Howard and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development

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Howard and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development [2020] AATA 1262 (12 May 2020)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION  

File Number:2019/4742         

Re:Gilbert Howard

APPLICANT

Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional DevelopmentAnd  

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:L M Gallagher, Member

Date:12 May 2020

Place:Perth

The decision under review is affirmed.

..............[Sgd]..........................................................

L M Gallagher, Member

CATCHWORDS

TRANSPORT – motor vehicles – importation of nonstandard motor vehicle – whether vehicle manufactured ‘before 1 January 1989’ – meaning of ‘manufactured’ – consideration of relevant factors for the exercise of the general discretion to approve the import – no grounds for exercise of discretion – decision to refuse application to import motor vehicle affirmed

LEGISLATION

Motor Vehicle Standards Act 1989 (Cth) – ss 3(b), 5, 5(1), 7, 18, 19(1), 20, 20(1)(b), 20(3), 39(1)(f)

Motor Vehicle Standards Regulations 1989 (Cth) – regs 7A, 11, 17

CASES

Re Bartle and Minister for Infrastructure and Transport (2011) 122 ALD 362

Re Bastian and Minister for Transport and Regional Services (2007) 98 ALD 485

Campos and Minister for Infrastructure and Transport [2012] AATA 244

Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634

Grapsas v Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development [2020] FCA 525

Selway and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government [2010] AATA 595

Selway v Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (2011) 120 ALD 40

Skoljarev v Australian Fisheries Management Authority (1995) 22 AAR 331

Trajkovski and Department of Transport and Regional Services [2000] AATA 1073

Williamson and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government [2009] AATA 48

SECONDARY MATERIALS

‘Vehicles Manufactured Before 1989 Option’, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications (Web Page, 10 December 2019) < FOR DECISION

L M Gallagher, Member

12 May 2020

INTRODUCTION

  1. Mr Howard is a Ford Mustang enthusiast. In January 2016, Mr Howard entered into a contract to purchase a 1968 Ford Mustang chassis from which a replica 1968 Ford Mustang Fastback ‘Eleanor’ vehicle (Vehicle) was built (R1, T8 page 48). The Vehicle was built by Classic Speed Inc (Classic Speed), a (then) Australian owned company located in the Philippines. The Vehicle was completed in 2019 and is presently in the Philippines.

  2. The Vehicle is a nonstandard road vehicle and does not have an identification plate within the meaning of those terms as prescribed by the Motor Vehicle Standards Act1989 (Cth) (Act) and as applied in the Motor Vehicle Standards Regulations1989 (Cth)


    (the Regulations). 

  3. Prior to the hearing, Mr Howard contended that, notwithstanding the Vehicle being nonstandard and without an identification plate, he is entitled to have his application to import the Vehicle approved by reason of it being ‘manufactured before 1 January 1989’.

  4. At the hearing, however, Mr Howard contended that while he accepted that the Vehicle was ‘a new car’ (transcript page 73 [35]), he is entitled to have his application to import the Vehicle approved by reason…

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Details
Case
[2020] AATA 1262
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Howard to import a motor vehicle into Australia. Mr Howard sought to import a Ford Mustang, which he contended was manufactured before 1 January 1989, thereby qualifying for import under regulation 17 of the relevant regulations. The Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development refused the application, asserting that the vehicle did not meet the pre-1989 manufacture criteria. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal was required to determine whether the vehicle qualified for import under the pre-1989 provision or, alternatively, whether the Minister's discretion to approve the import should be exercised in Mr Howard's favour.

The Tribunal considered the meaning of "manufactured" in the context of regulation 17. Mr Howard accepted that the vehicle was a newly manufactured car, built between 2016 and 2019, using a chassis from a 1968 Ford Mustang but with all other components being new. The Tribunal found that the vehicle was not a restoration of an original 1968 vehicle but rather a new build, and therefore did not meet the criteria for being manufactured before 1 January 1989. The Tribunal then examined whether to exercise the general discretion to approve the import, considering factors such as the policy objectives of the Act, potential unfairness, financial hardship, uniqueness of the vehicle, and any unpredictable events.

