In the Matter of Jesse Colin Corner

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Application)

In the Matter of JESSE COLIN CORNER

[2015] SASC 100

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton

10 July 2015

SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - GENERALLY

SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - LOSS OR LACK OF CAPACITY AND STATUTORY WILLS

An application was made by the mother of the proposed testator pursuant to s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) for an order authorising the making of a will – the proposed testator is severely physically and intellectually disabled – the proposed testator’s parents separated in 1987 and he has not had contact with his father since 2002 – where no prior will has been made – whether permission to proceed with the application should be granted – whether the proposed testator lacks testamentary capacity – whether the proposed will would accurately reflect the likely intentions of the proposed testator if he had testamentary capacity – whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances that the order should be made.

Held:

1) Permission to proceed with the application.

2) The proposed testator lacks testamentary capacity.

3) The terms of the will proposed by the proposed testator’s litigation guardian reflect the likely intentions of the proposed testator.

4) It is reasonable in all the circumstances that an order be made authorising the making of a will in terms of the draft will exhibited to the litigation guardian’s written submissions.

Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 7, referred to.
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; Boulton v Sanders (2004) 9 VR 495; Bryant v Blake (2004) 237 LSJS 23; Hoffmann v Waters (2007) 98 SASR 500; In the Matter of Brown [2009] SASC 345; In the Matter of Shaun Arthur Pickles [2013] SASC 175; In The Will of Wilson (1897) 23 VLR 197; Re Fenwick (2009) 76 NSWLR 22; Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277, considered.

In the Matter of JESSE COLIN CORNER
[2015] SASC 100

Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction

  1. BAMPTON J.      Alison Joy Karlovassitis (“Mrs Karlovassitis”) is the mother of Jesse Colin Corner (“Jesse”).  Jesse is severely physically and intellectually disabled.

  2. Mrs Karlovassitis seeks permission to bring an application pursuant to s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) (“the Act”) and, if permission is granted, an order authorising the making of a will on behalf of Jesse.

    The application

  3. Mrs Karlovassitis seeks orders that the Court approve and authorise the making of a will in the terms of the proposed will exhibited as AJK4 to her affidavit sworn on 15 December 2014.

  4. The Acting Deputy Registrar of Probates ordered that Ms Pamela Jean McEwin (“Ms McEwin”) be appointed litigation guardian for Jesse. 

  5. In accordance with a direction of the Court, the Public Advocate was served with a copy of Mrs Karlovassitis’ summons and the affidavits filed in support of her application.  By letter dated 15 May 2015, the office of the Public Advocate advised…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASC 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved an application by Mrs Karlovassitis, the mother of Jesse Colin Corner, for permission to make a will on behalf of Jesse, a severely physically and intellectually disabled individual. Jesse, who was born with cerebral palsy, has no prior will and has been under the care of his mother since his parents separated in 1987. Mrs Karlovassitis applied under section 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) to seek an order allowing Jesse to make a will. The court was required to determine whether Jesse lacked testamentary capacity, whether the proposed will accurately reflected Jesse’s likely intentions if he had testamentary capacity, and if it was reasonable in all circumstances to grant the order.

The court examined the evidence and concluded that Jesse indeed lacked testamentary capacity and would not gain it. The affidavits provided by Jesse’s mother, his litigation guardian, and others established that Jesse was unable to communicate or understand the nature of making a will. The court also noted that Jesse’s estate was valued at approximately $452,000. Given that Jesse has never had testamentary capacity, the court found it challenging to determine his likely intentions without a previous will as a reference. Despite this, the court considered the evidence and submissions, and found that the proposed will by Jesse’s litigation guardian reflected Jesse’s likely intentions. The court was satisfied that it was reasonable to grant the order, considering all the factors prescribed by the Act.

