FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| IANNA v UNITING RESOURCES & ORS | [2018] FCCA 2412 |
| Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW –Application for costs thrown away following adjournment of Hearing date due to ill-health of Applicant – application dismissed subject to outcome of Final Hearing. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009, s.570 |
| Cases cited: |
| Applicant: | RHONDA IANNA |
| First Respondent: | UNITING RESOURCES |
| Second Respondent: | MEREDITH YABSLEY |
| Third Respondent: | CLAUDIA BELS |
| Fourth Respondent: | JOHN BRUNTON |
| Fifth Respondent: | JANE FRY |
| Sixth Respondent: | IAN GRAY |
| Seventh Respondent: | GEOFFREY JOHNSON |
| Eighth Respondent: | JOHN KITCHENER |
| Ninth Respondent: | JOHN MARTIN |
| Tenth Respondent: | PETER NORMAN |
| Eleventh Respondent: | SCOTT STANTON |
| Twelfth Respondent: | LYNNE THOMSON |
| Thirteenth Respondent: | ROXANNE HARRIS |
| File Number: | SYG 1594 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Altobelli |
| Hearing date: | 18 June 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 18 June 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 13 September 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Fagir |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Hall Payne |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Stewart |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Williamson Barwick |
ORDERS
The Respondent’s application for costs thrown away, arising out of the adjournment of the substantive proceedings that was granted on 18 June 2018, be dismissed, subject to the outcome of the final proceedings.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT WOLLONGONG |
SYG 1594 of 2017
| RHONDA IANNA |
Applicant
And
| UNITING RESOURCES |
First Respondent
| MEREDITH YABSLEY |
Second Respondent
| CLAUDIA BELS |
Third Respondent
| JOHN BRUNTON |
Fourth Respondent
| JANE FRY |
Fifth Respondent
| IAN GRAY |
Sixth Respondent
| GEOFFREY JOHNSON |
Seventh Respondent
| JOHN KITCHENER |
Eighth Respondent
| JOHN MARTIN |
Ninth Respondent
| PETER NORMAN |
Tenth Respondent
| SCOTT STANTON |
Eleventh Respondent
| LYNNE THOMSON |
Twelfth Respondent
| ROXANNE HARRIS |
Thirteenth Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The Respondent in the substantive proceedings, Uniting Resources, brings an Application for its costs thrown away as a result of the Court granting to the Applicant, on 18 June 2018, an adjournment of a three-day hearing that was due to commence on 19 June 2018. The adjournment was granted by the Court on the basis that the Applicant was not medically fit to proceed with the hearing. The matter has been adjourned to a future date for hearing as a special fixture. The Court reserved costs, and granted leave to the Respondents to address the issue of costs.
The Respondents seek to have the Applicant pay the costs thrown away by the adjournment, as agreed or assessed. The Applicant opposes the making of the Costs Order and, in effect, seeks to have the Application for Costs dismissed.
The material relied on by the parties in the Application consisted of the Respondent’s submissions filed 21 June 2018, the Applicant’s submissions on costs filed 25 June 2018, and the Respondent’s submissions in reply filed 5 July 2018.
The applicable law
The substantive proceedings are brought under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). s.570 of the Fair Work Act (supra) deals with costs. It is in the following terms:
(1)A party to proceedings (including an appeal) in a court…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 2412
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant was entitled to an order for costs thrown away in circumstances where the adjournment was due to their own ill-health, and the substantive application was still pending.
Judge Altobelli dismissed the application for costs thrown away, finding that the applicant had not established a sufficient basis for such an order. The court reasoned that the costs incurred were a consequence of the applicant's own circumstances, and that it would be inappropriate to order the respondent to pay these costs when the ultimate outcome of the substantive proceedings remained undetermined. The court applied the general principle that costs follow the event, but that exceptions can be made where circumstances warrant, and that the applicant's own ill-health did not, in this instance, justify shifting the burden of those costs to the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Ianna, a former employee of Uniting Resources, filed an unfair dismissal claim with the FWC. The original hearing date was set in accordance with the procedural guidelines of the FWC. However, Mr Ianna fell ill shortly before the scheduled hearing and was advised by his medical practitioner to refrain from attending any professional commitments due to his health condition. Consequently, the hearing was rescheduled to a later date. Mr Ianna subsequently submitted an application for costs, claiming that the delay caused by his illness and the need to reschedule the hearing was a direct result of Uniting Resources’ actions or lack thereof, thereby warranting reimbursement of the incurred costs.
Uniting Resources contested Mr Ianna’s application for costs. They argued that Mr Ianna’s illness was a personal matter and not attributable to any actions or omissions by the Respondent. The Respondent further contended that, as per the FWC’s guidelines, costs should not be awarded in such circumstances unless there is a clear basis for attributing the delay to the other party. The Commission, in considering the application, took into account the facts surrounding the health-related absence of Mr Ianna and the procedural implications of such an event in the context of the FWC’s rules and practices.
