HIRSCH & HIRSCH (No.2)
[2020] FCCA 18
•10 January 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HIRSCH & HIRSCH (No.2) | [2020] FCCA 18 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Parenting – judgment delivered and final orders made on 16 January 2019 – mother unilaterally relocates to the City K area in July 2019 – father seeks that the mother return to the Region A area – mother seeks orders permitting her to remain in the City K area – best interests of the children – mother and children permitted to remain in the City K area. |
| Cases cited: A & A: Relocation Approach [2000] FamCA 751 Hirsch & Hirsch [2019] FCCA 48 U & U [2002] HCA 36 |
| Applicant: | MR HIRSCH |
| Respondent: | MS HIRSCH |
| File Number: | DGC 57 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Burchardt |
| Hearing date: | 18-19 November 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 19 November 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 10 January 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Taghdir |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Go To Court Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Potter |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Taylor & Barnes Solicitors |
ORDERS
All previous parenting orders be discharged.
The Mother and Father have equal shared parental responsibility for the children X born 2013 and Y born 2015 (“the children”).
The children live with the Mother.
The Mother be permitted to relocate to the City K area.
The children spend time with the Father:
(a)During school terms, each alternate weekend from the conclusion of school on Friday (or after school on Thursday if not a school day) until commencement of school on Monday (or 9.00 am Tuesday if not a school day).
(b)For one half of the Term 1 and Term 3 school holidays and one half of the long term summer vacation as agreed between the parties, and in default of agreement for the first half of such school holiday period in even numbered years and the second half in odd numbered years;
(c)For the entirety of the Term 2 school holidays;
(d)From 4.00pm on Christmas Eve until 2.00pm Christmas Day in even numbered years;
(e)From 2.00pm on Christmas Day until 4.00pm on Boxing Day in odd numbered years;
(f)From 4.00pm on New Year’s Eve until 2.00pm New Year’s Day in even numbered years;
(g)From 2.00pm on New Year’s Day until 4.00pm on the day immediately following New Year’s Day commencing in odd numbered years;
(h)On the weekend of Father’s Day, from 10.00am on Saturday until 5.00pm on Father’s Day; and
(i)As may otherwise be agreed between the parties.
Any period the children are to spend with the Father be suspended as follows:
(a)For one half of the Term 1 and Term 3 school holidays and one half of the long term summer vacation as agreed between the parties, and in default of agreement for the second half of such school holiday period in even numbered years and the first half in odd numbered years;
(b)From 4.00pm on Christmas Eve until 2.00pm Christmas Day in odd numbered years;
(c)From 2.00pm on Christmas Day until 4.00pm on Boxing Day in even numbered years;
(d)From 2.00pm on New Year’s Eve until 2.00pm New Year’s Day in odd numbered years;
(e)From 2.00pm on New Year’s Day until 4.00pm on the day immediately following New Year’s Day commencing in even numbered years;
(f)On the weekend of Mother’s Day, from 10.00am on Saturday until 5.00pm on Mother’s Day; and
(g)As may otherwise be agreed between the parties.
Changeovers occur at the children’s school where possible, and otherwise at the City C Police Station, or such other location as may be agreed between the parties in writing from time to time.
Each of the Mother and Father be at liberty to communicate with the children at reasonable times and by reasonable means (including by FaceTime, etc.) when the children are in the other party’s care, including, but not limited to, between 7.00pm and 7.30pm each Tuesday and Thursday night.
The parties each be, and is hereby, authorised to obtain, directly from any school attended by the children, or either of them, details of the children’s progress at school; copies of all school reports; photographs; notices of parent-teacher interviews; and notices of other functions which parents normally attend.
Both parties be permitted to attend parent/teacher interviews and other school activities/functions normally attended by the parents.
Neither party enrol the children, or either of them, in any extra-curricular or sporting activity which is to occur during the time the children spend with the other parent, save with the consent of such parent.
Each of the parties keep the other informed of any illness or injury occurring to the children, or either of them, whilst in their care which requires medical attention, such notice to be provided as soon as practicable and not more than 24 hours following the child attending upon a medical practitioner.
Each of the parties provide the other with their contact address and telephone number during periods when the children are in their care and inform the other forthwith of any change in such address or telephone number.