The Tribunal concluded that the policy objectives of controlling emissions and promoting energy saving were not met by importing a vehicle with a large V8 engine. It found no unfairness or injustice to Mr Howard, as he had access to information regarding the import requirements. No evidence of financial hardship was presented, and the vehicle was not considered unique in the context of being an original 1968 model. The Tribunal also noted that the relevant laws had been in place since 2005, refuting any claim of unexpected legal changes. Consequently, the Tribunal found no cogent reasons to exercise the discretion in Mr Howard's favour. The decision to refuse the application to import the motor vehicle was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing, however, Mr Howard contended that while he accepted that the Vehicle was ‘a new car’ (transcript page 73 [35]), he is entitled to have his application to import the Vehicle approved by reason of it being ‘beautifully made’ to a ‘high specification’ (transcript page 72 [20]), because of his sentimental attachment to it and because other similar cars have been imported into Australia.BACKGROUND AND CLAIM HISTORY On 29 January 2016, Mr Howard entered into a sales agreement with Classic Speed for the Vehicle (Sales Agreement) (R1, T8 pages 48–51), with the purchase price of US$120,000.00. The Sales Agreement indicates that Mr Howard would take possession of the Vehicle in the Philippines on or before the scheduled completion date of December 2016 (R1, T8 pages 48 and 51). The Sales Agreement also states that Mr Howard was to assume full ownership and responsibility for the Vehicle at final inspection (R1, T8 page 48) and would be responsible for all associated on road costs in Australia, including ‘shipping costs’ (R1, T8 page 49). The Sales Agreement stipulated a payment schedule whereby Mr Howard would pay an initial deposit of approximately US$36,000.00 in order to commence the build, followed by 11 monthly payments of between US$4,000.00 and US$10,000.00(R1, T8 page 51). Mr Howard claims that he visited Classic Speed in the Philippines in May 2019 to view the completed vehicle. On 30 May 2019, Mr Howard completed an application to import the Vehicle under reg 17 of the Regulations on the basis that the Vehicle was manufactured before 1 January 1989 (R1, T7 pages 38–44). In his application, Mr Howard indicated that the Vehicle was manufactured in 1968 and that it was in original condition (R1, T7A page 38). On 4 June 2019, Mr Howard wrote to the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, formerly the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Cities and Regional Development (the Department), seeking further guidance in relation to his application (R1, T8 pages 45–46). In his letter, Mr Howard gave the additional information regarding the Vehicle, including (R1, T8 page 46):Items that were included in the vehicle build. The build order was to restore the car to original condition.Brakes have been upgraded and the interior is new.The engine is a 428 V8 which was available in 1968 in this vehicle.Basically, it looks like a new car.Enthusiasts in your office will recognize that this the [sic] vehicle is a replica of the Eleanor movie car from Gone in 60 seconds. This is one of the worlds [sic] most copied cars from the 1967-8 model.(Emphasis added.) On 27 June 2019, the Department sent an email to Mr Howard informing him that (R1, T9 page 77):The Technical Engineers have assessed the application to import this Ford Mustang under the Vehicle built before 1989 import option and your application is unable to meet this option by:This replica vehicle has been significantly modified after 1989 with modifications to the engine, transmission and suspension. This is considered a remanufactured vehicle and does not meet the requirements for the pre-1989 import option.(Original emphasis.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal is satisfied that all the relevant evidence was before the Tribunal and that both parties were provided an opportunity to address it, either orally or in writing.Mr Howard’s evidence At hearing, Mr Howard said that the Vehicle is a 50th wedding anniversary present he was planning (having met his wife in 1968) and it means a lot to him (transcript page 12 [45]). Mr Howard said that in April 2013, he paid Classic Speed a $10,000.00 deposit, following which:…They [Classic Speed] searched America to find a vehicle. It took them almost a couple of years and they came back and said they’ve got one. What you actually buy from them after they’ve sent it to the Philippines is you buy the chassis and then they build you a new car. So in this case we’re saying that we ordered what we call a GT 500 which was an exact copy of a Ford standard product that was available in 1968.All of the components in this vehicle that have been