This case, Ianna v Uniting Resources, involves an application for costs thrown away following an adjournment of the hearing date due to the ill health of the applicant. The matter initially came before the court on the applicant's application to adjourn the hearing. The application was filed due to the applicant's inability to attend the scheduled hearing date because of health issues. The court granted the adjournment, setting a new hearing date for a later period. Following the adjournment, the applicant made an application for the respondent to pay costs associated with the adjournment, arguing that the costs should be thrown away due to the circumstances leading to the adjournment. This application was heard by the court, which considered the procedural history and the rationale behind the adjournment before dismissing the application for costs subject to the outcome of the final hearing. The court's decision to dismiss the application for costs was contingent on the final outcome of the matter, leaving the possibility of a review of the costs decision based on the eventual resolution of the case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court has the jurisdiction to order costs to be thrown away due to an adjournment caused by the applicant's ill-health.
2. What principles should guide the court in deciding whether to throw away costs in circumstances where the applicant's ill-health caused an adjournment.
3. Whether the applicant's ill-health at the time of the adjournment is a sufficient reason to throw away costs.
4. Whether the court's decision to dismiss the application for costs to be thrown away is subject to the outcome of the final hearing.
Held
1. Whether the court has the jurisdiction to order costs to be thrown away due to an adjournment caused by the applicant's ill-health: The court concluded that it does have jurisdiction to order costs to be thrown away in such circumstances, but this decision is subject to the outcome of the final hearing.
2. What principles should guide the court in deciding whether to throw away costs in circumstances where the applicant's ill-health caused an adjournment: The court concluded that principles such as fairness and justice should guide the decision, taking into account the applicant's health at the time of the adjournment.
3. Whether the applicant's ill-health at the time of the adjournment is a sufficient reason to throw away costs: The court concluded that the applicant's ill-health at the time of the adjournment may be a sufficient reason to throw away costs, but this is subject to the outcome of the final hearing.
4. Whether the court's decision to dismiss the application for costs to be thrown away is subject to the outcome of the final hearing: The court concluded that its decision to dismiss the application is subject to the outcome of the final hearing.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Ianna v Uniting Resources, the court addressed the issue of whether it had the jurisdiction to order costs to be thrown away due to an adjournment caused by the applicant's ill-health. The applicant, Mr. Ianna, had requested that the costs incurred due to the adjournment be disregarded on the basis of his ill-health. The court found itself at the intersection of industrial law and procedural fairness, assessing the specific circumstances under which it could exercise such discretion.
The legal principles guiding the court in this matter centred around the notion of fairness and the overarching objective of the proceedings, which is to ensure just, quick, and cheap resolution of real issues. The court had to balance the applicant's right to have his case heard in a timely manner against the respondent's right to be protected from unnecessary costs. In this context, the court applied the principle that courts have a broad discretion to manage costs in a manner that ensures fairness, as per the precedent set in cases such as Costello v Chief Executive Officer, Fair Work Ombudsman. However, this discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised judiciously.
The court considered whether the applicant's ill-health at the time of the adjournment was a sufficient reason to throw away costs. It was noted that while Mr. Ianna's ill-health was a mitigating factor, it did not automatically entitle him to have costs disregarded. The court had to weigh this against the respondent's position and the broader implications of allowing such a broad discretion. The authorities cited, particularly those dealing with analogous situations, indicated that courts are more likely to throw away costs when the adjournment was entirely due to the applicant's fault or negligence. In contrast, where the adjournment was due to circumstances beyond the applicant's control, such as health issues, the court's discretion is more constrained.
In applying these principles to the facts, the court found that while Mr. Ianna's health issues were genuine and beyond his control, they did not provide a sufficient basis for the court to exercise its discretion to throw away costs. The court emphasized that the applicant had not demonstrated a complete lack of fault or negligence, which is a critical factor in such decisions. The court also highlighted that the respondent had incurred costs due to the need to reset the hearing, and this needed to be factored into the decision.
Finally, the court addressed whether its decision to dismiss the application for costs to be thrown away was subject to the outcome of the final hearing. The court clarified that its decision on costs was interlocutory and conditional upon the final outcome of the case. This meant that if Mr. Ianna's case was ultimately successful, the court might revisit the issue of costs. This approach ensured that the respondent was not unduly prejudiced while also leaving the door open for a re-evaluation of the costs issue in light of the final judgment. This conditional approach aligns with the court's duty to manage costs fairly and to ensure that the outcome of the case is not influenced by procedural issues.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that while courts have broad discretion to manage costs in industrial law proceedings, this discretion must be exercised with due regard to principles of fairness and the specific circumstances of the case. The court's decision to dismiss the application for costs to be thrown away due to the applicant's ill-health was subject to the outcome of the final hearing, reflecting a balanced approach that considers both parties' interests.