The parties, by themselves, their servants and/or agents be and are hereby restrained by injunction from:
(a)Abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking or otherwise denigrating the other party, their partner or their family; and
(b)Discussing these proceedings,
to or in the presence or hearing of the children or either of them and from permitting any other person to do so.
All extant applications be dismissed and removed from the pending cases list.
AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.Pursuant to ss.65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Attachment A and these particulars are included in these orders.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Hirsch & Hirsch (No.2) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT DANDENONG |
DGC 57 of 2018
| MR HIRSCH |
Applicant
And
| MS HIRSCH |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introductory
This is an unusual parenting dispute. It is unusual because as recently as 16 January 2019 I delivered a judgment following a contested hearing that took place in November 2018. I made orders for the introduction of a 10/4 spend time regime in favour of the mother to be introduced over time and made property division orders also. It should be noted that notwithstanding the fact that I made factual findings in that judgment, neither party has sought to object in any way to my hearing and determining the subsequent dispute.
Put shortly, the applicant father seeks that the respondent mother be compelled by court order to relocate from City K, where she presently lives, to the Suburb O/Suburb L area and that the spend time regime previously in place before the mother moved to City K be reinstated. Indeed, that is his alternate position. His primary position is that the children should live with him and spend time with the mother.
The mother’s position is that she be permitted to remain in City K and that there be some adjustment to the father’s spend time regime to reflect the difficulties of travel that her residence in City K will produce.
Much of this case, which was strongly contested, was preoccupied with the, as the father would put it, deceitful and dishonest behaviour of the mother in the way that she moved to City K. I have some sympathy with this view. Nonetheless it should be noted and always remembered that the Court is concerned first and last with the best interests of the children. For the reasons that follow I am going to make orders substantially as sought by the mother.
My Earlier Judgment
Given the way the case has been run, it is appropriate to pay some reference to the judgment given on 16 January 2019.
At paragraph 4, I indicated that I was going to order a gradual increase in the time the children spend with their father until they spend four nights per fortnight with him.
At paragraph 6, I noted that the father was a public servant. He was presently suspended, but on his evidence, it was unlikely that that suspension would continue (this has not, in fact, proved to be the case as he is still presently facing criminal charges).
At paragraph 10, I noted that the mother continued to live in the former matrimonial home in Suburb O.
At paragraph 16, I noted Mr D’s observation that the mother was not very inclined to see parenting as a shared task.
At paragraph 24, I noted that the father was living with his own mother, but was spending 80 per cent of his time with his new partner in Suburb B. The relationship had then been underway for some six months.
At paragraph 35, I noted that the mother was working in City M.
At paragraph 40, I noted a reference to driving time by the mother which implied the father living at Suburb B with his new partner.
In paragraph 43, I noted that the mother could not increase her hours of work, was based in City M and the travel time was one hour.
Having found at paragraph 48 that I accepted the mother’s evidence about the occasion when the father broke into the family home and that the mother seemed beaten down and presented as very much overborne by her actions with the father, I noted at paragraph 50:
The mother presented to Mr D as someone who did not regard parenting as a joint exercise and the father presented as somebody who lacked insight as to the force of his past actions. Having seen the parents give their evidence, I agree with both those observations.
I went on to make an order for equal shared parental responsibility.
At paragraph 61, I noted that the amount of time the children spend with the father was at least in part dependent on where he lived. If he lived with his mother, the driving time was likely to be unhelpful and that even a half hour journey from Suburb B might be problematic. I did, however, note at paragraph 63 that many children in metropolitan Melbourne would travel one hour between their parents depending upon the time of day and the routes they were using. I went on for the reasons given to indicate that a 10/4 regime was the appropriate endpoint. I noted at paragraph 77 that this would also minimise the number of changeovers to two per fortnight, and that this was desirable given the dynamic between the parents was not without difficulty.
The Parties’ Affidavits
The parties have filed copious affidavit material, and I have, of course, read and had regard to it. Nonetheless, it would not be inaccurate, in my view, to characterise the parties’ affidavits as simply putting forward the arguments why, on the father’s case, the mother has been deceitful in a variety of different ways and it is not in the children’s best interests to move to City M and on the part of the mother, assertions that the father has acted inappropriately and why it is a good thing that the children move to City M. In the circumstances, and given the somewhat self-serving nature of much of the affidavit material in any event, it is more appropriate to concentrate on what the parties said at Court.
