SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
HOST-PLUS PTY LIMITED v BLACKWELL
[2022] SASC 59
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Blue
SUPERANNUATION - PRIVATE SECTOR FUNDS - TRUSTEES - GENERALLY
SUPERANNUATION - PRIVATE SECTOR FUNDS - AMENDMENT OF TRUST DEED
EQUITY - TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES - POWERS, DUTIES, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES - MISCELLANEOUS OTHER POWERS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES - POWER TO VARY TRUSTS
The applicant trustee sought orders under section 59C of the Trustee Act 1936 (SA) varying the trust deeds governing the Hostplus Pooled Superannuation Trust and the Hostplus Superannuation Fund to insert a new clause empowering the trustee to charge a Risk Charge.
The motivation for the proposed amendments was that, particularly after 1 January 2022, the trustee of the Fund and the Trust, and trustees of superannuation funds generally, would be liable to the potential imposition of fines and penalties in relation to any contravention of Commonwealth laws in respect of which they would not be indemnified by their respective superannuation funds. The applicant has no significant capital of its own out of which to pay any such fine or penalty and in this respect is in a similar position to other trustees of industry superannuation funds.
The application was opposed by the respondent, a member of the Fund, as the representative of all actual and potential beneficiaries of the Fund and of the Trust. The interested party, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, made submissions without taking a position in relation to the application.
The application was heard as a matter of priority. Orders were made varying the respective trust deeds because of the imminent legislative changes due to come into operation.
Held:
1The proper construction of subsections 56(2) and 57(2) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) considered (at [154]).
2The proposed clauses would not be rendered void by subsections 56(2) or 57(2) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (at [162]).
3In the absence of the acquisition by the Applicant of substantial capital, it would be rendered insolvent by the imposition of any significant non-indemnifiable penalty and this would cause very substantial costs and losses to the Fund and the Trust and thereby to the beneficiaries (at [126]).
4A preferable mechanism to provide capital to a trustee in the position of the Applicant would be for its superannuation funds to acquire shares in the trustee company but this is presently precluded by the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) (at [194]).
5Given legislative provisions and time constraints, it was not possible to satisfactorily mitigate that risk by 1 January 2022 other than by the introduction of a trustee risk charge of the type proposed (at [220]).
6In the circumstances, there was good reason to vary the trust deeds and it was in the interests of the beneficiaries of the respective trusts to do so (at [221]).
7In the circumstances, the variations would not result in one class of beneficiaries of either trust being unfairly advantaged to the prejudice of another class (at…
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- AGLC
- Host-Plus Pty Limited v Blackwell [2022] SASC 59
- Case
- [2022] SASC 59
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that it did have the discretion under section 59C of the Trustee Act to vary the trust deeds. The court examined the necessity of the Risk Premium Charge, given HPPL's limited capital and the potential consequences of its insolvency. The evidence demonstrated that HPPL's inability to be indemnified by the funds against significant penalties could lead to its insolvency, necessitating a replacement trustee, which would be costly and detrimental to the funds' members. The proposed Risk Premium Charge was deemed necessary to maintain the financial stability of HPPL, thereby ensuring the continuity of trusteeship for the funds.
Accordingly, the court exercised its discretion to amend the trust deeds to include provisions for the Risk Premium Charge. The amendments were designed to ensure that the charges were imposed in the best financial interests of the fund members and were fair and equitable. The court concluded that these changes were in the best interests of the members and beneficiaries of the funds, thereby upholding the integrity and sustainability of the superannuation arrangements.
The final orders of the court included varying the trust deeds to insert new provisions regarding the Risk Premium Charge, granting liberty to apply for further variations, and allocating the costs of the proceeding between the funds in equal proportions.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Policy provides that the Risk Reserve may only be applied by HPPL with the authority of the Board.Rationale for the proposed amendments The background to the proposed introduction of the Risk Charges is that HPPL only has share capital of $600 and after 1 January 2022 it would not be able to be indemnified by the Fund or the Trust against a liability for a fine or civil or administrative penalty or amount payable under an infringement notice under Commonwealth legislation (collectively a penalty). The rationale for the proposed introduction of the Risk Charges is that the Trustee of the Fund and the Trust would become insolvent if it were to incur a penalty in any significant amount. If HPPL were to become insolvent, it would be unable to continue as trustee of the Fund or the Trust. Section 120(2) of the Supervision Act defines a “disqualified person” amongst others as a company in respect of which a receiver, manager, administrator or provisional liquidator has been appointed or which is being wound up. Section 126K prohibits a disqualified person from acting as a trustee of a superannuation entity. Sections 133 and 134 empower APRA to remove a disqualified person as trustee of a superannuation entity and appoint a replacement trustee to act as trustee until the vacancy is filled. At first sight, it might be thought that it would be relatively easy for HPPL to be replaced with an alternative trustee of the Fund or the Trust. However, the evidence establishes that this is not the case and that there would be a very substantial cost and detriment to the Fund and the Trust, and therefore to the members of the Fund and the Trust, in that event. If HPPL were unable to continue as Trustee of the Fund or the Trust, theoretically there would be two alternatives. First, the appointment of a replacement trustee to take over as the long term trustee of the Fund and the Trust. Secondly, a merger of the Fund with another superannuation fund under the control of a short term replacement trustee and a dismantling of the Trust. Any replacement trustee (whether long term or short term) would be required to hold an AFS Licence from ASIC and an RSE Licence from APRA. APRA would be unlikely to appoint or license a replacement trustee that had the same directors as a trustee that had become a disqualified person. That power has never been exercised in respect of a large superannuation fund of the order of the Fund or the Trust. Any trustee appointed by APRA would only be an acting trustee in the short term and it would still be necessary to procure a long term replacement trustee if the first alternative could be pursued. Any acting trustee appointed by APRA would charge substantial fees. Although trustees of existing superannuation funds do not necessarily have significant capital or financial support from their shareholders, it appears likely that a replacement trustee would be required to have substantial capital or financial guarantees in order to obtain an RSE Licence. This would have to be provided in some form by the Fund and the Trust, either by directly providing the capital (see below) or by paying fees of the type proposed by HPPL to create such capital. Even if a replacement trustee could be procured without substantial capital, that trustee would run the same risk of insolvency as would have been run by (and hypothetically materialised for) HPPL. On the evidence adduced before me, it appears unlikely that a long term replacement trustee could be procured in respect of a superannuation fund of the size of the Fund and the Trust.