The final orders included granting permission to Jesse to make a will as proposed by his litigation guardian. The will specified that Jesse’s estate would pass to his mother, with provisions for his stepfather, biological father, and half-siblings if certain conditions were met. The court’s decision ensured that Jesse’s estate would be distributed according to what was likely his intentions if he had testamentary capacity.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 26 June 2015, I heard submissions from the parties supplementing their written submissions. Mrs Karlovassitis was represented by Mr Mead. Jesse was represented by his litigation guardian, Ms McEwin, and Mr Beck was represented by Ms Millard. The following affidavits were received into evidence:·affidavits of Mrs Karlovassitis sworn 15 December 2014 (the December affidavit), 20 March 2015 and 11 June 2015;·affidavits of Thomas William Mead sworn on 18 February 2015 and 14 April 2015;·affidavit of Pamela Jean McEwin sworn on 11 June 2015; and·affidavit of Colin Edward Beck sworn on 11 June 2015.Background In the December affidavit, Mrs Karlovassitis describes Jesse’s traumatic birth in Western Australia on 18 January 1986. Jesse suffered foetal distress for 12 hours during labour and was born with an APGAR score of 1 at one minute. He was placed on life support for over a week after developing seizures and was eventually discharged on 27 January 1986. Jesse is blind and unable to stand up. He suffers spastic diplegia, severe mental retardation and fits.[1] [1] AJK1 Karlovassitis affidavit sworn 15 December 2014. Jesse and Mrs Karlovassitis issued proceedings in Western Australia against the obstetrician managing Mrs Karlovassitis’ labour and delivery of Jesse and the hospital where he was born. The proceedings were settled in 1996 on confidential terms. Jesse’s parents separated in 1987 and their marriage was dissolved on 1 November 1988.[2] [2] AJK1 Karlovassitis affidavit sworn 20 March 2015. Mr Beck re-married in 1991 and Mrs Karlovassitis remarried Parry Karlovassitis (“Mr Karlovassitis”) in 1997. Mr Beck has two further children with his second wife, Jarrod and Tayla. Mrs Karlovassitis and Mr Karlovassitis are the parents of Mia and Thomas. Mrs Karlovassitis moved to Berri, South Australia, in 2002 with Jesse to be with Mr Karlovassitis. Jesse moved to live in supported accommodation in Craigmore, in June 2008. Mr Beck has continued to reside in Western Australia and has had no contact with Jesse since 2002. In the December affidavit Mrs Karlovassitis deposed that she became Jesse’s main carer after the breakdown of her marriage and that Mr Beck has had minimal contact with Jesse since that time. Mrs Karlovassitis stated that the expenses of Jesse living in the supported accommodation would have exhausted Jesse’s funds if it were not for her and Mr Karlovassitis’ efforts in preserving those funds. I accept that it was through the efforts of Mr and Mrs Karlovassitis that Jesse still has money available to him. Mrs Karlovassitis deposed to Mr Karlovassitis providing a purpose built home in 2002 to accommodate Jesse and their expanding family. She stated that Mr Karlovassitis has spent an enormous amount of his own money in providing Jesse’s care and has never asked for any of Jesse’s money to provide for Jesse’s care. I accept that Mr Karlovassitis has provided care for Jesse over many years out of love for Mrs Karlovassitis and for Jesse and at a financial cost to himself.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Banks v Goodfellow,[11] Cockburn CJ held that to have testamentary capacity a testator must understand the nature of the will and its effects, comprehend the extent of the property which is being disposed of, and understand and appreciate the claims to which he or she ought to give effect.[12] In In The Will of Wilson,[13] Hood J noted that in order for a testator to rightly understand these matters, it is essential that his “mind should be free to act in a natural, regular and ordinary manner”.[14] Justice Dixon cited these observations with approval in Timbury v Coffee.[15] [11] (1870) LR 5 QB 549.[12] Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, 565.[13] (1897) 23 VLR 197.[14] (1897) 23 VLR 197, 199.[15] (1941) 66 CLR 277, 283.The evidence regarding Jesse’s testamentary capacity Ms McEwin, in her affidavit, deposed to having attended upon Jesse on 22 May 2015. Ms McEwin noted Jesse is severely disabled and was unable to provide any verbal response to any of her comments. However, she observed that Jesse became animated and smiled when she spoke about his mother, stepfather, and sister, Mia. Jesse did not give such a strong response when his stepbrother was mentioned, however, Ms McEwin stated this may be because she referred to Jesse’s brother as Tom rather than Thomas in error. Ms McEwin formed the opinion that Jesse lacks testamentary to make a will. In his report dated 30 September 2014, which is exhibited to the December affidavit of Mrs Karlovassitis, Jesse’s general practitioner, Dr Boo Hin Khoo, stated that “Jesse suffers from a very severe form of Cerebral Palsy since birth”. Dr Khoo’s opinion is that Jesse does not have mental capacity to understand his estate and is incapable of making any decision about a will.[16] [16] AJK3 Karlovassitis affidavit sworn 15 December 2014 The parties agree and it is clear on the evidence that Jesse lacks testamentary capacity and will not gain testamentary capacity.Estate A statement from Perpetual Trustee issued 17 January 2015 shows a total portfolio of $419,222.86 in Jesse’s name.[17] Mrs Karlovassitis deposes to $32,700 in a Westpac Bank account in her name that she regards as being held on trust for Jesse. Jesse’s estate would therefore total around $452,000.[17] AJK2.Likely testamentary intention In determining this issue the law distinguishes between “lost capacity” and “nil capacity” cases.[18] In the case of a proposed testator who once had testamentary capacity and then lost it, they are said to have “lost capacity”. A matter concerning a proposed testator who has never had capacity is said to be a case of “nil capacity”. It is clear on the evidence in this matter that Jesse has never had capacity to make a will and has never made a will. In a nil capacity case it is harder to determine the proposed testator’s likely intention as there is no previous will to refer back to that could assist the Court to ascertain their likely intention.[18] See In the Matter of Brown [2009] SASC 345.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BAMPTON J