What follows is taken from my notes.
The Evidence of the Father
The Father adopted his affidavits as true and correct.
Under cross-examination by counsel for the mother, the father said he had a very poor relationship with the mother. When asked if he was in any way to blame for this the father said they were both to blame. He attempted to communicate, but there is no response. The mother is dishonest and deceitful.
He is currently suspended as a public servant. He lives in Suburb N. It is a very long day for the children when they visit him. At the previous trial he said he lived 80 per cent of the time at Suburb B. When his criminal matter is concluded he will apply to Suburb L or Suburb P. He is not working at the moment. He did not believe he had verbally abused the mother. He did say that on one occasion he made an accidental phone call to the mother during which, as his affidavit material asserts, he said, “you won’t believe what the lying bitch has done”, thinking he was talking to his partner Ms G. He had pressed the wrong button and in fact was speaking to the mother. He denied calling the mother “a fucking cunt”. Other than that, his communications with the mother have been by text. Although there is an Interim Intervention Order in place, he does not have an anger problem.
The father said he had made it clear in Court that the children would spend time with him in Suburb B. His Committal Mention is later this month and he will not work until the charges are disposed of. When it was put to him that the mother was always the primary carer, the father said this was not so when they were together. Since separation, the children have spent the majority of the time with the mother. During the relationship he had worked full-time and the mother worked part-time. He was completely unprepared to admit what to my mind is obvious, which is that the mother was the primary carer, given their work responsibilities. The father said the mother could live in Suburb L or Suburb P and could transfer back to the Region A area. He cannot move to City K, as he lives in Suburb B. He pays $400 per fortnight to his partner, which covers his food and the children’s food when they are with them. He has a concern about the mother’s mental health. He believes she is unwell, but said he is not an expert. He and his partner have renovated their kitchen. When the girls are there, there will be six people in the house. If the children were to live with him, travel time to City K would not be insuperable. X is now in school. The solution is for the mother to transfer back to the Region A area. When challenged as to why he said the mother was cunning and deceitful, the father referred to the fact that the mother had not told him of the children’s school being changed and her intentions to move. He would have opposed, if the mother had asked, to move closer to her work in City M. He does not know why the mother moved from the Region A area to City K. Her mother lives in Suburb L and her sister lives in City M.
When it was put to him that X had been spending a lot of time in before and after school care, the father said he was available at any time to assist. He conceded that he had put Suburb N as his address on the swimming form, but had not read it. He conceded that his Divorce Application gives Suburb N as his address. He said the mother had known all along that he resides at Suburb B. He is always there to offer assistance and does not work nine and a-half hour shifts. He does some work with a tradesman.
He was challenged as to the change he made in evidence-in-chief to his address, being changed in the text of the affidavit from Suburb N to Suburb B, and said this was just a typo. I should say that I do not accept that. He was challenged as to the fact that he had never put in affidavit that the mother’s Intervention Order allegations were false. He could not say why but he does say that what she says is false. He wants X to return to F School. He would pay child support, but not her school fees. He proposes to report the mother to Authority Q when this case is over. The mother has used her position to obtain an Intervention Order. He is going to complain against all of those involved in the Intervention Order, which she had connived to take out through her own employer where she works.
The father had no overnight time with the girls until February 2019. He had a bedroom set up, but there was no overnight time at Suburb N. In 2019, he was overseas. He went on to say that time can be spent at any time he sees fit. The travel to City M is too far. If his relationship with Ms G did not work out, he would move closer to this children.
The father made vivid complaint about Y’s childcare and the suburb where it takes place. He said this was a poor area and Child Care would be better. The mother should get a three bedroom house, because the children shared a bedroom at the moment. The children should return to the previous school and his concern is that the children now live about two hours from where he lives. Christmas time should be left as it is. He had no idea how much child support he paid. (It is apparent that he pays child support as assessed, but does not otherwise contribute). He did not take issue with the cost of childcare at Suburb O and school fees totalling $370 per week. From Suburb B to Suburb O is one and a-half hours.
