HZK v Director of Public Prosecutions

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CHILDRENS COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

HZK v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] QChC 11

PARTIES:

HZK

(applicant)

v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

CCJ 174/25

DIVISION:

Childrens Court, Queensland

PROCEEDING:

Sentence review application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Redcliffe Childrens Court

DELIVERED ON:

19 September 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10 September 2025

JUDGES:

Dearden DCJ

ORDER:

1.        Application granted.

2.        Set aside the sentence of three years probation, with no conviction recorded, imposed on 20 June 2025 at the Redcliffe Childrens Court for the offence of attempted to enter dwelling with intent at night, in company, damages property, and substitute an order that the applicant be sentenced to a period of 12 months probation, with no conviction recorded.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING JUVENILES – OTHER MATTERS – where the applicant was sentenced to three years probation at the Childrens Court at Redcliffe for the charge of attempted to enter dwelling with intent, at night, in company, damages property – where the applicant submitted that the sentence was unlawful – whether the sentencing magistrate fell into error by concluding that an attempted offence, other than those enumerated in s 175A(1), was a significant offence under s 175A of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld)

LEGISLATION:

Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 419, s 535

Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 118, s 122, s 150, s 175A

CASES:

Beckwith v The Queen [1976] 135 CLR 569

CAK v DPP [2022] QChC 31

ERG v Director of Public Prosecutions [2023] QChC 38

R v CDV [2025] QCA 163

R v PPD [2019] QCA 59

R v Webb [1995] 1 Qd R 680

COUNSEL:

R Gill (sol) for the applicant
M Metcalfe (sol) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

Introduction

  1. This is an application for sentence review filed on 16 July 2025 in respect of a sentence of three years probation imposed at the Childrens Court of Redcliffe on 20 June 2025, in respect of the following charge:

Date of Offence

Place of Offence

Offence

6/2/2025

Margate

Attempted to enter dwelling with intent at night in company, damages property (Criminal Code (Qld) s 419(1) & (2) and s 535).

Grounds of review

  1. The applicant was granted leave to file an amended application for sentence review on 10 September 2025, with the following grounds:

    1.   The sentence was unlawful; and/or

    2.   In all circumstances of the matter the sentence was excessive.

    The law

  2. In ERG v Director of Public Prosecutions [2023] QChC 38, [2]-[7], I set out an overview of the law in respect of sentence reviews in the following terms:

    “[2]     A Childrens Court judge may review a sentence order made by a Childrens Court magistrate.[1]

    [3]The review is a re-hearing on the merits,[2] and the Childrens Court judge may have regard to the proceedings before the Childrens Court magistrate and further submissions and evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise.[3] The review…

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Details
Case
[2025] QChC 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of HZK v Director of Public Prosecutions involved the applicant who was sentenced to three years of probation at the Redcliffe Children's Court for the offence of attempted entry into a dwelling with intent to commit an offence, at night, in company, causing damage to property. The applicant challenged the legality of the sentence, arguing that the sentencing magistrate erred by treating the attempted offence, which was not listed under s 175A(1) of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), as a significant offence warranting a sentence under s 175A(2) of the Act.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the sentencing magistrate had fallen into error by concluding that the attempted offence, not specified in s 175A(1), qualified as a significant offence under s 175A of the Youth Justice Act. The court had to determine if the magistrate's interpretation and application of the Act's provisions were correct and whether the sentence imposed was appropriate under the circumstances.

The court found that the magistrate was indeed in error. The court reasoned that unless specifically identified, attempts to commit any of the offences specified in s 175A(1) do not fall under that provision. Consequently, the magistrate incorrectly applied s 175A(2) of the Act, which permits a Children's Court magistrate to impose a probation period of up to three years for significant offences. Given the nature of the offence committed, the court concluded that the magistrate could only impose a maximum sentence of 12 months probation, which would still adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence while providing sufficient supervision. Therefore, the court set aside the original sentence and ordered that the applicant be resentenced to a period of 12 months probation.

The final orders of the court were to grant the application, set aside the original sentence of three years probation, and substitute it with a sentence of 12 months probation, with no conviction recorded.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application granted.

2. Set aside the sentence of three years probation, with no conviction recorded, imposed on 20 June 2025 at the Redcliffe Childrens Court for the offence of attempted to enter dwelling with intent at night, in company, damages property, and substitute an order that the applicant be sentenced to a period of 12 months probation, with no conviction recorded.