made for me are new. It is not a restoration of some other vehicle. It’s actually a new vehicle. In that case we gave them a work order in January to do it in 2016 and it’s taken a couple of years for them to build it……the car was finished in May 2019. Part of the contract was for me to accept the vehicle at the factory. So I gave myself a bit of a holiday, I went to the Philippines, inspected the factory and signed off the vehicle.Then I came back to Australia and paid my $50 to the Department of Infrastructure to import the vehicle and that was the first time I actually found that there was something not acceptable by the government……I felt that when the…Department were assessing things, they were assuming that I was restoring the old shell which was absolutely never the case. The order has always been to build a new car and the only reason we bought the old car – the shell – was that you needed something like that to start with. So the big debate about when it was built and how it was built, I accept the fact it’s new. It was built from 2016 until now and I don’t debate that……So basically what they do is the car is stripped right out to nothing which is what I bought and then they restore the chassis by making it safe if it had to be and then they buy the panels and the doors…they’re all new bits. Everything is new. So what I actually purchase [sic] didn’t even have any wheels or gearbox or diff or anything, it’s just a frame. That’s how they do it……I know it [the Vehicle] doesn’t fit into their [manufactured pre 1 January 1989] category…(Transcript page 13 [15]– [45], page 14 [20], page 16 [30] and page 19 [10].) (Emphasis added.) Mr Howard said that his work order for the Vehicle was placed ‘before the introduction of their pre-1989 laws anyway and I also noticed that December last year they changed the law again because it wasn’t working’ (transcript page 19 [15]). During cross examination by Mr Burgess, Mr Howard stated that the only original part of the Vehicle is the chassis, the panels are all new and nothing other than the chassis was kept from the donor car (transcript page 21 [5]–[10]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Burgess went on to make the following contentions for the Respondent in support of its position that the Vehicle was manufactured before 1 January 1989 (and that the discretion in reg 11 ought not to be applied):[5] [5] Contentions were made orally, at the hearing, unless otherwise specified. The Tribunal has referred to (and subsequently considered) the Respondent’s contentions to the extent that they relate to Mr Howard’s evidence at hearing that he purchased a chassis from a 1968 Ford Mustang and Mr Howard’s position at hearing that he accepts his car is a newly manufactured vehicle (refer to paragraphs [43], [45], [48] and [52] of this decision).(a)It is important to remember that the starting point in the legislation is that a vehicle manufactured post-1989 cannot be brought into Australia.(b)The discretion in reg 11, which is guided by policy, is an exception in certain circumstances and, by its nature, must be exercised sparingly.[6][6] Referring to then Senior Member McCabe in Williamson and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government [2009] AATA 48 at [11]. Refer also to paragraph [64] of this decision.(c)So, if a vehicle is manufactured post-1989, it can only be brought in if it complies with the policy and there is a discretion granted to do so.(d)As to the date of manufacture, the proper construction of the word ‘manufacture’ in reg 17 was addressed in the decision of Re Bartle and Minister for Infrastructure and Transport (2011) 122 ALD 362 (Re Bartle decision).[7][7] at 364–366. Refer further to paragraphs [30]-[33] of this decision.(e)The Re Bartle decision talks about the initial vehicle being not just a part, but a complete road vehicle, so the present matter can be clearly distinguished from the Re Bartle decision based on the fact that Mr Howard only bought the chassis and everything else is new (transcript page 35 [10]). (f)This is a case where a single donor part was provided from a 1968 Mustang, where Mr Howard only bought the chassis. Classic Speed built all of the body parts and Mr Howard accepts that the Vehicle is a newly manufactured car. If the Tribunal makes the same finding, then what remains for consideration is whether the Tribunal should exercise the discretion to allow it to be imported regardless.(g)The Vehicle clearly falls into the category of the policy that says:…If parts of a vehicle with a date of manufacture before 1 January 1989 have been assembled into another vehicle, the date of manufacture is taken to be the date on which this new vehicle was first driven. If this conversion (into a different automotive product, such as a replica car, a drag racing car or a hot rod) happened after 1 January 1989, the vehicle does not qualify under this option.