The Evidence of Ms G
Ms G adopted her affidavit as true and correct. Under cross-examination she confirmed that the father lives full-time with her. In November of last year it was about 80 per cent of the time. On Thursday nights he was going to his mother for sports training. He has been living at her home since February 2019.
When it was put to her that the father has a dim view of the mother, Ms G said she would not say that. Some of the things she has asserted have not been the truth. It was a complete lie that she had been aggressive to X at changeover. The father contributes $400 per fortnight to her household. The father has mentioned Authority Q. Things the mother has done which are not truthful. She is not sure what he intends. She would be happy to have the children full-time, but she thought there had been an amendment. They would miss their mum like they miss their father when they are with their mother.
The Evidence of Ms Hirsch
The mother adopted her affidavits as true and correct. She is an professional with the Employer R and is stationed at City M. She is not able to transfer. She described herself as being held in time. She could not apply for a transfer out until October 2020, even if she wished to.
Under cross-examination the mother conceded that she had seen the transcript of the previous proceeding. She met the father in 2011 and X was born in 2013. They married in 2014 and Y was born in 2015. Separation was in December 2016. There were legal proceedings and a Family Report by Mr D before Orders made on 16 January 2019. She was living in Suburb O at the time and had kept the matrimonial home. She filed her Divorce Application on 4 June 2019. She asserted that when she had described X’s school in Suburb O in the July affidavit she had had no intention to change the school. She did not accept that the father learnt of her intention to move to City K on 18 June 2019. She conceded that her tenancy application in City K could have been dated 20 June 2019 and, further, that she had on 26 June 2019 signed an application to enrol X in school in City K. She did not dispute that she signed a tenancy agreement on 5 July 2019 and that she had sold the matrimonial home which settled on 29 July 2019. It was listed on Wednesday, open on Saturday and signed within a week. The mother conceded that on 13 July 2019 the father sent her a text saying that the girls had told him they were changing school. She had not responded to that message. She had signed a tenancy for 12 months on 17 July 2019 and the father had learnt about the change of school from X on 18 July 2019. She did not dispute that X was enrolled at H School by the end of July. Indeed, she did not dispute that the father had spoken to the former school at Suburb F on 24 July 2019 and had been advised that 28 July 2019 would be X’s final day. She was aware that the father did not consent to X being enrolled at H School.
The mother conceded that when the matter of divorce was before Registrar Riddiford on 24 July 2019, the Registrar told her she could not pack up and run away. He had told her she would need a Court Order and she had said she was only thinking about it. On 29 July, she moved in at City K and X was enrolled at the school and Y at J Early Learning Centre. She messaged the father about these changes on 1 August 2019 for the first time. She told the father about the change of school on the day X started at E Primary School in City K. She had sought sole parental responsibility in the previous hearing and had read the father’s affidavits in that proceeding together with the Family Report of Mr D. She had read the Judgment and Final Orders. She had not sought mediation before the move but moved unilaterally. She moved despite Registrar Riddiford’s advice and did not tell the father she was going to move. The reason for her move is the time the children were spending in day care. She had just started working at City M at the time of the trial and working eight days per fortnight. She had said the travel time was one hour, but it is one hour and ten minutes. She had said she had no plans to move to full time. She had not tried to transfer to somewhere closer to Suburb O and had not explored rental properties in Suburb O. She denied that the father was spending time with the children at Suburb B. She said she had only understood that he was in a relationship with Ms G when she read the Affidavit in July 2019. She had thought he was only spending time with Mae because they were both not working and he would go back to Suburb N for his position in City S. She thought he was only at Suburb B because he was suspended.
I should interpolate and make it clear that I do not believe these answers. It was quite plain in the previous proceeding that the father was in a relationship with Ms G and was spending 80 per cent of his time with her.
The mother went on to say that de facto is 100 per cent of the time and she did not know that he lived in Suburb B when she decided to move. As I have just indicated, I do not accept this evidence at all.
The mother said she was not aware what the father does with the children. He is listed on the website as a head coach in sports on Thursdays and Sundays. She and the father do not communicate. He does not respond to text messages. She believes he has two addresses. She was surprised the father had taken the children to day care because that was to assist her work. She conceded that the issue of distance of travel was an issue at the trial. The time from where the father is now is one and a half hours. Thirty minutes was regarded as too much at the trial. There is greater travel time now but the children are not tired from one and a half hours travel. She is not willing to move back to Suburb O.
