Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital [2016] FCAFC 107

Appeal from: Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 270
File number(s): NSD 324 of 2016
Judge(s): COLLIER, JAGOT AND PERRY JJ
Date of judgment: 22 August 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Federal Circuit Court of Australia - disability discrimination – Federal Circuit Court summarily dismissed application at first directions hearing– whether primary judge erred in finding no reasonable prospect of success –  whether denial of procedural fairness
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 24, 29A, 123

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.10

Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) sch 2, cl 4

Cases cited:

Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7; (2013) 252 CLR 38

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 270

Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; (2015) 229 FCR 301

Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349

Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 7 July 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms K M Nomchong SC and Ms K Edwards
Solicitor for the Appellant: Public Interest Advocacy Centre
Counsel for the Respondent: The Respondent filed a submitting appearance

ORDERS

NSD 324 of 2016
BETWEEN:

KATE JOYNTON-SMITH HINTON

Appellant

AND:

ALPHA WESTMEAD PRIVATE HOSPITAL PTY LIMITED ACN 083 874 597

Respondent

JUDGES:

COLLIER, JAGOT AND PERRY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

22 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the application under s 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) be set aside.

3.The application be remitted to a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, other than the primary judge, for determination according to law.

4.Each party pay their own costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. This appeal must be allowed. The order made by the primary judge on 11 February 2016 dismissing the application under s 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (the FCCA Act) must be set aside.  The matter must also be remitted to a judge of the Federal Circuit Court other than the primary judge for determination according to law.  Remittal on this condition is necessary because the course of the hearing before, and the reasons of the primary judge, would give rise to an apprehension of bias on his Honour’s…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 107
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal, Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital, was heard by the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant, who has a disability that affects her ability to hear, sought to challenge the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to summarily dismiss her application for an interlocutory injunction and damages. The primary dispute was whether the private hospital had discriminated against the appellant by not providing an Auslan interpreter during the birth of her child. The legal issues included whether the primary judge erred in finding that there was no reasonable prospect of success for the appellant's claim and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness.

The court examined the reasoning of the primary judge, who dismissed the application based on the argument that the husband, who was the appellant's next of kin, was not receiving any services from the hospital. The court found that the primary judge's conclusion was flawed because the service in question involved information provided to the husband to enable him to support the appellant during the birth, confer with her, and participate in decision-making. The court noted that the primary judge had denied the appellant the opportunity to file a pleading to identify the material facts on which she relied, which was a denial of procedural fairness. The court also observed that the primary judge's decision to dismiss the application was an abuse of process, as the complaint raised an arguable case of unlawful disability discrimination.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the application, and remitted the application to a different judge for determination according to law. The court held that each party pay their own costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the application under s 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) be set aside.

3. The application be remitted to a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, other than the primary judge, for determination according to law.

