International Registration 1412961 (21, 25, 30, 43) - Australian Trade Mark Application number 1941867 (21, 25, 30, 43) – RALPH’S COFFEE- in the name of The Polo/Lauren Company L.P.
[2021] ATMO 154
•14 December 2021
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
ReInternational Registration 1412961 (21, 25, 30, 43) - Australian Trade Mark Application number 1941867 (21, 25, 30, 43) – RALPH’S COFFEE- in the name of The Polo/Lauren Company L.P.
Delegate: Nicholas Smith Representation: Holder: James Maxwell of Maxwell’s Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys Pty Ltd Decision: 2021 ATMO 154
Regulation 17A.24: final decision on examination – consideration of section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 – IRDA accepted for possible extension of protection to Australia in respect of goods in class 25. For the remainder of the goods and services, the Trade Mark is insufficiently inherently adapted to distinguish – insufficient evidence of use provided –extension of protection refusedBackground
On 14 May 2018, The Polo/Lauren Company L.P. (‘Holder’) applied to extend protection to Australia of International Registration 1412961 under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘Act’) and Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (‘Regulations’). Such an application is referred to as an International Registration Designating Australia (‘IRDA’). The current details of the IRDA appear below:
Application Number:
1941867
International Reg.
1412961
Filing Date:
14 May 2018
Priority Date
29 December 2017
Goods and Services: Class 21: Mugs; plates of paper and of plastic materials; cups of paper and of plastic materials Class 25: T-shirts; aprons (clothing)
Class 30: Coffee; tea; chocolate
Class 43: Bar services; restaurant services Alcoholic beverages containing wine; Beverages (‘Holder’s Goods and Services’)Trade Mark:
RALPH’S COFFEE
(‘Trade Mark’)
The IRDA was examined as required under reg 17A.12 of the Regulations. On 6 January 2019 IP Australia issued a first adverse examination report which amounted to a Notification of Provisional Refusal of the IRDA, identifying grounds for rejection pursuant to s 41 of the Act in respect of the Holder’s Goods and Services save the class 25 goods (‘First Report’). With respect to the s 41 ground, the examiner stated (paraphrased) that the Trade Mark is not capable of distinguishing the specified goods and services because it contains as its main feature the surname RALPH, which other traders may wish to use in connection with the Holder’s Goods and Services.
Between January 2019 and 1 June 2021 the Holder and this office engaged in further correspondence with IP Australia issuing 3 further examination reports maintaining the s 41 ground for rejection in respect of the Holder’s Goods and Services save the class 25 goods. The Holder then requested to be heard by the Registrar of Trade Marks under reg 17A.17 of the Regulations.
This matter was listed for hearing on 16 November 2021. On 15 November 2021 the Holder filed evidence in this matter, being a declaration of Derek Morales dated 15 October 2021 with Exhibits A-B and 1-9 (‘Morales Declaration’). On 16 November 2021 the Holder filed written submissions that supplement the earlier submissions made by the Holder to the examiner (collectively ‘Holder’s Submissions’). At the hearing James Maxwell (with Julian Clulow in attendance) made further oral submissions to support the Holder’s Submissions.
The present matter is a hearing under reg 17A.17 (which is similar in nature to a request for hearing under s 33(4) of the Act). As noted in MHFC Holdings Pty Ltd[1] as well as other decisions of the Registrar (Teraglow Pty Ltd[2] and TOM Organic Pty Ltd[3]), the purpose of such a hearing is not a review of the examiner’s decision but rather a fresh consideration of the ground for rejection, in this case the ground for rejection under s 41 of the Act. Any decision I shall make is not a review of the examiner’s approach and I am not bound in any way to follow it. Rather this proceeding will consider afresh the s 41 ground for rejection under this Act as it applies to the IRDA for the Holder’s Goods and Services other than the goods in class 25[4].
[1] [2016] ATMO 96, [9] (Hearing Officer Wilson).
[2] [2016] ATMO 32 (Hearing Officer Worth).