The wife was cross-examined about the alleged insulting phone calls in September 2019 and denied the father’s version that he had said, “you won’t believe what the lying bitch has done now.” The incident with the car on 11 August 2019 had happened, but it had not been reported to police on the same day. She had waved to the children in his car and he had waved back. She conceded she should have consulted the father before changing schools.
Final Submissions of Counsel for the Mother
Counsel opened his submissions with a candid concession that the mother should have sought to consult with the father before moving. Nonetheless the fact that the children are awakened at a very early hour and spend long days in care was relevant. The mother was incurring childcare costs when the child started school and the father was not assisting. There was a real lack of communication and this was a relocation case. The move was in the children’s best interests. There is support from the mother’s family in City K. The father has concerns about the childcare in Suburb J. The mother was prepared to meet at the City C Police Station on Thursday and provide the father with extra time if Friday or Monday was a public holiday or alternatively give an extra week in the school holiday such that the children spend the entire midyear holiday with the father. This would involve less time in childcare and less costs and the move was in the children’s best interests.
Final Submissions of Counsel for the Father
Counsel for the father submitted that this was not a relocation case. It was a unilateral decision made notwithstanding an order for equal shared parental responsibility in respect to health and education. Counsel submitted that the Court should consider the findings made in the earlier Judgment and the Family Report of Mr D. There had been a blatant disregard of Court Orders notwithstanding the reminder from Registrar Riddiford. All the matters now raised were canvassed in the trial including working in City M. The move would involve a substantial change which would affect the meaningful relationship between the father and his partner’s family and the children. Thirty minutes was too much travel at the time at trial and now it was one and a half hours. This would affect friends, birthday parties and the like. The father cannot now attend sporting events as it is too far. The only change is the mother’s unilateral decision. There is a loving relationship between the father and the children and there was no evidence of the children’s views. The father said they were not happy with the change. X had drawn a picture of her family including Ms G’s children. Mr D said the mother thought parenting was not a joint activity. If the mother was left in City K, she would continue to make unilateral decisions.
Counsel submitted that it was open to the mother to relocate back to Melbourne. Time restraints would operate only to October 2020 in any event. The father’s position was that the mother knew she should not move and was dishonest to the Registrar. He asserts that there should be an order that she not move more than 50 kilometres from Suburb O and failing which there should be a recovery order and the children should live with the father.
In reply, counsel for the mother pointed out that the question of moving to City M was not itself in issue at the trial.
Findings About the Facts
Having seen both the parties give their evidence, I have no doubt whatsoever that they are both extremely strong-willed persons who are very keen to get their own way. The father impressed me as being somewhat controlling in his manner and the mother struck me as similarly determined.
There is no doubt that the mother’s decision to relocate to City K was undertaken in clear breach of the extant orders for equal shared parental responsibility. She was underhand and deceitful in the way that she did it. She lied to Registrar Riddiford about her intentions. She had already taken steps to move there when she told him that she was only thinking about it.
Nonetheless, the mother’s underhand behaviour needs to be seen in proper context. She well knew what the father would do when he found out. Contrary to his denials, he called her “a fucking cunt” when he learnt of it. I have no doubt he also said, “you won’t believe what the lying bitch has done now.” That is what he thinks of her.
Indeed, one of the most concerning aspects of this proceeding has been the attitude of each of the parents to the other. The mother was keen to lay emphasis on the fact that the father was facing criminal charges. I formed the clear view that she be only too delighted if the husband was to be found guilty and incarcerated and no doubt dismissed as a public servant. Contrarywise, the father proposes to report the mother to Authority Q along with other employees from her work. No doubt if this is successful she will also lose her career as a public servant. Their future employment in the event of such developments would be questionable at best. It is absolutely obvious that these two simply lack insight. There is no gain to the children in having their parents lose their careers and finding their future employment prospects significantly diminished. Their apparent and avid desire to see such a result speaks volumes about their mutual self-obsession and their incapacity to put the children’s interests first.
I have no doubt that in moving permanently to City K the mother is keen to put distance between her and the father, whom she detests. As she sees it I have no doubt it is an endeavour to reassert her independence after what she has always described as a controlling and abusive relationship.