Background

Background to the litigation

In R v CDV [2025] QCA 163, Muir J (with whom Bond and Boddice JJA agreed), in a detailed and comprehensive decision, concluded that the Court of Appeal does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of a Childrens Court judge following a sentence review under s 118 of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (“YJA”).[11] During the course of that decision, Her Honour helpfully and comprehensively outlined the nature of a sentence review before this court, in terms which confirm the summary contained in ERG v Director of Public Prosecutions [2023] QChC 38, [2]-[7]. It is useful to reproduce Her Honour’s observations in full, as follows:-[12]“[42] The express legislative purpose for the introduction (and reintroduction) of the sentence review scheme into the Youth Justice Act was to enable an informal, fair, just and prompt resolution of challenges to Childrens Court magistrates’ sentence orders. This purpose is expressly reflected in the text of s 122(3), which provides that “the review of a sentence order must be conducted expeditiously and with as little formality as possible”[43]This legislative context and purpose, which includes that a sentence review and a s 222 appeal are alternate options, gives shape to the requirement that a sentence review be conducted “by way of rehearing on the merits”.[13] As already foreshadowed, the nature of a sentence review forms part of the legislative framework by which any right of appeal to this court from such a review is to be considered. For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the nature of a review by way of rehearing on the merits does not require any error in the sentencing discretion below to be demonstrated. Rather, it requires a Childrens Court judge to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh by way of a rehearing de novo.[44]First, whilst it is reasonable to infer that as a matter of practice, the sentence review is conducted with regard to the record of the proceeding below, the word “may” in s 122(2) contemplates that a review might be conducted without such recourse. This flexibility is consistent with the overarching objectives of the Youth Justice Act and Parliament’s expressed intention for an efficient and informal resolution, as opposed to the formal s 222 Justices Act appeal process.[45]Second, by s 122(2)(b), the Childrens Court judge may have regard to “any further submissions and evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise”. This differs from the orthodox constraint imposed in an “ordinary” sentence appeal, which requires leave to adduce further evidence.[14] Relevantly, the discretion to consider further evidence under s 122(2)(b) is wide and includes oral evidence.[15] The power of the review court to review additional or substituted evidence or information was considered to be a decisive one (together with the power to make any order it considered appropriate) in Director of Public Prosecutions v Filippa [2005] 1 Qd R 587. In that case, Douglas J determined that a review by a Supreme Court judge of a magistrate’s decision under s 19B of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld) was a rehearing de novo.[16][46]Third, the wide powers of the Childrens Court in a sentence review under s 123 are consistent with the Childrens Court judge not being constrained by the need to identify error. For example, the judge is obliged to give a decision on the current evidence,[17] the judge must decide the matter in the same way as the Childrens Court magistrate might have done by exercising the sentencing discretion afresh,[18] and the judge’s powers are wide, constrained only by what orders would be permitted in the jurisdiction of the magistrate.[19][47]Lastly, the s 222(2)(c) Justices Act appeal avenue requires an error to be shown for there to be intervention. It is therefore unlikely that Parliament intended sentence reviews to also require the identification of an error before a Childrens Court judge could intervene.”[11]R v CDV [2025] QCA 163, [95].[12]R v CDV [2025] QCA 163, [42] – [47].[13]See YJA s122(1).[14]See, eg, Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 223.[15]See also Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 at 204 [17] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ); Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson [No 2] (1990) 170 CLR 267 at 272 (Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).[16]Director of Public Prosecutions v Filippa [2005] 1 Qd R 587 at 590 [15] (Douglas J).[17]See also Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 at 204 [17] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ); Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson [No 2] (1990) 170 CLR 267 at 272 (Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).[18]See also Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616 at 631 (Murphy J).[19]See YJA s 123(2).Facts of the offence

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Queensland Court of Appeal in Turner v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) 265 A Crim R 388, [47] relevantly identified that if there was ambiguity in construing a particular provision of the Bail Act, that doubt should be resolved in favour of the appellant. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in construing YJA s.175A and what constitutes a significant offence, that ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the defendant. In short, unless specifically identified, attempts to commit any of the offences specified in s.175A(1) are not covered by that provision.Conclusion I conclude therefore that the learned acting magistrate (with the concurrence, it should be noted, of both the prosecutor and the applicant’s legal representative) was in error in dealing with the applicant in respect of this offence as if it was subject to the provisions of YJA s.175A(1), and accordingly, the relevant provision of YJA s.175A(2), which empowered a Childrens Court magistrate to impose a period of probation for a period not longer than three years, did not apply to the applicant in this case, in respect of the offence of attempted to enter dwelling with intent, at night, in company, damages property. It follows that the learned acting magistrate fell into error, and the sentence should be reviewed. The learned acting magistrate could only sentence the applicant to a maximum period of 12 months probation for the attempt offence. In the context of the applicant’s serious offending, as the applicant’s counsel readily concedes, a 12-month probation order would adequately reflect the offending, whilst still providing a lengthy period of supervision. Accordingly, I conclude that the order for three years probation should be set aside and the applicant should be resentenced to a period of 12 months probation. Orders I order as follows:1. Application granted.2. Set aside the sentence of three years probation, with no conviction recorded, imposed on 20 June 2025 at the Redcliffe Childrens Court for the offence of attempted to enter dwelling with intent at night, in company, damages property, and substitute an order that the applicant be sentenced to a period of 12 months probation, with no conviction recorded.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established