Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland & Anor [2023] QCA 88

PARTIES:

DONALD JAMES INNES
(appellant)
v
ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF QUEENSLAND
(first respondent)
MARK BRYAN JAMIESON
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8560 of 2022
SC No 5067 of 2020

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2022] QSC 122 (Bradley J)

DELIVERED ON:

5 May 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10 March 2023

JUDGES:

Bond JA and Gotterson AJA and Wilson J

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   The Appellant is to pay the Respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL MATTERS – AGREEMENTS AS TO COSTS – where various costs-related orders were made against the appellant at first instance – where the relief sought by the appellant is that the decision at first instance be vacated, that the default costs certificates and consequent orders and warrants be set aside, and that the costs assessments be remitted to the Supreme Court Registry “for a jointly conducted contested assessment” – whether the provisions of Chapters 17A or 19 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (“UCPR”) apply to the assessment of costs under costs orders made pursuant to the Local Government Electoral Act 2011 (Qld) (“LGEA”) or the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) – whether a general complaint about a costs statement is sufficient to constitute a notice of objection under r 706 UCPR – whether an error in a costs assessor’s certificate was an accidental slip that could be rectified by a court on its own initiative pursuant to r 388 UCPR – whether the appellant demonstrated an error of fact or law on the part of the primary judge – whether the appeal should be dismissed

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL MATTERS – POWER TO AWARD GENERALLY – STATUTORY BASIS GENERALLY – where orders were made under s 148(1) LGEA for the appellant to pay the first and second respondents’ costs “on the standard basis” – where those orders related to a decision that was not the subject of the appeal – where the appellant nevertheless contended that the orders were inconclusive because they did not specify a process by which costs would be assessed – where the appellant contended the orders could not have contemplated assessment under the UCPR – whether the discretion to order “reasonable costs” conferred by s 148(1) LGEA ought to be constrained

Elections Act 1983 (Qld), s 174
Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), s 137
Local Government Electoral Act 2011 (Qld), s 148, s 151, s 152
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 3, r 209, r 211, r 371, r 388, r 678, r 702, r 705, r 706, r 709, r 742, r 748, r 800, r 819

Caltabiano v Electoral Commission of Queensland (No 1) [2010] 1…

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Details
Case
[2023] QCA 88
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland involved Mr Innes who appealed against various costs-related orders made against him at first instance. The primary issues before the court were whether the provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR) applied to the assessment of costs under costs orders made pursuant to the Local Government Electoral Act 2011 (Qld) or the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), whether a general complaint about a costs statement was sufficient to constitute a notice of objection, and whether an error in a costs assessor’s certificate could be rectified by the court on its own initiative. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the appellant had demonstrated an error of fact or law on the part of the primary judge, and whether the appeal should be dismissed.

The court reasoned that the UCPR does not apply to the assessment of costs under costs orders made pursuant to the LGEA or the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld). It held that a general complaint about a costs statement was not sufficient to constitute a notice of objection under rule 706 UCPR. The court also found that an error in a costs assessor’s certificate could be rectified by the court on its own initiative pursuant to rule 388 UCPR. The court concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated an error of fact or law on the part of the primary judge and dismissed the appeal.

The court's final orders were as follows:
1. The appeal was dismissed.
2. The appellant was to pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the appeal on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the Respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Innes filed an application in the Supreme Court on 6 December 2021[16] which was ordered to be heard with a supervening application filed by him on 16 December 2021.[17] The learned primary judge who heard the applications on 10 June 2022 described the latter application as “a prolix document”. In reasons published on 22 June 2022, his Honour summarised the relief sought by it under the UCPR as follows:[18]“[34] … Mr Innes seeks an order under r 819(1) or in the alternative r 800(1)(a) and (b), staying the ECQ enforcement proceeding. Mr Innes also seeks a declaration that Mr Jamieson is estopped from pursuing a cost assessment process by a costs assessor’s certificate filed on 16 June 2021 and that “any process” by either ECQ or Mr Jamieson from 16 June 2021 is an abuse of process.[35]Mr Innes also seeks an order, under r [209(1)] and r 211(1)(c), requiring ECQ or its solicitor to deliver up or produce “directly relevant matters” referred to in an item in Mr Jamieson's costs statement.[36]Mr Innes also seeks three “further or alternative orders”. Firstly, an order under r 371(2)(a), (b) and (c) settling aside the ECQ costs statement, Mrs Francis’ costs assessment and the ECQ enforcement proceeding “as against” ECQ. Secondly, an order under r 371(2)(e) and r 709(1) setting aside the Francis certificate and the ECQ money order in the interests of justice. The third further or alternative order is an order remitting the costs assessment process to a registrar for assessment under UCPR chapter 17A, part 3, division 3, and setting the matter down for directions.”[16]AB 136 – 141.[17]AB 195 – 198; AB 121 – 122.[18]Innes v The Electoral Commission of Queensland & Ors [2022] QSC 122 at [34] – [36] (“Reasons”).The decision at first instance Having summarised the relief sought, the learned primary judge then identified what might be described as a fundamental proposition advanced by Mr Innes. It was that the provisions of the UCPR, particularly Chapters 17A and 19 thereof, do not apply to his Court of Disputed Returns application or the re-opening application. Accordingly, he submitted, both the ECQ’s and Mr Jamieson’s enforcement proceedings should be stayed or set aside.[19] His Honour considered, and rejected, both the proposition and the submission.[20][19]Reasons [38].[20]Reasons [38] – [44]. With regard to the stay orders sought by Mr Innes in respect of the money orders and the enforcement warrants, the learned primary judge proceeded to outline how he proposed to determine them subject to three contentions raised by Mr Innes which he subsequently considered and rejected. His Honour held that there was no reason to stay the ECQ money order since it had been satisfied. The ECQ enforcement warrant had no purpose to serve and it should be set aside.[21][21]Reasons [49]. As to the Jamieson money order, his Honour declined to set it aside for a further reason advanced by Mr Innes, namely, that 30 days had elapsed between the making of the money order in Mr Jamieson’s favour and the service of it on him.[22] A concession was made on Mr Jamieson’s behalf that the enforcement warrant in his case overstated the sum payable by Mr Innes by $200.00 (the one half of the deposit to be paid to Mr Jamieson). His Honour regarded that as an appropriate basis for setting aside the enforcement warrant under r 819(1).[23][22]Reasons [53].[23]Reasons [55].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established