In the matter of Bioaction Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bioaction Pty Ltd v Ogborne, in the matter of Bioaction Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 436

File number: NSD 61 of 2022
Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J
Date of judgment: 26 April 2022
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – determination of a separate question pursuant to rule 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where substantive proceedings are an application to set aside a statutory demand pursuant to s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether the application to set aside a statutory demand was served within the 21 day period specified in s 459G – where application and supporting documents (originating documents) were sent by email to the defendant’s legal representative – where email contained originating documents as attachments in portable document format (PDF) – where email attaching the originating documents was sent on the last day of the statutory period provided by s 459G – where plaintiff relies on expert evidence as to the timing of receipt of the originating documents by the defendant’s legal representative – whether s 600G and the deeming provisions in ss 105A and 105B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) apply - whether rebuttable presumption in s 161 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is displaced – whether the PDF versions of the originating documents were in complete and legible form – Held: Separate question, being “was the application for an order setting aside the statutory demand and the affidavit supporting the application filed and served within the 21 day statutory period specified in s.459G of the Corporations Act 2001?” answered “yes”
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), ss 2B, 28A

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 9, 105A, 105B, 109X, 459E, 459G, 600G

Corporations Amendment (Corporate Insolvency Reforms) Act 2020 (Cth)

Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth), s 14A

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 161

Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth), regs 1.0.03, 1.0.04, 1.0.05, Schs 1 and 2

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 30.01

Cases cited: Caason Investments Pty Ltd v International Litigation Partners No 3 Ltd (NO 1662762) [2021] VSC 487
Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 248 CLR 378
Chen & Anor v Kornucopia Pty Ltd and Ors [2019] VSC 756; 349 FLR 35
Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2020] FCAFC 192; 282 FCR 1
David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp [1995] HCA 43; 184 CLR 265
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v ABW Design and Construction Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 346; 203 FCR 70
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; 250 CLR 503
Greenmint Pty Ltd v O’Keeffe [2015] VSC 326
Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie [1996] NSWSC 314; 41 NSWLR 542
In the matter of World Square Realty Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 307
Intelogent Pty Ltd v Onthego Group Pty Ltd
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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 436
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bioaction Pty Ltd, a company engaged in the design, manufacture, and installation of systems for mitigating hazardous gases, was the subject of a statutory demand served by Mr. Ogborne, its former Chief Financial Officer/Chief Operating Officer. The dispute centered on Mr. Ogborne's entitlements following his redundancy in November 2021. Mr. Ogborne sought payment of $240,688.31, which he claimed was due as unpaid salary, superannuation, and other entitlements. The statutory demand was served on Bioaction on 13 January 2022, with a statutory period of 21 days for Bioaction to apply to set it aside.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the application to set aside the statutory demand and the accompanying affidavit were served within the 21-day statutory period specified by section 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The crux of the matter hinged on the timing and method of service of the originating documents. Mr. Ogborne argued that the application was not served within the statutory period, while Bioaction contended that it was. Bioaction submitted that the documents were sent via email to the legal representatives of Mr. Ogborne on the last day of the statutory period and were received before the deadline.

The court considered whether the provisions of sections 600G, 105A, and 105B of the Corporations Act, along with the rebuttable presumptions in section 161 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), applied to the case. Bioaction relied on expert evidence to prove the timing of receipt, while Mr. Ogborne did not challenge this evidence. The court concluded that the deeming provisions in sections 105A and 105B of the Corporations Act and the rebuttable presumptions in section 161 of the Evidence Act were applicable. Given that the originating documents were sent via email and were in a readable PDF format, the court determined that the application to set aside the statutory demand and the supporting affidavit were indeed served within the statutory period.

The court answered the separate question posed under rule 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) in the affirmative, stating that the application and affidavit were filed and served within the 21-day statutory period. The court ordered that Bioaction pay the plaintiff's costs of the hearing of the separate question and listed the originating application for case management before a Registrar of the Federal Court. The parties were granted leave to apply to the Registrar as necessary.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The separate question, the subject of Order 1 made pursuant to r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on 23 February 2022, as refined in submissions, that is:

“Was the application for an order setting aside the statutory demand and the affidavit supporting the application filed and served within the 21 day statutory period specified in s.459G of the Corporations Act 2001?”

be answered “yes”.

2. The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the hearing of the separate question.

3. The originating application filed 3 February 2022 be listed for case management before a Registrar of this Court on Wednesday, 4 May 2022 at 11:00 am or such other time as is ordered by the Registrar.

