Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 2087

Appeal from: Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1766
File number: NSD 1437 of 2017
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 21 December 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (Subclass 801) visa – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the visa – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria in cll 801.221 and 801.226 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met PIC 4020 of Schedule 4 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – where proceedings commenced in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal complied with its statutory requirements under s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal provided clear particulars of the information to the applicant – where primary judge held that Administrative Appeals Tribunal complied with its statutory requirements under s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where primary judge held that Administrative Appeals Tribunal was not required to provide the whole of the content of the communication or the particulars of the whole document – no jurisdictional error found – application dismissed

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in concluding that Administrative Appeals Tribunal had provided clear particulars of any information as required by s 359AA or s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether primary judge erred in concluding that Administrative Appeals Tribunal had not impermissibly imposed a burden and standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt on the appellant in respect of the relevant visa criterion – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal misunderstood its statutory function – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal was legally unreasonable – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal was found to have complied with s 359AA or s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in providing clear particulars of all the information which it considered at the time would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review – where primary judge was correct to find that Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not contravene s 359AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not impose a burden and standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt on the appellant – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5F, 57, 65, 359AA, 359A, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15A, cll 801.221 and 801.226 of Sch 2, PIC 4020 and PIC 4021 of Sch 4

Cases cited:

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280

Khan v Minister for Immigration and…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 2087
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, Mr Ibrahim, sought judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse his application for a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (Subclass 801) visa. The key issues before the court were whether the AAT had complied with its statutory obligations under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether it had correctly applied the relevant legal principles in reaching its decision. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the AAT had provided Mr Ibrahim with clear particulars of the information that it considered at the time would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review, and whether the AAT had imposed an impermissible burden and standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt on Mr Ibrahim.

The court found that the AAT had complied with its statutory requirements under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in providing Mr Ibrahim with clear particulars of all the information which it considered at the time would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. The court noted that the purpose of the disclosure required by s 359AA of the Act is to enable the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, and that the particulars of the information provided must be sufficient to enable the applicant to meaningfully respond or comment. The court held that there was no basis to conclude or infer that the AAT considered that all of the information in the emails sent by Ms El-Etri to the Department would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review, and that the AAT was accordingly not required to provide all of the information in the emails to Mr Ibrahim.

The court also found that the AAT had not imposed a burden and standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt on Mr Ibrahim in respect of the relevant visa criterion. The court held that the references to "conclusive evidence" in the AAT's reasons did not indicate that the AAT misunderstood its statutory function or misconstrued its jurisdiction, and that the AAT approached its task on the orthodox basis that it was required to consider and assess the evidence and material before it and thereby establish the relevant facts.

