Background
Background to the litigation
In relation to the issue of loyalty, the Applicant said:21. As stated in the opening remarks, Zionism is an essential theme within Judaism. Judaism mandates the loyalty of a Jew to his people and to the Land of Israel. ASIO would be well aware that most Australian Jews do not volunteer to serve in the ADF, the vast majority of Jews in Australia, if they do serve in any national army, serve in the IDF. I elected to serve in the ADF as I felt a strong sense of belonging to Australia and I wanted to give back to the country and demonstrate the importance of serving here in Australia as opposed to the IDF. It seems that events have now turned on me.22. The Australian Government is aware that every Jew harbours a varying degree of loyalty to Israel. Some have a higher and more overt levels of loyalty than others. This is the latent risk that the Australian Government must naturally accept when employing Jews. The revocation of my Security Clearance and subsequent removal of myself from the ADF, notwithstanding 19 years of service, on the grounds that I harbour loyalty to Israel, would be viewed within the Jewish World with apprehension. This further puts into question the standard of multiculturalism tolerated within the ADF.23. The 19 years of service I rendered to the ADF are clear indications of strong loyalty that I have shown for Australia. Throughout the interview process, I stated many times that I remained loyal to the ADF. Furthermore, my resignation from the CSG in March 2023 was an indication that I chose to prioritise the ADF over the CSG. Thus, the loyalty I have displayed to Australia must serve to moderate the stated risk that is been projected.[34][34] Ibid, [21]-[23] The Facts as Found by the Tribunal There is no significant dispute between the parties as to the background facts which are based on what the applicant told ASIO in his interviews. The real dispute is whether those facts support the assessments made in the ASA. The Applicant is a full-time serving member of the Australian Army Reserve since 2013, having first joined the Australian Defence Force in 2004. He obtained an NV1 security clearance in 2008 which was increased to the NV2 level in 2010. The Applicant joined the Community Security Group (CSG) as a volunteer in 2014 and he resigned in February 2023. The CSG is an organisation that provides security and intelligence services to the Jewish community. The respondent accepts that involvement in the CSG, of itself, would not justify the revocation of a security clearance. When he first joined the CSG in 2014, the applicant participated in a basic security training course conducted over 12 weeks on Tuesday evenings. The Applicant participated in two training courses in Israel in February 2016 and February 2019. The courses in Israel were conducted by Ami-AD, an organisation which the Applicant knew was “a group which are responsible for conducting security training to Jewish groups throughout the world” and was “sourced and financed by the Israeli government.”[35] Many of the trainers were “ex-shabak” which the applicant described as Israel’s “national police”.[36][35] RUD211[36] RUD 73, 211
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
We are satisfied the ASA meets the threshold of a ‘security assessment’ for the purposes of Part IV of the ASIO Act and Part 6 of the ART Act.The Evidence The Tribunal has before it a large amount of documentary materials. The unclassified materials are set out in the ‘Open Court Book’ (OCB) lodged for the Director-General, including four tranches of documents labelled as ‘UD’ and ‘RUD’ documents. The Applicant challenged the veracity, reliability and relevance of some UD documents provided in support of the Director-General’s case. These include media articles[21], including articles to which the Applicant objects[22]. Generally, the UD documents are not in respect of the Applicant. Some contain prejudicial opinions. Other set out relevant historical background[23] and applicable standards and policies[24]. They add context, but little more, to the matters we must consider. To the extent they are relevant at all, these documents must be approached with great caution. They have not been tested in any way and their contents are of dubious veracity. [21] OCB, Tab 10, Items 4-14 and 21-35.[22] Ibid, 75-77, 301, 302 and 310.[23] Ibid, Items 1-3.[24] Ibid, Items 15-20. The Applicant gave written[25] and oral evidence. The evidence includes transcripts of the Applicant’s interviews with ASIO[26] and his responses to ASIO questionnaires[27]. [25] Ibid, Tab 4 and Tab 15.[26] Ibid, Tab 11, Items 8 and 20.[27] Ibid, Items 13 and 32. “Brian Dowell”, a former senior ASIO officer, gave written[28] and oral evidence. Mr Dowell considers that the Applicant is vulnerable to influence or coercion by the Israeli Intelligence Services (IIS) to enable acts of foreign interference or espionage based upon the following factors:[28] Ibid, Tab 12.a. the applicant is likely known to IIS as a result of his participation in training in Israel;b. the applicant's character, including:i. a demonstrated willingness to withhold information from personnel security processes;ii. a level of maturity and judgement that does not meet the standard required of security clearance holders;iii. poor security awareness; andc. the applicant has a high level of loyalty to Israel.[29][29] Ibid, [29] In relation to the Applicant’s character, Mr Dowell said:35. Based on my experience, the material that I have reviewed raises serious security concerns about the applicant's:a.willingness to withhold information;b.susceptibility to influence; andc.maturity and judgement - including security awareness.