IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A22 of 2021
B e t w e e n -
DARRYL MARTIN HORE
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A23 of 2021
B e t w e e n -
JACOB ARTHUR WICHEN
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
GAGELER J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO SYDNEY, MELBOURNE AND BRISBANE
ON MONDAY, 21 FEBRUARY 2022, AT 9.30 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
GAGELER J: In accordance with the protocol for remote hearings, I will announce the appearances of the parties.
MR G.P.G. MEAD, SC appears with MR S.A. McDONALD, SC for the applicant in each application. (instructed by Legal Services Commission (SA))
MS L.M. BOORD, SC appears with MS Z.E.M.H. SMITH for the respondent in each application. (instructed by Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA))
GAGELER J: Ms Boord, we would be assisted by hearing from you first.
MS BOORD: May it please the Court. This is a challenge to the statutory test for release and at the heart of the challenge – that challenge – is the definition of the word “willing” – so, special leave questions 1 and 2, ground 1 of the appeal – and whether the statute contemplates a step‑down approach being included into a consideration of that definition – so, special leave question 3, ground 2.
It is the respondent’s position that neither of those challenges identifies a point of principle that requires the intervention of this Court. Save for the harsh nature of that regime, there is nothing in the applicant’s argument that is controversial. The point is not novel. There is no difference or dispute in the way in which our Supreme Court have been dealing with this issue. In the three cases in which the definition has required interpretation, there have now been six Supreme Court judges who have all concluded that the word “willing” is the converse of “unwilling”.
The respondent accepts from the outset that the result of this statutory test is that many offenders will find themselves, to quote our Chief Justice, “trapped in a paradox”. The result of this legislation has not been lost on the six judges who have heard and determined that the word “willing” must have been intended to mean the converse of the word “unwilling”.
EDELMAN J: Ms Boord, do you accept the assumption that seems to have been made in a number of these decisions that the legislative definition of “unwilling” is not the same as the ordinary meaning of the word?
MS BOORD: I do.
EDELMAN J: Why is that so?
MS BOORD: Of “unwilling”, because it is defined under the Act ‑ ‑ ‑
EDELMAN J: But why is that definition different from the ordinary meaning of “unwilling”?
MS BOORD: Because Parliament has given it a special meaning, with respect.
GORDON…
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- Case
- [2022] HCATrans 18
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence obtained from the listening device. Specifically, the Court had to consider the application of s 138 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW), which governs the exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence, and the principles of fairness in admitting such evidence. This involved assessing whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence that had been obtained in contravention of the law.
The Court reasoned that s 138 requires a balancing exercise, weighing the probative value of the evidence against the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained improperly or illegally. Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ held that the trial judge had correctly applied this balancing exercise, finding that the probative value of the evidence was high and that its admission would not be unfair. The Court emphasised that the focus of s 138 is on the fairness of admitting the evidence, not on the illegality of its obtaining, and that the trial judge's assessment of fairness was not vitiated by error. The appeals were dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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