In the Estate of ISTVAN MOLNAR (DECEASED)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Civil)

In the Estate of ISTVAN MOLNAR (DECEASED)

[2016] SASC 55

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

5 May 2016

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - TRUSTS AND DECEASED ESTATES

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - GENERALLY - POWER OF COURT TO EXTEND LIMITATION PERIOD

SUCCESSION - CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS - CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY - ASCERTAINMENT OF TESTATOR'S INTENTION

SUCCESSION - CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS - CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY - PRINCIPLES OR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION - WHERE MISTAKE OR MISDESCRIPTION - AS TO PERSON OR OBJECT

Istvan Molnar (“the deceased”) died on 26 April 2012.  Probate of the last will and testament of the deceased dated 22 September 2010 was granted on 5 August 2013 to three executors.

The application seeks rectification of the will.  There are two issues on the application.  First, whether the court should consent to an extension of time within which to bring the application.  Second, whether the terms of the will accurately reflect the testamentary intention of the deceased.  In particular, the issue is whether the deceased intended to confer a binding right on the applicant to an option to purchase a King William Street property or whether the provision is precatory, expressing a mere desire on the part of the deceased, not an intention to create a binding obligation or trust.

Held (per Stanley J):

1. There are adequate reasons to exercise the discretion in s 25AA(2) of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) and consent to the extension of time. Further, there is no particular prejudice arising from the bringing of the application out of time (at [39]).

2.  There is clear and convincing evidence that the relevant clause of the will does not accurately reflect the actual testamentary intentions of the deceased.  The will is to be rectified so as to give proper expression to those intentions (at [71]).

Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 25AA(1), s 25AA(2); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 47, s 48(3)(b)(ii), s 48(3b), s 48(4), referred to.
Kerr v Kerr [2015] SASC 199; In the Estate of Nies (deceased) [2014] SASC 93, applied.
Re Swain (deceased) [2008] NSWSC 1343, distinguished.
ANZ Trustees Ltd v Hamlet [2010] VSC 207; Rawack v Spicer [2002] NSWSC 849, discussed.
Re Adams and Kensington Vestry (1883) 24 Ch D 199; Adams and Kensington Vestry (1884) 27 Ch D 394; In Re Angas [1906] SALR 208; Re Atkinson (1911) 80 LJ Ch 370; Chittock v Stevens [2000] WTLR 643; In re Salmon [1981] Ch 167; Amos v Amos [1966] VR 442; Goodwin v Phillips (1908) 7 CLR 1; Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2006) 225 CLR 130; Chittock v Stevens [2000] WTLR 643; In the Estate of Hennekam (deceased) (2009) 104 SASR 289; Sykes v Sykes [2010] SASC 356; Wesley v Wesley (1998) 71 SASR 1; Re Allsop [1968] Ch 39,…

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Details
Case
[2016] SASC 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Benjamin Marks Baker, sought an extension of time to bring an application for rectification of the will of the deceased, Istvan Molnar. The application was brought approximately eight months out of the statutory limitation period of six months from the date of the grant of probate. The court had to decide whether to grant the extension and whether to rectify clause 8 of the will, which contained errors and misdescriptions. The court found that the applicant's solicitor had been unaware of the limitation period until late in the proceedings, and while there had been some delay and lack of urgency in prosecuting the matter, there had been no disposition of the King William Street property, and the estate had not been fully distributed. The court exercised its discretion under section 25AA of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) to extend the time for bringing the application, and rectified the will to reflect the deceased's actual testamentary intentions.

