SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Civil)
In the Estate of ISTVAN MOLNAR (DECEASED)
[2016] SASC 55
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley
5 May 2016
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - TRUSTS AND DECEASED ESTATES
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - GENERALLY - POWER OF COURT TO EXTEND LIMITATION PERIOD
SUCCESSION - CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS - CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY - ASCERTAINMENT OF TESTATOR'S INTENTION
SUCCESSION - CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS - CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY - PRINCIPLES OR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION - WHERE MISTAKE OR MISDESCRIPTION - AS TO PERSON OR OBJECT
Istvan Molnar (“the deceased”) died on 26 April 2012. Probate of the last will and testament of the deceased dated 22 September 2010 was granted on 5 August 2013 to three executors.
The application seeks rectification of the will. There are two issues on the application. First, whether the court should consent to an extension of time within which to bring the application. Second, whether the terms of the will accurately reflect the testamentary intention of the deceased. In particular, the issue is whether the deceased intended to confer a binding right on the applicant to an option to purchase a King William Street property or whether the provision is precatory, expressing a mere desire on the part of the deceased, not an intention to create a binding obligation or trust.
Held (per Stanley J):
1. There are adequate reasons to exercise the discretion in s 25AA(2) of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) and consent to the extension of time. Further, there is no particular prejudice arising from the bringing of the application out of time (at [39]).
2. There is clear and convincing evidence that the relevant clause of the will does not accurately reflect the actual testamentary intentions of the deceased. The will is to be rectified so as to give proper expression to those intentions (at [71]).
Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 25AA(1), s 25AA(2); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 47, s 48(3)(b)(ii), s 48(3b), s 48(4), referred to.
Kerr v Kerr [2015] SASC 199; In the Estate of Nies (deceased) [2014] SASC 93, applied.
Re Swain (deceased) [2008] NSWSC 1343, distinguished.
ANZ Trustees Ltd v Hamlet [2010] VSC 207; Rawack v Spicer [2002] NSWSC 849, discussed.
Re Adams and Kensington Vestry (1883) 24 Ch D 199; Adams and Kensington Vestry (1884) 27 Ch D 394; In Re Angas [1906] SALR 208; Re Atkinson (1911) 80 LJ Ch 370; Chittock v Stevens [2000] WTLR 643; In re Salmon [1981] Ch 167; Amos v Amos [1966] VR 442; Goodwin v Phillips (1908) 7 CLR 1; Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2006) 225 CLR 130; Chittock v Stevens [2000] WTLR 643; In the Estate of Hennekam (deceased) (2009) 104 SASR 289; Sykes v Sykes [2010] SASC 356; Wesley v Wesley (1998) 71 SASR 1; Re Allsop [1968] Ch 39,…
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- Case
- [2016] SASC 55
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the deceased intended to confer a binding right on the applicant to an option to purchase the King William Street property, rather than expressing a mere desire. The court substituted the original clause 8 with a new clause that grants the applicant the first right to purchase the property at the current market value, with conditions for the sale and payment of the purchase price. The court also directed the executors to pay the costs associated with the sale of the property and to discharge any mortgage held by Frank Michelon and Lisa Ann Michelon. The court declined to determine the question of whether the prior equity of Mr Michelon is an impediment to the exercise by the applicant of his option to purchase the King William Street property.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Lempens also gave evidence about the exchange of correspondence between the parties and his hope that the matter would be resolved without the need for legal proceedings. Further, he gave evidence about the deadlock that developed as to how the matter ought to proceed and who was responsible for obtaining directions from the court. This evidence was uncontentious and I have no difficulty in accepting it. Extension of time: consideration I accept Mr Starke’s evidence that he did not become aware of the existence of the limitation period until an opinion of counsel was sought, which was subsequently provided on 8 June 2014. Mr Ower concedes that this is a relevant consideration but contends that, even if I am minded to extend time based upon Mr Starke’s ignorance of the limitation period, the subsequent conduct of the matter ought to weigh against the granting of an extension of time given the lack of urgency with which the matter has been commenced and prosecuted. He says that upon being alerted to the expiration of the limitation period Mr Starke ought to have “... moved heaven and earth ...”[27] to have the matter brought before the court. Mr Ower complains that, instead, the evidence demonstrates that the matter has been conducted with a total and utter lack of urgency and diligence. I consider that this submission has some force. [27] T 238.2 - 238.3. I acknowledge the extenuating circumstances that Mr Stevens submits existed at various times prior to the hearing of this matter. However, I find that the criticisms made of Mr Starke’s conduct of this matter on behalf of the applicant are, to a significant extent, justified. Notwithstanding this, I am not prepared, in the circumstances of this case, to visit what appears to be the fault of the applicant’s solicitors upon the applicant. I accept the applicant’s evidence to the effect that he was frustrated by the delays in commencing and progressing his claim, and I am satisfied he was reasonably and properly diligent in pressing Mr Starke in relation to the matter, but ultimately he was reliant on his solicitor. I am reinforced in my view that it is just and proper to extend time in the circumstances of this case because there has been no disposition of the King William Street property. The rationale for a limitation period of six months for the bringing of rectification claims lies, in part, in the risk that estates will have been administered and distributed. The Parliament has fixed the limitation period bearing in mind the difficulties associated with unwinding the distribution of an estate and the obvious hardship caused by subsequently recovering from beneficiaries their share of an estate distributed pursuant to an unrectified will. The evidence in this case is that the estate has been substantially administered but not fully distributed and distribution will not occur for a considerable period of time due to the age of two of the deceased’s grandchildren who, pursuant to the will, are to share the residue of the deceased’s estate upon their attaining thirty years of age.[28] Like Chittock v Stevens,[29] this is not a case where, if the application for rectification is successful, the court will have to unscramble the distribution of assets effected in accordance with the unrectified will. As the court observed in Chittock this removes what was characterised in In re Salmon[30] as a most important factor weighing against an extension of time.[31] [28] T 265.[29] [2000] WTLR 643 at 651-652.[30] [1981] Ch 167.[31] [2000] WTLR 643 at 651-652.