[8][8] Refer also to paragraph [34] of this decision.(h)What has been created is a replica car. It is the case (and Mr Howard accepts) that the chassis was purchased and everything else in that car is a brand-new part that was assembled and first driven in 2018 or 2019. There is certainly no question that that occurred before 1989.(i)The policy looks at whether or not a restoration/modification that was made was in its original specification of the make and model of the vehicle. Here, the majority of the important parts of the Vehicle were not available for the original 1968 Ford Mustang GT500, or for a lesser model.(j)This leaves the question of whether there are cogent reasons to depart from the policy such that the discretion ought to apply.(k)Referring to the matters identified by Senior Member Dunne in the Selway[9] decision as being potentially relevant to the exercise of the discretion in reg 11 of the Regulations, which ought to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances:[10](i)Policy objectives of the Act – Looking at the policy objectives set out in ss 3 and 5(1) of the Act,[11] controlling the emission of gas, particles or noise from road vehicles and promoting the saving of energy is not achieved by importing a car with a seven litre V8 engine into Australia. Further, to exercise the discretion in Mr Howard’s favour would allow the Vehicle, which does not have an identification plate, to be imported without good reason. This would undermine and frustrate the policy and objectives of the Act.(ii)Any unfairness or injustice to the Applicant – Mr Howard contended that ‘it would be unfair not to allow him to import the Vehicle because he has spent a substantial amount of money on the Vehicle and because he is aware of other similar vehicles being imported into Australia’.[12] There is no unfairness or injustice to Mr Howard where the Department is following a policy published on its website. The Respondent acknowledges that the Department’s website in January 2016 provided less detail than it currently does in relation to the effect of specific modifications to an assessment of the manufacture date of the Vehicle.[13] If Mr Howard had considered the published available information at the time, the issues he would face in importing a vehicle manufactured in 2016 to 2018 would have been very clear. ‘The Vehicle underwent substantial modifications that were not in line with the original factory specification and were not available at the original date of manufacture’.[14](iii)Financial hardship that would be occasioned by not being approved to import the vehicle – Mr Howard has provided no evidence of financial hardship, having had the funds available to purchase the car at the time and proposing to fund the cost of transporting the vehicle to Australia. Mr Howard also sought for Classic Speed to investigate whether any customers in Japan or the UK would be interested in purchasing the Vehicle. There is no evidence that if Mr Howard were to sell the car, he would be unable to recoup the costs.(iv)Whether the vehicle is unique – There is no evidence about the uniqueness of the Vehicle. It is not the case that the Vehicle is an original 1968 Ford Mustang; it is a new car utilising the chassis from a Mustang.(v)Whether there were unpredictable or unexpected events, beyond the Applicant’s control, that intervened to thwart their plans to comply with the Act – There was nothing to this effect. Any claims by Mr Howard that the law changed between the time he first sought to acquire a chassis for the Vehicle to when the Vehicle was complete are unfounded as the relevant laws have been in place since 2005.[15] (vi)Other potentially relevant matters – there are no other potentially relevant matters apparent on the facts of this matter.[16](l)Each of the considerations in paragraph [53](k) of this decision weigh against allowing the Vehicle to be imported. Mr Howard ‘has not identified any matter relevant to the Tribunal’s consideration that would warrant the discretion being exercised in his favour’.[17] [9] Adopting the approach taken in Selway and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Local Government [2010] AATA 595 (Selway [2010]) at [35]. The Tribunal addresses this interpretation of the approach to the exercise of the discretion in reg 11 of the Regulations in its consideration below.[10] Selway [2010] at [35]. [11] Refer to the definition of vehicle standard in s 5(1) of the Act, extracted at paragraph [22] of this decision.[12] Respondent’s SFICs (R3), paragraph [46].[13] Respondent’s SFICs (R3), paragraph [48].[14] Respondent’s SFICs (R3), paragraph [49].[15] See, for example, paragraph [44] of this decision.[16] Respondent’s SFICs (R3), paragraph [56].[17] Respondent’s SFICs (R3), paragraph [57].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.