Hu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 51 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCAFC 63

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – natural justice – where primary judge exercised discretion on basis of a finding of lack of candour of the first appellant – whether appellant put on notice as to possibility of that adverse finding – whether denial of procedural fairness

IMMIGRATION – jurisdictional error – s 128 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) –visa cancelled without prior notice to visa holder – notice under s 129 – whether information in notice under s 129 sufficient to justify cancellation – whether delegate failed to ask whether it was appropriate to cancel the visa under s 129.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 116, s 128, s 129, s 131, s 132, s 133, s 140
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 457.111, cl 457.221, cl 457.223

Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 cited
BP Australia Ltd v Brown (2003) 46 ACSR 677 cited
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 cited
Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 cited
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 cited
Doukmak v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 432 cited
Lobo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 200 ALR 359 cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairsv Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 cited
Wicks v Bennett (1921) 30 CLR 80 cited

M Aronson and B Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd ed, 2000)
Cross on Evidence (6th Aust ed, 2000)

ZHAO LIN HU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 1506 of 2003

HILL, SACKVILLE & MARSHALL JJ
SYDNEY
26 MARCH 2004


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1506 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE COURT

BETWEEN:

ZHAO LIN HU
FIRST APPELLANT

JIAXIN HU
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HILL, SACKVILLE AND MARSHALL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MARCH 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal be dismissed.
  2. The Appellants pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal.
  3. That there be no order as to the costs of the proceedings at first instance.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1506 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE COURT

BETWEEN:

ZHAO LIN HU
FIRST APPELLANT

JIAXIN HU
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HILL, SACKVILLE AND MARSHALL JJ

DATE:

26 MARCH 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HILL and MARSHALL JJ:

  1. We have had the opportunity of reading in draft form the reasons of Sackville J.  His Honour sets out the relevant facts, the background to the appeal and summarises the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Hu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous A... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs involved the appellants, Hu and his wife, challenging the decision to cancel their visas and the subsequent refusal to revoke the cancellation. The primary issue before the court was whether the primary Judge's decision to dismiss the appellants' application on discretionary grounds was correct. Specifically, the court had to determine if the first appellant's failure to notify the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) that he had abandoned his proposal to establish a battery assembly business in Australia, and instead pursued another business venture, constituted a lack of candour warranting the dismissal of their appeal.

The court examined the grounds upon which the visa was granted, which required the first appellant to maintain a genuine and realistic commitment to the proposed business. The primary Judge found that the first appellant's actions demonstrated a lack of candour and disentitling conduct, as he had abandoned the proposed battery assembly business without informing DIMIA. This conduct, according to the primary Judge, was sufficient to deny the appellants' relief on discretionary grounds. Furthermore, the court found that the second appellant's position was dependent on the first appellant's statutory entitlements, and thus she could not be in a better position than him. The court also noted that the proposed acquisition of an established bookshop business could not serve as a basis for the grant of a subclass 457(7) visa.

