Huntley v Alexander - [1922] HCA 21

ALEXANDER Practice-High Court-Juny-Order for trial with jury-Discretion-Action for

breach of promise of marriage and seduction-High Court Procedure Act 1903- 1921 (No. 7 of 1903-No. 35 of 1921), secs. 12,13-Rules of the High Court 1911, MELBOURNE.

Part I., Order XXXIII., r. 2. May 10, 15.

The fact that an action in the High Court is one for breach of promise of marriage and seduction is not in itself a ground for ordering that the action be tried with a jury.

Gardner v. Jay, (1885) 29 Ch. D., 50, applied. SUMMONS.

An action was brought in the High Court bv Eva Huntley, a resident of Victoria, against William Telford Alexander, a resident

30 CLR 567

of New South Wales, by which the plaintiff claimed £2,000 damages for breach of promise of marriage and seduction. The plaintiff applied by summons for an order that the trial of the action be with a jury of six men. The summons was heard by Isaacs J.

Power, for the plaintiff. The managing clerk of the defendant's solicitors, for the defendant.

Cur. adv. vult

ISAACS J. read the following judgment -This is an application on summons by the plaintiff under Order XXXIII., r. 2, for an order that this action be tried with a jury. By sec. 12 of the High Court Procedure Act it is enacted that 'in every suit in the High Court, unless the Court or a Justice otherwise orders, the trial shall be by a Justice without a jury." That is, the normal course as prescribed by the Commonwealth Parliament is to try every suit by a Justice without a jury; to alter this course an order is required. Sec. 13 enacts that " the High Court or a Justice may, in any suit in which the ends of justice appear to render that mode of inquiry expedient, direct the trial with a jury of the suit or any issue of fact," &. Then by Order XXXIII., r. 2, it is provided that "any party to a suit may within ten days after notice of trial has been given, or within such extended time as the Court or a Justice allows, apply to the Court or a Justice for a trial with a jury of the suit or of any issues of fact, and the Court or Justice may if they think fit direct a trial with a jury of the suit or issues accordingly," &.

This suit is for breach of promise of marriage and seduction. The defendant denies the promise and the seduction. The plaintiff is a resident of Victoria, the defendant a resident of New South Wales, and the writ is issued from the Melbourne Registry. No place of trial is named in the writ. The defendant objects to the application being granted.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff urged that the nature of the action was sufficient, and that the State practice in this respect should be followed. It is the law of the Commonwealth that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Huntley v Alexander

Details

AGLC: Huntley v Alexander [1922] HCA 21
Case: [1922] HCA 21
Decision Date: 15 May 1922

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Huntley v Alexander*, the plaintiff, Eva Huntley, a resident of Victoria, brought an action in the High Court against the defendant, William Telford Alexander, a resident of New South Wales, seeking £2,000 in damages for breach of promise of marriage and seduction. The plaintiff applied by summons for an order that the trial of the action be conducted with a jury of six men.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff had satisfied the onus to justify an order for trial with a jury, given that the High Court Procedure Act 1903-1921 stipulated that trials were to be by a Justice without a jury unless otherwise ordered. The Court also considered the discretion granted by the High Court Rules 1911, Order XXXIII, rule 2, which allowed a party to apply for a jury trial, and section 13 of the Act, which permitted a jury trial if the ends of justice appeared to render it expedient.

Isaacs J. reasoned that the mere fact that the action concerned breach of promise of marriage and seduction was not, in itself, a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory norm of a judge-alone trial. Applying the principles from *Gardner v. Jay*, His Honour held that any judicial discretion to order a jury trial must be exercised according to common sense and justice, considering the differences between jury and judge-alone trials and the specific facts of the case to determine the most just and convenient mode of inquiry. In this instance, no circumstances were presented to demonstrate that the ends of justice rendered a jury trial expedient, nor was there any other compelling reason to exercise discretion in favour of a jury.

Consequently, the summons was dismissed, and the defendant was awarded costs.

Orders