IN THE ESTATE OF TLB
[2005] SASC 459
•6 December 2005
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Application)
IN THE ESTATE OF TLB
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray
6 December 2005
SUCCESSION - WILLS, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION - THE MAKING OF A WILL - EXECUTION - INFORMAL DOCUMENT INTENDED TO BE WILL
Application for an order that a document purporting to express testamentary intentions be admitted to probate - documents comprised a will instruction sheet and a will drafted in accordance with the instructions on the will instruction sheet - deceased committed suicide prior to executing the will - consideration of amendments to the Wills Act 1936 (SA) - consideration of which amendment applicable - consideration of testamentary capacity - application granted - will instruction sheet admitted to probate as the last will of the deceased.
Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 8, s 12(2); Wills Act Amendment Act (No 2) 1975 (SA) s 12(2); Statute Law Revision Act (No 2) 1990 s 12(2); Wills (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 1994 (SA) s 7; Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 1998 (SA) s 22; Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Attorney-General's Portfolio) Act 2000 (SA) s 30; Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) s 72G(b), referred to.
In the Estate of McCarney deceased (unreported, S5884, 12 November 1996); Estate of Kolodnicky (1981) 27 SASR 374; Baumanis v Praulin (1980) 25 SASR 423; Estate of Parkinson (1988) 143 LSJS 336; Estate of Vauk (1986) 41 SASR 242; Estate of Krawzuk (1992) 168 LSJS 231; Estate of Templar-Warner (1993) 174 LSJS 263; Estate of Brewer deceased (unreported, S6134, 29 April 1997); Estate of Mead deceased (unreported S6547 13 February 1998); Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; Re Hodges: Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698, considered.
IN THE ESTATE OF TLB
[2005] SASC 459Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction
GRAY J:
This is an application by summons for an order that a document purporting to express the testamentary intentions of the late T.L.B. be admitted to proof pursuant to section 12(2) of the Wills Act 1936 (SA).
T.L.B. (“B”) committed suicide by hanging herself at the St Josephs Family Care Centre at Mitchell Park, South Australia. Her body was found on 12 June 2000. She was last seen alive on 10 June 2000.
At the time of her death, B was 31 years old. She had two infant children, an eight-year-old daughter and a four-year-old son. She was married to S.L.M. (“M”). The two had separated in February 1999 due to M’s sexual interference with their daughter. In October 1999, M was convicted of this offence.
In May 2000, B commenced divorce proceedings in the Family Court. Those proceedings were yet to be heard at the date of her death.
At the time of death, B possessed personal estate that is said to not exceed $137,742.00. Her assets comprised personal effects and a life insurance policy, both held in the State of South Australia. Her liabilities were said to be limited to funeral expenses totalling $4,565.00.
B’s life insurance policy was in her married name, T.L.M. The document, the subject of the present application, being a draft will, was prepared in her maiden name, T.L.B. As a result, the applicant seeks a grant in the names T.L.B. otherwise T.L.M.
The Evidence
A body of documentary evidence has been filed in support of the application. That evidence includes a number of affidavits from V.R.H., the mother of B, an affidavit of A.M.B., the father of B, an affidavit of the administrator of the St Josephs Family Care Centre, an affidavit of Ms Josephson, a solicitor in the employ of D’Angelo Kavanagh, the solicitor for B and an affidavit of Annita Dagmar Paull, a psychiatrist providing a report prepared in regard to B’s mental health. The affidavits attach a number of documents including B’s Will Instruction Sheet and the unsigned “Last Will and Testament” said to have been prepared as a draft for B by Ms Josephson. Additional documentation included a copy of a post-mortem report concerning B, a copy of the remarks of the District Court in regard to the sentencing of M for the conviction of two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with the daughter of B and M. The affidavits also exhibited information from the Family Court proceedings concerning custody and access.
I have had regard to this body of evidence in determining this application.
The Will Instructions
B instructed Ms Josephson of D’Angelo Kavanagh, a firm of solicitors, to act for her in the Family Court proceedings.