The court found that the deceased intended to confer a binding right on the applicant to an option to purchase the King William Street property, rather than expressing a mere desire. The court substituted the original clause 8 with a new clause that grants the applicant the first right to purchase the property at the current market value, with conditions for the sale and payment of the purchase price. The court also directed the executors to pay the costs associated with the sale of the property and to discharge any mortgage held by Frank Michelon and Lisa Ann Michelon. The court declined to determine the question of whether the prior equity of Mr Michelon is an impediment to the exercise by the applicant of his option to purchase the King William Street property.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for rectification of a will. The applicant seeks an extension of time within which to bring the application. Background Istvan Molnar (“the deceased”) died on 26 April 2012. Probate of the last will and testament of the deceased dated 22 September 2010 was granted on 5 August 2013 to the executors, David Botten, Trevor Robinson and Robert Lempens. Mr Lempens was the deceased’s solicitor and drafted the will. Clause 8 of the deceased’s will provides:[1] [1] Exhibit P1, Annexure A.8.I DIRECT that my company International Sound Pty Ltd (ACN 60 053 790 515) (“the company”) is to be wound up by my executors. I DIRECT THAT the proceeds therefrom should be held as follows:(a) As to the proceeds of sale of the real property held by the company Lands Title Register Book volume 5579 folio 383 and situate at 304A King William Street Adelaide in the said State,(i)The costs associated with the winding up of the company and sale of the property are to be paid(ii)the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000.00) be given to FRANK MICHOLON of 35 Marion Street Unley in the State of South Australia for repayment of any debt I or the company may owe to him. (iii)Of the remaining amounta.fifty percentum (50%) thereof to the said FRANK MICHOLON;b.fifty percentum (50%) thereof to the residue of my estate;(b) for the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause 8. of this my Will I EXPRESS THE WISH that my executors give first option to buy the property described in Lands Title Register Book volume 5579 folio 383 to BENJAMIN MARKS BAKER at the current market value at the time of the sale as determined by a valuer appointed by the President of the Real Estate Institute of South Australia;(c) and residual funds from the winding up of the company to form part of the residue of my estate It is this clause which the application seeks to rectify. There is no issue that the clause incorrectly provides that the property situated at 304A King William Street (“the King William Street property”) was an asset of International Sound Pty Ltd (“the company”), a company effectively controlled by the deceased as its sole shareholder and director. In fact it was an asset of the deceased. In addition, the clause misspells the name of Mr Michelon. There are two issues on the application. First, whether the court should consent to an extension of time within which to bring the application. Second, whether the terms of clause 8 of the will accurately reflect the testamentary intention of the deceased. In particular, the issue is whether the deceased intended to confer a binding right on the applicant to an option to purchase the King William Street property or whether the provision is precatory, expressing a mere desire on the part of the deceased, not an intention to create a binding obligation or trust.[2] [2] Re Adams and Kensington Vestry (1883) 24 Ch D 199; Adams and the Kensington Vestry(1884) 27 Ch D 394 at 410; Re Williams [1897] 2 Ch 12; In re Angas [1906] SALR 208; In re Atkinson (1911) 80 LJ Ch 370.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While the Court would always give considerable weight to the views of Young CJ In Eq, it is important to recognise that s 25AA is a beneficial or remedial provision.[13] Section 25AA(2) should be given a wide construction consistent with the purpose or object of the section.[14] The enactment of s 25AA altered the common law so as to expand the powers of the court to rectify a will to properly reflect a testator’s actual testamentary intentions. Moreover, the terms of s 25AA(2) differ from the terms of the analogous provision considered in Re Swain. The provision in Re Swain required the court to be satisfied that sufficient cause was shown for the failure to bring the application within time while s 25AA(2) confers a broad, unfettered power to extend the time within which an application for rectification can be brought. That power must be exercised judicially. In my view, however, it would not be consistent with the purpose of the provision to adopt a narrow and stringent construction of the power conferred by s 25AA(2), although in exercising the power the court must give proper consideration to the underlying purpose of the limitation period which relates to the circumstances where it would be appropriate for the court to exercise the substantive power of rectification in the context of the administration of a deceased estate. In these circumstances, I am disposed to prefer the approach in Chittock v Stevens[15] notwithstanding the reservations expressed in Re Swain (deceased).[16][13] Kerr v Kerr [2015] SASC 199 at [26].[14] In the Estate of Nies (deceased) [2014] SASC 93 at [32].[15] [2000] WTLR 643.[16] [2008] NSWSC 1343.Extension of time: submissions and evidence The application for rectification of the will in this case is approximately eight months out of time. Mr Stevens, for the applicant, concedes that there have been delays in the commencement and prosecution of this action. He submits that the causes of the delay were a desire by the applicant to resolve this matter without resorting to legal proceedings; exchange of correspondence between the parties; the need to obtain valuations; indications by two of the three executors that the matter ought to be resolved in favour of the applicant; an impasse in relation to which party had the responsibility of bringing the application or seeking directions from the court; a direction by the Probate Registry not to serve the summons and attendant delays in the service of documents and listing of the matter; and the applicant’s solicitor’s lack of knowledge as to the limitation period. Mr Stevens submits that the executors have been on notice about the applicant’s claim since at least May of 2012. He submits that the applicant’s solicitor, Mr Starke, has taken responsibility for errors and omissions by him and his staff. He contends that there has been no prejudice to the executors or residual beneficiaries given the applicant continues to pay commercial rent to the estate. He says the only opposition is from the interested parties who do not have an immediate interest in the outcome of the application before this Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

