Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
1379830 – ABBOTS(a) CUB says that ABBOTS LAGER was established in 1904 and was brewed continuously until 1995. For much of that time it was one of the highest selling beers in Melbourne. It is named after the Abbotsford Brewery, originally owned by the Melbourne Co-operative Brewery, [10] and purchased by CUB in 1924. The brewery is one of CUB’s main breweries and for much of its existence has been the biggest brewery in the Southern Hemisphere.(b) Carlton and United Breweries ceased production of ABBOTS LAGER in 1995;(c) In July 2007, the Applicant brewed a limited release of ABBOTS LAGER to commemorate the 100 year anniversary of the Abbortsford brewery; and(d) There was a heritage release of ABBOTS LAGER in 2011. [10] There is a picture of the brewery under its original ownership at >1379851 – MASTHEAD(a) CUB acquired the Sanctuary Cove Brewery in Sanctuary Cove, Queensland in 1995 and in 2001 renamed it MASTHEAD Brewery;(b) MASTHEAD Brewery closed in 2001;(d) in 2005 CUB cancelled Australian company name “Masthead Brewing Company Pty Ltd”;(e) It appears that the trade mark has not been used on any goods or services in Australia since 2003/early 2004.1379854 – TOOTH’S (a) Tooth’s Kent Brewery was founded in 1835(b) Tooth & Co Limited operated Sydney’s Kent Brewery from 1835 to 1983;(c) By 1910 the New South Wales beer market was dominated by three Sydney brewers, which included Tooth’s.(d) CUB acquired the Kent Brewery in 1983;(e) Kent Brewery closed in 2005. However, there are indications of intended use of the TOOTH’S brand post this time. Most of this intended use is provided in the O’Keefe declarations. Because time has passed since these declarations were made, it is now clear that the TOOTH’S brand was not part of the 2011 heritage release.At the end of each of his declarations Mr Withers states his opinion:It is my belief that the application for registration of the trade mark was:(a) Only filed as a result of the Opponent’s solicitor specifically telling the Applicant that non-use applications would be filed against the registration of the historical marks;(b) Not actually intended to be used by the Applicant at any time after filing; and(c) Filed in bad faith given the negotiations that were ensuing.The Applicant’s Evidence in Answer As previously mentioned the Applicant's evidence in answer consists primarily of declarations and attached exhibits made by Mr Matthew O’Keefe. He states at paragraph 4 of the O’Keefe II declaration :FLG is a publicly listed Australian company which conducts Australia’s biggest brewing business through its subsidiary Foster’s Australia Limited (FAL”). Currently, and for most of its history FAL has carried on its beer business in Australia as Carlton & United Breweries, also known widely as simply “CUB”[the same entity as the Applicant].As I understand it a particularly relevant piece of evidence relating to the oppositions to registration as provided by Mr O’Keefe in his declarations is:In August 2010, the Applicant conducted a review of its heritage brands and filed applications for the Trade Marks (and others not a party to these proceedings) In May 2011, the Applicant approached ‘the two largest liquor retailers in Australia, who together have over half of the retail market and offered to supply them with several heritage brands as part of a celebration of heritage proposition. Amongst other things, the discussions focussed on sales targets, possible price points, recipes and branding. One retailer declined the opportunity but the other accepted the offer and the process to produce these products is now underway. There are approximately 10 brands that are part of the project…” [11][11] O’Keefe I declaration at paragraphs 41 and 44.The evidence claims that the BALLARAT BITTER LOGO, ABBOTS, BALLARAT BERTIE and TOOTHS trademarks were included in those 10. In regard to the closing of the MASTHEAD Brewery in 2003 , Mr O’Keefe states that:In August 2010, following a review of its heritage brands, CUB filed a fresh application for its MASTHEAD brand with the clear intention of using that mark as a beer brand.At no stage has CUB intended to abandon its rights in MASTHEAD. The spate of releases across the modern era demonstrates CUB’s ongoing commitment to its history.