to that hospital on 20 May 2016, and he was diagnosed as having a left pyothorax following a blunt trauma to the chest. He had a bronchoscopy, a left VATS debridement decortication performed on 21 May 2016 under general anaesthesia. He was discharged on 25 May 2016 and the letter suggested that the patient was not able to fly within the next three weeks until a follow up with the doctor who signed the letter.
The respondent submitted via telephone that he should be granted an adjournment to enable him to further prepare because he had recently had this surgery. He indicated his intention to return to Australia and appear in Court on the next adjourned date and defend the proceedings in person.
I made orders on that date adjourning the matter, and I also made orders that the respondent file and serve his Notice of Opposition and Response by close of business on 9 June 2016, that the creditor file and serve any responding affidavit by 15 June 2016, and adjourning the matter to Monday, 20 June 2016 at 2.15 pm.
On 9 June 2016, the respondent filed an Affidavit. On 16 June 2016, he filed the Notice of Constitutional Matter pursuant to s.78B, which I have already addressed. On 17 June 2016, the respondent caused to be filed a further Notice of Appearance. On 17 June 2016, he filed Grounds of Opposition to the Creditor’s Petition.
Whilst the applicant has been able to achieve the filing of documents with the Registry from overseas, he has persisted in communicating directly with my chambers through emails and various documents.
I will set out a brief history of the respondent making contact with my chambers via email. He copied my chambers in on an email on 25 May 2016. On that day, my chambers notified Mr Irwin that it was inappropriate to be copied into emails and that it was inappropriate to communicate directly with chambers. My chambers was copied in on four further emails, 26 May 2016 and 30 May 2016.
On 31 May 2016, an email was sent to my chambers that, in effect, requested an adjournment. On 1 June 2016, an email was sent directly to my chambers. On 5 June 2016, my chambers was again copied in on an email. On 9 June 2016, 14 June 2016 and 15 June 2016, further emails were sent directly to my chambers.
On 15 June 2016, my chambers notified Mr Irwin that it was inappropriate to communicate directly with chambers. On 16 June 2016, my chambers again notified Mr Irwin that it was inappropriate to communicate directly with chambers.
On 17 June 2016, my chambers was further copied into two emails. On 19 June 2016, my chambers was copied in on a further email. And on 21 June 2016, there was a further email addressed to my chambers.
Before 2 June 2016, the respondent provided what purported to be a medical certificate, that I have already referred to, which indicated that he had been involved in an accident.
On 19 June 2016, the email sent to the Court - that is, the day before this matter was adjourned – advised that instead of flying to Australia from Sri Lanka, he had flown from Sri Lanka to Dubai where he has claimed to habitually reside. A further letter which was provided in lieu of a medical certificate was attached to that email. That is the document that I have now marked as Exhibit 24. That is from the Keith Nicholl Medical Centre in Dubai and notes that Mr Irwin had sustained an accident on 15 May 2016. It gives details of the medical treatment he received in Colombo that was referred to in the earlier medical document and noted that it was not recommended for him to fly after six weeks after a pneumothorax and asserting that he would be fit to fly on 2 July 2016.
I note that in order to consult with that doctor, it was necessary for the respondent to fly from Sri Lanka to the United Arab Emirates. I do not regard the context of that letter as establishing a legitimate excuse for his failure to attend today. There is a limit to matters of which I can take judicial notice but it seems to me that flying from Sri Lanka to Dubai is not a logical flight path to take for a person genuinely intending to return to Australia for these proceedings.
I have not had regard to any of the matters raised in the email correspondence sent directly to my chambers, or to which my chambers has been copied in, except those two medical documents which I have now marked as Exhibits 23 and 24, and the explanation in the final email that he had flown to Dubai which in any event was obvious from Exhibit 24.
This brings me to the proceedings on 20 June 2016. The matter was called three times and there was no appearance by or on behalf of the respondent, Mr Campbell Creaghe Irwin. My Deputy Associate attempted to ring the respondent debtor using two mobile phone numbers that he had provided to the Court, one of which was used by the Court to contact him on 2 June 2016. The attempts to contact him by phone were unsuccessful. It seems the phone was not switched on.