When one steps away from the intensity of the parties’ vivid emotions, the issue in this case becomes, really, very clear.
On the one hand, there is every reason for the mother to desire to live near to where she works. I accept that the children were spending very long amounts of time in care before and after attending their educational establishments and this is plainly not good for them. Likewise, the very lengthy drive is debilitating to the mother. I should make it clear, and I have not done so already, that I do not accept for a moment that the mother was unaware that this move would be traumatic for the father. She well knew from the trial that he was living at Suburb B 80 per cent of the time and, indeed, her failure to tell the father was interrelated with the obvious consequences of her decision to move.
The mother has sold the family home as it was and is in a position to purchase a property in City K. That is where her ongoing employment is, and insofar as the father takes objection about the neighbourhood of the childcare centre and the like, these are, in my view, fanciful. They are simply objections designed the foster the father’s case.
The countervailing consideration is as obvious as the potential benefits of the move. It will, of course, be inconvenient to and disrupt the father’s time with the children. That is why he seeks to compel her to live somewhere closer to where he is. Plainly, the length of driving involved in the event that the move to City K becomes permanent will become a significant matter, and as I noted in my earlier Judgment, travel in excess of half an hour itself might be unhelpful. I would, however, repeat what I said in my earlier Judgment. Children in Metropolitan Melbourne may well drive an hour to an hour and a-half between parents’ residences, depending upon the time of day and the state of the traffic. It is not by any means an unknown situation.
It is not, in my opinion, necessary to rehearse again the well-established authorities of people moving and relocating. The principles are well-known in cases like A & A: Relocation Approach [2000] FamCA 751 and U & U [2002] HCA 36. What needs to be remembered is that the overarching and vital consideration is the best interests of the children, not the subjective positions and assessments of the parents.
It is clear that there are matters that stand strongly against permitting the mother to relocate. It will be extremely inconvenient for the father. It will disrupt these nascent relationships between these children and those of Ms G. I should note in passing however that the evidence as to that latter matter is not particularly strong. It may indeed have effects upon children’s friendships in the area where they have previously lived and birthday parties and things of that sort. These sort of deficiencies are obvious.
Against this however there are a number of equally obvious countervailing considerations. First of all, the mother will be far happier and since she is the children’s primary carer this is obviously not irrelevant, although it cannot be made a self-serving determinant. Furthermore, I accept that the children will spend far less time in before and after school care, a matter that had plainly achieved a real significance before the mother moved. In the event that the mother is forced to return to Suburb O her employment is going to prove extremely problematic. It is as she has discovered since the earlier Reasons for Judgment as a very long day to get down to City K and back. I accept the mother’s evidence that she cannot contemplate moving until October 2020 at the earliest and the evidence is not, in my view, sufficiently clear to make it apparent whether or not she could readily return thereafter. It should be noted that the mother had not been working at City M for any great length of time when the earlier Reasons for Judgment were given and it is perhaps unsurprising that she had not sufficiently turned her mind to the exigencies of travel at that point given the intensity of the battle that was then underway.
There is also, of course, the consideration that the mother has impressed Mr D as essentially a person likely to exclude the father from a proper exercise of equal shared parental responsibility and the mother’s conduct in acting as she has, plainly, only reinforces the force of Mr D’s observation. In the end, the evaluation of the force of these competing arguments involves an assessment by the Court. In my opinion, notwithstanding the various negative aspects of the mother’s decision and its consequences, it is plainly in the children’s best interests for the relocation to City K to take place. I have already detailed the positives and the negatives and, in my view, the positives outweigh the negatives by a significant margin.
Conclusion
I have drawn orders to reflect my conclusion that the mother should be permitted to relocate to City K. I accept, however, the force of the concessions made by the mother through her counsel’s closing submissions. Changeover should be at a halfway point. This will lessen the burden of driving of which the father has complained vividly in his affidavits. I will also order that the entirety of the midyear term holiday be spent with the father as counsel suggested. Additionally, I will order that the father’s time be expanded to include a Friday or Monday whether those are public holidays and are contiguous to other time that he will spend pursuant to the extant orders.
I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Burchardt
Date: 10 January 2020
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