B had seen Ms Josephson on or about 26 May 2000 for the purpose of giving instructions for her will. B’s mother accompanied her to the appointment. B’s mother recalls the deceased saying to Ms Josephson, “I do need to do a Will so he is not having my money or my kids”. B’s mother understood the reference to “he” to be M. As B’s mother and B left the offices of D’Angelo Kavanagh, B’s mother recalls B stating to her “I’ve taken care of the Will. I want you to look after my money and for the kids to live with you until they leave home. I have said in my Will that all my money and property is to go to the children and you have to make sure that they get it”.
B provided Ms Josephson with instructions pertaining to her will. These were noted by Ms Josephson, in hand, on a “Will Instruction Sheet”. According to the Will Instruction Sheet, B’s mother was to be appointed sole executor and “In the alternative” the deceased’s father was to be appointed executor. Under the heading “Directions as to burial/cremation” the word “cremated” has been written. Under the heading “Distribution of residue” appear the words “to children equally at 21”. Under the heading “Giftover Provision” the instruction “To their Children at 21” has been written. The words “Minors Clause” and the heading “Guardianship” follow. Beneath these headings, “to my parents” have been written. Attached, as a schedule to these reasons is a copy of the Will Instruction Sheet.
The Will Instruction Sheet was not signed or authenticated in any other manner by B. Ms Josephson does not have any independent recollection of the discussion that she had with B or the content of the instructions recorded in the notes. However, a draft will was prepared in accordance with the instructions set out in the Will Instruction Sheet.
Ms Josephson does not recall B making an appointment at that time to return to the office to execute the will. Ms Josephson recalls that B was awaiting approval from the Legal Services Commission regarding her application for funding for her Family Court proceedings. It was thought that B would return to execute the will when she next attended the office in regard to her Family Court proceedings.
B’s mother stated that shortly after 25 May 2000, B called the offices of D’Angelo Kavanagh in her presence, on at least two occasions, to ascertain whether the will was ready to be signed. On both of these occasions B did not speak to Ms Josephson. B subsequently made an appointment with Ms Josephson for 13 June 2000.
On 7 June 2000, B’s father telephoned Ms Josephson and arranged an appointment for B on 15 June 2000 at 1.00 pm as he was unable to take B to the appointment on 13 June 2000. B’s father understood that B made the appointment for the purpose of executing her will. This appointment was later changed to 3.00 pm on the same day. As earlier observed, B’s body was discovered on 12 June 2000.
The Draft Will
The draft will, prepared by Ms Josephson, following the completion of the Will Instruction Sheet, is the document that the applicant is seeking to have admitted to probate. The document commences as follows:
THIS IS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT of me T.L.B. of [address] Home Duties.
The draft contains the following provisions:
-a regular revocation clause;
-the appointment of B’s mother as the sole instituted executrix;
-the appointment of B’s father as the sole substituted executor in the event that B’s mother predeceased B or having survived her be unwilling or unable to act;
-a direction that B’s body be cremated;
-the whole of the estate is given to the trustee upon trust with the usual powers to liquidate assets or postpone conversion and to pay debts and testamentary expenses;
-the residue of the estate to be held on trust for such of B’s children as shall survive her for 28 days and attain the age of 21 years;
-in the event of a child not so surviving her but leaving a child or children who shall be living at her death and attain the age of 21 years then such child or children take as tenants in common the share to which his or her parent would have been entitled;
-the trustee is given power to advance money for the maintenance, education and benefit of any minor beneficiary during minority; and
-B’s parents are appointed guardians of the children during their minority.
In general, the draft will accords with the notes contained in the Will Instruction Sheet. However, as earlier observed, under the heading “Distribution of Residue” the words “to children equally at 21” were inserted. The draft will also require the children to survive the testator for 28 days.
The Wills Act
The draft will fails to comply with the formalities required by the Wills Act. Section 8 of that Act provides:
Subject to this Act, no will is valid unless it is in writing and executed in the following manner:
(a)it must be signed by the testator or by some other person in the testator's presence and by the testator's direction; and
(b)it must appear, on the face of the will or otherwise, that the testator intended by the signature to give effect to the will; and
(c)the signature must be made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time; and
(d)the witnesses must attest and sign the will (but no form of attestation is necessary); and
(e)the signatures of the witnesses must be made or acknowledged in the presence of the testator (but not necessarily in the presence of each other).