[12][12] O’Keefe IV declaration at paragraphs 14 and 15.The Donaldson I declaration confirms that the discussions with Australia’s two largest retailers took place. Mr O’Keefe further states: Indeed, in late November/Early December 2011, ABBOTS LAGER (Victoria), BALLARAT BITTER (Victoria)…will be available in cans through Dan Murphy and Woolworth's liquor outlets in the relevant state…The cans identified in the preceding paragraph are the first part of a wider release as bottles involving other iconic brands, are planned to follow in early 2012…the brands slated for release are McCRACKEN’S, RICHMOND LAGER, NQ LAGER, CAIRNS DRAUGHT and TOOTH’S.These releases by CUB by Dan Murphy and Woolworth's liquor arose out of CUB’s approach to Woolworth's Limited (owner of Dan Murphy’s) in May 2011 as noted in evidence already filed in these proceedings. The releases are entirely consistent with CUB’S commercial strategy of using its heritage brands as an important point of distinction with its competitors. As has been noted previously in the evidence, the applications opposed by Withers were clearly filed by CUB with an intention to use the marks. [13] [13] O’Keefe V declaration at paragraphs 13 to 15.In a later declaration dated 23 February 2012 Mr O’Keefe confirms that some releases did take place and they “attracted significant media attention, particularly in Queensland and Victoria”[14]. The exhibits MJO-215 and MJO-216 help to support this deposition. [14] O’Keefe VI declaration at paragraphs 7 and 8.Further Evidence The construction of the Opponent’s evidence is to cast doubt on the commercial validity and planning of the Applicant's heritage releases and its motives for conducting them. The Opponent also highlights a “history of [the Applicant] closing its breweries and discontinuing the brewing of its beers”. The Opponent provides examples of some such breweries and beers and as well as this, it provides examples of many country breweries that it contends were forced to close “due to pressure from CUB”.[15] [15] Withers VII declaration at paragraph 22.The Applicant responds to the depositions in the O’Keefe VII declaration dated 24 September 2012 and further states:In paragraph 18 of the Withers’ Declaration, Withers asserts that CUB’S applications for various “historical Marks” were made as a direct result of his attorney telling CUB that non-use applications would be filed against those marks, and because CUB “knew that its historical brands were vulnerable to removal”. These assertions are misguided. Each of these applications was filed because of an intention on the part of CUB to use the marks and as a prudent measure around protecting its valuable brands. [16][16] O’Keefe VII declaration at paragraph 5.During the hearing the Applicant, on one hand, stressed its claim that the Trade Marks are an important part of its overall business model whereas the Opponent alleged that they are a consummate part of our Australian heritage and should be available for use by Australians generally – more specifically, it would appear, by Mr Withers and his companies. In his submissions for the hearing, Mr Cordiner made the following comments:CUB is engaged in a systematic approach of trade mark banking. The non-use sections of the Trade Marks Act 1995 are written specifically to enshrine public interest in having a register of trade marks free from trade marks that are banked. Elixir’s principal contention is that the discretion to allow a company to maintain trade marks they are not using should not apply to CUB. Elixir intends to show the Hearings Office that there is a public and private interest in ensuring a multinational company like CUB uses its trade marks, or loses them, just like everyone else. Further, Elixir intends to show that some of the tactics employed by CUB by which it seeks to maintain its trade mark portfolio, such as limited non-commercial beer releases and refiling already registered trade marks, are done in bad faith.[17][17] Opponent’s written submissions at paragraph 2.Mr Allen has also brought to my attention that the Applicant has not renewed the registration of many of its brands which can be seen as inconsistent with its alleged intent to ‘bank’ trade marks. I will turn now specifically to the Applicant’s and Opponent’s written submissions. Both are lengthy and I see little value in repeating the detail in its entirety. In summary and with respect to section 59 and section 62A of the Act the most relevant submissions from each party are:• The Applicant provided information about past and future beer releases under relevant trade marks that it claimed as confidential. • The Opponent submitted a critical analysis of the Applicant's evidence. In essence, Counsel also submitted that the Applicant's evidence is a severely deficient instrument and is incapable of discharging the onus they claim the Applicant now carries to show that they filed the applications in good faith with an intention to use the Trade Marks.Based on my consideration of the evidence and submissions before me, I will now discuss the reasons for my decision in the context of sections 62A and 59 of the