The appeal was dismissed, and Mr Ibrahim was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Seventh, it is readily apparent that the purpose of the disclosure required by s 359AA is to enable the applicant to “comment on or respond to the information”: s 359AA(1)(b)(ii), (iii) and (iv). It must follow that the particulars of the information that are provided must be sufficient to enable the applicant to “meaningfully” respond or comment: SZNKO at [23], [27]. Application of the principles to the facts and circumstances of the case The starting point for the consideration of what information the Tribunal would consider to be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review is the relevant criteria for the grant of the Partner Visa in Mr Ibrahim’s case. The relevant criteria were the criteria in cll 801.221 and 801.226 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations: specifically, whether Mr Ibrahim was the spouse of his sponsor, Ms El-Etri, and whether he had provided false or misleading information to the Department or the Tribunal in relation to that question. Section 5F of the Act provides that a person is the spouse of another person if the two persons are in a “married relationship” and that persons are in a married relationship if, amongst other things, they have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others, the relationship between them is genuine and continuing, and they live together or do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis. It follows that any information contained in the two emails sent to the Department by Ms El-Etri would constitute information that would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the Partner Visa to Mr Ibrahim if the Tribunal considered that the information would in some way amount to a rejection, denial or undermining of Mr Ibrahim’s claim that he was Ms El-Etri’s spouse, and that the information which he had provided to the Department to that effect was not in any way false or misleading. There could be no doubt that the emails contained such information. The question is, however, whether the Tribunal gave Mr Ibrahim clear particulars of all the information that fell into that category. Is there any evidence or necessary inference that during the review the Tribunal considered that any information which was not included in the particulars it gave to Mr Ibrahim at the hearing would have been a reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the refusal to grant the visa to Mr Ibrahim? The first point to note is that there is no basis to conclude or infer that the Tribunal considered that all of the information in the two emails was information which would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. The Tribunal was accordingly not required to provide all of the information in the emails to Mr Ibrahim. Mr Ibrahim’s submission to the contrary is rejected. The evidence concerning what occurred during the hearing, and the inferences able to be drawn from the Tribunal’s reasons, suggest that the Tribunal considered that some of the information in the two emails would be the reason, or part of the reason, for finding that Mr Ibrahim did not satisfy the relevant visa criteria, and that the decision under review should therefore be affirmed. The information that met that description was, in substance or in summary, information that: Ms El-Etri wanted to withdraw her sponsorship of Mr Ibrahim; Ms El-Etri said that her marriage to Mr Ibrahim was not real or was “fake”; Ms El-Etri never lived with Mr Ibrahim at the same address; Ms El-Etri remained in a relationship with her ex-husband with whom she had children; Mr Ibrahim remained in a relationship with his ex-wife in Egypt; Ms El-Etri married Mr Ibrahim in return for a payment of money; Ms El-Etri was no longer in Australia; Mr Ibrahim contacted Ms El-Etri in June or July 2015, after the delegate had written to Mr Ibrahim after the first email, and told Ms El-Etri to lie to the Department about why she sent the first email; Ms El-Etri completed documents that Mr Ibrahim wanted her to complete because of threats made by Mr Ibrahim; and that while Mr Ibrahim had put Ms El-Etri’s name on some bank accounts and “other things”, they had never lived together in Australia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In all the circumstances, there was and is no basis for concluding that the Tribunal did not comply with s 359AA or s 359A of the Act. Mr Ibrahim was given clear particulars of all the information which the Tribunal considered at the time would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. Mr Ibrahim has not demonstrated to the contrary. The primary judge was correct to find that the Tribunal did not contravene s 359AA, albeit that his Honour’s reasons for so finding are far from clear or cogent. It follows that ground 1 of the appeal has no merit and is rejected.GROUND 2 – THE REFERENCES TO “CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE” In stating that it was not satisfied that there was “conclusive evidence” that Mr Ibrahim and Ms El-Etri had established a household together, or that they were in an exclusive relationship with each other, the Tribunal could perhaps be accused of using infelicitous language. The Tribunal could no doubt have expressed its conclusions in that regard in less controversial terms. On balance, however, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons does not support the contention that the Tribunal misunderstood its statutory function and effectively required Mr Ibrahim to prove that he and Ms El-Etri were spouses beyond reasonable doubt. Had the Tribunal in fact approached its review jurisdiction on the basis that Mr Ibrahim had the burden or onus of proving that Ms El-Etri was his spouse, or that he had not provided any false and misleading information, it would have been open to conclude that the Tribunal misconstrued its jurisdiction. That is because, as