Section 12(2) of the Wills Act sets out the requirements that need to be met for a will to be admitted to probate notwithstanding that it has not been executed with the formalities of the Wills Act. This subsection was first introduced in 1975 and has been subsequently amended on four occasions.
Subsection (2) was first introduced into the Act by the Wills Act Amendment Act (No 2) 1975 (SA), and came into operation on 29 January 1976. The subsection then provided:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person shall, notwithstanding that it has not been executed with the formalities required by this Act, be deemed to be a will of the deceased person if the Supreme Court, upon application for admission of the document to probate as the last will of the deceased, is satisfied that there can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to constitute his will.
The enactment of this subsection was a result of the South Australian Law Reform Committee’s concern regarding the plight of would-be testators who attempted to execute a will but failed for want of satisfying the formal requirements.[1]
[1] 28th Report of South Australian Law Reform Committee to Attorney-General Reform of the Law of Intestacy and Wills (1974).
The subsection was amended by the Statute Law Revision Act (No 2) 1990 (SA), which replaced the word “shall” with the word “will”, “deemed” was replaced by “taken” and “or her” was added after the word “his”. The subsection provided:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person will, notwithstanding that it has not been executed with the formalities required by this Act, be taken to be a will of the deceased person if the Supreme Court, upon application for admission of the document to probate as the last will of the deceased, is satisfied that there can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to constitute his or her will.
The onus of proof demanded by the amended subsection was the subject of criticism. In May 1992, the judiciary recommended that the subsection ought to be amended by striking out the words “that there can be no reasonable doubt” and replacing them with “the Court is satisfied that the deceased intended the document to constitute his or her will”.
The subsection was amended by the Wills (Miscellaneous)Amendment Act 1994 (SA) to provide:
Subject to this Act, if the Court is satisfied that a document that has not been executed with the formalities required by this Act expresses testamentary intentions of a deceased person, the document will be admitted to probate as a will of the deceased person.
The amended subsection omitted the express requirement of the progenitor provision, namely that the Court had to be satisfied that the document being propounded was intended by the deceased, as his or her will.
This omission was noted in the observations of Mullighan J in In the Estate of McCartney deceased.[2] In that case, the document in question comprised jottings on two pages of green notepaper attached to a notepad. On another page of the notepad, the deceased had written her name. The notes were consistent with instructions for a will. Counsel for the applicant submitted that as a consequence of the 1994 amendment to section 12(2), the animus testandi was no longer required, provided the document contained the intentions of the deceased. Mullighan J found that, on the balance of probabilities, the deceased intended the document to be her will. As a result, His Honour found it unnecessary to consider counsel’s submission.
[2] In the Estate of McCartney deceased (unreported, S5884, 12 November 1996).
Section 12(2) was further amended and came into force on 3 December 1998 by the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General’s Portfolio) Act 1998 as follows:
Subject to this Act, if the Court is satisfied that –
(a) a document expresses testamentary intentions of a deceased person; and
(b)the deceased person intended to make a will or a codicil to give effect to the testamentary intentions expressed in the document,
the document will be admitted to probate as a will (or a codicil to the will) of the deceased person even though it has not been executed with the formalities required by this Act.
There appears to be little parliamentary or judicial comment on this amendment.
The subsection was further amended in 2000 by the Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Attorney-General’s Portfolio) Act 2000 (SA) as follows:
Subject to this Act, if the Court is satisfied that –
(a) a document expresses testamentary intentions of a deceased person; and
(b) the deceased intended the document to constitute his or her will,
the document will be admitted to probate as a will of the deceased person even though it is has not been executed with the formalities required by this Act.
This amendment came into force on 20 July 2000 and constitutes the provision presently in force.
Which Version of Section 12(2) Applies?