[3] [2018] ATMO 46 (Hearing Officer Worth).
[4] Reg 17A.36(5) of the Regulations provides that if no notification under subregulation 17A.16(1), 17A.25(2) or 17A.32(2) or in connection with possible oppositions is made within 18 months of the Registrar being notified of the IRDA then the trade mark that is the subject of the IRDA becomes a protected international trade mark after the 18 month period. As no notifications have been made with respect to the class 25 goods, extension of protection will proceed with respect to the Holder’s goods in class 25.
Legislative framework
Reg 17A.24 of the Regulations provides that:
(1)The Registrar must, after the examination, accept the IRDA unless he or she is satisfied that:
(a)it is not in accordance with this Division; or
(b)there are grounds for rejecting it.
…
(3)The Registrar must reject an IRDA, in whole or in part, if the Registrar is satisfied that:
(a)it is not in accordance with this Division; or
(b)there are grounds for rejecting it, in whole or in part.
Section 41 of the Act provides:
41 – Trade Mark not distinguishing applicant’s goods or services
(1)An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (the designated goods or services) from the goods or services of other persons.
Note: For goods of a person and services of a person see section 6.
(2)A trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons only if either subsection (3) or (4) applies to the trade mark.
(3)This subsection applies to a trade mark if:
(a)the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and
(b)the applicant has not used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application to such an extent that the trade mark does in fact distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant.
(4)This subsection applies to a trade mark if:
(a)the trade mark is, to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and
(b)the trade mark does not and will not distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant having regard to the combined effect of the following:
(i)the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;
(ii)the use, or intended use, of the trade mark by the applicant;
(iii)any other circumstances.
Note 1:Trade marks that are not inherently adapted to distinguish goods or services are mostly trade marks that consist wholly of a sign that is ordinarily used to indicate:
(a)the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or some other characteristic, of goods or services; or
(b)the time of production of goods or of the rendering of services.
Note 2: For goods of a person and services of a person see section 6.
Note 3: Use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant and an authorised use of a trade mark by another person are each taken to be use of the trade mark by the applicant (see subsections (5) and 7(3) and section 8).
(5)For the purposes of this section, the use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant for the registration of the trade mark is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the applicant.
Note 1: For applicant and predecessor in title see section 6.
Note 2: If a predecessor in title had authorised another person to use the trade mark, any authorised use of the trade mark by the other person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the predecessor in title (see subsection 7(3) and section 8).
With respect to s 41 it is appropriate to discuss the ‘presumption of registrability’. As was explained by the Hearing Officer in Unilever plc v Beiersdorf AG with respect to s 33 of the Act, which corresponds to Reg 17A.24:
Section 33 of the Act states that the Registrar must accept an application unless satisfied that it has not been made in accordance with the Act, (which is not relevant here), or that there are grounds under the Act for rejecting it. In this regard s 33 embodies what is often referred to as a ‘presumption of registrability.’ As was explained in Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks[5] (‘Oregon’), however, prior to the [Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (“the Amending Act”)] ss 41(5) and (6) as they then were, (which essentially correspond to current ss 41(4) and (3) respectively), effectively shifted the onus onto an applicant. Section 41 was thus amended to address that inconsistency, with the Explanatory Memorandum to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 (‘the EM’) stating at page 146:
[5] (1998) 40 IPR 498, 505 (Branson J).
The changes are intended to clarify that the presumption of registrability, as provided for in section 33, does apply to section 41. … The intention is that, if the Registrar is equally unsure of whether the mark is or is not capable of distinguishing, that doubt should be resolved in the applicant’s favour.
The Amending Act was not however intended to alter the relevant standard for registrability. In this regard the EM goes on to state (also at page 146):
Note that while the amendment [to s 41] ensures that the onus rests with the Registrar during examination, it is not intended to require that the trade mark should clearly not be registered. Rather, as with other grounds it is intended that the delegate need only be satisfied that a ground exists on the balance of probabilities.