I declined to adjourn this matter on the basis of the s.78B Notice as I have already noted, and I proceeded to hear the submissions on the Creditor’s Petition from Mr Ower, counsel for the creditor.
I will now deal with the substantive application, namely, the Creditor’s Petition. Mr Ower indicated that his client relied on the following materials filed with the Court, and which have now been marked as Exhibits - that is:
·Exhibit A1, Affidavit of Bankruptcy Notice filed 2 March 2016;
·Exhibit A2, Creditor’s Petition filed on 2 March 2016;
·Exhibit A3, Affidavit of Angus William Irwin sworn on 3 May 2016;
·Exhibit A4, Affidavit of Service of the Creditor’s Petition, Claire Fitzgerald, sworn and filed on 3 May 2016;
·Exhibit A5, Affidavit of Matthew Selley sworn on 17 June 2016;
·Exhibit A6, Affidavit of Search sworn on 20 June 2016;
·Exhibit A7, Affidavit of Debt sworn on 20 June 2016;
·Exhibit A8, an extract from the ABN Register for the Trustee of Campbell Irwin Family Trust dated 20 June 2016;
·Exhibit A9, extract from the passport of the respondent debtor dated 18 July 2012, and a visa document dated 27 May 2015;
·Exhibit A10, the subpoena issued to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, passenger cards entry and departure of respondent debtor dated December 2015; and
·Exhibit A11, the order of Registrar Bochner dated 16 March 2015.
I have had regard to all of those documents and considered them.
The creditor also relies on Exhibits A12 through to A22 inclusive which are documents which have been tendered to the Court from the materials that were subpoenaed from BDO Accountants. I will not identify each of those documents separately in these reasons. They have been marked as exhibits. I have considered those documents in considering my reasons and the orders I should make.
There being no appearance by the respondent debtor, Mr Ower submits that there is no evidence before the Court that would either establish solvency or in any other way defeat the Creditor’s Petition. He submits that I should ignore the matters deposed to by Mr Campbell Creaghe Irwin in his Affidavit of 9 June 2016, as it has not been properly put before the Court in evidence, and the debtor has not made himself available for cross-examination on that document in any event. I will deal with that submission later in these reasons.
I can indicate that I have had regard to the Notice of Opposition filed by the respondent debtor and I will deal with that later in these reasons.
I turn now to the matters of which the Court must be satisfied on the hearing of a Creditor’s Petition. I note that the burden of proof lies with the practitioner.
Pursuant to s.52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the Court must be satisfied:
a)Of the matters stated in the petition having been verified;
b)The petition was properly served; and
c)That the petitioning creditor’s debt is still owing and is at least of the amount of $5,000.
I will dispose of the second and third requirements by indicating that I am satisfied that the Creditor’s Petition was properly served and that the debt is still owing at the time of the hearing and now.
I turn to the question of whether the matters in the petition have been verified. The petition alleges that the respondent committed an act of bankruptcy in the following circumstances:
a)That he owes the applicant creditor the amount of $38,300, based on the allocator dated 29 July 2014, for costs and disbursements satisfied pursuant to the judgment of Withers J delivered on 19 May 2014 in the Supreme Court of South Australia in the matter, Irwin v Piper Alderman and Others, Action No. 1677 of 2009.
b)Further, the petition asserts that the applicant creditor does not hold security over the property of the respondent debtor;
c)Thirdly, the petition asserts that at the time that the act of bankruptcy was committed, the respondent debtor was carrying on business in Australia either personally or by an agent or manager; and
d)Finally, the following act of bankruptcy was committed by the respondent debtor within six months before presentation of the petition, namely, that the respondent debtor failed to comply on or before 8 January 2016 with the requirements of a Bankruptcy Notice served on him on 18 December 2005, or to satisfy the Court that he had a counter-claim set off or cross-demand equal to or more than the sum claimed in the Bankruptcy Notice being a counter-claim set off or cross-demand that he could not have set up in the action in which the judgment referred to in the Bankruptcy Notice was obtained.