In Estate of Kolodnicky[3] Legoe J considered whether section 12(2) as first enacted in 1975 applied to an informal will which had been signed prior to the introduction of the subsection. The deceased had died after the 1975 enactment had come into operation. Legoe J held that the subsection should apply to all deaths of testators after 29 January 1976, being the date that the subsection came into operation. Legoe J reasoned that the relevant date, for the purposes of the subsection, was the date of death, rather than the date of the signing of the will. Legoe J observed that:[4]
Every will shall be construed … to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator unless a contrary intention appears by the will .
[3] Estate of Kolodnicky (1981) 27 SASR 374.
[4] Estate of Kolodnicky (1981) 27 SASR 374 at 382.
Legoe J considered that pursuant to the general rules of statutory construction contained in sections 21 and 22 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), every Act is to apply to the circumstances in which they arise and that every remedial provision of an Act should receive such construction as would best ensure the attainment of the object of that Act. This reasoning is apposite.
In the present case, the version of section 12(2) in operation at the date of B’s death, the version introduced by the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General’s Portfolio) Act 1998, is the version to be applied to the application for the admission of the document to probate.
Application of Section 12(2)
As earlier observed, the version of section 12(2) applicable to the present case came into force in December 1998 and critically provides that before a document is admitted to probate as a will of a deceased person if it has not been executed with the formalities required by the Wills Act the Court must be satisfied that:
-the document expresses testamentary intentions of a deceased person;
-the deceased person intended to make a will to give effect to the testamentary intentions expressed in the document.
This provision does not appear to have been the subject of judicial comment. However, judicial considerations of the progenitors of the subsection provide some guidance as to its application to the present case.
The courts have considered the circumstances giving rise to the existence of a formal will in situations where a deceased had given instructions for a will but death then intervened to frustrate the execution of the document. In Baumanis v Praulin[5] Mitchell J refused to admit a type-written document containing minor alterations that was not signed by the deceased on the grounds that there was no evidence that the deceased intended the document to constitute his will. It was said that the document could be described as an accurate record of his testamentary intentions but there was no indication on the document that these particular intentions were to amount to the last will and testament of the deceased.
[5] Baumainis v Praulin (1980) 25 SASR 423.
In Estate of Parkinson[6] a draft will was prepared for a woman who, having divorced her husband, sought to revoke her previous will and leave her estate to her children. The woman said she would execute the will once it was sent to her accompanied by a letter explaining its legal effect in simple terms. The draft will was sent to her, however, she died before it was executed. White J refused to admit the document, finding that it had been neither seen nor approved by the deceased.
[6] Estate of Parkinson (1988) 143 LSJS 336.
In Estate of Vauk[7] the deceased committed suicide. Four days before his death, the deceased gave instructions for a will to an officer of the Public Trustee. Handwritten notes were taken and a draft will prepared from those instructions. The draft will accorded with the deceased’s pencilled alterations on his previous will. An appointment was made for the deceased to sign the draft will, however, death intervened. A smudged note was found with the deceased upon his death. Legoe J held that the intention revealed in the smudged note enabled the exercise of the dispensing power to admit to probate the draft will, notwithstanding the fact that the deceased had not seen or signed the draft will.
[7] Estate of Vauk (1986) 41 SASR 242.
In Estate of Krawzuk[8] White J admitted to probate a document purporting to be a will that had not been seen or signed by the deceased. The document was a re-engrossment of an existing document, previously sighted and approved by the deceased. The re-engrossed document contained a minor spelling error in the Christian name of a beneficiary. White J held that the document, already approved by the deceased and only slightly amended, was his last will and testament and contained his testamentary intentions.
[8] Estate of Krawzuk (1992) 168 LSJS 231.
In Estate of Templar-Warner[9] Judge Bowen Pain admitted to probate a codicil not previously seen or approved by the deceased. The deceased was admitted to hospital and gave instructions to an officer of a Trustee company for a codicil to her will to be prepared leaving a legacy of $20,000 to the hospital. A codicil was prepared in accordance with her instructions however the deceased died before it could be executed.
[9] Estate of Templar-Warner (1993) 174 LSJS 263.
These authorities all address the 1990 amended version of section 12(2). There appears to be little relevant case law regarding the version of section 12(2) enacted in 1994.[10]
[10] Estate of Brewer deceased (unreported, S6134, 29 April 1997); Estate of Mead deceased (unreported, S6547 13 February 1998).