The amendments are not meant to alter the key concepts of “inherently adapted to distinguish”, “capable of distinguishing” and “does or will distinguish”. The judicial tests for these terms are settled and the amendments are not intended to change the legal concept of a trade mark distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services from others.
Branson J’s analysis at 504 in Oregon of the operation of s 41 as it stood prior to the Amending Act, as paraphrased below, also remains apt in relation to the amended section:
Having taken [the extent of inherent adaptation] into account, it is theoretically open to [me] to conclude:
(a) that the [Trade Mark] is inherently adapted to distinguish the [Holder’s Services] from the goods or services of other persons and capable, on that basis alone, of so distinguishing the [Holder’s Services]; [that is, neither s 41(3) nor s 41(4) applies] or
(b) that the [Trade Mark] is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the [Holder’s Services] from the goods or services of other persons; [that is, s 41(3) applies] or
(c) that the [Trade Mark] is to some extent inherently adapted to distinguish the [Claimed Goods] from the goods or services of other persons, but there is uncertainty, on that basis alone, that the trade mark is actually capable of so distinguishing the [Holder’s Services]. [that is, s 41(4) applies][6]
[6] [2017] ATMO 25, [38]-[40] (Hearing Officer Kirov).
In the present case the Holder has provided minimal evidence of use of the Trade Mark in Australia, indeed it is apparent from the evidence that the Holder uses the Trade Mark for promotional purposes only. The Holder’s evidence consists of undated photos of coffee carts bearing the Trade Mark along with flyers suggesting that the Holder has used a cart (it is unclear if the Holder has more than one cart) since 2019 to offer free coffee to visitors to promote the opening of its RALPH LAUREN clothing stores. The Morales Declaration also contains what are said to be two invoices (but are actually a single invoice) showing that the Holder has purchased 30kg of coffee beans from a related entity in Hong Kong in connection with its business in Australia, which further suggests that the amount of coffee provided by the Holder in Australia is minimal. No evidence of sales, turnover or advertising expenditure has been provided. I note that the Morales Declaration does provide evidence that the Holder operates an Instagram account using the name ‘Ralph’s Coffee’ but such evidence reflects a global use and does not indicate any significant use in Australia.
The Holder’s Submissions and the Morales Declaration refer to the reputation of the Holder more generally but such submissions are limited to the reputation of the Holder in its RALPH LAUREN Mark (and similar marks) and not the Trade Mark. I consider evidence in respect of the Holder’s reputation in marks that are not the Trade Mark (and not substantially identical to the Trade Mark) to be of minimal probative value with respect s 41(4) (either as evidence of use or other circumstances).
As such the ground for rejection under s 41 will apply if the Trade Mark is to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the Holder’s Goods and Services from the goods and services of other persons, being the test in s 41(4). It is not necessary to conclude that the Trade Mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish, being the test in s 41(3).
In Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd, the Full Court summarised the principles in respect of s 41 as follows:
(1) In deciding whether or not a trade mark is capable of distinguishing the designated services from the service of others, the first question is the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated services from those of others: s 41(2) and (3).
(2) In determining whether a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the services of a trader, the answer largely depends upon whether other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their businesses and without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in connection with their goods: Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (“Clark Equipment”) [1964] HCA 55; (1964) 111 CLR 511 per Kitto J at 514.
(3) The question of whether a trade mark is adapted to distinguish the services of the applicant is to be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives (in the exercise of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage for the sake of the signification which the words ordinarily possess) will think of the word and want to use it in connection with similar goods in any manner which would infringe the trade mark once registered: Clark Equipment at 514.
(4) Directly descriptive words, like geographical names, are not prima facie suitable for the grant of a monopoly conferred by registration of a trade mark because use of them, as trade marks, will “rarely eclipse” their “primary” (that is, their ordinary) signification. Such words (or a word) are unlikely to be inherently, that is to say, “in [their] own nature”, adapted to distinguish the applicant’s goods. Traders may legitimately want to use such words in connection with their goods or services “because of the reference they are ‘inherently adapted to make’ to those goods”: Cantarella Bros Pty Limited v Modena Trading Pty Limited (“Cantarella”) [2014] HCA 48; (2014) 254 CLR 337 at [57] per French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ.