Mr Beck strongly supports the terms of the will proposed by Ms McEwin.Conclusion It is clear that Mr Beck has been an absent father and Mrs Karlovassitis has carried the psychological, physical, financial and emotional burden of caring for their severely disabled son. Mr Karlovassitis has supported his wife and provided a home suitable for Jesse at personal cost. The evidence before me demonstrates that all of the affection and care provided to Jesse since at least 2002 has been provided by his mother, Mr Karlovassitis, Thomas and Mia. Despite the undisputed fact that Mr Beck has been an absent father I am satisfied that had Jesse not suffered intellectual disability it is likely he would have had a desire to know and make contact with his biological father and half siblings. It follows that had Jesse been of testamentary capacity it is likely he would have made some provision for his biological father and half siblings. Jesse does not and will not have testamentary capacity. No previous will has been made by Jesse. The application brought by Mrs Karlovassitis is not baseless. I therefore grant permission to make the application pursuant to s 7(1) of the Act. I am satisfied on the evidence that Jesse’s likely intention is that his estate pass wholly to his mother, Mrs Karlovassitis. In the event that Mrs Karlovassitis predeceases Jesse, I am satisfied that Jesse would be likely to make provision for Mr Karlovassitis and for Mr Beck. I am also satisfied that Jesse would be likely to make some provision for his half siblings, Thomas and Mia Karlovassitis, and some small provision for Jarrad and Tayla Beck. Having considered the submissions and the matters deposed to in the affidavits, I am satisfied that the will proposed by Ms McEwin reflects the likely intentions of Jesse on the assumption that he possessed testamentary capacity at this time. I am therefore satisfied that, having regard to all the factors I must take into account prescribed by s 7(4) of the Act, it is reasonable in all the circumstances that the order be made authorising the making of a will in the terms of the draft will exhibited to the written submissions of Ms McEwin and reproduced in Appendix 1 to these reasons. Appendix 1THIS IS THE LAST WILL of me JESSE COLIN CORNER of 4 Alawa Court Craigmore in the State of South Australia.1.I REVOKE all wills and testamentary dispositions previously made by me.2.I APPOINT my mother ALISON JOY KARLOVASSITIS sole executor and trustee of this my will but if she:(a)predeceases me; or(b)survives me but is unwilling or unable to obtain a grant of probate of this my will; or(c)survives me but dies without having obtained a grant of probate of this my willthen I APPOINT my uncle PETER ROBERT CORNER and my step‑father PARRY KARLOVASSITIS executors and trustees of my will in place of my said mother.3.I DECLARE that the expression “my trustee” in my will and in any and every codicil hereto shall mean the trustee or trustees for the time being whether original or substituted.4.I GIVE the whole of my estate to my trustee UPON TRUST to pay thereout my debts and funeral and testamentary expenses and to hold the balance then remaining (“my residuary estate”) UPON TRUST for my mother ALISON JOY KARLOVASSITIS absolutely if she survives me by the period of twenty eight days.5.IF my mother fails to survive me by that period then I DIRECT my trustees to hold my residuary estate UPON TRUST as follows:(a)As to twenty five per cent thereof for my father COLIN EDWARD BECK absolutely if he is living at my death.(b)As to twenty five per cent thereof for my step-father PARRY KARLOVASSITIS absolutely if he is living at my death.(c)As to ten per cent thereof for such of them my siblings JARRAD BECK and TAYLA BECK absolutely as shall be living at my death and if both then in equal shares absolutely.(d)As to the remaining forty percent thereof for such of them siblings THOMAS KARLOVASSITIS and MIA KARLOVASSITIS as shall be living at my death as shall attain or shall have attained the age of twenty one years and if both then in equal shares absolutely.6.IF either of them my said father or step-father predeceases me leaving a child or children who shall be living at my death and who shall attain or shall have attained the age of twenty one years then I DIRECT that the said child or children shall take and if more than one then in equal shares all the share and interest in my residuary estate which their his or her father would have taken if he had survived me.7.I EMPOWER my trustee:—(a)To apply the whole or any part of the contingent or vested share in the capital and income of my estate of any beneficiary of this my will under the age of twenty one years towards the maintenance education or advancement in life or generally for the benefit of such beneficiary and I further empower my trustee at his or her discretion to make such payments to the guardian for the time being of such beneficiary or to any person with whom such beneficiary may be living without being in any way answerable for the application thereof.(b)At such time or times as my trustee shall think fit and in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as my trustee shall think fit to sell call in or convert into money any part or parts of my estate which shall not consist of money.(c)To appropriate any part or parts of my estate in or towards the satisfaction of the share or interest of any beneficiary in my estate and for such purpose to determine the value or values of any asset or assets to be so appropriated.IN WITNESS whereof I have hereunto set my hand this day of Two Thousand and Fifteen.SIGNED by the abovenamed JESSE COLIN )CORNER the testator as and for his last will )and testament in the presence of us both )present at the same time who at his request in )his presence and in the presence of each other )have hereunto subscribed our names as )witnesses )