Pursuant to the version of section 12(2) enacted in 1998, relevant to the present proceedings, there must exist a document expressing the testamentary intentions of the deceased. However, there is no requirement that the deceased must have intended the document to be his or her will. The document will be admitted to probate as a will provided the Court is satisfied that the deceased intended to make a will to give effect to the intentions expressed in the document.
The only person who is adversely affected by the order sought in the present case is M. Under an intestacy he would be entitled to share in the estate.[11] M has been served with the application and supporting affidavit. He has appeared. His counsel has advised the Court that he supports the application and consents to the proposed orders.
[11] Section 72G(b) of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA).
Testamentary Capacity
There is evidence in the present case that B had testamentary capacity.
The test for determining whether a person possesses sufficient testamentary capacity can be found in Banks v Goodfellow,[12] where Cockburn CJ observed:[13]
It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a testator shall understand the nature of the act, and its effects; shall understand the extent of property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties — that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.
[12] Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549.
[13] Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 565.
The plaintiff bears the onus of proving that the deceased had testamentary capacity. This burden will be prima facie satisfied where a document has been duly executed, complies with all the formal requirements of the Wills Act and is rational on its face.
In the absence of the formal requirements it will be necessary to prove by other means that the deceased had testamentary capacity. Suicide, by itself, will not give rise to a presumption that the deceased lacked the requisite testamentary capacity.[14]
[14] Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698.
As Powell J observed in Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges[15] whilst age or grave illness may call for vigilant scrutiny by the court, it will only affect the testator’s or testatrix’s mental capacity if it appears that age or illness so affected their mental capacity as to render them “unequal to the task of disposing of [the] property”.[16]
[15] Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698.
[16] Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698 at 707.
American jurisprudence suggests that whilst suicide is a factor that can be considered when determining whether a deceased had testamentary capacity, it cannot be regarded as conclusive proof of insanity.[17]
[17] American Jurisprudence (2nd ed, 1975) vol.79 at 358, 367 and 387-388.
In the present case, the fact that B committed suicide is only a consideration in determining whether B had the requisite mental capacity. It is not an indication of itself that she was not of sound mind when she gave instructions for the preparation of the will or that she lacked testamentary capacity at the time of her death.
Dr Paull treated B on a number of occasions from late October 1999 until the time of her death. Dr Paull provided a report to this Court on whether, in her professional opinion, B had testamentary capacity at the time she consulted Ms Josephson in regard to making a will that bequeathed all of her assets to her two children, and that she continued to have testamentary capacity until she died.
It was Dr Paull’s professional opinion that B had testamentary capacity on or about 25 May 2000 when she gave instructions to Ms Josephson for the preparation of her Last Will and Testament. Dr Paull considered that B did not abandon her testamentary intention, rather at the time of committing suicide she was so preoccupied with ending her life that she forgot that the will had not yet been signed.
In reaching her conclusion, Dr Paull considered the numerous appointments she had with B where it was made clear to her that B did not want M to receive anything from her. She also considered the Glenside Hospital case notes, the number of phone calls B made to the office of D’Angelo Kavanagh to organise a time for her to sign her will and a phone call made by B to Dr Paull on 5 May 2000.
Dr Paull concluded:
I feel very confident that if she had been interrupted as she was in the course of committing suicide and asked whether she hadn’t forgotten something – whether she wanted to sign her will – she would have said something to the effect of “Oh, I forgot that. Yes, I want to sign my will” and ceased her suicide attempt to enable her to sign the will. I have this opinion because of what I came to know about her from spending time with her. I am confident that her prime concern (if her mind had been brought to it) would have been to ensure that [M] did not receive any of her estate and that her children received it all…and that she had done everything she could to protect her children.
Conclusion
In order for a draft will to be admitted under the relevant 1998 version of section 12(2), it must meet the following requirements:
-the death of the testator must have occurred on or between 3 December 1998 and 20 July 2000;
-there must be a document, which expresses the testamentary intentions of the deceased person;
-the document must not have been executed with the formalities required of the Act; and
-the deceased must have intended to make a will or codicil to give effect to the testamentary intentions expressed in that document.