Act.Discussion and ReasonsSection 62ASection 62A of the Act provides:62A Application made in bad faithThe registration of a trade mark may be opposed on the ground that the application was made in bad faithThe Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Marks Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) provided some non-exhaustive examples of applications made in bad faith:• persons who monitor new property developments, register the names of new developments as trade marks for a number of services and then threaten the property developers with trade mark infringement proceedings unless the developers licence or buy the trade marks;• persons who have a history of applying for trade marks that are deliberate misspellings of other registered trade marks;• persons who identify trade marks used overseas but with no Australian use as yet who then apply to register the trade marks in Australia for the express purpose of selling them to the overseas owners.The cases of Fry Consulting Pty Ltd v Sports Warehouse Inc. (No 2)[18] and DC Comics v Cheqout Pty Ltd[19] are currently the authorities on this section of the Act. Justice Dodds-Streeton in the former case, made the following comments at [24-26]: Clearly the court, when considering bad faith, cannot apply a purely subjective test, called by Lord Hutton “the Robin Hood test”. The dishonest person or one with low standards cannot be permitted to obtain trade mark registrations in circumstances where a person abiding by a reasonable standard would not. The registration of a trade mark is designed to enable bona fide proprietors to protect their proprietary rights without having to prove unfair trading. Registration is not provided to help those with low moral standards. … The words “bad faith” suggest a mental state. Clearly when considering the question of whether an application to register is made in bad faith all the circumstances will be relevant. However the court must decide whether the knowledge of the applicant was such that his decision to apply for registration would be regarded as in bad faith by persons adopting proper standards.[18] [2012] FCA 81.[19] [2013] FCA 478.I note also that each of the section 52 oppositions are in regard to trade marks and their respective goods that are essentially the same, or deceptively similar to, trade marks and relevant goods that are already registered under the name of CUB Pty Ltd. These trade marks appear in Annexure 1.[20] [20] See also paragraph 11 regarding CUB’s other registration for trade mark 863298 MASTHEAD which is not currently the subject of a removal action by Elixir.In Fry Consulting Dodds-Streeton J went on to say:The formulation in United Kingdom authority of bad faith as falling short of the standards of acceptable commercial behaviour observed by reasonable and experienced persons in a particular area is, in my view, an apt touchstone. An overly literal application may, however, tend to negate the relevance attributed to the applicant’s mental state in the combined test preferred in Harrison. Further, in my view, mere negligence, incompetence or a lack of prudence to reasonable and experienced standards would not, in themselves, suffice, as the concept of bad faith imports conduct which, irrespective of the form it takes, is of an unscrupulous, underhand or unconscientious character. Mr Cordiner, on behalf of the Opponent, submits that:In many parts of CUB’s evidence it seeks to pull at the heart strings of the examiner to retain registration of its historical brands that it has not used for decades. Such evidence should be read in light of CUB’S behaviour in its dealings with IPDC and Withers. CUB perfectly understands the operation of the non-use system and the trade mark registration system and the only conclusion that can be drawn from its cynical re-filing of already registered trade marks is that those applications were made in bad faith. As a result they should be refused registration under s62A of the TMA [the Act].[21][21] Opponent’s written submissions at paragraph 124.I am also aware that the Opponent has made recent applications for a number of trade marks that have obvious similarities to the Applicant’s registered trade marks. Further, Elixir’s amended proposal[22] suggests that Mr Withers’ interest lies in CUB’s other heritage brands, including the trade marks subject of these section 52 oppositions.