4. The parties have leave to apply to the Registrar.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

If it is determined that the application was not served within the statutory period, then the resolution of the separate question will finally determine the outcome of the proceedings. Proceeding by way of determination of a separate question facilitates the just resolution of the matters in dispute between the parties as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. FACTS Bioaction is a company that specialises in the design, manufacturing and installation of systems to eliminate or mitigate odorous, hazardous and corrosive gases. Mr Ogborne was Bioaction’s Chief Financial Officer / Chief Operating Officer in the period from December 2019 until November 2021, when he was made redundant by Bioaction. Following Mr Ogborne being made redundant a dispute arose between him and Bioaction as to his entitlements as a result of the cessation of his employment. It is not disputed that a payment was made by Bioaction to Mr Ogborne, the dispute is as to whether Mr Ogborne is entitled to any additional sum. On 13 January 2022, Mr Ogborne served the statutory demand on Bioaction seeking payment of the amount of $240,688.31, to which Mr Ogborne contends he is entitled as unpaid salary, unpaid superannuation, unpaid salary in lieu of termination, unpaid annual leave and unpaid redundancy pursuant to the employment contract entered into by Mr Ogborne and Bioaction on 25 November 2020. The statutory demand was in the prescribed form and included paragraph 6 as follows: The address of the creditor for service of copies of any application and affidavit is CFC Lawyers, Level 1, Oro House, 39 Bay Street, Double Bay NSW 2028. The statutory demand did not give any email address for service. It is common ground that service was effected by delivery of a copy of originating documents to the registered office of Bioaction on 13 January 2022. It is common ground that the last day of the 21 day statutory period was 3 February 2022. Mr Ogborne is represented by Cerena Fu of CFC Lawyers. Bioaction is represented in the present proceedings by Darrin Mitchell of MSD Law. Bioaction was represented by Karen Ansen of Karen Ansen Consulting in relation to the employment dispute with Mr Ogborne. As noted above, the statutory demand was served on Bioaction in the context of the employment dispute. There were email communications exchanged between the legal representatives of Mr Ogborne and Bioaction in relation to the statutory demand in the period from 21 December 2021 to 3 February 2022. Email communications were sent by the legal representatives of Bioaction to CFC Lawyers using the work email address of Ms Fu and the general email address for CFC Lawyers, which address is included on the firm’s stationery. I will refer to these email addresses respectively as Ms Fu’s CFC email address and the CFC general email address. Ms Fu sent emails to Bioaction’s legal representatives from her CFC email address. In those email communications, Ms Fu sent letters as attachments, using the firm’s stationery which included the CFC general email address in the letterhead.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 161 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) also creates a rebuttable presumption whereby an electronic communication of which a record is tendered was sent or made in the form shown in the record, was sent or made by a person appearing from the record to have sent it, was sent or made on the day and at the time it appears to have been sent and was received at the destination to which it appears to have been sent at the time the sending of the communication concluded as shown in the record: Miletich v Murchie [2012] FCA 1013; 297 ALR 566 at 591 [100] (Gray J). The parties were not able to identify any cases in which ss 600G, 105A and 105B have been considered.THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONSBioaction’s submissions Bioaction accepts that it has the onus of establishing service in accordance with s 459G(2) and (3) so as to attract jurisdiction. Bioaction contends that the originating documents were served by midnight on 3 February 2022, being the last day of the 21 day statutory period, and that, as a result, the separate question should be answered “yes”. The consequence is that it has validly invoked the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to s 459G of the Corporations Act. Bioaction submits that:(1)In order to enliven the jurisdiction conferred by s 459G the originating documents must be served within the 21 day statutory period on the person who served the demand;(2)A statutory demand must be in the form prescribed, that is Form 509H, which at paragraph 6 requires the creditor to nominate an address for service of the originating documents under s 459G. Where solicitors are acting for the creditor, the creditor must nominate the address of the solicitors;(3)Notwithstanding that the s 459G application is an originating process of the Court to which formal rules of service will otherwise apply, personal service is not required;(4)The statutory demand nominated the office address of CFC Lawyers as the place where any s 459G application may be served and the service requirement of s 459G was met when the documents are delivered to that address;(5)In the context of s 459G(3) service of electronic copies by facsimile or email is, at the level of principle, permissible: Newsnet at 115 [39]; SGR Pastoral at [27]; (6)In any event, service by electronic communication is confirmed by the terms of s 600G of the Act, s 459G being a provision within Chapter 5 which is expressly referred to in s 600G (1);(7)Consent of the recipient to delivery by electronic communication is not a pre-requisite to valid service of originating documents under s 459G and cannot be asserted by the defendant so as to restrict the manner in which a plaintiff may comply with the requirements of s 459G(3): see Newsnet at 115 [39];(8)Section 600G of the Corporations Act permits the giving of notice by email where the creditor/recipient has first nominated an email address for receipt of such notices. However it does not state that such notice as given without such nomination is ineffective. It is permissive, not restrictive, and includes deeming provisions as to service if met: Gollant, in the matter of OT Markets Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2020] FCA 207 at [33] (Beach J). (9)Delivery by electronic communication pursuant to s 600G is permissible if at the time the electronic communication is used it is reasonable to expect that the document would be readily accessible so as to be useable for subsequent reference and there is a nominated electronic address in relation to the recipient;(10)The Mitchell email was capable of being retrieved, in readable form, from the email mail boxes associated with Ms Fu’s CFC email address and the CFC general email address on the CFC email server (CFC Server) within about eleven seconds of 4:48 pm on 3 February 2022 (i.e. the time it was sent). It is open to the Court to infer that the originating documents were sent in a readable form in circumstances where Ms Fu did not raise any difficulties in accessing and opening the attachments to the Mitchell email;(11)The transmission of the Mitchell email resulted in the originating documents being received at the creditor’s address for service nominated in the statutory demand shortly before 5 pm on 3 February 2022;(12)Proof of the time and place of receipt of the Mitchell email is facilitated by application of the statutory presumptions in ss 105A and 105B of the Corporations Act and by s 161 of the Evidence Act; (13)The "effective informal service rule" is irrelevant because formal service has occurred. It follows that the requirement that the documents actually come to the attention of the recipient, which is critical to the effective informal service rule, does not apply.Mr Ogborne’s submissions

