Honeysett v The Queen - [2014] HCATrans 57

[2014] HCATrans 057

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S265 of 2013

B e t w e e n -
ANTHONY CHARLES HONEYSETT
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 14 MARCH 2014, AT 12.30 PM

MS D. YEHIA, SC: If it please the Court, I appear with MR D.P. BARROW on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by Blair Criminal Lawyers)

MR J.H. PICKERING, SC: I appear for the respondent, your Honour. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW))

FRENCH CJ: Thank you, Mr Pickering. Yes, Ms Yehia.

MS YEHIA: Your Honours, we need an extension of time.

FRENCH CJ: Is that opposed?

MR PICKERING: No issue with that.

FRENCH CJ: Yes, extension of time is granted.

MS YEHIA: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honours, this application is not simply concerned with competing expert evidence in relation to characteristics discernible from CCTV footage. In our submission, to characterise it as such is to fail to grasp the importance of the issues raised by the application and, indeed, the importance of the gatekeeping obligations imposed upon trial judges in the area of the admission of expert evidence in criminal trials.

The application raises questions of general importance pertaining to the criteria that must be satisfied pursuant to section 79 of the Evidence Act, particularly with the respect to the admission of expert evidence and to the admission of evidence that has come to be categorised as “ad hoc” expertise and, indeed, whether such a category of evidence properly survives the Evidence Act under the relevant statutory framework. That relevant statutory framework really refers to section 76 of the Evidence Act and section 79.

In our submission, section 76 is a prescriptive and exclusionary rule intended to cover the field when it comes to the admissibility of opinion evidence, both with respect to opinion evidence in relation to identity and opinion evidence in relation to similarity where that opinion evidence is given by a witness who purports to be an expert witness. To be admissible, of course, the opinion evidence must satisfy section 79 and we ask how does ad hoc expertise comply with the requirements of section 79?

The expansion of this category of evidence, ad hoc expertise, particularly in the context of criminal trials, where it is simply based upon task repetition rather than qualification or study increases the risk, in our submission, that may flow from unsatisfactory expert evidence and, therefore, gives rise to questions of general importance. If I could commence by dealing with what we submit was error on the part of the intermediate court in holding that Professor Henneberg had necessary specialised knowledge and that his opinion was based on that knowledge.

FRENCH CJ: What do we know about – he is a Professor of Anatomy at Adelaide University, I think?

MS YEHIA: Yes, that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Honeysett v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Honeysett v The Queen [2014] HCATrans 57
Case: [2014] HCATrans 57
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Honeysett v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal against a conviction for dangerous driving occasioning death. The appellant, Mr Honeysett, had been involved in a collision resulting in the death of another driver. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of evidence concerning the appellant's prior driving history, specifically a prior conviction for dangerous driving.

The High Court was required to determine whether the evidence of the appellant's prior conviction for dangerous driving was improperly admitted at trial. Specifically, the court had to consider whether this evidence was relevant to proving the dangerousness of the driving in the present case, or if it was merely introduced to suggest that the appellant was a person of bad character who was likely to have committed the offence charged. The court also considered the potential for prejudice arising from the admission of such evidence.

The High Court held that the evidence of the prior conviction was improperly admitted. The court reasoned that the prior conviction was not relevant to establishing the dangerousness of the driving on the occasion in question. It was not admissible to show a propensity or disposition to drive dangerously, as this would amount to an improper use of character evidence. The court emphasised that evidence of prior convictions is generally inadmissible unless it has a specific, independent relevance to an issue in the current proceedings, beyond merely suggesting a propensity to commit the crime. The admission of this evidence was found to be a substantial error, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders