HOWLETT v Police - [2004] SASC 387

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
HOWLETT v POLICE
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Besanko
25 November 2004
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - APPEAL BY CONVICTED PERSONS - APPLICATIONS TO REDUCE SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRIVING OFFENCES - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SENTENCING
Appeal against sentence imposed by a Magistrate - the appellant was convicted of driving an unregistered motor vehicle, driving an uninsured motor vehicle, driving a motor vehicle whilst disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence, failing to truly answer and providing false information on a bail application - the appellant was sentenced to a period of four months imprisonment and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of three years - whether the period of imprisonment and the period of disqualification were manifestly excessive - where the appellant has a history of offences in relation to motor vehicles - appeal allowed but only for the purpose of setting aside the order that the appellant be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for three years - order that the appellant be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 12 months substituted.
Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 42; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 s 9, s 102, s 91, s 74; Road Traffic Act 1961 s 42, s 168; Bail Act 1985 s 22, referred to.
Sadler v Crossman (1988) 47 SASR 331; Peart v Police (2003) 229 LSJS 194; House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; Uznanski v Searle (1981) 26 SASR 388, considered.

HOWLETT v POLICE
[2004] SASC 387
Magistrates Appeal

BESANKO J: This is an appeal against sentence pursuant to s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991. The appellant submits that a sentence imposed on him by a Magistrate on 13^th September 2004 was manifestly excessive.
On 28^th January 2004 the appellant was charged on complaint with five offences. The offences and the maximum penalty in relation to each offence are as follows:
1.On 24^th January 2004 at Pennington in the State of South Australia, the appellant drove a vehicle, namely a motor vehicle, on a road, namely Grand Junction Road, the registration of such motor vehicle not then being in force under the provisions of Part 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (“MVA”), contrary to s 9 of the said Act.
The maximum penalty for this offence is an amount equal to twice the amount of the prescribed registration fee for 12 months that would have been payable for the granting of registration in respect of the vehicle on the day of the offence, or $750 whichever is the greater.
2.On 24^th January 2004 at Pennington in the said State, the appellant drove a vehicle, namely a motor vehicle, on a road, namely Grand Junction Road, without there then being in force, in relation to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading HOWLETT v Police

Details

AGLC: HOWLETT v Police [2004] SASC 387
Case: [2004] SASC 387
Decision Date: 25 November 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, HOWLETT, appealed against the sentence imposed by a Magistrate, following their conviction for multiple driving-related offences. The offences included driving an unregistered motor vehicle, driving an uninsured motor vehicle, driving while disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence, failing to truthfully answer questions, and providing false information on a bail application. The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to a period of four months imprisonment and disqualified them from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of three years. The appellant argued that both the period of imprisonment and the period of disqualification were manifestly excessive, especially considering their history of motor vehicle-related offences. The central legal issues before the court were whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive and whether the period of disqualification was disproportionate given the appellant's past conduct.

The court examined the principles of sentencing and the appellant's history of similar offences, which indicated a pattern of disregard for driving laws. The court recognised the appellant's history but also acknowledged the need for deterrence and rehabilitation. In assessing the severity of the sentences, the court considered the cumulative effect of the offences and the appellant's persistent behaviour. The court found that while the period of imprisonment was within the range of appropriate penalties for the offences, the three-year disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence was excessive. The court determined that a reduced period of disqualification was warranted, balancing the need for deterrence and the appellant's history of reoffending. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal only to the extent of modifying the disqualification period, substituting a 12-month disqualification for the original three-year term.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was allowed to the extent of modifying the sentence. The court set aside the order that the appellant be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for three years, substituting it with a disqualification for 12 months. The period of imprisonment remained unchanged. This decision reflects the court's effort to balance the need for appropriate punishment and deterrence with the necessity of considering the appellant's history and the proportionality of the sentence.

Orders