[22] See discussion at paragraph 25.The Opponent argues that the Applicant has only filed for registration of the Trade Marks in response to the Opponent’s interest in licensing, or securing the intellectual property rights in some of CUB’s heritage brands which themselves had not been in use for many years. In doing so, the Opponent says the Applicant applied in bad faith because it filed the applications with the knowledge that its heritage trade marks would otherwise be vulnerable to non-use proceedings.During the hearing Mr Allen argued that the Applicant is in the commercial planning phase for the release of more heritage brands. The finer details of these plans have not been put forward in evidence, which Mr Cordiner argued is suspect. Mr Allen claimed that detailed evidence was withheld because of a concern that the confidential nature of such evidence may not be respected. Indeed this fear seems credible, as confidential information was apparently leaked to a journalist during the proceedings. In light of these events, I am prepared to accept Mr Allen’s explanation for the Applicant’s failure to provide more detailed evidence.After consideration of the emails between Mr Malone and Mr Watson, which I view as a key piece of evidence in these proceedings, I am satisfied of two important facts:1) that CUB was aware Elixir had an interest in using the Trade Marks; and,2) that there was at no time a business relationship between either Mr Withers, Elixir or IPDC and CUB.I am not prepared to draw the inference proposed by the Opponent, that is, that the filing of the applications was purely a defensive or tactical response to the interest Mr Withers had shown in regard to using the Applicant’s prior registrations. If any inference is to be drawn, it seems more reasonable that, as the Opponent sought license from the Applicant for use of its prior registrations, the Opponent regarded the Applicant to be the legal owner of the Trade Marks. As no evidence has been provided to show that the Applicant (or a reasonable man in its shoes) shouldn’t have applied for the Trade Mark’s. I am unable to ascertain any issues of bad faith inherent in the making of these applications. The Applicant’s conduct (in my view) does not fall short of the ‘standards of acceptable commercial behavior’ articulated by Dodds-Streeton J. Nor is it conduct which is of ‘an unscrupulous, underhand or unconscientious character’.[23] [23] Fry Consulting at [165-166].The Applicant has not renewed the registration of many of its brands. To my mind, this adds some weight to the argument that the Trade Mark applications are for the securement of heritage brands being for use in future commercial releases, not for the purpose for trade mark ‘banking’ as the Opponent would have me believe.Given the surrounding circumstances I find that the Applicant was justified in applying for the registration of the Trade Marks. I am satisfied that the Opponent has not established the section 62A ground of opposition. Section 59Section 59 of the Act provides:59 Applicant not intending to use trade markThe registration of a trade mark may be opposed on the ground that the applicant does not intend:(a) to use, or authorise the use of, the trade mark in Australia; or(b) to assign the trade mark to a body corporate for use by the body corporate in Australia;in relation to the goods and/or services specified in the application.As a general principle, the act of applying for registration is taken to be prima facie evidence of an intention to use the trade mark in relation to all the goods and services listed.[24] However, if a prima facie case is made to the contrary, the onus shifts to the Applicant to establish the requisite intention. The words of fellow Hearing Officer, Ian Thompson are also relevant here:… if a person files an application to register a trade mark with an intention at the filing date only to sell the trade mark to another person, or only to thwart a registration of a trade mark by its rightful owner and/or gain a financial benefit therefrom, or only as a spoiler or blocking strategy in a trade marks dispute with another person, there can have been no intention at that date to use that trade mark as the intended use must have been in relation to goods or services and not for some other purpose.[25] [24] Aston v Harlee Manufacturing Co (1960) 103 CLR 391; Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (2010) 86 IPR 437 at 456.