JUDGE:	VICKERY J
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	16 APRIL 2012
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	27 APRIL 2012
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	HODGSON v AMCOR (No. 8)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2012] VSC 162

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Judgment – Application of ‘Slip Rule’ – r 36.07 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules2005 – Application to reasons for judgment and orders by way of judgment – Inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to apply ‘slip rule’ – Content and application of slip rule both under inherent jurisdiction and r 36.07 - Application of ss 7 and 8 Civil Procedure Act 2010 to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under the ‘slip rule’ - Lollis v Loulatzis and Anor [2008] VSC 231 (Kaye J) distinguished and not followed - Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd v J Aron Corp (NSWCA) (2007) 70 NSWLR 411 followed – Judgments and orders to be interpreted in the context of the prevailing law.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff (9420 of 2004)	Mr C Gunst QC with Mr P Booth of counsel	A.J. Macken & Co
For the Defendant (9420 of 2004)	Mr J D Elliott SC with Ms SB McNicol of counsel	Corrs Chambers Westgarth

HIS HONOUR:

Introduction

In the proceeding before the Court James George Hodgson v Amcor Limited and Amcor Limited & Others (Supreme Court Proceeding No. 9420 of 2004) (the “Hodgson Proceeding”) I pronounced judgment and delivered reasons for the decision on 20 March 2012 (the “Reasons for Judgment”). The judgment was authenticated by an order made 27 March 2012 (the “Judgment”).

In the Hodgson Proceeding, Mr James Hodgson (“Hodgson”) as the Plaintiff claims amounts due to him under his contract of employment with the Defendant Amcor (“Amcor”) consequent on the termination of his employment with that company which I have found to have occurred on 1 October 2004. Hodgson, at the time of his departure from Amcor, occupied a senior position as Group General Manager of Amcor’s corrugating division known as Amcor Fibre Packaging Australia (“Corrugating/AFPA”). Amcor defended Hodgson's claims, by challenging the quantum of the sum due to him, and on the basis that he is disentitled to the amounts he claims by reason of serious misconduct, as alleged in Amcor’s counterclaim.

The trial of the quantum of Hodgson’s claim in the Hodgson Proceeding was conducted in an earlier and separate trial (the “Quantum Trial”). The balance of the issues, including Amcor’s counterclaim, were heard in the principal trial which was conducted concurrently with another proceeding, the Barnes Proceeding. The Reasons for Judgment delivered 20 March 2012 included reasons for decision in relation to both parts of the Hodgson Proceeding.

The Judgment was in the following terms:

1. Judgment for the Plaintiff in the sum of $917,695.
2.The Defendant is ordered to pay interest on the Judgment sum at the rate…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Hodgson v Amcor (No. 8)

Details

AGLC: Hodgson v Amcor (No. 8) [2012] VSC 162
Case: [2012] VSC 162
Decision Date: 27 APRIL 2012

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Hodgson v Amcor (No. 8), the parties involved were Hodgson, the applicant, and Amcor, the respondent. The dispute revolved around the application of the 'slip rule', a procedural mechanism that allows for the correction of errors in judgments or orders. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The core issue before the court was whether the 'slip rule' could be invoked under the inherent jurisdiction of the court or solely through Rule 36.07 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005. Additionally, the court had to consider the applicability of sections 7 and 8 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 to the inherent jurisdiction of the court in this context.

The court meticulously examined the content and application of the'slip rule', both in its inherent jurisdiction and under Rule 36.07. It distinguished the case of Lollis v Loulatzis and Anor [2008] VSC 231 (Kaye J), where the application of the'slip rule' was considered under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Instead, the court followed the reasoning in Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd v J Aron Corp (NSWCA) (2007) 70 NSWLR 411, which emphasised that judgments and orders should be interpreted in the context of the prevailing law. The court concluded that the 'slip rule' could be invoked under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, provided that the error was one that the court intended to correct and the opposing party would not be prejudiced by the correction. This decision underscored the importance of ensuring that judgments and orders accurately reflect the court's intentions and the applicable law.

The court's ruling clarified the circumstances under which the 'slip rule' can be applied and reinforced the principle that judgments and orders must be interpreted in light of the prevailing law. The Supreme Court held that the 'slip rule' is not limited to procedural errors but can also be invoked to correct errors in the substantive application of the law. This decision provides guidance to parties and practitioners on the use of the'slip rule' and ensures that judgments and orders are accurate and reflective of the court's intended decisions. The court's orders were made in accordance with the prevailing law and the principles established by the court's reasoning.

Orders