Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council & Anor; Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council & Anor

The High Court of Australia considered appeals from decisions of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in two separate cases. In the first, Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd (HIAL) sought to recover from Clarence City Council (CCC) and the Commissioner of State Revenue (CSR) amounts paid by HIAL under a notice of assessment for land tax. In the second, Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Ltd (APAL) sought to recover from Northern Midlands Council (NMC) and the CSR amounts paid by APAL under a notice of assessment for land tax. The core dispute in both cases concerned whether the land owned and operated by the airport companies was exempt from land tax under s 13(1)(d) of the *Land Tax Act 2000* (Tas).

The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper construction of s 13(1)(d) of the *Land Tax Act 2000* (Tas), which provides an exemption from land tax for "land which is used or occupied by, or on behalf of, the Crown or any public authority for any public purpose". The court was required to determine whether the airport companies, as lessees of Commonwealth land, were entitled to the exemption, and if so, whether their use of the land for operating commercial airports constituted a "public purpose" within the meaning of the section. This involved considering the nature of the lessees' interest in the land and the scope of the exemption as it applied to entities that were neither the Crown nor a public authority themselves.

The High Court unanimously held that the airport companies were not entitled to the exemption under s 13(1)(d). The Court reasoned that the exemption applied only to land used or occupied by the Crown or a public authority. While the land itself was owned by the Commonwealth, the lessees, HIAL and APAL, were private entities and not public authorities. Furthermore, the Court found that the operation of commercial airports, even though serving a public function, did not constitute a "public purpose" in the context of the statutory exemption, which was intended to apply to the direct use by the Crown or public authorities for their statutory functions. The appeals were dismissed.