I will deal firstly with the question of the service of the Bankruptcy Notice. I refer to Exhibit A1 in this matter, the Affidavit of Service of David Jeffrey Chambers. That Affidavit indicates as follows: that on Friday, 18 December 2015 at 12.30pm in the afternoon, he served Mr Campbell Creaghe Irwin outside the Supreme Court of South Australia on Gouger Street. He served him with a true copy of the Bankruptcy Notice dated 18 December. He served him with a true copy of the allocator dated 29 July and a true copy of the order dismissing the action made on 9 November 2012, as well as a true copy of the reasons of Withers J made on 31 March 2014.
Mr Chambers deposes to the fact that at the time of service, he identified Mr Campbell Creaghe Irwin from a description supplied to him of his height, his build, his facial hair being light and the clothing that he was wearing on the day. He approached the person and asked him if he was Campbell Creaghe Irwin. The person did not reply and continued walking. He then said to the person, “I have a bankruptcy notice here for you with other documents. Will you accept them?” The person again did not reply. He said, “I will leave the documents here in your presence”, at which time he placed the documents on a bench seat which the person then walked past. That affidavit annexes copies of the documents which were served on that person on 18 December 2015.
I am prepared to draw the inference that the person spoken to by Mr Chambers was the respondent debtor. Mr Chambers had a description of the debtor. The actions of the person that Mr Chambers spoke to, namely, failing to acknowledge or respond to him when he addressed him directly, and clearly asked him to identify himself, and not responding when he was told that he was wanting to serve a Bankruptcy Notice and other documents on him, shows that the person was the respondent. I find that he was properly served when the Notice was left in his presence, even though it was on a public street.
The respondent can have been in no doubt as to the reasons for the process server speaking with him on that day.
I am satisfied that the creditor has proven the existence of the debt alleged in the Notice of Bankruptcy. That is, I am satisfied that the allocator was made on the day alleged and that, as a result, the respondent was liable to pay the creditor the amount of $38,300.
I am satisfied that the respondent failed to comply with the Bankruptcy Notice on or before 8 January 2016, or to satisfy the Court that he had some form of counter-claim or those other matters referred to in the Creditor’s Petition that might tend to go in his favour. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the respondent debtor committed an act of bankruptcy as alleged in the Creditor’s Petition.
I now turn to the question of jurisdiction. Pursuant to s.43(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, the Court has jurisdiction to make a sequestration order where a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy and, at the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, the debtor:
(1)Was personally present or ordinarily resident in Australia;
(2)Had a dwelling house or place of business in Australia;
(3)Was carrying on business in Australia either personally or by means of an agent or manager; or
(4)Was a member of a firm or partnership carrying on business in Australia by means of a partner or partners or of an agent or manager.
In those circumstances on a petition presented by the creditor, I have jurisdiction to make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.
The matters referred to at subs.43(1)(b)(i) to (iii) inclusive are not cumulative but are matters that can be proven in the alternative.
The creditor acknowledges the respondent has resided for some years on and off in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. Mr Ower made submissions which sought to establish that the Court had jurisdiction by virtue of the respondent carrying on business in this country at the time of the act of bankruptcy.
Mr Ower frankly conceded that the central issue in this matter was one of jurisdiction and whether the debtor was carrying on business in Australia.
Mr Ower submits the documents tendered by the creditor established that he was carrying on business at the time of the act of bankruptcy. He further submits that if there is any doubt about that, I can draw an inference on the basis of the principle in the case of Jones v Dunkel[4] and that I can more confidently draw that inference because of the failure of the debtor to bring any matters to the attention of the Court to the contrary.
[4] Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298.
Mr Ower submits that quite obviously the debtor has not adduced any evidence and has declined to attend for the purpose of cross-examination and, if any inference is to be drawn from this, it should support the assertions that are made by the creditor in their submissions and on the basis of the materials they have tendered.
I note that the business must be the debtor’s own and that employment in someone else’s business would not be sufficient and that the authority of Turner v Trevorrow & Another [5] establishes that having a company in a jurisdiction is of itself not enough.
[5] (1994) 49 FCR 566.
Mr Ower identifies two businesses which he says, in effect, would create the nexus, either individually or collectively. The first is a business known as ICICAM Pty Ltd. The creditor submits that ICICAM was a tool by which the applicant carried on business in Australia and that this inference is strengthened by his failure to attend at Court and provide any documents to the contrary, or any documents about ICICAM.