[25] Scotch Whisky Association v Jin Ho Lee and Myong Gil Lee [2013] ATMO 1 (9 January 2013) at paragraph 15The Opponent's arguments under this ground rely heavily upon the email communications between Mr Malone and Mr Watson which detail the Opponent's proposal for the license or acquisition of some of the Applicant's heritage trade marks as well as the Opponent's failed negotiations with the Applicant in this same regard. By virtue of this awareness the Opponent argued that the Applicant applied to register the Trade Marks without any intention of using them. Instead the alleged intention for the filing of the applications was to prevent any other party from using the Trade Marks should the previous registrations be removed from the Register for non-use.During the hearing Mr Cordiner referred to the present applications being for goods in which the Applicant has not yet traded. The remarks by the delegate in Ferring BV v Pure Health Direct Pty Ltd (‘Ferring’) [26] are relevant here:The opponent has not evidenced any lack of intention in relation to the balance of the goods, only a lack of actual use. A lack of actual use is what pertains in common in relation to all of the unused trade marks in respect of which registration is sought; however, if lack of intention to use is alleged, the evidence of such lack of intention must go to some other factor other than the lack of use in itself. ….Here there is only a contention of a lack of intention with nothing more substantial than argument in support of the allegation. There is nothing, therefore, for the applicant to respond to and no inferences may be drawn from its lack of response.The opponent has not established its opposition under section 59 of the Act.[26] [2011] ATMO 99.In Ducker’s Trade Mark[27] Lord Hanworth MR said:I agree that the goods need not be in being at the moment, and that there is futurity indicated in the definition; but the mark is to be a mark which is to be definitely used or in respect of which there is a resolve to use it in the immediate future upon or in connection with goods. I think that the words “proposed to be used” mean a real intention to use, not a mere problematic intention, not an uncertain or indeterminate possibility, but a resolve or settled purpose which has been reached at the time when the mark is to be registered.[27] Re Ducker’s Trade Mark (1928) 45 RPC 397 at 402 (CA UK).The Applicant has described plans for future beer releases, and after a consideration of the evidence I think it is reasonable to infer that such plans are truthful.I am not satisfied that the onus has shifted to the Applicant to demonstrate an intention to use the Trade Marks. The Opponent has made allegations and not provided sufficient evidence to present a prima facie case, Allegations are not sufficient to shift the onus from the Opponent to the Applicant. An intention to use a trade mark is inherent in the application, and it requires more than what I have before me to cast aspersions on that intention.However, in case I am wrong in this, the Applicant’s review of its heritage brands in 2010[28] and its past and planned future heritage releases, together with its existing registrations for the same or deceptively similar trade marks, discharge any onus that might have shifted to the Applicant. I am of the view that any inference potentially created by the Opponent’s evidence has been addressed or explained by the Applicant. Further, it is no obstacle in itself if the Applicant’s primary purpose in filing for the Trade Marks was to prevent their use in Australia by the Opponent, provided the Applicant also has a genuine intention to use the Trade Marks on the goods. I find such an intention exists.[28] See also paragraph 38.For the reasons given above I am satisfied that the Opponent has not established the section 59 ground of opposition. DecisionSection 55 The Opposition will be decided pursuant to section 55 of the Act which relevantly provides:55 Decision (1) Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide: (a) to refuse to register the trade mark; or (b) to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application; having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established. The Opponent has failed to establish any grounds of opposition. The opposition thus fails. Applications 1379830, 1379832, 1379851, 1379854 and 1342305 may proceed to registration after one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar has been served with a notice of appeal before that time, I direct that registration shall not occur until either the appeal is withdrawn or a court so orders.CostsThe Applicant has sought an award of costs in its favour. I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. As the Opponent has not established a ground of opposition, I have awarded costs against the Opponent.Cristy CondonHearing OfficerHearings & Oppositions10 September 2013Annexure 1 – The Applicant’s RegistrationsDue to the age of some of the trade marks that appear below, some of the images are of poor quality. The images are the best quality available at this time. Trade Mark Number Trade Mark Goods/ Services Filing Date 2445 Class: 32 Beer 4 October 1906 12786 Endorsements: The essential particular of the Trade Mark is the following:- The device of a rampant horse. Applicant Company disclaims any right to the exclusive use of the added matter, except in so far as it consists of its name and address. In use the description of goods appearing in the Mark is varied in accordance with the application of the Mark to other goods mentioned in the specification.