(5) The principles derived from the observations of Kitto J in Clark Equipment apply with as much force to directly descriptive words as they do to words which are, according to their ordinary signification, geographical names: Cantarella at [57].
(6) In determining whether a word is (or words are) inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services of an applicant, the question is to be examined from the point of view of the “possible impairment” of the rights of “honest traders” and from the “point of view of the public”: Cantarella at [59].
(7) In determining whether a word contains (or words contain) a “direct reference” to the relevant goods or services (and thus prima facie not registrable as a trade mark) or whether the word (or words) makes a “covert and skilful allusion” to the relevant goods or services (and thus prima facie registrable as a trade mark), the “ordinary signification” of the word or words to persons who will purchase, consume or trade in the goods or services, must be considered: Cantarella at [59].
(8) Where the question is whether there are other traders who may legitimately want to use or apply a word or words in connection with their goods or services (other than a geographical name or a surname), the test refers to the “legitimate desire of other traders to use a word which is directly descriptive in respect of the same or similar goods”: Cantarella at [59].
(9) Consistent with the proposition at (7), the test described at (8) does not encompass the desire of other traders to use a word or words which in relation to the goods or services are “allusive or metaphorical”: Cantarella at [59].
(10) In determining whether a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services for the purposes of s 41(3), the ordinary signification of the word or words are to be considered from the perspective of “any person in Australia concerned with the goods or services to which the trade mark is to be applied”: Cantarella at [70].
(11) Consideration of the “ordinary signification” of any word or words said to constitute a trade mark is “crucial”: Cantarella at [71]. That is so whether the word (or words) is said not to be registrable because: it is not an invented word and has direct reference to the character or quality of the goods or services; or, the word is laudatory; or, the word is a geographical name; or, the word has either lost its distinctiveness or it never had the requisite distinctiveness from the outset: Cantarella at [71].
(12) The process of reasoning in addressing s 41(3) of the Act involves first identifying the “ordinary signification” of the word in question and then undertaking an enquiry into whether other traders might legitimately need to use the word in respect of their goods: Cantarella at [71]. If a word contains an allusive reference to goods or services it is, prima facie, qualified for the grant of a monopoly as a trade mark under the Act. If, on the other hand, the word is understood, by the target audience, as having a directly descriptive meaning in relation to relevant goods or services then, prima facie, the proprietor is not entitled to a monopoly in respect of the word. As a general proposition, a word or words which are prima facie entitled to a monopoly secured by registration as a trade mark under the Act, according to this method, are inherently adapted to distinguish: Cantarella at [71]. [7][7] [2017] FCAFC 56, [236] (Greenwood, Besanko and Katzmann JJ).
As noted in paragraph 5 above, the process I am required to undertake is not a review of the examiner’s reasoning. However, it is useful to understand how the examiner considered the question of inherent adaption to distinguish in respect of the Trade Mark. In particular the Examiner in its First Report noted that:
Your IRDA is refused because your trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the specified goods/services. This is because your trade mark is, or has as its main feature, the word RALPH. This word is also the surname of many Australians, or its plural or possessive form.
People will often provide goods and/or services using their surname. The more common a surname is, the more likely it is that other traders may wish to use it.