The second business is a business known as Leading Light Astrology, the exact nature of which is not completely known but it appears, Mr Ower submits, to conduct business from Australia. The applicant has residence in Dubai, so the documents establish, on the basis that he conducts a foreign business. And on the face of his visa, Leading Light Astrology is identified as the foreign business that he conducts.
Mr Ower submits that the company, ICICAM, was registered in May 2005 and that at that time it had one shareholder and on the date of registration had one director, namely, the respondent. In 2008, the company, and the trust of which it was trustee, sought a business number and this can be seen in Exhibit A8. The seeking out of an ABN, Mr Ower submits, is solely consistent with the desire to use that entity for business purposes.
In November 2012, the time the costs order was made at or about that time, the respondent described himself as being the manager of Leading Light Astrology and Mr Ower refers me to the Affidavit of Mr Selley and, in particular, Annexure MS7.
The extracts from the respondent’s passport, Exhibit A9, indicate as I have already said, that he is a partner in a sponsored business, Free zone/Leading Light Astrology FZC. His visa was extended to sometime beyond this date. I will clarify that later in these reasons.
The business, Leading Light Astrology, appears to be conducted through a website, llastrol.com, registered by the Australian company, Digital Pacific. This is referred to at page 80 of Mr Selley’s Affidavit. The website is registered in Sydney. The time zone on the website is Queensland time. It has two PO boxes: one in Dubai and one in Victoria.
The inference, Mr Ower says, that I should draw comfortably is that Leading Light Astrology was a business carried on in Australia as per the domain name, and that that business was carried on by Campbell Creaghe Irwin in some form of partnership as per the indication on his visa documents for the United Arab Emirates and his LinkedIn profile which describes him as “manager”. The creditor also tendered departure and entry cards, and I note that they indicate his occupation as “manager”.
Mr Ower submits that if there is anything equivocal in those matters as to him conducting business in Australia, I should draw an inference on the basis of the case in Jones v Dunkel. In any event, he submits, in effect, that I can consider the evidence relating to Leading Light Astrology in association with all of the other evidence relating to ICICAM Pty Ltd.
Mr Ower notes that the allocator was signed on 20 July 2014 and at or about the same time a company return from ICICAM was filed, and the registration fee was paid for that. The BDO documents establish this.
Mr Ower points to the fact that BDO requested the respondent to pay the registration fee and that the respondent undertook to do so. Mr Ower properly concedes that we have no similar documents for 2015, but we can infer that if the registration fee was not paid in that year, the company would be deregistered administratively by ASIC and that that appears not to have occurred.
Mr Ower further submits, with respect to the Leading Light Astrology website, that it makes reference to paid reports for astrology services being able to be obtained through the website. That was a matter, he said, that clearly supports an inference that it was a commercial endeavour.
The visa stamp on Exhibit A10, Mr Ower says, suggests that the respondent will be conducting his business until the end of 2018, and that for that reason, at least, I should be comfortable drawing the inference.
However, there is one significant item of evidence to which Mr Ower draws my attention, and that is an email dated 2 October 2014 from Campbell Creaghe Irwin to Mr Peter Sheehan – that is, Exhibit A16. Mr Ower colourfully referred to this as the “smoking gun” which establishes that the company - that is, ICICAM - was not being carried on at arm’s length. It is, in fact, his alter ego, he is carrying on business through his use of the company. As a result of that email, what the respondent does can be seen, namely, he names another director of ICICAM Pty Ltd and so forth and he sought the backdating of the registration.
Mr Ower notes that the documents show that in December 2014 the company had generated income for the respondent and accordingly he had to make a payment for GST, then he subsequently changed his mind despite asking the Australia Taxation Office to register the company for GST purposes. He then in late January 2015 sought a cancellation of this.
Mr Ower directs my attention to an email that was sent to Anne, namely, Anne Irwin on 21 March 2015. That is referred to in Exhibit A3 in the Affidavit of Angus William Irwin and it is Annexure D. That email said in part:
“There are also two credit cards that I have in Australia and that will affect my credit cards here in Dubai as it is all interlinked and be a real problem. My business visa here would also be compromised as it goes to character questions and bankruptcy has to be declared.”