While I understand the force of the submission made by Mr Riggall that granting the application may be of limited utility given that it will not achieve a complete resolution of the claims of all parties, the application before the court is an application for rectification and I am satisfied, to the extent that I must be, that it is appropriate to grant that application. The question of whether Mr Michelon’s prior equity is an impediment to the exercise of the applicant’s option to purchase the King William Street property was raised in the course of submissions but I was not asked to decide that matter. In my view, it is not open to me to conclude that rectification is futile on the basis it would not resolve the difficulty presented by the prior equity of Mr Michelon. Given the clear and convincing proof of the testamentary intention of the deceased that the applicant should have an option to purchase the King William Street property at valuation, I consider the proper course is to rectify the will to reflect the deceased’s actual testamentary intentions and the question of whether the prior equity is an obstacle to the exercise by the applicant of his option to purchase the King William Street property can be determined if he chooses to exercise the option. I also consider that it is appropriate, as submitted by Mr Stevens, to introduce commercial certainty into the deceased’s will. Conclusions The time for the making of this application for rectification is extended to 8 October 2014. The deceased’s will is rectified substantially in the manner set out in annexure DAS-1 to the affidavit of Mr Starke sworn on 4 September 2015,[109] by substituting the following clauses for the existing clause 8:[109] Exhibit P5, Annexure DAS-1.8A.I DIRECT that my company International Sound Pty Ltd (ACN 60 053 790 515) (“the company”) is to be wound up by my executors. I DIRECT THAT:8A.1 The costs of winding up International Sound Pty Ltd shall be paid by my estate. 8A.2 The proceeds therefrom be held on trust as part of the residue of my estate and for the trusts described in clause 9 below.8.Subject to the conditions in this clause I DIRECT my executors to sell my property at 304A King William Street Adelaide in the said state being the whole of the land described Certificate of Title Volume 5579 Folio 383 (my King William Street property). 8.1 grant to BENJAMIN MARKS BAKER (Baker) the first right to purchase my King William Street property at the current market value at the time of the sale as determined by a licensed valuer appointed by the President of The Australian Property Institute, South Australia Division less any amount paid by Baker before or after the date of my death for the improvement or maintenance of my King William Street property.8.2 I direct my executors to make application to the President of The Australian Property Institute, South Australia Division for the appointment of a licensed valuer within two months.8.3 I direct my Executors to serve a copy of the valuation on Baker within 10 business days of its receipt by them together with a contract for the sale and purchase of my King William Street property. The terms and conditions of sale shall be those contained in the Law Society of South Australia Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Land. Baker may at any time within 20 business days of the date of service of the valuation give written notice to my Executors that exercise the right to purchase my King William Street property. Settlement and payment of the purchase price shall occur within 30 days of the date that Baker exercise the right to buy my King William Street property.8.4 As to the proceeds of sale of my King William Street property I direct my Executors:8.4.1 To pay the costs associated with the sale of my King William Street property.8.4.2To discharge and pay the principal and any accrued or unpaid interest due pursuant to Memorandum of Mortgage No 9236582 in the name FRANK MICHELON and LISA ANN MICHELON both of 35 Marion Street Unley in the State of South Australia. 8.4.3 To pay fifty percentum (50%) of the net proceeds of sale of my King William Street property (calculated as the valuation price less the amounts in clause 8.1) to the said FRANK MICHELON and LISA ANN MICHELON.8.4.4 To hold the balance of the net proceeds of sale of my King William Street property on trust as part of the residue of my estate and for the trusts described in clause 9 below.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Lempens also gave evidence about the exchange of correspondence between the parties and his hope that the matter would be resolved without the need for legal proceedings. Further, he gave evidence about the deadlock that developed as to how the matter ought to proceed and who was responsible for obtaining directions from the court. This evidence was uncontentious and I have no difficulty in accepting it. Extension of time: consideration I accept Mr Starke’s evidence that he did not become aware of the existence of the limitation period until an opinion of counsel was sought, which was subsequently provided on 8 June 2014. Mr Ower concedes that this is a relevant consideration but contends that, even if I am minded to extend time based upon Mr Starke’s ignorance of the limitation period, the subsequent conduct of the matter ought to weigh against the granting of an extension of time given the lack of urgency with which the matter has been commenced and prosecuted. He says that upon being alerted to the expiration of the limitation period Mr Starke ought to have “... moved heaven and earth ...”[27] to have the matter brought before the court. Mr Ower complains that, instead, the evidence demonstrates that the matter has been conducted with a total and utter lack of urgency and diligence. I consider that this submission has some force. [27] T 238.2 - 238.3. I acknowledge the extenuating circumstances that Mr Stevens submits existed at various times prior to the hearing of this matter. However, I find that the criticisms made of Mr Starke’s conduct of this matter on behalf of the applicant are, to a significant extent, justified. Notwithstanding this, I am not prepared, in the circumstances of this case, to visit what appears to be the fault of the applicant’s solicitors upon the applicant. I accept the applicant’s evidence to the effect that he was frustrated by the delays in commencing and progressing his claim, and I am satisfied he was reasonably and properly diligent in pressing Mr Starke in relation to the matter, but ultimately he was reliant on his solicitor. I am reinforced in my view that it is just and proper to extend time in the circumstances of this case because there has been no disposition of the King William Street property. The rationale for a limitation period of six months for the bringing of rectification claims lies, in part, in the risk that estates will have been administered and distributed. The Parliament has fixed the limitation period bearing in mind the difficulties associated with unwinding the distribution of an estate and the obvious hardship caused by subsequently recovering from beneficiaries their share of an estate distributed pursuant to an unrectified will. The evidence in this case is that the estate has been substantially administered but not fully distributed and distribution will not occur for a considerable period of time due to the age of two of the deceased’s grandchildren who, pursuant to the will, are to share the residue of the deceased’s estate upon their attaining thirty years of age.[28] Like Chittock v Stevens,[29] this is not a case where, if the application for rectification is successful, the court will have to unscramble the distribution of assets effected in accordance with the unrectified will. As the court observed in Chittock this removes what was characterised in In re Salmon[30] as a most important factor weighing against an extension of time.[31] [28] T 265.[29] [2000] WTLR 643 at 651-652.[30] [1981] Ch 167.[31] [2000] WTLR 643 at 651-652.