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having regard to the deeming of the time and place of receipt of the Mitchell email by operation of ss 105A and 105B, it is not necessary to determine whether the rebuttable presumptions that arise under s 161 of the Evidence Act apply in the circumstances of this case are displaced by Ms Fu’s unchallenged evidence that she did not see, access or open the email at the relevant address until after the end of the statutory period.CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, I find that the application for an order setting aside the statutory demand and the affidavit supporting were filed and served within the 21 day statutory period specified in s 459G of the Corporations Act. Accordingly, the separate question is answered “yes”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The statutory demand must comply with the requirements of s 459E(2), which include that the demand must be in the prescribed form: s 459E(2)(e) of the Corporations Act; regs 1.0.03, 1.0.04, 1.0.05 and Schedule 1 of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth). The prescribed form is form 509H: see Volume 5, Schedule 2 of the Corporations Regulations. Paragraph 6 of Form 509H is as follows: The address of the creditor for service of copies of any application and affidavit is (insert the address for service of the documents in the State or Territory in which the demand is served on the company, being, if solicitors are acting for the creditor, the address of the solicitors).Application to set aside a statutory demand Section 459G is situated in Chapter 5 (External Administration), Part 5.4, Division 3 (Application to set aside a statutory demand) of the Corporations Act. Section 459G provides: Company may apply(1)A company may apply to the Court for an order setting aside a statutory demand served on the company.(2)An application may only be made within the statutory period after the demand is so served.(3)An application is made in accordance with this section only if, within that period:(a) an affidavit supporting the application is filed with the Court; and(b) a copy of the application, and a copy of the supporting affidavit, are served on the person who served the demand on the company.Service The burden of proof lies with the party upon which the demands were served to establish that service was effected in a manner satisfying s 459G: Jin Xie at 283 [6] (Barrett J). The 21 day time limit for service imposed by s 459G(2) and (3) is strict and immutable: David Grant at 278 (Gummow J); Jin Xie at 283 [5] (Barrett J). Section 459G does not define what constitutes service. The term is not defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act. The meaning of service in the context of s 459G was considered by Young J (as his Honour then was) in Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie [1996] NSWSC 314; 41 NSWLR 542 at 544 as follows:Section 459G itself does not deal with what is service. The ordinary meaning of “service” is personal service, and personal service merely means that the document in question must come to the notice of the person for whom it is intended. The means by which that person obtains the document are usually immaterial… Provisions which provide for a mode of service of documents on natural persons (s 28A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)) and companies (s 28A of the Acts Interpretation Act and s 109X of the Corporations Act) are facultative not mandatory. In respect of s 28A of the Acts Interpretation Act see Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v ABW Design and Construction Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 346; 203 FCR 70 at 76 [20] (Logan J). In respect of s 109X of the Corporations Act see Intelogent Pty Ltd v Onthego Group Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 257 at [33] - [38] and the authorities cited therein (Farrell J). Other means of service may be adopted, and if those other means result in the documents arriving at the nominated address within the statutory period then valid service will have been effected. What is critical is the result which is achieved by the plaintiff’s efforts, not the manner by which that result has been achieved: Newsnet Pty Ltd v Patching [2011] NSWSC 690; 81 NSWLR 104 at 112 – 113 [30] (White J, as his Honour then was); Seventh Cameo Nominees Ltd v Holdway Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of Victoria 24 April 1998, unreported, Chernov J); SGR Pastoral Pty Ltd v Christensen [2019] QSC 229; 2 QR 334 at [23] (Bowskill J, as her Honour, the Chief Justice then was). In SGR Pastoral, Bowskill J rejected a submission advanced by the creditor that personal service of the s 459G application on the creditors’ nominated agent is required, describing the submission (at [19]) as both counter-intuitive and inconsistent with authority, including Newsnet, Rochester Communications Group Pty Ltd v Lader Pty Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 648; 15 ACLC 570 and In the matter of World Square Realty Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 307.