* The preceding endorsement(s) were recorded prior to commencement of the Trade Marks Act 1995.* Class: 32 Ale, beer, lager beer, stout, cider and fermented liquors generally; ginger beer, ginger ale, hop beer, botanic beer, lemonade, spa water, soda water, lithia water, mineral and aerated waters natural and artificial, 28 March 1912 18894 Endorsements: In use the description of goods appearing on the Mark is varied in accordance with the application of the Mark to other goods comprised in the specification.* The preceding endorsement(s) were recorded prior to commencement of the Trade Marks Act 1995.* Class: 32 Lagers and beers 28 September 1915 30084 Class: 32 Ales, lager beer and stout 27 January 1921 33775 Class: 32 Ales, lager beer and stout 15 July 1922 42305 TOOTH’S Class: 32 Fermented liquors being, beer, ale and porter being goods included in this class 30 July 1925 54596 Endorsements: In use the description of goods comprised in the mark is varied in accordance with the application of the mark to other goods comprised in the specification.* The preceding endorsement(s) were recorded prior to commencement of the Trade Marks Act 1995.* Class: 32 Lagers and beers 8 November 1929 173634 Class: 32 Beer, ale and porter 11 May 1962 225429 Endorsements: In use the description of goods appearing in the mark is varied in accordance with the application of the mark to other goods comprised in the specification* The preceding endorsement(s) were recorded prior to commencement of the Trade Marks Act 1995.* Class: 32 Beer, ale, lager and stout 14 January 1969 225432 Endorsements: In use the description of goods appearing in the mark is varied in accordance with the application of the mark to other goods comprised in the specification* The preceding endorsement(s) were recorded prior to commencement of the Trade Marks Act 1995.* Class: 32 Beer, ale, lager and stout 14 January 1969 369884 Class: 32 Beer, ale, lager and other brewed liquors, products in this class for use in the manufacture of beer, lager ale and porter, including hop extracts and products resulting from the refinement of hops 30 December 1981 369886 Endorsements: In use the description of goods appearing in the mark is varied in accordance with the application of the mark to other goods comprised in the specification. It is a condition of registration that, when the mark is in use in relation to the goods for which it is registered, the blank space in the mark will either be left vacant or be occupied by the trade marks the subject of registration nos A369884 and A238755, with or without the addition of matter of a wholly descriptive or non-trade mark character. It is a condition of registration of this trade mark that it will not be assigned separately from the trade marks the subject of registrations nos A238755 and A369884. Registration of this trade mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the word BALLARAT.* The preceding endorsement(s) were recorded prior to commencement of the Trade Marks Act 1995.* Class: 32 Beer, ale, lager and other brewed liquors, products in this class for use in the manufacture of beer, lager, ale and porter, including hop extracts and products resulting from the refinement of hops 30 December 1981 420564 ABBOTS EXXTRA LIGHT Endorsements: In use the description LIGHT appearing in the mark is varied in accordance with the application of the mark to other goods comprised in the specification* The preceding endorsement(s) were recorded prior to commencement of the Trade Marks Act 1995.* Class: 32 Beer, ale and porter 9 January 1985 536842 Endorsements: Registration of this trade mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the word BALLARAT* In use the description BITTER appearing in the mark is varied in accordance with the application of the mark to other goods comprised in the specification* The preceding endorsement(s) were recorded prior to commencement of the Trade Marks Act 1995.* Class: 32 Beer, ale, stout, lager and other brewed liquors included in this class 27 June 1990 564232 ABBOTS ABBOTS LAGER Class: 32 Beer and stout 27 September 1991 915899 Class: 32 Beers; mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks; fruit drinks and fruit juices; syrups and other preparations for making beverages 11 June 2002 915900 BALLARAT BERTIE Class: 32 Beers; mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks; fruit drinks and fruit juices; syrups and other preparations for making beverages 11 June 2002