The principles of when a trade mark will be rejected on the basis of it being a surname are set out in Vectura GmbH[8] where the Hearing Officer stated (in connection with the particular mark, being FOX):
Fox is a surname that occurs on the Australian electoral roll 7259 times (referred to as the ‘SFAS value’). The current office practice in relation to surnames is set out in the Trade Marks Office Manual of Practice and Procedure (‘the Manual’). The Manual relevantly provides:
The SFAS value gives a measure of the commonness of the surname and therefore of the likelihood that a trader with that name would wish to use the name in connection with his or her goods or services. The more common the surname, the less inherent adaptation to distinguish it will have. As a general rule, an SFAS value of 750 or more will tend to indicate that the surname is sufficiently common to warrant raising a ground for rejection. However, the nature of the goods and/or services must be taken into account, that is whether they are specialised, commonplace or somewhere between these extremes.[9]
In accordance with the above wording, office practice is that an SFAS value of 750 or more tends to indicate that a surname is sufficiently common to warrant raising a ground for rejection. This should not be misinterpreted as meaning that a ground for rejection is warranted in all circumstances where the surname has an SFAS value of 750 or more. A decision to reject a trade mark should not be based solely on the fact that it is comprised of a surname which appears an arbitrary number of times among the Australian adult population.[10]
…
The consideration as to whether a trade mark containing or consisting of a surname is capable of distinguishing is multifaceted; the SFAS value is but one of the relevant factors. Other factors that should be taken into account include any alternate meanings of the word/s, the nature of the designated goods or services and whether it is common for traders in those goods or services to use their surname as a trade mark.[11]
[8] [2016] ATMO 77, [14]-[17] (Hearing Officer Brown).
[9] Part 22.16.1.
[10] Garrett Electronics Inc. [2015] ATMO 48, [22] (Hearing Officer O’Brien).
[11] Ibid [25].
In the present case the I note that that there is no other meaning for the Trade Mark and I agree with the Examiner’s views that the nature of the goods and services are commonplace and it is common for traders in the Holder’s Goods and Services to use their surname as a trade mark.
The Holder’s Submissions in respect of s 41 are summarised below:
·While Ralph is a common first name in Australia it is not a common surname, with only 2528 people with that surname in Australia.
·The Holder’s Goods and Services provided under the Trade Mark will be and are recognised as synonymous and will convey an association with the Holder’s RALPH LAUREN fashion brand, which is registered for numerous goods and services in Australia. In particular the Trade Mark is always used in relation to coffee outlets located directly outside retail outlets clearly branded as RALPH LAUREN.
·A stylised version of the Trade Mark has been registered and held to be distinctive in Korea, Japan and China. The Trade Mark has been registered in other jurisdictions including Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the European Union. In addition, the Registrar has allowed the registration of trade mark 2,094,446 for RALPH’S CLUB.
·There is evidence of use of the Trade Mark and RALPH LAUREN set out in the Morales Declaration.
·The Holder is prepared to allow the specification of the goods and services in classes 21, 30, and 43 to be amended to include the following “all of the foregoing goods/services to be provided outside retail outlets owned by the applicant”.
I do not consider the amendment to the specification proposed by the Holder to be appropriate to grant in this case. This amendment does not in any way reduce the scope of the Holder’s Goods and Services and is practically unworkable.
Equally I am unpersuaded by the evidence of overseas registrations and state of the Register. The fact that the Applicant has existing registrations for various marks containing the word ‘ralph’ has little or no bearing on whether or not the Trade Mark distinguishes the Holder’s Goods and Services from the goods and services of other providers. I note that each case must be considered on its own facts and the RALPH’S CLUB mark identified by the Holder is materially different from the Trade Mark in wording, and relationship between the descriptive words and the goods/services applied for. I note the statement by Justice Wilcox in Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks that ‘[A]lthough consistency in public administration is desirable, a public officer in not justified in persisting in error. Marks may, in the past, have been wrongly registered. It would be an unwarranted distraction from the task at hand to investigate, in a particular case, whether they were or not’.[12] While the existence of overseas marks is relevant and has been taken into account, it should not, in isolation, be the determining factor enabling the Registrar to ignore the other considerations in s 41.[13]
[12] (2000) 47 IPR 579, 590.
[13] See KAMYR Inc, Re [1996] ATMO 14 (Hearing Officer Murray).