[30][30] Ibid, [35] In relation to loyalty to Israel, Mr Dowell said:69. Security clearance holders are required to have an overriding loyalty to Australia. Security risks arise when security clearance holders have a strong loyalty to another country that might exceed or conflict with their loyalty to Australia, because this loyalty renders them vulnerable to an approach by a FIS as I describe further below.70. The applicant has a close affinity with and high level of loyalty to Israel, evidenced by his statements in the second SAI: for example, RUD221 SAI 24/03/2022 p 31 Q312. The applicant has also stated that he is loyal to Australia. However, and importantly, the applicant does not appear to be conscious of the extent to which his loyalty to Israel may conflict with his loyalty to Australia. For example, the applicant stated in the SAls:a.... "we kind of view a loyalty to Israel as not being conflicting with Australia": RUD238 SAI 24/03/2022 p 48 Q598;b."I don't think Israel would really be interested in Australia to that extent" and "I think Israel - even if they were to have that information, I mean, Israel and Australia, we're sort of - we're friends - to my knowledge, we're in alliance": RUD244 SAI 24/03/2022 p 54 Q652, Q655; andc."But in terms of purely Australia and Israel, I don't think Israel gives a fuck, really, excuse my language, about what Australia - who's got, who's where and who is doing what. Unless of course it's going to be Australian troops coming to, you know, invade Israel, or on the border to enforce something, then that may be different. But that's certainly not - that's not the reality you know right now, and I can't see that in the future either": RUD244 SAI 24/03/2022 p 54 Q656.71. I take from these statements that the applicant believes the interests of Australia and Israel to be close to perfectly aligned, and that his shared or divided loyalty would be a problem only if an active conflict between Australia and Israel arises. When pressed to provide examples of when Australia and Israel's interests may not align, the applicant also suggested that he was serving in the Australian Army at the moment and therefore his loyalty was "with you, with Australia": RUD85 SAI 21/10/2020 p 32 Q352. The applicant does not appear to appreciate the extent to which Australia and Israel's interests, including in the protection of sensitive information held by the Australian Government, may diverge.…76. I have not formed a definite view about whether or not the applicant's loyalty to Israel "exceeds" his loyalty to Australia. Based on the admissions set out above, I think there is a real risk that it does, or that it at least has the potential to. However, in my opinion, for the purposes of the assessment of the risk posed by the applicant continuing to hold a security clearance, the important point is whether his loyalty to Israel might, in some circumstances, cause him to act in a manner that is contrary to the interests of Australia. In my opinion, it is clear that it might, because:a.the applicant's loyalty to Israel is a source of vulnerability to approach or exploitation to 11S; andb.the applicant's naivety about that possibility is in itself a substantial source of risk.[31][31] Ibid, [69]-[71], [76]
Decision
Reasons for decision
Under s 4 of the ASIO Act, ‘security clearance decision’ means:security clearance decision means a decision to do any of the following:(a) grant a security clearance to a person;(b) deny a security clearance in respect of a person;(c) impose, vary or remove conditions on a security clearance in respect of a person;(d) suspend a security clearance, or revoke a suspension of a security clearance, held by a person;(e) revoke a security clearance held by a person.Note: See also subsection 82L(4) in relation to a decision of an internal reviewer (within the meaning of Part IVA). The power for ASIO to make a ‘security clearance decision’ is set out in s 82C(1)(b) of the ASIO Act. Some decisions of this kind are susceptible to internal review and review by the Tribunal under Division III, Part IVA. The adverse assessment is not a ‘security clearance decision’ which has been subject to internal review under Subdivision A, Div III, Part IVA and it is not an ‘externally reviewable decision’ for the purposes of s 83 of the ASIO Act. This conclusion is consistent with the content of the adverse assessment which recommends but does not decide revocation of the Applicant’s security clearance. The term ‘security clearance suitability assessment’ is given the following meaning in s 4 of the ASIO Act:security clearance suitability assessment means a statement in writing that:(a) is furnished by the Organisation; and(b) is about a person’s suitability to hold a security clearance (with or without conditions imposed in respect of the security clearance) that has been, or may be, granted by another security vetting agency (within the meaning of Part IVA); and(c) expressly states that it is a security clearance suitability assessment for the purposes of paragraph 82C(1)(d). The adverse assessment issued in this case does not meet paragraph (c) of the ‘security clearance suitability assessment’ definition. In its terms, the ASA is made under s 17(1)(c) and s 37(1) of the ASIO Act for the purpose of providing security advice to AGSVA “on whether it would be consistent with the requirements of security for prescribed administrative action to be taken in respect of [HWMW]”. In other words, the adverse assessment was made under ASIO’s function ‘to advise Ministers and authorities of the Commonwealth in respect of matters relating to security, in so far as those matters are relevant to their functions and responsibilities’, which includes (under s 37(1)) ‘the furnishing to Commonwealth agencies of security assessments relevant to their functions and responsibilities’. From this it follows the adverse assessment has the characteristics of a ‘security assessment’ under Part IV of the ASIO Act. Against this, the Applicant asserts ASIO’s adverse assessment is no more than a character assessment which does not amount to a ‘security assessment’. For the reasons which follow, this is incorrect. The term ‘security assessment’ is given the following meaning in s 35(1) of the ASIO Act:security assessment or assessment means a statement in writing furnished by the Organisation to a Commonwealth agency, State or authority of a State expressing any recommendation, opinion or advice on, or otherwise referring to, the question whether it would be consistent with the requirements of security for prescribed administrative action to be taken in respect of a person or the question whether the requirements of security make it necessary or desirable for prescribed administrative action to be taken in respect of a person, and includes any qualification or comment expressed in connection with any such recommendation, opinion or advice, being a qualification or comment that relates or that could relate to that question.