Hickey and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation)

This matter concerned an application by Mr Hickey for a review of a determination by the Australian Postal Corporation (APC). Mr Hickey sought compensation for depression, alleging it was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment. The APC had determined that Mr Hickey's depression was a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner, which would exclude it from being a compensable injury under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act).

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether Mr Hickey's depression constituted a compensable "injury" under the SRC Act. This required the Tribunal to determine if the depression was a "disease" as defined by the Act, meaning it was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment. Crucially, the Tribunal also had to consider whether the depression was suffered as a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner, which would operate as an exclusion from compensation.

The Tribunal applied the principles established in cases such as *Re Lynch*, *Cross*, and *Dunstan v Comcare* to assess the "reasonable administrative action" exclusion and the "significant degree" threshold for contribution. It noted that "significant degree" means "substantially more than material" and requires an evaluative exercise. The parties had agreed that Mr Hickey's psychological condition was an ailment contributed to to a significant degree by his employment, thus meeting the definition of a "disease". Therefore, the central question became whether the reasonable administrative action exclusion applied. The Tribunal's reasoning focused on the objective assessment of the administrative actions and whether they were irrational, absurd, or lacked natural justice.

The Tribunal affirmed the APC's decision, finding that Mr Hickey's depression was a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner. Consequently, the depression was excluded from the definition of an injury under the SRC Act, and Mr Hickey was not entitled to compensation for this condition. The Tribunal also addressed a separate issue regarding liability under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act for a disc prolapse and foot injury, determining it had no jurisdiction to review the APC's determination on those matters as they had not been determined by the APC in a way that created a present liability.