In the present case, the first and third of the requirements listed above have been met. With respect to the second requirement, it is clear that B provided Ms Josephson with instructions expressing her testamentary intentions. These instructions were recorded on the Will Instruction Sheet. This document, in existence during B’s lifetime, expressed B’s testamentary intentions and meets the second requirement listed above.
It is clear that B did not intend the Will Instruction Sheet to constitute her will. It is evident from B’s instructions to Ms Josephson that B envisaged that her will would be professionally drafted into a formal document in accordance with her intentions recorded on the Will Instruction Sheet. These circumstances indicate a continuing testamentary intention on the part of B to make a formal will to give effect to her intentions as noted on the Will Instruction Sheet. The fact that she took her own life does not negate these intentions or give rise to a presumption of abandonment or change of testamentary intentions. Therefore the fourth requirement of the relevant version of section 12(2) is satisfied.
The question then arises: – which document ought to be admitted to probate - the Will Instruction Sheet or the draft will drawn up generally in accordance with those instructions? The summons to admit seeks an order:
That a document purporting to express the testamentary intentions of [T.L.B.] be admitted to proof pursuant to Section 12(2) of the Wills Act 1936...
The affidavit filed in support of the application seeks an order that a document exhibited to the affidavit, the will prepared in accordance with B’s instructions, be admitted to proof. However, this document was neither sighted nor signed by B. There is no evidence that at the time of her death, B had knowledge of its existence. It may not even have been created during her lifetime.
Conversely, the Will Instruction Sheet, containing the notes made by Ms Josephson recording B’s instructions, expresses B’s testamentary intentions; intentions that she wished to form the basis for a formal will.
I am satisfied that the Will Instruction Sheet accurately reflects B’s intentions. For this reason, the Will Instruction Sheet, annexed to the affidavit of Ms Josephson and marked ARJ1, is the appropriate document to be admitted to probate.
I am satisfied that the Will Instruction Sheet expresses the testamentary intentions of B and that B intended to make a will to give effect to the testamentary intention expressed in the document.
I order that:
-the document (commencing with the words “Executor/s and Trustees” and concluding with the words “To my parents”) be admitted to probate as the last will of T.L.B., otherwise T.L.M.;
-that probate be granted to B’s mother, sole executor named in the last will.
-The costs of and incidental to this application and order be paid out of the estate of T.L.B.
ANNEXURE
00274
CALDICOTT & CO
WILL INSTRUCTION SHEET
Date of
Instructions 25/5/00FULL NAMES [T.L.B.] Notes
RESIDENTIAL [house number and street]
ADDRESS: [suburb]P/CODE:
TELEPHONE: [phone number] (W)OCCUPATION(S)
ASSETS:
1. Real Estate – Joint Tenancy/Tenancy in Common
-
-
2. Shares / Debentures / Savings
3. Valuable Personal Items
4. Superannuation – Life Policies
Company AMP $15,500
Death Component YES
Nomination Children
5. Motor Vehicle/s
6. Business/Partnership
7. Childrens Names
[B.R.M.] DOB 3/11/91
[J.B.M.] DOB 8/5/96
DOB
8. Grandchildrens Names
DOB
DOB
DOB
9. Reason Disentitled or Disabled
EXECUTOR/S & TRUSTEE/S
FirstlyName [T.L.B’s mother]
Address [House number and street]
[Suburb] P/CODE
Occupation
Relationship to
Client MotherSecondly/ *In the alternativeName [T.L.B’s father]
Address [House number and street]
[Suburb] P/CODE
Occupation
Relationship to
Client FatherDIRECTIONS AS TO BURIAL/CREMATION:
Cremation
BEQUESTS
DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDUE:
To children equally at 21
GIFTOVER PROVISION:
To their children at 21
Minors clause:
Guardianship
To my parentsFORGIVE ANY DEBT
LIFE INTEREST – Mortgage
SPECIAL PROVISIONS (POWER TO RESIDE IN HOUSE ETC)
DETAILS OF FAMILY TRUST, BUSINESSES OR COMPANIES
Signature
3
1