4. Each party pay their own costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour, in response, repeated the proposition that this argument would mean that every time the appellant sought a service anywhere, her husband would have to be provided with an interpreter. Senior counsel answered that this was not the case, given that the services being provided were medical services which included information in relation to the birth in contrast, for example, to the appellant “buying a bag of chips and her husband just happened to be standing next to her”. His Honour then asked what medical services the husband was receiving. Senior counsel answered that the services were more than medical treatment of the appellant, as her husband was her next of kin and he would be required to give instructions if the appellant could not. The services were therefore to both the appellant and her husband. Senior counsel again noted that the context was not comparable to one in which services were provided only to the appellant, such as the appellant buying a bag of chips. His Honour responded “[w]ell, why isn’t this case about a bag of chips?” and said again that the husband was not receiving any services. Senior counsel returned to procedural fairness, observing that they were running the case “on the hop”, having been given five hours’ notice, in circumstances where the primary judge had “not yet had the opportunity to understand the nature of the case in a fully pleaded matter”. The primary judge noted that lawyers must be satisfied that proceedings have reasonable prospects of success before commencing, and asserted that this “is an abuse of process on its face”, “a trifle”, and “nothing more than a try-on”, with the consequence if successful, that “anywhere she goes with her husband, any entity, has to provide her with an Auslan interpreter” which was “rubbish”. In response to the proposition that the service to the husband was to enable him to participate, and engage, in decision-making about the birth of the child, the primary judge responded “what, by telling his wife ‘Don’t have a child now’”, and again asking “what is it that occurred that gives rise to this being any more than involving a packet of chips?” and “why isn’t this a trifle?”. Senior counsel responded that the time a decision must be made about interpreter services is before the birth; it would be too late to try to do so during the birth if, for example, the appellant was unable to consent to a procedure and her husband had to do so on her behalf or on behalf of the child. 2.4 The ex tempore judgment summarily dismissing the application The primary judge delivered judgment ex tempore. In these reasons (Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 270), the primary judge referred to s 17A of the FCCA Act (which enables summary judgment in s 17A(2)(b), if the Court is satisfied that the party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding), the objects of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), and r 13.10 of those Rules, which enables summary dismissal if the Court is satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The primary judge continued:(1)“It is manifest from the complaint that the applicant’s husband was not the recipient of maternity services and was not the patient at the respondent private hospital. The respondent private hospital was not providing any services to the applicant’s husband” (at [5]).(2)“The complaint did not identify any conduct on its face disclosing any arguable contravention of the DD Act” (at [6])(3)“…the joinder of the husband would not cure the want of an arguable issue” (at [9]).(4)“Nothing said by senior counsel identified any arguable basis upon which there could be said to be some allegation of unlawful disability discrimination arising from the complaint on behalf of the husband if he was allowed to be joined” (at [10]).(5)“…the applicant in due course attended upon a public hospital for the birth of her child. At the public hospital arrangements were made by the hospital, at its own cost, for the attendance of an Auslan interpreter during the birth. It is difficult to understand, in those circumstances, why the applicant has brought these proceedings against the respondent. On the face of the proceedings, they appear to be nothing more than a trifle…” (at [11]).(6)“The application arising from the complaint in this case is a trifle. It is oppressive and vexatious to pursue a trifle” (at [12]).(7)“The applicant’s demand for free Auslan interpreting services during her child’s birth from the respondent, despite being informed that she could bring along another third party to communicate with her husband or at her own cost bring along an interpreter, is at best a misplaced belief of entitlement that does not give rise to any arguable case of unlawful discrimination” (at [14]).(8)“The respondent provides important medical services and should not be vexed with a baseless trifle complaint of unlawful disability discrimination. None of the circumstances raised in the present complaint the subject of this application rise above a mere trifle, the pursuit of which is vexatious and as such an abuse of process. The Court’s jurisdiction is not to be invoked for trifles as that is vexatious and an abuse of process” (at [15]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 7 July 2016, the appellant filed written submissions in support of the appeal which we determined should be resolved on the papers given the submitting appearance by the respondent.3. CONSIDERATION First, we consider that his Honour’s conclusions that the case was doomed and about a trifle and thus an abuse of process are wrong. Section 4(1) of the DD Act defines “services” inclusively. By s 24, it is unlawful for a person to discriminate against a person (or, by s 7, an associate of the person) in relation to the provision of a service. The service being provided and the person to whom it is provided are questions of fact. As McHugh J said in Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 404 – 405, the service must be identified with precision before any finding of discrimination may be made. The complaint to the AHRC expressly said that, although Mr Hinton was not the “patient”, in a case where the appellant was an expectant mother arranging to use the respondent’s services for birth, “it is unreasonable to exclude Mr Hinton as if he is somehow peripheral”. Absent the opportunity to file any pleading to identify all of the material facts on which the appellant relied (an opportunity the primary judge denied the appellant, as discussed below), the application as filed was manifestly sufficient to raise an arguable case that the services in question included services by way of information to the husband so that he could support the appellant during the birth, confer with her as necessary, participate in the making of decisions about the treatment of the appellant and their child and, if necessary, give consent to treatment and procedures if the appellant was unable to do so. As the appellant’s written submissions put it, communication with the husband was not a separate service but a part of the service being provided to the appellant. This proposition is plainly arguable. Further, and as the appellant’s submissions also said, even if the service was being provided only to the appellant, it was equally plainly arguable that the associate provision (s 7 of the DD Act) was engaged and that the appellant was treated less favourably than a person whose associate did not have the disability in the same circumstances. The primary judge’s observation at [13] that the respondent was not “present” during the discussion with the Nursing Unit Manager who was said to have informed the appellant that no Auslan interpreter would be provided appears to overlook the potential for the respondent to be found vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee – another reasonably arguable proposition that, had she been given the opportunity, could have been articulated in a pleading for the appellant. It also overlooks the potential application of s 123 of the DD Act which provides that any “conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate by a director, employee or agent of the body corporate within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority is taken, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in also by the body corporate unless the body corporate establishes that the body corporate took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid the conduct” (s 123(2)). Again, it appears reasonably arguable on the face of the complaint that s 123(2) might be engaged.