Irving v Pfingst (No 2)

In the case of Irving v Pfingst (No 2), the plaintiff, Irving, pursued a claim against Pfingst and another defendant for malicious prosecution. The plaintiff was successful in his claim concerning one of the charges but not the other. The plaintiff sought general, aggravated, and exemplary damages, as well as interest. The defendants argued that the delay of the plaintiff should affect the period for which interest was awarded. The plaintiff also sought an order that the defendants pay all of the plaintiff’s costs of the trial on a standard basis. The defendants argued that the costs should reflect the level of success on the issues considered and the plaintiff's unreasonable delay, which increased costs.

The court found that the assessment of damages must take into account the findings of the majority of the Court of Appeal that the defendants were liable for malicious prosecution and any relevant evidence from the trial. The court found that the objective insufficiency of the material to warrant the Accessory Charge was demonstrated by the absence of material in the first defendant's possession to warrant the allegation that Wayne Suthers had committed the robbery. The court found that the insufficiency of the material was such that it supported an inference that the first defendant could not honestly have formed the view that there was a proper case for the prosecution of Irving in relation to the Accessory Charge. The court found that the first defendant could not have held an honest belief that Irving was guilty of the offence charged if, at the same time, she suspected that it was Irving, and not Suthers, who robbed the bank.

The court ordered that the parties were to calculate and agree on the amount of interest at the rate in the Proposed Orders for the relevant period. The parties were to provide an agreed draft order containing the Proposed Orders which includes the calculation of interest to the Associate for Brown J by 4 pm on 18 September 2025 to be provided by email. The defendants were to pay 40 per cent of the plaintiff’s costs of proceedings in the Trial Division excluding certain specified costs.