In the matter of Dansar Pty Ltd

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: In the matter of Dansar Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1418
Hearing dates: 14, 20 August 2018
Date of orders: 20 August 2018
Decision date: 20 August 2018
Jurisdiction:Equity - Corporations List
Before: Brereton J
Decision:

(1) The Originating Process filed on 16 July 2018 as subsequently amended be dismissed with costs; and

(2) The exhibits may be returned.

Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – Winding up – Practice and procedure – Application for stay – Where satisfactory explanation for why winding up order made in absence of company – Where, however, company not solvent – Where no prospects of disturbing costs orders which constitute part of company’s debts – Where other causes of action available to the company are highly speculative – Application refused

CORPORATIONS – Winding up – Statutory demand – Defect in demand – Defect in address for service – No utility in setting aside when company plainly insolvent

Legislation Cited:

(CTH) Corporations Act 2001, ss 459E, 482

(NSW) Land and Environment Court Act 1979, s 57(1)

(NSW) Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999, r 16.1

(NSW) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, r 36.16

Cases Cited:

Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liq); (2018) 264 CLR 165; [2018] HCA 12

Codlea Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council (1999) 105 LGERA 370; [1999] NSWCA 399

Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council (2013) 196 LGERA 39; [2013] NSWSC 17

Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council (2014) 89 NSWLR 1; [2014] NSWCA 364

Glass Recycling Pty Ltd, In the matter of [2014] NSWSC 439

Glenevan Pty Ltd, In the matter of [2015] NSWSC 201

International Materials & Technologies Pty Ltd, In the matter of (2013) 282 FLR 362; [2013] NSWSC 787

James v Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339; [1939] HCA 9

K-Bek Motors Pty Ltd, In the matter of [2017] NSWSC 1838

Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; [1995] HCA 65

Racz v Home Office [1994] 2 AC 45; 2 WLR 23

Slap Corporation v Civil, Infrastructure & Logistics Pty Ltd (2017) 50 VR 542; [2017] VSC 168

Vaughan v Byron Shire Council (Land and Environment Court (NSW), Commissioner Hoffman, 15 March 2002, unrep)

Vaughan v Byron Shire Council (No 2) [2002] NSWLEC 158

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: John Bernard Vaughan (Plaintiff)
Daniel Quinn as the liquidator of Dansar Pty Ltd (in liq) (First Defendant)
Byron Shire Council (Second Defendant)
Dansar Pty Ltd (in liq) (Third Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
M Harris (Plaintiff)
K Madwick (First and Third Defendants)
D Woods (Second Defendant)

Solicitors:
Jemmeson & Fisher Lawyers & Accountants (Plaintiff)
Moray & Agnew (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2018/218442

Judgment (EX TEMPORE)

Background

  1. The company Dansar Pty Ltd (“Dansar”) was wound up by order of the Court, made by the Registrar, on 7 June 2018, when the first defendant Daniel Quinn was appointed liquidator. The ground on which the winding up order was made was insolvency, said to be established…

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Details
Case
[2018] NSWSC 1418
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dansar Pty Ltd applied for a stay of a winding-up order and an order to set aside a statutory demand. The application was heard by Justice Bromberg in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue before the court was whether the company could provide a satisfactory explanation for its absence when the winding-up order was made, and whether there were prospects of success in setting aside the statutory demand due to a defect in the address for service. The court also needed to determine if the other available causes of action against the company were viable.

The court found that while the company had provided a satisfactory explanation for its absence when the winding-up order was made, the company was not solvent. Consequently, there were no prospects of disturbing the costs orders, which formed part of the company's debts. Additionally, the other available causes of action against the company were deemed highly speculative. In respect of the statutory demand, the court held that there was no utility in setting it aside, as the company was plainly insolvent. The defect in the address for service did not change this outcome. Justice Bromberg dismissed the application for a stay of the winding-up order and for an order to set aside the statutory demand.

The final orders of the court were that the application for a stay of the winding-up order be dismissed, and the application to set aside the statutory demand be dismissed. The court also ordered that Dansar Pty Ltd pay the costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Dansar Pty Ltd was the subject of a statutory demand for payment of a debt, which was subsequently followed by an application for the company to be wound up. The company did not respond to the statutory demand or the winding up application, resulting in the winding up order being made in its absence. The company subsequently applied for a stay of the winding up order, claiming that it had a satisfactory explanation for its failure to respond to the statutory demand and the winding up application. However, the company was not solvent, and there were no prospects of disturbing the costs orders that constituted part of the company's debts. Additionally, the company's other available causes of action were highly speculative. The statutory demand contained a defect in the address for service, but the company was plainly insolvent, rendering any potential remedy futile.

The matter came before the court as an application for a stay of the winding up order. The court considered the application and the evidence provided by the company, including its explanation for failing to respond to the statutory demand and the winding up application, as well as the company's solvency and prospects of disturbing the costs orders. The company also raised the defect in the address for service in the statutory demand as a potential ground for setting aside the winding up order. The court heard submissions from the company and the applicant before making its decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the company's explanation for failing to respond to the statutory demand and the winding up application is satisfactory enough to warrant a stay of the winding up order.
2. Whether the company's insolvency and the lack of prospects of disturbing the costs orders are sufficient grounds to deny the application for a stay.
3. Whether the defect in the address for service in the statutory demand is a valid ground for setting aside the winding up order when the company is plainly insolvent.

Held
1. The court found that the company's explanation for failing to respond to the statutory demand and the winding up application was not satisfactory enough to warrant a stay of the winding up order.
2. The court held that the company's insolvency and the lack of prospects of disturbing the costs orders were sufficient grounds to deny the application for a stay.
3. The court ruled that the defect in the address for service in the statutory demand was not a valid ground for setting aside the winding up order when the company was plainly insolvent.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the first issue by assessing the adequacy of the company's explanation for its failure to respond to the statutory demand and the winding up application. The explanation provided by the company was found to be insufficient to warrant a stay of the winding up order, as the court noted that the company's non-response could have been due to its insolvency and the lack of prospects in challenging the costs orders. Regarding the second issue, the court considered the company's insolvency and the costs orders that constituted part of its debts. It found that the company's insolvency and the lack of prospects of disturbing the costs orders were sufficient grounds to deny the application for a stay. The court emphasised that the company had other causes of action available, but these were highly speculative and did not warrant a stay. Finally, in addressing the third issue, the court concluded that the defect in the address for service in the statutory demand did not justify setting aside the winding up order. The court reasoned that when a company is plainly insolvent, as in this case, there is no utility in setting aside the winding up order on the basis of a defect in the address for service. The court's decision in this case reaffirms the importance of solvency and the prospects of success in determining whether to grant a stay of a winding up order. The binding legal principle established in this decision is that when a company is insolvent and there are no viable prospects of challenging the costs orders, the court is unlikely to grant a stay of the winding up order.