Hopcroft v Edmunds (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

HOPCROFT & ANOR v EDMUNDS & ORS (NO 2)

[2012] SASC 94

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Blue

12 June 2012

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - FORMATION OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - DISCHARGE, BREACH AND DEFENCES TO ACTION FOR BREACH - CONDITIONS - CONDITIONS PRECEDENT AND SUBSEQUENT

ESTOPPEL - ESTOPPEL IN PAIS - THE REPRESENTATION - BY CONDUCT

CONTRACTS - PARTICULAR PARTIES - PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - RELATIONS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND THIRD PERSONS - RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PRINCIPAL IN RESPECT OF CONTRACTS OF AGENT

In 1995, the plaintiffs were suing successive Directors of Fisheries. The first three defendants were suing a fisherman and firm of solicitors. All actions concerned abalone licences.

The plaintiffs had discussions with the first three defendants concerning assistance which the plaintiffs may be able to provide to them in their action. It was proposed that the plaintiffs would provide assistance in the litigation, would become directors and shareholders of the third defendant, and would be paid a percentage of the proceeds of the litigation. The parties acted on the basis that the third defendant was the trustee of a family trust, but in fact the fourth defendant had replaced the third defendant as trustee.

A “Shareholders Agreement” was drafted by solicitors on instructions from the defendants’ accountant. It was executed by the plaintiffs but not by any of the first three defendants. The plaintiffs were made directors and shareholders of the third defendant which the plaintiffs pleaded occurred pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement. Certain payments were made to the plaintiffs which they pleaded were made pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement.

The plaintiffs claim that a contract was entered into with the first three defendants either upon their execution of the Shareholders Agreement or upon the appointment of the plaintiffs as directors of, and the issue of shares to them in, the third defendant. The plaintiffs claim that the fourth defendant is estopped from denying it is bound by the contract.

The defendants deny that any contract came into existence. In the alternative, they claim that any contract was subject to an unfulfilled condition precedent or was rescinded or terminated by them for misrepresentation or breach. They also claim that the plaintiffs’ action is statute barred.

Held, plaintiffs’ action dismissed because no contract came into existence:

(1) It was the manifest intention of the parties that the Shareholders Agreement was not to become binding until executed by all parties. In any event, the defendants’ accountant did not have authority to proffer the Shareholders Agreement to the plaintiffs on the basis that execution by the plaintiffs alone would constitute a binding agreement and there was no case of ostensible authority.

(2) The appointment of the plaintiffs as directors and the issue of shares to them (and the payments made to the plaintiffs) were not sufficiently referrable to the Shareholders Agreement as to constitute acceptance. 

If there had been a contract:

(3) The fourth defendant would have…

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Details
Case
[2012] SASC 94
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hopcroft v Edmunds (No 2), the primary dispute was over the formation, validity, and termination of a shareholders' agreement between the parties. The court was tasked with determining whether the defendants' claims of misrepresentation and termination of the contract were valid. The defendants argued that the contract was terminated at various points between July 1995 and August 2000, and sought relief under the Fair Trading Act. The plaintiffs countered that the contract remained in force and that the defendants' claims were unfounded.

The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the contract terms and the applicability of the Fair Trading Act. The court had to determine whether the defendants had valid grounds to terminate the contract and if their claims for misrepresentation were substantiated. Additionally, the court examined whether the defendants' cause of action under the Fair Trading Act was time-barred.

The court found that the defendants' claims of termination were not substantiated. The alleged discussions in July 1995 and November 1996 did not occur, and even if they had, they did not constitute lawful termination. The requests for resignation and the subsequent removal of directors did not amount to a termination of the contract. The letter from Phillips Fox also did not serve as a lawful termination. The court further held that the clause 8.1.3 of the Shareholders Agreement could not be relied upon as it addressed a scenario where the plaintiffs were wholly unsuccessful in their litigation, which did not occur.

The court concluded that the defendants' claims for misrepresentation and termination of the contract were without merit. The claim that they rescinded the contract for misrepresentation and their claim for relief under the Fair Trading Act were dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

If a cause of action arose under section 56 of the Fair Trading Act, it arose at the earliest in July 1995 when the parties entered into the contract and at the latest in 2001 when abalone licence W17 was transferred to Dadeeton. On any view, the cause of action arose more than three years prior to the institution of the proceedings under the Fair Trading Act. The defendants conceded this in final address. Conclusion The defendants’ claim that they rescinded the contract for misrepresentation and their claim for relief pursuant to section 85 of the Fair Trading Act fail.12. Termination The defendants contend that the contract was validly terminated as follows:1.in July 1995 when Mr Edmunds informed Mr Edwards that the Edmunds would not sign the Shareholders Agreement;2.in November 1996 when Mr Edmunds informed Mr Edwards that there would be no agreement;3.in about June 1998 when Mr Edmunds sought the resignation of Messrs Edwards and Hopcroft as directors of Smoothpool;4.in September 1999 when Mr Noolan informed Messrs Edwards and Hopcroft that they had been removed as directors of Smoothpool;5.in September 1999 when Phillips Fox wrote to Mr Danvers stating that no agreement had been reached;6.on 10 August 2000, pursuant to clause 8.1.3 of the Shareholders Agreement by reason of “judgment being given … in the action which results in Smoothpool and/or Edmunds not gaining reinstatement of the licence and/or compensation for lost income”. I address these contentions as follows:1.In relation to the alleged discussions in July 1995 and November 1996, I have found that they did not take place. Even if they had taken place, while they might have constituted a repudiation by the Edmunds of the contract, a repudiation is not a lawful termination. The defendants in closing address did not identify any grounds entitling them to terminate the contract on those occasions. 2.The requests by Mr Edmunds that Messrs Edwards and Hopcroft resign as directors did not constitute a purported termination of the contract. The removal of Messrs Edwards and Hopcroft as directors might have constituted a breach or repudiation of the contract but was not and did not purport to be a termination of the contract.3.The letter from Phillips Fox dated 6 September 1999 did not purport to terminate the contract. It did deny the existence of the contract and comprised a repudiation, but a repudiation does not constitute a lawful termination. 4.In relation to the termination which is alleged to have occurred in August 2000, clause 8.1.3 of the Shareholders Agreement provides:… this Agreement will terminate on the first to occur of the following: - 8.1.3 judgment being given or settlement occurring in the action which results in Smoothpool and/or Edmunds not gaining reinstatement of the licence and/or compensation for lost income.The defendants are not entitled to rely upon that clause of the contract for the same reasons I have given in section 8 above. In any event, on the proper construction of clause 8.1.3, it addresses a situation in which the plaintiffs in the Edmunds litigation were wholly unsuccessful. That simply did not occur.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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