DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2003] AATA 70
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2001/875
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION )
Re JEAN HOOK
Applicant
And REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr I R Way, Member
Date24 January 2003
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
...................(Sgd)....................
IR Way
Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS – benefits and entitlements – war widow's pension – whether death of the veteran was war-caused – death of veteran occurred following a motor vehicle accident – whether reasonable hypothesis can be established linking veteran's death with his war service
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 ss 5B, 6A, 8, 13, 14, 120, 196
East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517
Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 149 ALR 721
Cooke v Repatriation Commission (1997) 45 ALD 205
REASONS FOR DECISION
24 January 2003 Mr I R Way, Member
This is an application by Jean Hook (the applicant) for review of a decision of the Repatriation Commission dated 8 February 2001, affirmed by the Veterans' Review Board (VRB) on 6 August 2001, that determined the death of the applicant's late husband, Frederick Hook (the veteran), was not war-caused within the meaning of section 8 of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (the Act).
The Tribunal had before it the documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (T1–T6) and the following documentary evidence:
Report of Dr J Love dated 5 April 2002 Exhibit A1
Report of Professor Ansford dated 3 February 2002 Exhibit R1
Report of Dr J McCarthy dated 3 December 2001 Exhibit R2
Notes from original post-mortem file Exhibit R3Ms M Brennan represented the applicant and Mr D McAninly appeared for the respondent. Dr Love, Dr Wilkinson and Professor Ansford gave oral evidence.
Under section 13 of the Act the Commonwealth is liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to the dependents of the veteran, where the death of the veteran was war-caused. A dependent of a deceased veteran, including a widow (section 11) may make a claim to a pension under section 14 of the Act.
The veteran served in the Australian Army during Word War II from 22 July 1940 to 4 December 1945, including service overseas.
The applicant is the widow of the veteran, who rendered operational service as defined in sections 5B and 6A of the Act, namely continuous full time service outside Australia during World War II.
Background FactsThe relevant background facts in this matter are not in dispute and the Tribunal finds:
· The veteran was born on 2 August 1917.
· The veteran underwent heart surgery for replacement of a mitral valve in May 1991.
· On 28 March 2000 at 0630 hours, the veteran was struck by a rigid truck, travelling at 60 kilometres per hour, while he, as a pedestrian, was crossing a road near his home.
· At the time of the accident the applicant's war-caused accepted disabilities were:
·Solar dermatosis with malignant change;
·Mitral valve prolapse…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court examined the evidence and concluded that the veteran was taking Warfarin, an anticoagulant, which would have significantly increased his risk of excessive bleeding in the event of an injury. The applicant argued that the Warfarin contributed to the veteran's excessive bleeding and death following the accident. The Court considered the relevant statutory provisions and past case law to assess whether the hypothesis was reasonable. The Court found that the hypothesis was not merely a possibility but one supported by the facts, as the material pointed to the veteran's severe injuries and the effects of Warfarin.
The Court found that the hypothesis put forward by the applicant was reasonable because it was supported by the facts. The Court noted that the severity of the impact from the accident would inevitably have caused the veteran's death, regardless of the Warfarin. However, the Court held that the hypothesis was not fanciful, untenable, or contrary to known scientific fact. The Court was satisfied that there was a reasonable hypothesis linking the veteran's death with his war service.
The Court affirmed the decision under review, holding that the death was war-caused. The applicant was entitled to the war widow's pension.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It was therefore submitted that the decision under review should be affirmed.Consideration The Tribunal is satisfied that the veteran, at the time of the accident, was taking the anti-coagulant drug Warfarin, such that his INR would have been maintained at a level between 3 and 4. The Tribunal is also satisfied that at this ratio level blood clotting takes significantly longer than it would if Warfarin was not being taken (of the order of three to four times as long); and therefore can lead to increased bleeding in the event of injury. The hypothesis put forward by the applicant however is not contested by the respondent on the ground that the veteran actually suffered excessive bleeding at the time of the accident. The respondent's contention is that the extreme severity of the impact suffered by the veteran inevitably causing his death regardless of any coagulant medication being taken by the veteran. As such the respondent contends that the hypothesis put forward by the applicant is not a reasonable hypothesis. The Tribunal, being satisfied that there is no SoP in force or pending pursuant to the Act, is to determine this matter within the provisions of sections 120(1) and 120(3) of the Act. The Tribunal is mindful that the Courts have addressed the correct approach to be taken in matters such as this. The joint judgment of the Full Court in East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517 cited with approval the following passage:"…To be reasonable a hypothesis must possess some degree of acceptability or credibility – it must not be obviously fanciful, impossible, incredible or not tenable or too remote or too tenuous. For a reasonable hypothesis to be raised by the material – that is, the material must point to, and not merely leave open, a hypothesis as a reasonable hypothesis …a reasonable hypothesis requires more than a possibility, not fanciful or unreal, consistent with the known facts. It is a hypothesis pointed to by the facts, even though not proved on the balance of probabilities (at 532-3)." With regard to the approach to be taken in considering whether an hypothesis is reasonable, the Tribunal notes the comments of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 149 ALR 721. In Bey, at 730, the Full Court commented on the decision in Cooke v Repatriation Commission (1997) 45 ALD 205 as follows:"In the passages from the judgments of Einfeld J and Lee J relied on by the primary judge their Honours concluded that the mere possibility of a connection between a disease and war service is sufficient to constitute a 'reasonable hypothesis' on the ground that any hypothesis is no more than a possibility. Accordingly, for the tribunal to say that a reasonable hypothesis is not raised by a mere possibility of a connection reflects a misconception of the task imposed by s 120(3). In our view that course of reasoning ignores the fact that the expression in question is not 'hypothesis' but 'reasonable hypothesis'. While a hypothesis may be no more than a possibility or supposition, in order for a hypothesis to be reasonable, it must as East states, be pointed to or supported, and not merely left open as a possibility, by the material before the decision-maker. The reasoning is also inconsistent with what was said by Jason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ in Bushell (at CLR 414; ALR 34):'The material will raise a reasonable hypothesis within the meaning of s 120(3) if the material points to some fact or facts (the raised facts) which support the hypothesis and if the hypothesis can be regarded as reasonable if the raised facts are true.'It is also inconsistent with what was said by Mason CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Byrnes (at CLR 569-570; ALR 214):'The statement in Bushell that the material must point to some fact or facts which support the hypothesis means no more than that the material before the commission must raise some fact or facts which give rise to the hypothesis. When that fact or those facts have been identified, the question for determination is whether the hypothesis is reasonable.'Any doubt that attends the status of East as a correct exposition of the law relating to s 120(3) should be dispelled. This court restates the position established by East, Bushell and Byrnes. A 'reasonable hypothesis' involves more than a mere possibility. It is a hypothesis pointed to by the facts, even though not proved upon the balance of probabilities. That understanding of the expression gives force to the word 'reasonable', is strongly supported by the history of the relevant provisions, and accords with the intention appearing in the minister's second reading speech and with authority."