SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Application)
In the Matter of JESSE COLIN CORNER
[2015] SASC 100
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton
10 July 2015
SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - GENERALLY
SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - LOSS OR LACK OF CAPACITY AND STATUTORY WILLS
An application was made by the mother of the proposed testator pursuant to s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) for an order authorising the making of a will – the proposed testator is severely physically and intellectually disabled – the proposed testator’s parents separated in 1987 and he has not had contact with his father since 2002 – where no prior will has been made – whether permission to proceed with the application should be granted – whether the proposed testator lacks testamentary capacity – whether the proposed will would accurately reflect the likely intentions of the proposed testator if he had testamentary capacity – whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances that the order should be made.
Held:
1) Permission to proceed with the application.
2) The proposed testator lacks testamentary capacity.
3) The terms of the will proposed by the proposed testator’s litigation guardian reflect the likely intentions of the proposed testator.
4) It is reasonable in all the circumstances that an order be made authorising the making of a will in terms of the draft will exhibited to the litigation guardian’s written submissions.
Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 7, referred to.
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; Boulton v Sanders (2004) 9 VR 495; Bryant v Blake (2004) 237 LSJS 23; Hoffmann v Waters (2007) 98 SASR 500; In the Matter of Brown [2009] SASC 345; In the Matter of Shaun Arthur Pickles [2013] SASC 175; In The Will of Wilson (1897) 23 VLR 197; Re Fenwick (2009) 76 NSWLR 22; Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277, considered.
In the Matter of JESSE COLIN CORNER
[2015] SASC 100Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction
BAMPTON J. Alison Joy Karlovassitis (“Mrs Karlovassitis”) is the mother of Jesse Colin Corner (“Jesse”). Jesse is severely physically and intellectually disabled.
Mrs Karlovassitis seeks permission to bring an application pursuant to s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) (“the Act”) and, if permission is granted, an order authorising the making of a will on behalf of Jesse.
The application
Mrs Karlovassitis seeks orders that the Court approve and authorise the making of a will in the terms of the proposed will exhibited as AJK4 to her affidavit sworn on 15 December 2014.
The Acting Deputy Registrar of Probates ordered that Ms Pamela Jean McEwin (“Ms McEwin”) be appointed litigation guardian for Jesse.
In accordance with a direction of the Court, the Public Advocate was served with a copy of Mrs Karlovassitis’ summons and the affidavits filed in support of her application. By letter dated 15 May 2015, the office of the Public Advocate advised…
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- Case
- [2015] SASC 100
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence and concluded that Jesse indeed lacked testamentary capacity and would not gain it. The affidavits provided by Jesse’s mother, his litigation guardian, and others established that Jesse was unable to communicate or understand the nature of making a will. The court also noted that Jesse’s estate was valued at approximately $452,000. Given that Jesse has never had testamentary capacity, the court found it challenging to determine his likely intentions without a previous will as a reference. Despite this, the court considered the evidence and submissions, and found that the proposed will by Jesse’s litigation guardian reflected Jesse’s likely intentions. The court was satisfied that it was reasonable to grant the order, considering all the factors prescribed by the Act.
The final orders included granting permission to Jesse to make a will as proposed by his litigation guardian. The will specified that Jesse’s estate would pass to his mother, with provisions for his stepfather, biological father, and half-siblings if certain conditions were met. The court’s decision ensured that Jesse’s estate would be distributed according to what was likely his intentions if he had testamentary capacity.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BAMPTON J
The Court considered the application made by Mrs Karlovassitis under s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) for an order authorising the making of a will for her son, Jesse. The Court found that it was appropriate to grant permission to proceed with the application as Jesse lacks testamentary capacity and has never made a will. The Court relied on the evidence presented by the parties, including affidavits from Mrs Karlovassitis, Jesse's litigation guardian, Ms McEwin, and Dr Boo Hin Khoo, Jesse's general practitioner. The Court also considered the legal principles established in Banks v Goodfellow and In The Will of Wilson which outline the requirements for testamentary capacity.
The Court found that Jesse lacks testamentary capacity and will not gain testamentary capacity. The evidence presented demonstrated that Jesse is severely physically and intellectually disabled, and his general practitioner opined that he does not have the mental capacity to understand his estate and make decisions about a will. The Court accepted this evidence and found that Jesse does not meet the legal requirements for testamentary capacity.
In determining the likely testamentary intention of Jesse, the Court distinguished between "lost capacity" and "nil capacity" cases. It was clear that Jesse had never had testamentary capacity and had never made a will. In a nil capacity case, it is harder to determine the proposed testator's likely intention as there is no previous will to refer back to that could assist the Court to ascertain their likely intention. The Court considered the evidence presented and found that it was likely that Jesse would have made some provision for his biological father and half siblings if he had testamentary capacity. The Court also found that it was reasonable in all the circumstances to make the order authorising the making of a will in the terms of the draft will proposed by Ms McEwin.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a proposed testator lacks testamentary capacity and has never made a will, it is appropriate to grant permission to proceed with an application for an order authorising the making of a will if it is likely that the proposed will accurately reflects the likely intentions of the proposed testator if they had testamentary capacity. The Court distinguished this case from prior authority as it involved a nil capacity case rather than a lost capacity case. The Court followed the legal principles established in Banks v Goodfellow and In The Will of Wilson in determining the requirements for testamentary capacity.
In conclusion, the Court granted permission to proceed with the application made by Mrs Karlovassitis under s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) for an order authorising the making of a will for her son, Jesse. The Court found that it was appropriate to grant permission to proceed with the application as Jesse lacks testamentary capacity and has never made a will. The Court also found that it was likely that the proposed will accurately reflects the likely intentions of Jesse if he had testamentary capacity and that it was reasonable in all the circumstances to make the order authorising the making of a will in the terms of the draft will proposed by Ms McEwin.