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BAMPTON J

The Court considered the application made by Mrs Karlovassitis under s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) for an order authorising the making of a will for her son, Jesse. The Court found that it was appropriate to grant permission to proceed with the application as Jesse lacks testamentary capacity and has never made a will. The Court relied on the evidence presented by the parties, including affidavits from Mrs Karlovassitis, Jesse's litigation guardian, Ms McEwin, and Dr Boo Hin Khoo, Jesse's general practitioner. The Court also considered the legal principles established in Banks v Goodfellow and In The Will of Wilson which outline the requirements for testamentary capacity.

The Court found that Jesse lacks testamentary capacity and will not gain testamentary capacity. The evidence presented demonstrated that Jesse is severely physically and intellectually disabled, and his general practitioner opined that he does not have the mental capacity to understand his estate and make decisions about a will. The Court accepted this evidence and found that Jesse does not meet the legal requirements for testamentary capacity.

In determining the likely testamentary intention of Jesse, the Court distinguished between "lost capacity" and "nil capacity" cases. It was clear that Jesse had never had testamentary capacity and had never made a will. In a nil capacity case, it is harder to determine the proposed testator's likely intention as there is no previous will to refer back to that could assist the Court to ascertain their likely intention. The Court considered the evidence presented and found that it was likely that Jesse would have made some provision for his biological father and half siblings if he had testamentary capacity. The Court also found that it was reasonable in all the circumstances to make the order authorising the making of a will in the terms of the draft will proposed by Ms McEwin.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a proposed testator lacks testamentary capacity and has never made a will, it is appropriate to grant permission to proceed with an application for an order authorising the making of a will if it is likely that the proposed will accurately reflects the likely intentions of the proposed testator if they had testamentary capacity. The Court distinguished this case from prior authority as it involved a nil capacity case rather than a lost capacity case. The Court followed the legal principles established in Banks v Goodfellow and In The Will of Wilson in determining the requirements for testamentary capacity.

In conclusion, the Court granted permission to proceed with the application made by Mrs Karlovassitis under s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) for an order authorising the making of a will for her son, Jesse. The Court found that it was appropriate to grant permission to proceed with the application as Jesse lacks testamentary capacity and has never made a will. The Court also found that it was likely that the proposed will accurately reflects the likely intentions of Jesse if he had testamentary capacity and that it was reasonable in all the circumstances to make the order authorising the making of a will in the terms of the draft will proposed by Ms McEwin.