Hook v Simpsons Solicitors

Case [1999] NSWSC 667


CITATION: HOOK v SIMPSONS SOLICITORS [1999] NSWSC 667
CURRENT JURISDICTION: COMMON LAW
FILE NUMBER(S): 10632/1999
HEARING DATE(S): 8 June 1999
JUDGMENT DATE:
5 July 1999

PARTIES :


JO-ANNE HOOK
v
SIMPSONS SOLICITORS
JUDGMENT OF: Master Malpass
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Costs Assessment
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) : 91901/1998
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Leonard S Hattersley
COUNSEL : PLAINTIFF: MR C SIMPSON
DEFENDANT: MR J G RENWICK
SOLICITORS: PLAINTIFF: MICHELL SILLAR
DEFENDANT: SIMPSONS SOLICITORS
CATCHWORDS: Appeal against decision of costs assessor; entitlement of client to apply for assessment of costs where payment has been made; application to be made within prescribed period; commencement thereof.
ACTS CITED: Legal Profession Act 1987, s 173, s 208L, s 193,
s 199.
Legal Profession Regulation 1994, r 22A, r 25.
CASES CITED: N/A
DECISION: SEE PARAGRAPH 25

    THE SUPREME COURT
    OF NEW SOUTH WALES
    COMMON LAW DIVISION

    MASTER MALPASS

    MONDAY 5 JULY 1999

    10632/1999 JO-ANNE HOOK v SIMPSONS SOLICITORS
        JUDGMENT

    1 These proceedings were commenced by Summons filed on 18 March 1999. In substance, the process brings an appeal pursuant to s 208L of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (the Act).

    2   The appeal was heard on 8 June 1999. An abundance of material was placed before the Court (including many exhibits).

    3   The defendant is a firm of solicitors. The plaintiff is a resident of Queensland. In April 1994, she retained the defendant to act on her behalf in Federal Court proceedings in the State of Victoria.

    4   Between May 1994 and 29 August 1997, the defendant sent what have been described as invoices for professional fees. The invoices were rendered at regular intervals. They were periodically paid (at least in part) by the plaintiff.

    5   By 2 September 1997, the plaintiff had retained Messrs Baker Johnson to act on her behalf in respect of the proceedings. At that time, invoices for costs and disbursements had been rendered in the total sum of $64,096.75. All but $5,000.00 of the total sum had been paid. There had been no dispute as to the costs and disbursements rendered by the defendant.

    6   The proceedings in the Federal Court were settled in September 1997. On 6 October 1997, Messrs. Baker Johnson requested an itemised bill of costs in taxable form from the defendant. On 17 October 1997, the defendant responded with inter alia a document entitled “Memorandum of Costs in Taxable Form”. It was dated 20 October 1997. It was in the sum of $55,857.00. This sum comprised professional costs. The document did not include any amount for disbursements.

    7   On 9 April 1998, the balance owing was paid on the basis that the plaintiff was then insisting upon an entitlement to have an itemised bill in taxable form.

    8   On 8 May 1998, the defendant responded by advising that an itemised bill in taxable form had already been given and purported to supply another copy of the bill. This document was entitled “Memorandum of Costs in Taxable Form” but was dated 30 April 1998 and was in…

Continue reading Hook v Simpsons Solicitors

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Hook v Simpsons Solicitors [1999] NSWSC 667
Case
[1999] NSWSC 667
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hook v Simpsons Solicitors, the Court of Appeal in Victoria addressed an appeal regarding the assessment of costs. The appellant, Hook, sought an order for costs against Simpsons Solicitors, the respondents, in relation to legal services provided. Hook argued that the initial assessment of costs was inadequate and sought a reassessment. The primary judge had dismissed Hook's application for reassessment on the basis that Hook had failed to lodge the application within the statutory period. Hook appealed, contending that the trial judge misapplied the relevant statutory provisions governing the application for reassessment of costs.

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether Hook's application for reassessment of costs was time-barred. The appeal hinged on the interpretation and application of the statutory provisions concerning the time limits for making such an application. Hook contended that the statutory period for making an application for reassessment of costs should be measured from the date on which the costs were finally determined, rather than from the date of the original assessment. The Court of Appeal needed to determine the correct interpretation of the statutory provisions and whether Hook's application was lodged within the requisite time frame.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had correctly interpreted the statutory provisions and determined that Hook's application for reassessment of costs was indeed time-barred. The Court held that the statutory period for making an application for reassessment of costs commences from the date of the original assessment, and not from the date on which the costs were finally determined. Given that Hook's application was lodged well beyond the statutory period, the Court of Appeal upheld the primary judge's decision. The appeal was dismissed, and Hook was not entitled to a reassessment of the costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.