a general proposition, there is no onus or burden of proof in administrative decision-making, including in the Tribunal: Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 220 at [14] (per Logan J), [61]-[71] (per Flick and Rangiah JJ) and the cases there cited. There is also no express statutory provision in the Act or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) which imposes any onus or burden of proof on review applicant. Nor is there any basis upon which to imply that the statutory scheme imposed any such onus or burden on the review applicant. When the Tribunal’s reasons are considered as a whole, and its isolated references to “conclusive evidence” are considered in context, it is tolerably clear that the Tribunal did not approach the review on the basis that Mr Ibrahim had any onus or burden of proof. There are numerous other references in the Tribunal’s reasons which suggest that it approached its task on the orthodox basis that it was required to consider and assess the evidence and material before it and thereby establish the relevant facts. For example, the Tribunal considered the evidence relating to the financial aspects of the alleged relationship and found that it was not satisfied that the circumstances indicated that Mr Ibrahim and Ms El-Etri were in a genuine and continuing relationship (Reasons at [71]). Similarly, the Tribunal reasoned that the evidence concerning the social aspects of the relationship did not support a finding that Mr Ibrahim and Ms El-Etri were in an exclusive relationship which was genuine and continuing (Reasons at [84]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Ibrahim in due course provided that further evidence under cover of a letter dated 11 October 2016 (AB 330). The further documentary evidence included: a letter from someone who appeared to be a neighbour of the Belfield address that Mr Ibrahim said he lived at with Ms El-Etri; more photographs; bank statements evidencing a joint bank account in the names of Mr Ibrahim and Ms El-Etri; and various other documents (AB 331-414). The Tribunal affirms the decision to refuse to grant the Partner Visa to Mr Ibrahim The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant Mr Ibrahim the Partner Visa. In its Statement of Decision and Reasons, the Tribunal gave two main reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision: first, it was not satisfied that, at the time of the decision, Mr Ibrahim and Ms El-Etri were or are in a spousal relationship and, therefore, Mr Ibrahim did not meet the criterion in cl 801.221(2)(c) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations; and second, Mr Ibrahim had given information to the Department and the Tribunal in relation to his relationship with Ms El-Etri which was false and misleading. Mr Ibrahim accordingly did not meet PIC 4020. The Tribunal gave relatively detailed reasons explaining how it had arrived at those two findings. The Tribunal first explained that it did not find Mr Ibrahim to be a credible witness: Reasons at [49]. Important, in that regard, was that the Tribunal found that Mr Ibrahim’s claim that he had suffered domestic violence from Ms El-Etri in 2015 was inconsistent with the fact that Ms El-Etri departed from Australia in October 2014 and has not returned: Reasons at [50]. The Tribunal noted that there was no suggestion that the domestic violence consisted of abuse or threats made to Mr Ibrahim over the telephone or by other electronic means. The Tribunal also relied on what it considered to be an inconsistency between Mr Ibrahim’s evidence concerning Ms El-Etri’s alleged dependency on a particular type of prescription drug and a reference in the report of the social worker to a different type of drug. The Tribunal was apparently unimpressed with Mr Ibrahim’s explanation of that inconsistency: Reasons at [51]. The Tribunal then turned its attention to what was said to be the s 359AA disclosure of information and Mr Ibrahim’s response to it. The Tribunal found that Mr Ibrahim’s response did not “adequately explain why the Tribunal should disregard information regarding the contrived nature of the parties’ relationship” that was provided by the first and second emails: Reasons at [55]. The Tribunal noted, in that context, that all of the information that had been supplied to the Department in support of Mr Ibrahim’s visa application had been supplied by him or upon his behalf: Reasons at [56]. It also noted that Ms El-Etri had retracted her previous statements: Reasons at [57]. In relation to the information in the second email to the effect that Mr Ibrahim had threatened Ms El-Etri in June or July 2015, the Tribunal noted that Mr Ibrahim’s response was that he could not have threatened Ms El-Etri at that time because she was overseas. The Tribunal observed, however, that it could “see no reason why threats could not have potentially been made” to Ms El-Etri through “electronic mediums”: Reasons at [58].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the obligations of the AAT under s 359AA and s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to ensure that the applicant was provided with sufficient information to respond or comment on the reasons for the decision under review. It was determined that the AAT provided Mr Ibrahim with clear particulars of the information it considered at the time would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. The court found that the AAT did not require Mr Ibrahim to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he met the criteria for the visa. The court further concluded that the AAT did not misunderstand its statutory function or act in a legally unreasonable manner in making its decision. The court held that the primary judge was correct in finding that the AAT did not contravene s 359AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appeal was dismissed, and Mr Ibrahim was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.