In conclusion, the court upheld the primary Judge's decision, dismissing the appeal and ordering that the appellants pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The court did not order any costs for the proceedings at first instance. This decision underscores the importance of candour and adherence to the conditions of visa grants, particularly in the context of business visas requiring a genuine and realistic commitment to the proposed business activity.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellants pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3. That there be no order as to the costs of the proceedings at first instance.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary Judge dismissed the application on discretionary grounds. His Honour considered that the first appellant had acted with a “lack of candour” in failing to notify the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“DIMIA”) that he had abandoned his proposal to establish a battery assembly business in Australia. It was on the basis of that proposal that the first appellant had been granted a visa.FACTUAL BACKGROUND On 28 June 2000, the first appellant applied for an “independent executives” visa (“the visa”) within subclass 457 Business (Long Stay), contained in Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (“the Regulations”) made pursuant to the Act. Clause 457.221(1) of the Regulations required the applicant to meet, at the time of the decision, the requirements of any one of a number of sub-clauses. One of these sub-clauses was cl 457.221(7), headed “Independent executives”. It relevantly provided as follows:“The applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if the Minister is satisfied that:(a)the applicant proposes to develop in Australia a business activity that will be:(i)conducted by the applicant as a principal; and(ii)of benefit to Australia; and (b)the applicant has a genuine and realistic commitment:(i)to maintain or obtain an ownership interest in a business in Australia; and(ii)to maintain a direct and continuous involvement in the management of the business; and(iii)to make decisions that affect the overall direction and performance of the business from day to day;…”. In his application for a visa, the first appellant said that he proposed to set up a factory in Sydney, at a named location, to assemble car batteries. He planned to conduct the enterprise through a wholly owned Australian company and to employ four local staff. The application outlined research undertaken by the first appellant relating to the proposed business and gave details as to how the proposed business activity would benefit Australia. The first appellant’s management role in the proposed business activity was said to comprise the following:“Plan to target production.Control finance in the cost of production of batteries.Research into the battery industry in Australia and elsewhere.Maintain quality management of quality of products.Train staff for performance.Supervise performance of employees.Respond to consumers’ needs.Achieve cost effectiveness.Review management of business.Improvement of brand name and brand products.” On 20 September 2000, the first appellant was interviewed by an officer of DIMIA to assess his business proposal. Apparently in consequence of this interview, the first appellant’s agent wrote to the visa section of the Australian Consulate-General in Guangzhou on 15 November 2000. The letter recorded the first appellant’s intention to travel to Australia later in the year “in order to establish the company, [and] select and decide the location of the factory”. The letter stated that the first appellant was “committed to his business activities in Australia”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 140 of the Act is relevant to the position of the second appellant. Section 140(1) provides that if a person’s visa is cancelled under s 128, a visa held by another person because of being a member of the family unit of the visa holder “is also cancelled”. Section 140(4) provides that if a visa is cancelled under s 140(1) because another visa is cancelled and the cancellation is revoked under s 131, the cancellation under s 140(1) is also revoked.THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT The primary Judge noted that then counsel for the appellants had developed “in a careful argument” the contention that the delegates’ cancellation and non-revocation decisions were each infected by jurisdictional error. However, his Honour considered that, in the circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise his discretion to set the decision aside in favour of the appellants, even if it be assumed that they could establish jurisdictional error. His Honour reasoned as follows:“… it is important, in my view, to recall the specific conditions upon which a Subclass 457(7) is granted. In the present context, the visa was granted upon the basis that the first [appellant] “propose[s] to develop a business” in Sydney to assemble car batteries. No possibility of acquiring an established bookshop was ever mentioned or countenanced. Yet by July 2002 the first [appellant] had abandoned his battery business proposal, notwithstanding that this was the whole basis upon which the visa was granted. Significantly, the first [appellant] made no attempt to inform DIMIA of the radical change of his position, or of his infrequent visits to Australia, until, six months later, when he was called in to be interviewed.”In my opinion, this conduct and the lack of candour on the part of the first [appellant] should be characterised as disentitling conduct for present purposes (cf Visy Board Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (Cth) (1983) 51 ALR 705 at 712-713).Since the second [appellant’s] position necessarily depended upon the first [appellant’s] statutory entitlements, she can be in no better position, in discretionary terms, than that of the first [appellant].For completeness, I should add that it has never been suggested that the battery business proposal might be re-activated, and, in my view, the acquisition of the established bookshop business could not qualify as the basis for the grant of a Subclass 457(7) visa.Accordingly, for these discretionary reasons alone, I would refuse the relief sought.”THE SUBMISSIONSTHE APPELLANTS’ CONTENTIONS Counsel for the appellants, Mr Lancaster, submitted that the primary Judge’s exercise of discretion had miscarried. He advanced a number of grounds in support of this contention. However, the principal ground was that the appellants had not been put on notice at the trial that the primary Judge might make a finding that the first appellant had demonstrated a lack of candour by reason of his failure to notify DIMIA that he had abandoned his proposal for a battery assembly business. Accordingly, so Mr Lancaster argued, the appellants had been denied procedural fairness at the trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.