Hudson v Northern Protective Services Pty Ltd

[2025] FedCFamC2G 1653

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Hudson v Northern Protective Services Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 1653

File number:

PEG 360 of 2025

Judgment of:

JUDGE LADHAMS

Date of judgment:

3 October 2025

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an extension of time to file a general protections court application under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – extension of time granted.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 351, 368, 370

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 2.05

Cases cited:

Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298

Division:

Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs:

12

Date of hearing:

3 October 2025

Place:

Perth (via Webex)

Counsel for the Applicant:

Ms Z Kalimeris

Solicitor for the Applicant:

MKI Legal

Counsel for the Respondents:

Ms M Noorzai

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Irwell Law Pty Ltd

ORDERS

PEG 360 of 2025

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

LEANNE HUDSON

Applicant

AND:

NORTHERN PROTECTIVE SERVICES PTY LTD ACN 639 141 549

First Respondent

BRADLEY PATRICK KYNE

Second Respondent

GARY ALEXANDER

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:	3 OCTOBER 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to s 370(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the time within which the applicant may make her application to this Court is extended to 12 August 2025.

2.The matter be referred to mediation before a Registrar of this Court on a date to be fixed by that Registrar.

3.At least 14 days before the mediation referred to in order 2, the applicant is to provide to the respondents, on a without prejudice basis, an indication of the quantum of damages she is claiming and how that quantum is calculated.

4.If the matter does not resolve in the mediation referred to in order 2 above, the matter be listed for a further directions hearing before a Judge of this Court on a date to be fixed.

5.The parties have liberty to apply upon 24 hours’ notice to the Court, to vary the terms of these orders.

6.Costs, if any, be reserved.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore and revised from the transcript)

JUDGE LADHAMS:

1. Ms Hudson seeks an extension of time to make an application in the Fair Work Division of this Court. Ms Hudson claims Northern Protective Services Pty Ltd contravened ss 340 and 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Fair Work Act), and that Mr Kyne and Mr Alexander were involved in the contraventions.

2. On 28 July 2025 the Fair Work Commissioner issued a certificate under s 368 of the Fair Work Act in relation to the dispute between the parties. Pursuant to s 370(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act, Ms Hudson was required to make her application to this Court within 14 days after the certificate was issued, or within such further time as the Court allows. The final day for Ms Hudson to make her application to the Court without needing an extension of time was 11 August 2025.

3. Ms Hudson filed an Application – Fair Work Division and a Form 2 in this Court. Both of these documents are marked as having been lodged on 11 August 2025 at 6:44pm. Pursuant to r 2.05(4) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), which applied at the time the application was filed, a document received by the Court by electronic communication after 4:30pm on a day the Registry is open for business is taken to have been filed on the next day the Registry is open for business.

4. Although it is not entirely clear from the documents before me, I infer that the application as lodged at 6:44pm on 11 August 2025 was not accepted for filing by the Registry as it was received by the Court after 4:30pm and was considered to require an extension of time. Ms Hudson or her lawyers appear to have then amended the Form 2 to seek an extension of time to make the application.

5. I have before me an affidavit of Meagan Hillier filed on behalf of Ms Hudson on

   
   

   12 August 2025. Ms Hillier deposed that she is Ms Hudson’s representative and lodged the application on her behalf at 6:44pm on 11 August 2025. Ms Hillier deposed that Ms Hudson provided instructions in a timely way and the late lodging of the application was entirely due to representative error. Ms Hillier deposed that she believed the filing deadline was just before midnight. She also deposed that there was a delay in lodging due to the eLodgement portal requiring a secondary step to authenticate credit card payments for filing fees. I accept Ms Hillier’s evidence.

6. The respondents indicated in their response that they do not oppose the extension of time sought by Ms Hudson. In circumstances where the extension of time is not opposed, and if an extension of time is required, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant an extension of time, it is not necessary to address in this judgment whether the application was required to be made by 4:30pm or just before midnight.

7. I now explain why I consider it is appropriate to grant the extension of time if one is required. In considering whether to grant an extension of time in Fair Work matters, the Court will often have regard to the principles in Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298. Those principles are:

   (a)Special circumstances are not necessary, but the Court must be positively satisfied that the prescribed period should be extended. The prima facie position is that the time limit should be complied with unless there is an acceptable explanation of the delay which makes it equitable to so extend.

   (b)Action taken by the applicant to contest the termination, other than applying under the Fair Work Act, will be relevant. It will show that the decision to terminate is actively contested. It may favour granting an extension of time.

   (c)Prejudice to the respondent, including prejudice caused by delay, will go against the granting of an extension of time.

   (d)The mere absence of prejudice to the respondents is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.

   (e)The merits of the substantive application may be taken into account in determining whether to grant an extension of time.

   (f)Considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position are relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion.

8. Based on the evidence of Ms Hillier, Ms Hudson took steps in a timely way to make an application to this Court. I accept that the reasons the application was not lodged until after 4:30pm on 11 August 2025 are not attributable to Ms Hudson, and rather relate to the actions of her legal representatives acting on the belief that they had until just before midnight to make the application. I am satisfied that there is an adequate explanation for the very short delay.

9. I do not consider that there is any prejudice to the respondents arising from the very short delay.

10. I have insufficient information before me at present to express any meaningful view on the merits of the substantive application and I treat it as a neutral consideration. I simply observe that the Form 2 articulates recognisable causes of action under the Fair Work Act. There is nothing in the Form 2 that would warrant refusing an extension of time in the circumstances of this case for any reason related to merit.

11. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the extension of time and I therefore make the following order:

    Pursuant to s 370(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the time within which the applicant may make her application to this Court is extended to 12 August 2025.

12. I now propose to hear from the parties about their minutes of proposed orders and the further steps that should be taken in this matter.

I certify that the preceding twelve (12) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams.

Associate:

Dated:       10 October 2025