JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: HINGSTON -v- CHALLISTON PTY LTD & ORS [2006] WADC 132
CORAM: DEPUTY REGISTRAR HARMAN
HEARD: 5 MAY 2006
DELIVERED : 28 AUGUST 2006
FILE NO/S: CIV 295 of 2003
BETWEEN: BRADLEY HINGSTON
Plaintiff
AND
CHALLISTON PTY LTD
First DefendantDEAN GEORGE SCOOK
CAROL NORMA HARDIE
Second Defendants
Catchwords:
Practice - Practice under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia - Review of taxation - sufficiency of objection - Getting up case for trial
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Objection not within the scope of r 53(1)
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr S Forbes
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendants : Mr H R Robinson
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Paiker & Overmeire
First Defendant : Haydn Robinson
Second Defendants : Haydn Robinson
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
May v Vincent Smith as Administrator for Cole Engineering Pty Ltd (Under Administration) & Anor [2001] WASC 352
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
DEPUTY REGISTRAR HARMAN: Under the order for the costs of the action the plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable cost of services necessarily provided to him for the purposes of the action. His bill of costs was taxed and the defendants have filed a notice of objection in the following terms:
"The Defendants object to the allowance of $14,000.00 for Item 16 Getting up for Trial and contend the allowance should have been an amount not in excess of $3,000.00.
The reasons for the objection are:
1.A getting up component is already included in items 1, 2, 8, 9 and 11.
2.To settle the SOC, apply for summary judgment, argue the summary judgment before Deputy Registrar Harman and appeal before Marino DCJ, brief counsel for the appeal plus the work done by counsel covered by Item 17, means the Plaintiff had substantially got the case up for trial before the Entry for Trial.
3.The amount of work required by the Plaintiff's solicitor in getting up over and above the work already done and covered by the other items should therefore have been minimal.
4.A proof was required from the Plaintiff but he must have already provided a proof prior to the Entry for Trial, evidenced by his affidavits and the pleadings.
5.The Plaintiff's solicitor conferred with others including Wallace (sic) Bleakley (sic) and other investors who had signed like deeds as referred to in the SOC. This does not mean the Defendants should pay for the costs thus incurred, because none of those witnesses would have been allowed to give evidence, all being irrelevant.
6.The Plaintiff proposed to call Travers, Shann and Hardie but did not take proofs from any of them.
7.The issues for determination were fundamentally questions of law. There was very little in issue on the facts.
8. The issues included:
·was the instrument relied upon by the Plaintiff a deed?
·was the instrument duly signed?
·did the Plaintiff duly exercise the put option in terms required by…
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- AGLC
- Hingston v Challiston Pty Ltd [2006] WADC 132
- Case
- [2006] WADC 132
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to address were primarily focused on whether the plaintiff's objection to the taxation of costs was sufficient, particularly in relation to the costs associated with getting the case up for trial. The court had to distinguish between the general activity involved in preparing a case and the specific process of getting a case up for trial, and determine whether the costs claimed were necessary and proportionate to the value of the subject matter of the action.
The court's reasoning involved a detailed analysis of the relevant provisions and case law. It emphasised the distinction between the general preparation of a case and the specific process of getting a case up for trial, noting that only the latter is claimable under the relevant item. The court further explored the principle of proportionality between the value of a particular service and the value of the subject matter of the action. Ultimately, the court found that while the plaintiff's action was relatively close to being tried, the costs claimed were not necessarily proportionate to the value of the subject matter of the action.
The court's final orders were that the plaintiff's objection was not sufficient, and the costs claimed for getting the case up for trial were not recoverable. The plaintiff was only awarded a portion of the costs claimed, amounting to $14,000.00 out of the total $30,000.00 available.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The second part of par 12 articulates the distinction between activity and the process of getting up case for trial. It has not had much of an airing in judicial utterances in recent times. One recent occasion upon which it was given an airing was May v Vincent Smith as Administrator for Cole Engineering Pty Ltd (Under Administration) & Anor [2001] WASC 352 where Templeman J in response to the proposition that costs incurred in the course of preparing a case and which are not claimable under any other item are claimable as getting up case stated at par 20."In my view, that submission is too broad. That is because item 13 relates not to the general preparation of a case, but to getting up a case for trial. I accept that there may be an overlap." There is a fundamental distinction between mere activity and the process of getting up case for trial. I have no difficulty with the proposition put at par 13. It, like par 14 is nothing more than a submission. The only other observation that I would make in response to par 14 is that it adds nothing to what the defendants had previously suggested at pars 1 to 3. Perhaps in the light of my earlier observations as to the deficiencies of the notice it is a minor quibble that pars 15 and 17 are directed to the plaintiff's claim rather than the determination. Paragraph 16 is founded upon the proposition that there ought to be scope to recognise some proportionality between the value of a particular service and the value of the subject matter of an action. In the context that I have canvassed that existed prior to 1991 it was the value of the subject matter of an action that determined the fixed component in the value of the service getting up case for trial. Now that there is no such component expressed in the scale, r 20 according to which actions were valued has fallen into desuetude. I would recognise that a view of the value of the subject matter of an action appears to have some appeal for the purpose of analysis of the manner in which a case is being or has been conducted. In my opinion such an analysis would neither engage with or respond to any principle that would operate inter partes at any point of litigation including at taxation. In considering the satisfaction of the first limb of the test of recovery it would add nothing to an evaluation of the necessity of the provision of a service. Indeed it would be wrong in principle to deprive the beneficial party of the benefit that would accrue upon the taxing officer's satisfaction that a service had been necessarily provided. In considering the impact of the second limb of the test it is the service provided that is to be valued. In my opinion the dollar value of the cause of action is far removed from the scope of a proper assessment of the value of a service. Regardless of that analysis in this case the action came relatively close to being tried. Of a maximum available of some $30,000.00 the plaintiff recovered $14,000.00 in a case in which $85,340.00 had been in issue.