Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 115

Citation: Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 115
Parties: STEPHEN HOPKINS AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HOPKINS SUPERANNUATION FUND and KIM DENISE HOPKINS AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HOPKINS SUPERANNUATION FUND v AECOM AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 093 846 925) (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MAUNSELL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD) and RiverCity Motorway Management Limited (Administrators appointed) (ACN 117 343 361) and RiverCity Motorway Services Pty Limited (Administrators appointed) (Receivers and Managers appointed) (ACN 117 139 992)
File number: NSD 757 of 2012
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 22 February 2013
Corrigendum: 28 February 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – representative proceeding under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether applicants’ solicitors should be required to submit questionnaire to group members for completion and return – where group members acquired interest in stapled units – where group members may have received advice from financial advisers – potential cross-claims for contribution – where possibility of prejudice to first respondent as a result of expiration of limitation periods – where possibility of prejudice confined to particular sub-class of group.
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Part IVA, s 33ZF, s 37P, s 37M,
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1022B(2), s 1041I, s 1041L(1), Pt 7.10, Div 2A
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) Pt IV
Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) s 79
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW) s 5(1)(c)
Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 6(c)
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) s 7(c)
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) s 12(4)
Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 19 and s 21
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 23A and s 23B, s 24(4)
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) s 4 and s 6
Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas) s 2, s 3(1)(c), s 3(5), s 3(6)
Cases cited:

Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 450

Hopkins v Aecom Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1204
King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd) [2002] FCA 1560
McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (No 6) (1988) 84 FCR 1
Meaden v Bell Potter Securities Ltd [2011] FCA 136
National Australia Bank Limited v Pathway Investments Pty Ltd (2012) 265 FLR 247
P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 176
Regent Holdings Pty Ltd (as trustee for the V L Halliday Investment Trust) v Victoria [2012] VSCA 221

Date of hearing: 2 November 2012 and 20 December 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr M Lee SC with Mr M Pesman
Solicitor for the Applicants: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Dr A Bell SC with Dr R Higgins
Solicitor for the First Respondent Baker & McKenzie
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr…
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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (No 2), the applicants, represented by their solicitors, sought to proceed with a representative proceeding under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The dispute centred around whether the applicants’ solicitors should be mandated to submit a questionnaire to the group members for completion and return, especially since these group members had acquired an interest in stapled units and potentially received advice from financial advisers. The matter also raised the prospect of cross-claims for contribution, and the potential for prejudice to the first respondent due to the expiration of limitation periods, which was confined to a particular sub-class of the group.

The court was tasked with determining several legal issues. Firstly, it had to consider whether it was necessary for the applicants’ solicitors to distribute a questionnaire to all group members to ascertain their reliance on the disclosure documents, given the potential for prejudice to the first respondent from the expiration of limitation periods. Secondly, it had to balance the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions against the need for just resolution of the disputes. The overarching purpose, as outlined in section 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, includes facilitating the just resolution of disputes as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible, alongside other objectives such as the efficient use of judicial resources and timely disposal of proceedings.

The court reasoned that given the proceeding's early procedural stage, with pleadings closed but discovery incomplete, it was prudent to consider the necessity of the questionnaire. The court noted that the potential prejudice to the first respondent was confined to a specific sub-class of the group, and there was a possibility that some group members might have received independent financial advice. The court also considered the statutory requirement under section 33ZF(1) of the Act, which allows the court to make any order it deems appropriate or necessary to ensure justice in the proceeding. Taking into account these factors, the court decided against mandating the submission of the questionnaire at that stage, considering it premature given the unresolved issues and procedural context.

The final orders of the court were that the applicants’ solicitors were not required to submit the questionnaire to the group members at that stage of the proceeding. The court left the door open for revisiting this issue as the case progressed, particularly once more information became available through the discovery process and written evidence submissions.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The causes of action pleaded in the amended statement of claim as against the first respondent are twofold. First, the applicants rely upon a statutory claim under s 1022B(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act). Second, the applicants rely on a common law claim for negligence. The proceeding is still in its early stages procedurally. The pleadings have closed, but discovery in this and related proceedings has not been completed. None of the parties has yet commenced to file written evidence. There is also a distinct possibility that one or more of the existing respondents may seek to cross claim against other parties. I should add, for completeness, that there is no mediation scheduled, and I would not ordinarily expect mediation to take place until some time after the parties had filed their written evidence. There are a number of alternative ways in which the applicants have pleaded their case against the first respondent. One of these is pleaded in a way that would, if otherwise sustainable, obviate the need for group members to prove that they relied (at least directly) on the traffic forecasts included in the PDS. However, this is true of only one of the ways in which the applicants’ case has been pleaded. I therefore propose to deal with the interlocutory application on the footing that, in all probability, it will be necessary for each of the relevant group members to establish his or her reliance upon the PDS and the traffic forecasts contained in it. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS Section 37M of the Act provides:(1)The overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes:(a)according to law; and(b)as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.(2)Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the overarching purpose includes the following objectives:(a)the just determination of all proceedings before the Court;(b)the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court;(c)the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload;(d)the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner;(e)the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.(3)The civil practice and procedure provisions must be interpreted and applied, and any power conferred or duty imposed by them (including the power to make Rules of Court) must be exercised or carried out, in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose.(4)The civil practice and procedure provisions are the following, so far as they apply in relation to civil proceedings:(a)the Rules of Court made under this Act;(b)any other provision made by or under this Act or any other Act with respect to the practice and procedure of the Court. Section 33ZF(1) of the Act provides:In any proceeding (including an appeal) conducted under this Part, the Court may, of its own motion or on application by a party or a group member, make any order the Court thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceeding.