Horn v Australian Electoral Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Horn v Australian Electoral Commission [2006] FCA 1778

PROCEDURE – application to dismiss proceeding – obligation on Australian Electoral Commission to screen voters from observation when marking ballot-papers – whether application relating to prospective future refusal of voter to enter booth as provided at last election gives rise to a ‘matter’ – effect of draft proposed substitute application – whether applicant has sufficient material interest

ELECTORAL LAW – obligation to screen voters from observation – whether reasonably arguable that obligation requires provision of enclosed booths – whether anticipated refusal to vote in non-enclosed booths at next federal election gives rise to justiciable matter

CommonwealthElectoral Act 1918 (Cth) ss 206, 233(1)(a), 245(1), 245(8), 245(15), 245(15A), 245(15B), 283, 284, 338, 348, 355
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B, 39B(1), 39B(1A)(c)

Federal Court Rules O 20 r 2

Australian Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493
Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119
In re The Judiciary Act 1903-1920 and in re The Navigation Act 1912-1920 (1921) 29 CLR 257
Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591

DIETER HANS GUSTAV HORN v AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
WAD 232 OF 2006

NICHOLSON J
19 DECEMBER 2006
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 232 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

DIETER HANS GUSTAV HORN
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 DECEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent’s notice of motion dated 26 September 2006 be granted.

2.The proceeding be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 232 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

DIETER HANS GUSTAV HORN
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLSON J

DATE:

19 DECEMBER 2006

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 19 October 2004 the applicant attended at the Manjimup Town Hall for the purpose of voting in the Commonwealth elections.  When there he formed the view that if he were to vote, his vote would not be screened from observation when he marked his ballot-papers.  He therefore departed without either registering or voting. 

  2. On 16 August 2006 the applicant filed an application requesting the Court to compel the respondent to construct voting compartments in what he says would be in accord with the requirements of ss 206 (first part) and 233(1)(a) of the CommonwealthElectoral Act 1918 (Cth) (the Electoral Act). He sought specifically that the Court should compel him to be screened from observation from above the knees to above the head from all four vertical sides when marking his ballot-papers in the voting compartment in future federal elections and referenda.

  3. Section 206 reads:

    ‘206Polling booths shall have separate voting compartments, constructed so as to screen voters from observation while they are…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1778
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Horn v Australian Electoral Commission involved the applicant, Horn, and the respondent, the Australian Electoral Commission. The dispute centred around the admissibility of Horn’s application to the court, specifically whether it constituted a justiciable matter. The application was initially dismissed by the court, prompting Horn to propose a redrafted application. The Federal Court was tasked with deciding whether the redrafted application constituted a justiciable matter under the law.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the redrafted application by Horn presented a justiciable matter. The court had to consider the legal precedents and definitions surrounding what constitutes a justiciable matter, particularly in light of recent judicial decisions. The court was also required to determine whether the redrafted application sufficiently met the criteria for a justiciable matter.

The court concluded that while the law on the understanding of a justiciable matter had evolved, it had not evolved to the extent necessary to find that Horn's redrafted application would constitute a justiciable matter. The court accepted that Horn intended to abandon the original application in favour of the redrafted one, which meant that the original application no longer held any weight. Consequently, the court decided to grant the respondent’s motion to dismiss the proceeding. The court also ruled that the respondent was entitled to the costs of the motion.

The court's final orders were to grant the respondent's notice of motion, dismiss the proceeding, and order the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the motion. This decision effectively ended Horn's attempt to bring the matter before the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s notice of motion dated 26 September 2006 be granted.

2. The proceeding be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

NICHOLSON J
Although I accept (as does the respondent) the applicant’s submission that the law on understanding ‘matter’ has moved in terms of the two decisions relied upon by the applicant, I consider that the respondent is correct in stating that it has not moved as far as would be requisite to find that the applicant would, in his redrafted application, be bringing a justiciable ‘matter’ to the Court. Conclusion The applicant’s draft application is not presently on the record of the Court. It is apparent, however, that by proposing to abandon the application in favour of the draft application the applicant no longer places reliance upon the application as filed by the applicant personally. Accordingly it appears that the appropriate way to dispose of the respondent’s motion is to allow the motion in relation to the application on the record (and by implication the draft proposed substitute application) and to do so with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NICHOLSON J

Full text does not contain this section.