During 2015, Mr Ower notes that ICICAM received a letter from the ATO and that is Annexure MS6 to Mr Selley’s Affidavit and referred to at page 76 of that Affidavit. The company, Mr Ower says, has established a presence in Australia for GST purposes and carrying on business extends to situations where active business may have ceased.[6] And so, Mr Ower submits, that even if I was not satisfied that on 8 January 2016 ICICAM Pty Ltd was trading, nevertheless there had been no tax paid from 2009, and on well-established principles, the company was still being wound up and as such is still carrying on business. Mr Ower referred me to authority establishing that proposition.
[6] Westpac Banking Corporation v Faress [2011] FMCA 26 at [14]-[15].
Exhibit A8 indicates that the ABN number for the trust company was cancelled on 6 May 2016 and that was after the first hearing when Mr Edwards appeared.
I have not referred specifically to the content of all of the materials tendered by the creditor but I have considered them. Mr Ower makes the overall submission that all of these materials establish that ICICAM is an alter ego for the respondent.
Mr Ower points to some of the activity that has been engaged in by ICICAM over time and, in particular, the fact that the respondent father’s estate had a large parcel of shares to be distributed to the brothers of the family and ICICAM received shares of $5.5 million on behalf of the respondent.
The material submitted, Mr Ower says, establishes that this is the case he refers me to the transfer forms which have been annexed to Mr Selley’s Affidavit.
The only conclusion that can be reasonably drawn from all of the materials tendered, and the inference which Mr Ower asks that I draw, is that Mr Campbell Creaghe Irwin conducts his affairs through ICICAM.
If I am satisfied, Mr Ower says, that ICICAM is the alter ego and yet still had doubts that it was trading, then there still remains the question of the winding up of the business and the unpaid income tax.
ICICAM in short received $5.5 million, was registered for GST, and the documents show that the respondent used it to pursue an express interest in other business opportunities. He was clearly using the company as a tool for carrying on business, Mr Ower suggests. In the absence of any explanation from the respondent as to what that company was to him, I should draw the inference that Mr Ower urges upon me.
I turn to the question of the respondent’s Affidavit of 9 June 2016. I accept the submission that the respondent creditor, in not having attended the final hearing has, firstly, not put evidence of those matters before the Court, and has not made himself available for cross-examination on that Affidavit.
I find that I am not able to take account of that Affidavit and it is not properly before me.
However, the main contention of the respondent contained in that Affidavit beyond the question of jurisdiction which he raised in his Notice of Opposition to the creditor’s petition is that he cannot say if he is or is not solvent because he has not yet received any final distribution from the estates to which he is an apparent beneficiary. This would not in any event satisfy me that the respondent debtor is solvent in the sense that he is able to pay his debts. And I refer to the definition of being able to pay debts, as and when they fall due, and the classic statement of that in Sandell v Porter[7]– I shall not read the entire passage but I note that insolvency is expressed as an inability to pay debts as they fall due out of the debtor's own money. But the debtor’s own moneys are not limited to his cash resources immediately available. They extend to moneys which he can procure by realization, by sale, or by mortgage or pledge of his assets within a relatively short time. The conclusion of insolvency ought to be clear from a consideration of the debtor's financial position in its entirety and generally speaking ought not to be drawn simply from evidence of a temporary lack of liquidity.
[7] (1966) 115 CLR 666 at 670.
I am not satisfied, having considered all of the materials before me, that the debtor is able to establish that he is able to pay his debts.
I turn to the discretion in s.52B of the Bankruptcy Act. I may dismiss the petition if I am satisfied by the debtor that there is other cause why a sequestration order ought not be made. I am not satisfied that there is other sufficient cause why a sequestration order ought not be made.
To be clear, I am satisfied that the creditor has proven those matters of which proof is required by ss.43(1) and 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, and there is not sufficient cause for me not to make the sequestration order.
I certify that the preceding seventy-five (75) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Heffernan
Date: 13 July 2016
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