FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital [2016] FCAFC 107
Appeal from: Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 270 File number(s): NSD 324 of 2016 Judge(s): COLLIER, JAGOT AND PERRY JJ Date of judgment: 22 August 2016 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Federal Circuit Court of Australia - disability discrimination – Federal Circuit Court summarily dismissed application at first directions hearing– whether primary judge erred in finding no reasonable prospect of success – whether denial of procedural fairness Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 24, 29A, 123
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.10
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) sch 2, cl 4
Cases cited: Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7; (2013) 252 CLR 38
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 270
Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; (2015) 229 FCR 301
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 7 July 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms K M Nomchong SC and Ms K Edwards Solicitor for the Appellant: Public Interest Advocacy Centre Counsel for the Respondent: The Respondent filed a submitting appearance ORDERS
NSD 324 of 2016 BETWEEN: KATE JOYNTON-SMITH HINTON
Appellant
AND: ALPHA WESTMEAD PRIVATE HOSPITAL PTY LIMITED ACN 083 874 597
Respondent
JUDGES:
COLLIER, JAGOT AND PERRY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 AUGUST 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the application under s 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) be set aside.
3.The application be remitted to a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, other than the primary judge, for determination according to law.
4.Each party pay their own costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
1. INTRODUCTION
This appeal must be allowed. The order made by the primary judge on 11 February 2016 dismissing the application under s 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (the FCCA Act) must be set aside. The matter must also be remitted to a judge of the Federal Circuit Court other than the primary judge for determination according to law. Remittal on this condition is necessary because the course of the hearing before, and the reasons of the primary judge, would give rise to an apprehension of bias on his Honour’s…
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 107
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the reasoning of the primary judge, who dismissed the application based on the argument that the husband, who was the appellant's next of kin, was not receiving any services from the hospital. The court found that the primary judge's conclusion was flawed because the service in question involved information provided to the husband to enable him to support the appellant during the birth, confer with her, and participate in decision-making. The court noted that the primary judge had denied the appellant the opportunity to file a pleading to identify the material facts on which she relied, which was a denial of procedural fairness. The court also observed that the primary judge's decision to dismiss the application was an abuse of process, as the complaint raised an arguable case of unlawful disability discrimination.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the application, and remitted the application to a different judge for determination according to law. The court held that each party pay their own costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the application under s 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) be set aside.
3. The application be remitted to a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, other than the primary judge, for determination according to law.
4. Each party pay their own costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 7 July 2016, the appellant filed written submissions in support of the appeal which we determined should be resolved on the papers given the submitting appearance by the respondent.3. CONSIDERATION First, we consider that his Honour’s conclusions that the case was doomed and about a trifle and thus an abuse of process are wrong. Section 4(1) of the DD Act defines “services” inclusively. By s 24, it is unlawful for a person to discriminate against a person (or, by s 7, an associate of the person) in relation to the provision of a service. The service being provided and the person to whom it is provided are questions of fact. As McHugh J said in Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 404 – 405, the service must be identified with precision before any finding of discrimination may be made. The complaint to the AHRC expressly said that, although Mr Hinton was not the “patient”, in a case where the appellant was an expectant mother arranging to use the respondent’s services for birth, “it is unreasonable to exclude Mr Hinton as if he is somehow peripheral”. Absent the opportunity to file any pleading to identify all of the material facts on which the appellant relied (an opportunity the primary judge denied the appellant, as discussed below), the application as filed was manifestly sufficient to raise an arguable case that the services in question included services by way of information to the husband so that he could support the appellant during the birth, confer with her as necessary, participate in the making of decisions about the treatment of the appellant and their child and, if necessary, give consent to treatment and procedures if the appellant was unable to do so. As the appellant’s written submissions put it, communication with the husband was not a separate service but a part of the service being provided to the appellant. This proposition is plainly arguable. Further, and as the appellant’s submissions also said, even if the service was being provided only to the appellant, it was equally plainly arguable that the associate provision (s 7 of the DD Act) was engaged and that the appellant was treated less favourably than a person whose associate did not have the disability in the same circumstances. The primary judge’s observation at [13] that the respondent was not “present” during the discussion with the Nursing Unit Manager who was said to have informed the appellant that no Auslan interpreter would be provided appears to overlook the potential for the respondent to be found vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee – another reasonably arguable proposition that, had she been given the opportunity, could have been articulated in a pleading for the appellant. It also overlooks the potential application of s 123 of the DD Act which provides that any “conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate by a director, employee or agent of the body corporate within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority is taken, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in also by the body corporate unless the body corporate establishes that the body corporate took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid the conduct” (s 123(2)). Again, it appears reasonably arguable on the face of the complaint that s 123(2) might be engaged.