The Holder argues that the objection on the basis of Ralph being a surname is unwarranted due to there only being 2528 people in Australia with that surname. I note (but am not bound) by longtime Registrar practice that a surname used by more than 750 individuals in Australia will be sufficiently common to warrant raising a ground for rejection. In the present case I am satisfied that there are sufficient number of individuals in Australia with the surname ‘Ralph’ that the Trade Mark, which consists of a surname with a possessive and a descriptive word, has a limited inherent adaptation to distinguish. My conclusion is bolstered by a number of factors including a) there is no relevant alternate meaning of the word (while ‘ralph’ has a slang meaning (to vomit) this meaning would not be suitable in respect of a beverage product and would not be used in the possessive) b) it is common for traders in the food and beverage industry to use their surname as a trade mark and c) the fact that ‘ralph’ is used as a first name increases rather than decreases the possibility that other traders for the Holder’s Goods and Services may wish to use the Trade Mark for similar goods and services: consumers could see a coffee cart with the words ‘Ralph’s Coffee’ on it and consider that it referred to coffee and related goods and services provided by an individual with either a first name or surname ‘Ralph’.
I consider the Holder’s Submissions that the Holder’s Goods and Services provided under the Trade Mark will be and are recognised as synonymous and will convey an association with the Holder’s RALPH LAUREN fashion brand to be speculative and unsupported by any evidence. There is simply no basis to assume that a consumer of the Holder’s Goods and Services would see (for example) a coffee shop with the Trade Mark and assume it was in any way connected with the Holder’s fashion products. There is no evidence before me as to the Holder’s reputation in ‘Ralph’ (separate from ‘Lauren’) and certainly none that extends beyond fashion.
Many of the Holder’s Submissions focused on the current use of the Trade Mark, namely for promotional use by a coffee cart outside a Ralph Lauren store and submitted that by reason of this use consumers in Australia would naturally associate the Trade Mark with the Holder. However, when considering a Trade Mark’s inherent adaptability to distinguish one cannot assume that subsequent use will be limited to that one particular use; the right granted by trade mark registration are not limited to the exact circumstances in which a trade mark happens to be used by an applicant at the relevant date; rather consideration must be given to the notional use of the Trade Mark, namely (in the case of the class 43 services, that the Holder will offer bar and restaurant services separate to its clothing business under the Trade Mark).
The Holder refers to the possibility that, due to the end of restrictions relating to the Covid-19 pandemic, it is likely that the use of the Trade Mark by the Holder will increase. Such a claim is broadly speculative and is unsupported by evidence of any plan to expand the Holder’s coffee business. In any event, I am unpersuaded that, by reason of increased use of the Holder’s coffee cart to offer free coffee to promote the Holder’s store openings, the Trade Mark will become distinctive.
Following the logic in Clark Equipment, the Trade Mark is plainly not inherently adapted to distinguish the Holder’s Goods and Services other than the Holder’s goods in class 25. I am unpersuaded that by reason of the evidence of past and intended use or other circumstances that the Trade Mark does or will distinguish the Holder’s Goods and Services from those offered by other traders. As such s 41(4) applies and the application to extend protection to the Trade Mark must be rejected in respect of the Holder’s Goods and Services other than the Holder’s goods in class 25.
Decision
Regulation 17A.24 provides:
17A.24Final decision on examination
(1)The Registrar must, after the examination, accept the IRDA unless he or she is satisfied that:
(a)it is not in accordance with this Division; or
(b)there are grounds for rejecting it.
(2)The Registrar may accept the IRDA subject to conditions or limitations.
(3)The Registrar must reject an IRDA, in whole or in part, if the Registrar is satisfied that:
(a)it is not in accordance with this Division; or
(b)there are grounds for rejecting it, in whole or in part.
Extension of protection will proceed in Australia in respect of the Holder’s Goods in class 25.
With respect to the Holder’s Goods and Services in all other classes, given that I am satisfied that there is a ground for rejection and the Holder has been unable to overcome it, I must reject the IRDA in accordance with reg 17A.24 for those Goods and Services, which I now do. If, however, the Registrar has been served with a notice of appeal within one month of the date of this decision, I direct that the disposition of the application be in accordance with the Court’s direction or order.
Nicholas Smith
Hearing Officer
Oppositions and Hearings
14 December 2021
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